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AN INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN CIVILIZATION

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AN INTRODUCTION TO
Western Civilization

Edited by
GEORGE A. HEDGER
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PREFACE

In the fourteenth century Francesco Petrarch, the foremost of the Italian humanists, wrote: "No intellect should ever strive for distinction in more than one pursuit. Those who boast of pre-eminence in many arts are either divinely endowed or utterly shameless or simply mad." In these terms Petrarch was announcing that the age in which one might know all things was drawing to a close. The body of knowledge accessible to man was becoming so vast that no ordinary mind could hope to compass it. The age of specialization was at hand.

In the modern world no one pretends to know all. Fields of knowledge, once studied as one, have been divided and subdivided until one may stake off, in a boundless area, a mere garden patch as his domain of learning. The process was inevitable. It was the only escape from utter confusion and frustration in the labyrinth of knowledge. No one would deny that specialization has added to man's heritage of knowledge beyond all calculation. But although it has proved desirable and highly productive it has carried with it certain undesirable results, also inevitable. Under the confining effects of specialization, students have frequently all but lost sight of the unity of knowledge. They have viewed the world as through a peep hole, and the picture they have seen has often been distorted, false, and misleading. Human realities are wholes, not parts; division, under specialization, is a necessary instrument of learning, but it is artificial and its results fall short of reality.

Of late there has appeared much evidence that the limitations of specialization are being recognized. The idea is not that specialization shall be abandoned; that would mean disaster. The idea is that the time has come when we should take stock of the masses of knowledge that have been piled up, that we may get a more realistic view of whither it leads, of what it signifies, of what it has to offer in guiding us to a more intelligent manner of living. Knowledge is valuable for its own sake, but it must be more than that; it must teach man the art of living. To that end the process of

pulling apart must be accompanied by the process of putting together; the parts must be correlated to make the whole, if one would approach reality. Such is the conception of many, and many have put much labor and time into the attempt to realize the conception. Hence the impressive crop of "outlines" and "stories" of this and that, and of "world" histories, usually in comparatively narrow compass, which have appeared in the last few decades.

The fundamental idea is sound, and the attempts to realize it are laudable; but to accomplish such an undertaking satisfactorily is difficult. In the desire to draw all important features of the development of human culture into a sufficiently narrow compass to bring it under the eye at once, so to speak, one is likely to spread so thin as to produce a sadly blurred picture. And if the project is attempted by a single author there is the danger of serious inaccuracy, for the "universal man" of the Renaissance no longer exists—if he ever did exist. It is no wonder, then, that some of those who have undertaken the task have brought down upon their heads the lightnings of disapproval—in many cases, doubtless, deserved. But the demand for the correlation of knowledge and its interpretation as a guide toward the solution of existing problems of community living is too insistent to permit the objective to drop out of sight.

The present volume makes no pretense of having solved the problem. It does make a modest attempt at the correlation of materials in a rather narrowly circumscribed field—that of the social sciences. The subject matter has been prepared by men working in the fields of economics, education, history, literature, philosophy, political science, and sociology; and the character of the work as a whole has been dictated very largely by the desire to provide an adequate preparation for students who will later enter those fields for more detailed study—but in no sense is the work designed as a substitute for "courses" in those fields. It is hoped that the limitation of the scope of the project may soften the charge of superficiality, and that the coöperation of a number of authors, each working in his own field, will obviate criticism for serious errors.

The authors believe that the student just entering upon his career in the liberal arts college will carry away from this introductory survey an experience valuable in several ways. It is expected that it will serve as a satisfactory introduction to the social

sciences and at the same time provide a background that will promote a higher standard of work in those fields. It is expected that it will help to erase departmental lines between related subjects, and thus aid the student to correlate for himself the knowledge which he acquires in artificially separated fields. Since the book has been written with the authors' attention fixed constantly upon the world in which the student lives, and more particularly upon its major social problems, it is hoped that it will help the student to discover a vitality of relationship between his academic experience and intelligent living in human society; for education, properly conceived, does not lift the student out of the world of realities, but is merely an intensification of the process by which he may more speedily come to interpret and evaluate it.

As a coöperative enterprise this book represents a synthesis in a sense far broader than that suggested by the fact that fourteen authors contributed the chapters that have entered into its making. It has been the function of the editor to draw freely on the contributors for criticism and information useful in supplying the needs of the work as a whole. First of all he wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the coöperative spirit which has enabled him in no small measure to pool the ability and experience of the whole group in sifting and distributing the materials that have gone into the book. If the matter has been molded into a unified and coherent whole—and we believe that it has been—the result has been attained because contributors have been willing, whenever necessary, to subordinate individual performance to the larger demands imposed by the objectives which the group set up for achievement.

Cincinnati, Ohio, June, 1933

GEORGE A. HEDGER

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
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AN INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN CIVILIZATION



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: MAN AND SOCIETY

IF A MAN lived a solitary existence his one great problem would be the elemental problem of self-preservation. The objects of his concern would be food, shelter, and safety. Life would be exceedingly simple. He would have no need of language, no problem of social adjustment, no concern for a cultural heritage. He would live wholly in the present. Introduce him suddenly, as an adult, into organized social life, particularly of an advanced civilization, and he would be utterly lost and helpless. He would be like a demented person; the continuance of his physical existence would be possible only as a public charge. His adjustment to the complicated pattern of life about him would be impossible.

But man does not live a solitary existence; he is born into a community and has his being as one of a community, a community which is indissolubly bound to a succession of larger and more inclusive communities. He finds himself constantly in more or less intimate relationships with others. It is through these relationships that he acquires certain traits which mark him off from other animals as distinctively human. It is only through his life in social groups that he develops his human personality. As his associations broaden he is brought into contact with a widening range of organized groups and institutions whose influence he likewise cannot escape, struggle as he may, unless he find shelter by isolation from his fellows—an unnatural procedure which means social suicide. The word "individual" applied to man or his life is a relative term; as a human person he is irrevocably a part of the social compound. Not that man seeks to escape from this kind of existence; normally it is the only kind of existence that is tolerable. Man is indeed a social animal.

The central problem arising from man's social relations.—It is out of this situation, out of the position of man in society, that the fundamental problems of existence and life arise. These are essentially problems of adjustment. To the individual it is a matter

of adjusting himself to the complex of social forces and influences that impinge upon him from all sides. As a member of a family, he is confronted by questions endless in variety, growing out of the multiple relationships of parent to child, of parents to each other, of children to one another. Material needs, both primal and refined, drive him into new competitive relationships with his fellows. As a citizen, he finds himself drawn into a complex of political forces in a succession of ascending organized groups. If he is intellectually alive to the world about him he presently discovers that he is a part, not merely of the local and national community to which he belongs, but of the human family at large, and that his well-being is bound up in surprising degree with the well-being of distant peoples. He is a citizen of the world. Pressing more obviously and closely upon him, religion, church, school, and club add to the confusion of voices that lure, provoke, or command him to respond in conformity with the ways of the group.

What are the sources of these lines of pressure, and what is their character? To comprehend them one needs to remember that human beings are the product of an infinite number of dynamic social forces that have operated through millenniums of time. By a kind of process of trial and error man has accumulated and passed on a fund of wisdom to point the way of survival and community well-being. In other words, the experience of the wise men, handed down through countless ages, has taught man the way he must go to survive and to contribute toward the survival of the group. These customary and traditional ways of behavior have become woven into the fabric of conventions, codes, laws, and institutions which exercise a compelling force upon the individual in the direction of conformity with them. Conformity is the lubricant which makes man's contacts with his social environment easy and pleasant. There is hardly a situation in life touching the individual's relations to his fellows which is so insignificant as to escape group pressure. This pressure exerts itself at one end of the scale in such matters as ordinary politeness and courtesy, and at the other in graver questions of obedience to moral standards, law, and government. It invades one's attitude toward races, nations, religions, and social classes. It demands conformity with the prejudices and biases of the mass. From infancy through life this problem of social adjustment is ever present and never completely solved.

The problem is never completely solved, and yet its solution within certain limits lies at the roots of the well-being of the individual, and, to an extent, of the well-being of the community. The lines of pressure converging on the individual cease to be painful only to the degree that he is able to bring about a satisfactory adjustment to his social environment. The pain involved may be inconsequential—the shock of a moment to one's self or to others arising from a passing circumstance or situation that demands a quick decision to perform an act of courtesy or one of human kindness and consideration. On the other hand, it may be bound up with a problem of fundamental importance involving deliberate judgment or high moral principle, and having for its issue the happiness, social usefulness, and durable satisfactions of life. When we speak of persons who are anti-social or criminal, we mean that for some reason, sometimes ascertainable, sometimes not, those persons have failed to fit in, have failed to achieve an acceptable social adjustment. On this side of these extreme cases there are many degrees of social maladjustment which militate against the satisfactory life of the individual.

The quest for a solution of the problem.—If the foregoing is a true statement of the case, it is clear that the question of social adjustment as an ideal to be achieved is not a mere academic problem. How then is it to be brought about? Some writers have spoken of conventions, customs, group ways, codes, and laws as the rules of the game of life; rules which one must observe in order to accommodate himself comfortably and efficaciously to his social environment. If life were no more than a game, one could learn to play it with comparative ease by learning the rules—that is to say, by unquestioning conformity. The analogy is misleading. There are no questions of reason or moral judgment involved in the rules of a game. If you desire to play the game you accept the rules because the rules are part of the game. Conformity to the rules is the game. Life is different. To accept it as a mere game, to accept unquestioning conformity as the inevitable way and requirement of the game may be to surrender principles that are the very essence of life, and to brand one's self as a moral and intellectual slave. To those so constituted that they can rationalize their moral and intellectual judgments to conform with standardized requirements, conformity is social adjustment, and being such it brings satisfaction. Conformity is not adjustment to him who in all honesty finds his moral

judgments in conflict. Such conformity does not tend to promote durable satisfactions or social usefulness. It is under such circumstances that adjustment becomes a matter of supreme importance.

In the final analysis, the solution of the problem will depend upon the ability of the individual to interpret experience and to apply its teachings wisely. Does education aid in this process? It ought to. There are those who go through life like a person running amuck. Their social environment is a constant source of irritations and painful thrusts. They are in a perpetual fog as to the causes of their dissatisfaction and unrest. They are incapable of analyzing or interpreting the forces which seem constantly to thwart or oppose them. Education ought to safeguard one against so deplorable a situation by equipping him to interpret experience more intelligently and to utilize that experience toward the solution of his problems.

How our quest leads to a study of civilization.—The quest for a more intelligent interpretation of experience in the world about one involves two major considerations. The first is a knowledge of the nature of man himself. The second is a knowledge of the nature of man's social environment—that is to say, of his culture or civilization. In neither case can one confine himself to observations and study of the existing world. It is necessary to venture far into the past. Rightly considered, the past is never dead; its forces are of us and in our lives; it reveals us to ourselves and illuminates our relations to the life and thought about us.

A study of man is essential in the interpretation of experience, for if we are not intelligent about ourselves as individuals, our own feelings, impulses, reactions, and our behavior in general remain largely as a sealed book to us, hardly more significant or intelligible than is the behavior of the beast to itself. The understanding of ourselves as members of the human family is bound up with the study of man through numerous approaches. All education, whether it come through ordinary experience or through the channels of the school, contributes something to the understanding of ourselves. In the case of formal education, certain fields of study contribute more specifically to the understanding of man: biology, physiology, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, the social sciences, to mention some of the more conspicuous examples. In the course of this book, most of these fields have been drawn upon to some extent to reveal the nature of man and to reveal to the student his own nature as a member of the species. Broadly speak-

ing, the approach to the study is based upon the general idea that one of the most fruitful ways to arrive at an understanding of man is to study how he came to be as he is. Since man is a product of biological, geographic, and social forces operative through unnumbered centuries it follows that we must look into the past, even into the remote past, if we would understand him as he is today. Hence this study goes back to the beginnings of man, to a time long before Adam. Once man is started on the path that winds down to the present, it becomes necessary to examine the slow, painful process by which he lifted himself from a remote, bestial existence to that high place which we designate as civilization.

The second step to be taken by the individual who would rightly interpret his own experiences is to acquire a knowledge of the civilization man has built. A study of the cultures of the past is valuable for its own sake; but as a key to the interpreting of experience, such knowledge is valuable only as one comes to comprehend the profound influence exerted by culture in molding the individual and determining the patterns of his behavior; for man is in large measure a creature of cultural influences beating in upon him from the past and from the age in which he lives.

This fact will become clear when we consider what civilization is and how it came about. For our present need we may define civilization or culture as the sum total of what man has thought and done to satisfy his needs, both elemental and refined. The satisfaction of his needs has come directly or indirectly from the conquest of his natural environment, for man's rise from the primitive to an advanced civilization has been contested every inch of the way by the forces of nature. At the present moment man has risen triumphant, but the imprint of the long struggle is deeply stamped upon him. The ways or methods which proved efficacious in the struggle were good ways. The behavior which strengthened man in the struggle was good behavior. Ways and behavior that proved efficacious, that were regarded as good in this sense, thus became customary and traditional. So vital did they seem to the well-being of man that he sought to preserve them for all time; hence he crystallized them into conventions, codes, laws, and institutions. These took on so hallowed a place in the history of society as to make them almost sacred; they were sheltered against those who did not conform by the most rigorous forms of compulsion; hence the rise of those taboos, orthodoxies, and prejudices which have contributed

to make man the creature that he is. These influences must be understood if one would evaluate his own behavior and his experiences. An avenue to understanding them is to be found in the study of the development of civilization.

The importance of institutions in the study of civilization.—

The associated and institutional life of man and man's relations to it bulk so large in modern society that we have chosen to devote a large proportion of space to their study. No one can hope to comprehend contemporary civilization who has no conception of the social forces, the play of ideas, and the philosophies that have come out of the past to shape the institutions of today. Institutions are not books and parchments in which laws and constitutions are written, or buildings, or vestments and ceremonials, or aggregations of people. Any of these or all may enter in; but the life of an institution is the less tangible spirit, the group habits and ideas, the social, political, and moral philosophies that have furnished the dynamic forces of which institutions are the expression. It is only when one comprehends these forces that he can understand the institutions themselves and the fundamental problems to which they give rise.

Peoples of most periods, since society became conscious of itself, have probably thought of their own institutions as a consummation. But we know otherwise. We know that society, whether it actually progresses or not, does not stand still during any period, advanced or backward. Society is dynamic; it moves. Institutions express in a general way the accepted outlook upon life of the period of their creation, the group ways of thought to which man should adhere for the preservation of social life. Because institutions are crystallizations, they tend to become more rigid than society itself. A minority move on to other outlooks upon life, to other conceptions of social welfare. Others follow, and presently there comes to be a discernible gap between current thinking and social institutions. Thus there arises another kind of maladjustment, not so much a maladjustment of the individual to his social environment as of prevailing institutions to society. When such a situation arises one of two things commonly occurs. Either the institutions in question undergo reform or modification that brings them back into measurable adjustment, or, if they fail to yield, the violent methods of revolution are likely to be applied.

Out of these maladjustments, sometimes ephemeral and sometimes fundamental, many of our serious problems arise,—problems touching education, economics, politics, religion, and morality; problems arising out of the never-ending conflict between liberty and authority. They concern all thinking members of society and challenge its wisest leaders for solution. Formal education as maintained by the community is inevitably directed in large degree to the fostering of existing institutions and the acceptance of standardized opinion; but if it does no more than this, “educated” persons are hardly likely to contribute much toward the solution of our problems. Education must do more; it should give the student a healthy skepticism concerning “facts”; it should expose the roots of popular prejudices and evaluate them—those prejudices that open the way to the sway of passion, befog one’s judgments and warp one’s sense of justice. Education so directed, honestly and intelligently, might contribute much to alleviate the ills of contemporary society.

The scientific attitude.—The problems discussed in the course of this work are not presented for “solution.” They should, however, serve to make the student intelligently conscious of their existence and of their serious import to all who are engaged in the search for more rational and satisfactory community life. They should serve also to reveal the conflicts of opinion and interest that make their solution difficult. Most important for the student, perhaps, is that he acquire some training in sound methods of approach in dealing with the problems of society; for, after all, method, in science, is more important than the conclusions reached. The so-called social sciences, as now written, cannot claim absence of bias. Part of this emotional prejudging derives from individual peculiarities of the author, part from group affiliations dating from childhood, which combine to form unconscious and uncriticized attitudes. Happily, science implies criticism of results and increasing objectivity. It supplies its own medicine. The student should realize, then, that the “facts” and their interpretation in this work may, in the light of better knowledge, prove to be partial and biased; at the same time the method of approach may be sound and in harmony with the spirit of science.

Let it be admitted that the social sciences, so called, are not sciences, as many critics, with good reason, declare they are not; they do lack the necessary precision. But the admission does not

preclude an approach in keeping with the spirit of scientific methods. James Harvey Robinson has put the matter succinctly: "Science is nothing more or less than the most accurate and best authenticated information that exists, subject to constant rectification and amplification, of man and his world. It is by no means confined to stars, chemicals, physical forces, rocks, plants, and animals, as is often assumed. There is a scientific way of looking at ourselves—our thoughts, feelings, habits and customs; at their origin and interworkings. Science, in short, includes all the careful and critical knowledge we have about anything of which we can know something."¹

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¹James Harvey Robinson, *The Humanizing of Knowledge*, p. 57.

PART I

MAN

- II. Beginnings of Life and Its Evolution
- III. Beginnings of Man and His Evolution

EARLE E. EUBANK

CHAPTER II

BEGINNINGS OF LIFE AND ITS EVOLUTION

OF THE countless "worlds" that constitute the physical universe, our own planet, Earth, is the seat of the only life we know anything about. In the course of the evolution of life man appeared; and in the course of the development of human society cultures began, of which our own civilization today is a lineal descendant. This series of great causes suggests a point of view indicating in general terms why we have chosen to open a study of Western civilization with so remote a subject as the beginnings of life and its evolution. Our first major interest is an interest in man as the architect and builder of civilizations, but a full understanding of the peculiar aptitudes of man as a culture builder can come only as we study him as a product in the evolution of living things. This fact will become clear as the matter is elaborated in the several chapters following. Our solar system as part of the cosmos, and the earth as a part of our solar system and as the dwelling place of man, are the chief features in the picture we first desire to sketch.

The physical universe.—Science has been able to tell us little as to the origin, extent, and ultimate nature of our physical universe. It is so vast that light traveling at a rate of approximately 186,000 miles per second would require 200,000 years to reach us from some of the heavenly bodies discerned by astronomers. Our most powerful telescopes give no evidence of even approximately reaching its boundaries. The census of the stars attempted by the great observatories reveals thousands of star clusters, thousands of light years in diameter, whose individual members cannot be counted, but whose numbers run beyond comprehension. Our own galaxy alone is estimated to number from thirty to one hundred billions.

Our solar system is, however, but a small corner within the cosmos. At its center is the controlling unit, the sun, nearly a million miles in diameter, about which are grouped nine known planets and their satellites—the planetoids, the meteors, and the comets. The sun dominates the whole group; its volume is many times that of all the other members of the system combined. Its

superior mass empowers it to hold the planets in their courses and to control their motions. From it, too, they receive light and heat—forces which make possible the life upon our own planet, Earth. It is believed that the sun had an origin and an evolution independent of the planets, and at a much earlier period. Next to it in importance are the nine planets. Their relative size and distance from the sun are indicated in Chart I. Insignificant as they are in size when compared with other heavenly bodies, they nevertheless occupy an impressive field.

CHART I. SHOWING THE DISTANCE FROM THE SUN AND THE DIAMETER OF THE PLANETS IN OUR SOLAR SYSTEM

BODY	DISTANCE FROM THE SUN IN MILES	DIAMETER IN MILES
Sun	0	864,392
Mercury	36,000,000	3,009
Venus	67,200,000	7,575
Earth	92,900,000	7,918
Mars	141,500,000	4,216
Jupiter	483,300,000	86,728
Saturn	886,000,000	72,430
Uranus	1,783,000,000	30,878
Neptune	2,793,900,000	32,932
Pluto	3,700,000,000	(Unknown, but prob- ably smaller than the earth.)

A comparison suggested by H. G. Wells in his *Outline of History* will aid us to comprehend their scale to each other: "If the earth were a small ball one inch in diameter," he says, "the sun would be a globe of nine feet diameter; it would fill a small bedroom." In this proportion the earth would be distant about the length of three football fields, with the moon, "a speck the size of a small pea," about thirty inches away. Two balls slightly smaller than the earth, representing Mercury and Venus, would be about 120 and 220 yards from the sun, respectively. Beyond the earth would come the other planets: Mars, five city blocks distant; Jupiter, nearly a mile; Saturn, over a mile and two-thirds; Uranus, nearly three and a half miles; Neptune, over five; Pluto, over seven. "The nearest fixed star to us, on this minute scale be it remembered—the earth as a one-inch ball and the moon a little pea—would be over

forty thousand miles away. Most of the fixed stars we see would still be scores and hundreds of millions of miles away."

This picture might well lead us to pause and consider our place in the universe with modesty. The space we occupy is so infinitely small as to defy imagination. The entire inhabited portion of the earth is only about one-tenth of the surface of the globe, and that globe is but a small one in a system whose sun is but one, and a minor one astronomically, of countless numbers that occupy space. Recent announcements before the National Academy of Science report the discovery of a star forty thousand times as radiant as our sun, and as much as 186,000,000 miles in diameter; and it is but one of a galaxy of millions, and there are many galaxies. The space, therefore, that is occupied by our civilization is indeed but a mote in the cosmos as a whole.

Is human life confined to our own minor planet? On this question there has been much speculation but no definite answer. There is pretty general agreement among astronomers that in our own solar system Mars and Venus are habitable. So far as the other planets go, conditions of temperature, climate and atmosphere are such that if life exists at all—which is improbable—it would necessarily be greatly different from anything with which we are familiar. Whether in the vast extent of space there are human habitations is only a matter of speculation. Since each of the countless billions of stars is a possible center for systems of invisible planets formed of materials like our own, and subject to the same laws of existence and change, it would indeed be strange for our own tiny globe to be the only one possessing life; but so far as science goes, our ignorance on this subject is complete.

When and how the earth originated is an unsolved mystery. Various hypotheses have been advanced, to be sure, to explain the riddle, but in the present state of scientific knowledge they remain hypotheses. It is not necessary, for our purpose, to enter into discussion of them. However our planet may have come into being, once formed the spinning globe destined to be the home of man required incredible millions of years for preparation before attaining the conditions necessary to the existence of life. Vast alterations have taken place within its bulk; the crust also has undergone sweeping changes—the separation of land and water, the formation of oceans and continents, the shaping of valleys and mountains upon the continents, the formation of atmosphere, the disinte-

gration of rocky portions into earthy soils which support vegetation, and the distribution of surface-matter by wind currents. All of this was preliminary and preparatory to the eventual appearance of life.

The emergence of life on the earth.—We do not know when and how life appeared upon the earth, for its first forms were of such a character as to leave no trace even had there been no sweeping geological changes to erase them. Many theories have been put forward¹, but in the end we arrive at the conclusion stated by Thomas Huxley after years of devoted study: "Looking back through the prodigious vista of the past, I find no record of the commencement of life, and therefore I am devoid of any means of forming a definite conclusion as to the conditions of its appearance."²

What is life? Its very nature eludes us, and the biologists themselves do not define it. All we are able to say at the present time is that when matter exhibits certain characteristics we consider it to be "alive." Most important of these which differentiate it from the non-living are:

1. Capacity to take nourishment.
2. Capacity to transform that nourishment internally into its own substance.
3. Capacity for growth as a result of nourishment.
4. Capacity to undergo inner molecular change while retaining external structural form.
5. Capacity for self-movement.
6. Capacity to receive and respond to external stimuli.
7. Capacity for reproduction.

But these criteria do not suffice in all cases. While they may serve as practical tests of difference between organic and inorganic matters, biologists are no longer willing to accept them as final. The belief is growing among them that the difference is one of degree rather than one of kind. Certain substances ordinarily regarded as inorganic are now found to possess certain of the characteristics here listed; and certain others ordinarily regarded as organic seem to lack some of them.³

¹For a concise summary of leading theories see *The Evolution of the Earth* (Yale Sigma Xi lectures for 1916-1917) Chapter 3, "The Origin of Life" by L. L. Woodruff.

²Presidential address before the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1870. See *The Scientific Memoirs of Huxley*, III, 586.

³For specific examples as well as general discussion of this, see "The Mind of the Molecule" by Professor Clifford Farr, in the *Atlantic Monthly*, for March, 1923.

Wherever and however it began, life's earliest forms seem to have required conditions of warmth, light, and abundant moisture, with little fluctuation of temperature. It is probable that life began in a tropical climate where gentle tides flowed and ebbed on flat, mud beaches. Some of these early organisms, living unnumbered centuries ago, have left their record in the rocks in the form of fossil remains. The record is fragmentary and incomplete at best, for geologic processes have themselves created gaps in the story of the development of organic life on the earth. But long and patient study has enabled the scientist to reconstruct the history of ancient life, and for convenience of study to differentiate five major geological periods, a division based upon important changes in the character of the life in each period. Chart II (pp. 16-17) indicates how we have passed from the simplest forms characteristic of the oldest geologic era to the emergence of man in the most recent.

Organic evolution.—As we look about us today we recognize that the earth is filled with multitudinous forms of life. Biologists have counted more than one million different species in the vegetable and animal world, not including a much greater number of subdivisions. What is the explanation of this great variety? The theory which prevailed in a pre-scientific age was that of an individual creation for each and every form, coupled with the idea that all forms have been present from the beginning. Space forbids going into a detailed discussion of the difficulties presented by this point of view; it is enough to point out that in the records of the rocks we find abundant evidence of the former existence of many species, notably reptiles, that are now extinct; and also of the appearance from time to time of many forms previously non-existent.

Not only is there this striking multiplication of species in the course of the development of organic life through the geological periods, but a study of fossils reveals the further highly significant fact of the emergence of progressively higher forms of life from one geological period to another. When we say "higher" we refer to the increasing complexity of bodily structure, the development of specialized organs and senses, the appearance of a more efficient and highly developed nervous system, and, above all, an ascending scale of intelligence.

Struck by these facts, men have for a long time sought to explain the phenomena. From ancient times on they have speculated

concerning the possibility of establishing a definite line of descent. During the first half of the nineteenth century, a conviction arose that there was a causal sequence between lower and higher forms of life, the whole representing a progressive development. Charles Darwin gives the names of thirty-four writers prior to himself who had definitely put forward an idea of an organic series whereby the

CHART II. RECORD OF LIFE, BY GEOLOGIC PERIODS¹

PERIOD

RECORD OF LIFE

I. ARCHEOZOIC ERA

(Estimates of time duration: 80 to 800 millions of years)

Possibly no life. If any at all, it was one-celled life, protozoa.

II. PROTEROZOIC ERA

Invertebrate Dominance

(60 to 600 millions of years)

Primitive invertebrates only. Scanty and poor fossil remains. Low structural forms: jelly fish, green scum.

III. PALEOZOIC ERA

Fish Dominance

(36 to 360 millions of years)

- | | |
|---------------|---|
| 1. Cambrian | Appearance of first known marine animals: abundant invertebrates, possibly some vertebrates. Dominance of trilobites. |
| 2. Ordovician | Appearance of first known fresh-water fishes. Corals; molluscs; moss-animals: trilobites. |
| 3. Silurian | Appearance of vertebrates without limbs; lung-fishes; scorpions. Appearance of first known land plants. |
| 4. Devonian | Appearance of first known amphibians, and marine fishes; first woody plants, and primitive seed plants. |

¹The duration of the intervals of time is so uncertain, and estimates vary so widely that some authorities refuse to suggest figures at all. The numbers here given indicate the uncertainty of all approximations, and their only value is to suggest relative proportions.

present forms of life have developed from the lower. Organic evolution is the term used to designate this developmental process. It "implies descent in living things—that higher forms of animals and plants have evolved from lower forms, which were the more immediate descendants of the first living things to appear on Earth." J. Arthur Thomson has expressed the idea clearly: The

- | | |
|------------------|---|
| 5. Mississippian | Rise of marine sharks. Some coal deposits. |
| 6. Pennsylvanian | Appearance of first reptiles, and primitive insects. Highest point of amphibians. Abundant coal deposits. |
| 7. Permian | Rise of reptiles, land vertebrates, and insects. Decrease of marine invertebrates. |

IV. MESOZOIC ERA

Reptile Dominance

(14 to 140 millions of years)

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Triassic | Appearance of first mammals. Rise of dinosaurs. Rise of gymnosperms. |
| 2. Jurassic | Appearance of first birds. Flying reptiles. |
| 3. Cretaceous, Lower (Comanchian) | Largest land animals (dinosaurs). Appearance of flowering plants (angiosperms). |
| 4. Cretaceous, Upper | Rise of archaic mammals. Disappearance of great reptiles. |

V. CENOZOIC ERA

Mammal Dominance, Culminating in Man

(4 to 40 million years)

- | | |
|----------------------|---|
| 1. Eocene | Appearance of modern mammals. Disappearance of archaic mammals. |
| 2. Oligocene | Appearance of earliest primates; possibly of "man's structural ancestor." |
| 3. Miocene | Rise of primates; highest point of mammals. |
| 4. Pliocene | Probable appearance of ape-man, differentiated from other primates. |
| 5. Pleistocene | Appearance of man having true artifacts. Disappearance of great mammals. (Glaciation) |
| 6. Holocene (Recent) | Appearance and dominance of true man (<i>Homo Sapiens</i>). |

evolutionary point of view is "that the plants and animals around us are the result of natural processes of growth and change working throughout unthinkably long ages; that the forms we see are the lineal descendants of ancestors on the whole somewhat simpler; that these are the descendants from simpler forms, and so on backwards until we lose our clue in the mist of life's beginning. The essentially simple idea is that the present is the child of the past and the parent of the future."¹

What is the nature of the evidence supporting this belief? We shall present some of its important aspects.

EVIDENCE SUPPORTING ORGANIC EVOLUTION

Evidence from paleontology.—First might be mentioned the evidence from the rocks, the story of the development of life as it is recorded in the fossil remains of ancient living things. In many parts of the world one can pick up any number of stones containing the fossil remains of a variety of molluscs, coral, and other forms of marine life. These offer convincing evidence that such regions were once a part of the ocean bed, populated with myriad forms of simple life. Similarly, abundant records of many other species of organic life are left in the stones in all parts of the globe. In Arizona are found imbedded in what was once soft clay, the foot-prints of huge reptiles no longer existent; in northern China the ivory carvers use as their materials the tusks of giant mastodons which have been buried for thousands of years in the frozen soil of Siberia; preserved in pools of asphalt in the heart of Los Angeles are the bones of thousands of extinct creatures—sabre-toothed tigers, prehistoric elephants, and camels—trapped in the treacherous quagmire of long ago.

Now, the significant thing is that the older the geological strata in which these forms are preserved, the lower and more elementary is the type of life that is found; and the more recent these strata are, the higher are its forms of life. Taken as a whole, they present a series of ascending forms of life culminating in those most akin to man. There are gaps in the series, to be sure, but successive discoveries have enabled the geologist to present a story sufficiently complete to indicate the emergence of an increasing number of

¹*Heredity*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, Second Edition, 1913, p. 12.

species progressively developing into higher forms as the unnumbered ages pass. (See Chart II.)

Evidence from morphology.—Morphology affords further evidence in its comparative study of the form and structure of organisms. When the naturalist makes such a study he is struck by the close resemblances which exist among plants or animals of the same class. These are resemblances in the bony structure, the muscles, the organs, or other parts, and in the proportions and positions of parts. Such similarities become evident when one examines the structure of the hand of a man, the wing of a bird or a bat, the hand of a mole, the leg of a horse; or such organs as the heart or the lungs. The biologist convincingly explains such resemblances on the basis of common descent of homologous forms of life, the later developed forms having inherited similar structures from the earlier forms.

If we look upon Paleontology as a vertical exhibit of a series of ascending forms of life, we may find in the existence of present-day animal forms a horizontal exhibit of the same thing. Beginning with protozoa, the lowest forms of one-celled life, the scientist finds it possible to arrange a display of steadily ascending gradations, with the exception of an occasional vacancy, clear up to the highest of all, the backboneed animals known as vertebrata. In the American Museum of Natural History in New York City, such an exhibit has been set up in the form of a tree whose branches as they go higher up and more distant from the ground, increasingly branch out into smaller limbs and twigs, each of which corresponds to a higher order of life. Protozoa, sponges, jelly-fish, worms, and fish successively appear, each upon a separate level. These are not to be regarded as having been descended from each other, but rather as differentiations, various degrees removed from some parent stem. Within the diagram which the biologists have worked out there are many gaps, some of which we may never be able to fill, but all in all we cannot doubt that beneath the series as a whole there is a progressive structural unity corresponding to the various stages of development.

Evidence from embryology.—Embryology affords a third line of support. A speeded-up moving picture of what takes place in an egg during the three weeks in which the mother-hen is waiting for it to hatch would reveal the following: first, the familiar egg substance, the yolk possessing a microscopic point—its germ of life—but with no properties visibly related to life itself; after a few days a fish-like animal would begin to appear with gills and long tail; this would

be followed by a proportionate shortening of the tail and the bulging of four leg-like projections, the whole creature at this stage representing a lizard; a few days more and the two front projections would form into wings, the rear two into legs, the gills gradually disappearing. A similar thing is true of every other creature. Neither chicken, nor dog, nor horse, nor man takes its characteristic form at the beginning, but each of them passes through a fish and reptile stage before birth. It is as if the animal relived in its own body in the brief span preceding birth the stages that its ancestors took generations to live through in their own evolution.

It is significant that a comparative study of embryos reveals the striking fact that the closer the natural relation between the forms of life examined, the longer do the embryonic transformations run parallel to each other, in the course of their development. Thus, the embryos of a dog and a rabbit exhibit a certain parallelism in their metamorphoses during a longer period of their development than do the embryos of a dog and a bird; and the embryos of a man and an ape exhibit a longer period of parallelism than the embryos of a man and a dog. In fact, in the case of animals that most closely resemble each other in adult life, there is a most striking similarity of structure and form until the last stages in their embryonic life, when the divergences begin which differentiate them after birth. Such phenomena point to the conclusion that there is a continuity of physical development of all forms of life. Pointing to the same conclusion is the fact that a study of the embryo reveals the presence of many rudimentary and undeveloped structures, which formerly existed in a more highly developed state in some lower species; for example, the embryonic chicken gill mentioned above refers back to the perfected and necessary gill possessed during the more elementary fish stage.

Evidence from experimentation.—Actual experimentation in the selective breeding of animals and the propagation of new varieties of plants has made a valuable contribution in support of evolution. Obviously there could have been no development of one species from another unless protoplasm, which is the basic substance of the animal or vegetable cell, possessed the capacity for change; that is, unless it were plastic. Such plasticity is clearly demonstrated in the successful performance of breeders and horticulturists in the creation of new varieties, and even of species, in animals and plants.

It is by selective breeding that the wide varieties of domestic animals have been produced. Thus the existing varieties of pigeons have been derived from the common rock pigeon by a process of selecting and mating specimens in which variations from parent stock have occurred. In a like manner the various domestic breeds of swine were derived from the wild hog. In the field of horticulture Luther Burbank was an outstanding genius. By artificial selection he developed chestnut bushes which bear fine nuts six months after the seed is planted, plums without stones, cactuses without spines, walnuts with thin shells, calla lilies which give perfume, "plumcots" crossed from plums and apricots, and, from a single "seed ball," twenty-three potato plants so different as to constitute almost separate species. In such demonstrations as these we have an exhibit of evolution and transmutation actually in process.

The evolution of the horse.—As a further demonstration in support of evolution the geologist exhibits the history of the horse. Because of the difficulty of finding complete records, it is not to be expected that the evolution of any particular animal can be unerringly traced in an unbroken line from its early beginnings. The horse, however, is a fairly clear example. Our first records show him in the Eocene period, an *eohippus*, no larger than a small dog. He is a browsing animal, with his forelimbs slender and definitely lengthened, but having four toes on the front feet and three on the rear, with vestigial toes still present. In the Oligocene, he appears as the *mesohippus*, larger, longer limbed, with teeth better adapted to browsing. At this time, both front and rear feet have three toes actually functioning with the vestigial toes still more reduced. In the Miocene, we find him as *hipparion*, still larger, on whose foot the central toe alone is used, the side toes being mere vestigial appendages. From this point on, the side toes gradually diminish until we arrive at the modern horse with a single toe, or hoof, on each foot, bare traces being visible of the smaller toes which he formerly used.

Such are some of the chief points of evidence upon which the belief in organic evolution is based. Its value to the scientist, particularly to the biologist, is that it furnishes him with a working principle in his pursuit of the science of life and living things. The principle continues to be accepted by him because the facts of life so far discovered support it, and he has discovered nothing which invalidates

it. It is only when the scientist attempts to explain how evolution has occurred that there is disagreement. It is at this point that various theories as to the manner of evolution appear.

THEORIES CONCERNING EVOLUTION

Lamarck (1744-1829), a French biologist, was the first to make a notable contribution concerning the manner in which the evolutionary process takes place. The next of great importance was Charles Darwin (1809-1882), an English naturalist, whose work, *The Origin of Species* (1859), was prepared with such care and convincing evidence that its revolutionary conclusions shook the whole intellectual world. Due to the enthusiastic support of Thomas Huxley, evolution became a storm center of debate during the latter half of the 19th century.

Lamarck's view of evolution.—In 1809, the year of Darwin's birth, the Chevalier de Lamarck published in France a brief treatise entitled *Philosophie Zoologique*, in which he stated the revolutionary postulate that no species maintains a permanent, immutable form, but that all are subject to modification. His explanation of the manner in which such changes take place was deduced speculatively rather than experimentally. Essentially, it is as follows: (1) Every member of a species is after birth subjected to many bodily modifications produced by its environment; that is to say, changes of environment may impose upon it the necessity of bodily activity which develops this or that physical part as an instrument of self-preservation or special utility. (2) Physical parts so used become accentuated by reason of extended use, while parts not thus valuable tend to atrophy through disuse. (3) All characteristics so acquired are heritable. As Lamarck expressed it in his "fourth law," "all that has been acquired, traced out or altered in the organization of individuals during the course of their life is preserved by generation, and transmitted to the new individuals which originate from those which have experienced these modifications."

This theory of modification through the transmission of acquired characters was the almost universally accepted explanation of the *modus operandi* of evolution until the appearance of Darwin's *Origin of Species*. This volume, without disproving Lamarck's conception, shifted the emphasis to "natural selection" as the method whereby the numerous small variations occurring in the hardier

individuals, however those variations might have been originally derived, were preserved by their owner's survival, and passed on to posterity.

Darwin's theory of evolution.—Concerning the inception of his ideas, Darwin writes that it was in the autumn of 1836 that he became impressed with the notion of the "common descent of species." Observed facts concerning the fossils of South America and the species on the Galapagos Archipelago, he says, were the origin of all his views. But his working hypothesis came from reading the *Essay on Population* by Thomas Malthus, in which the author expounded the doctrine that the increase of population tends to outstrip means of subsistence. Of his conclusions upon reading the book, Darwin writes that "being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence, which everywhere goes on, from long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these circumstances favorable variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavorable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would be the formation of new species. Here then I had at last got a theory by which to work."¹

Darwin arrived at a logical sequence by applying the doctrine of Malthus to the whole animal and vegetable kingdom: (1) The overproduction of animals and plants as contrasted with the relatively constant food supply, (2) a resulting struggle for survival, (3) variation, (4) survival through a process of natural selection, and (5) the heritability of variations and the appearance of new species. Let us examine each of these principles to discover how Darwin arrived at the formulation of his theory.

Overproduction.—Throughout nature there is a tendency for living things to over-produce. Animals multiply in a geometrical ratio. If not checked in some way, every species could in a very short time so completely overrun the earth that there would be no room for anything else. About the time of the Civil War a would-be benefactor took a few rabbits to Australia, hoping that enough of them might be reproduced to provide a new source of food for the inhabitants. So rapidly did they breed that within two decades they were a great annoyance, and within a few years more they had become such a plague to that continent that a rabbit-proof fence was constructed entirely across the country to prevent their spread,

¹*Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, D. Appleton & Company, Vol. I, p. 68.

and enormous expeditions were organized for rabbit extermination. Barely three-quarters of a century ago the English sparrow was imported to America. In less than twenty-five years it had become more numerous than any other American bird, and is today a veritable pest in many places.

Ward has expanded Darwin's striking illustration of this:

The largest and most slow breeding creatures can furnish amazement if we grant them a few centuries. Suppose that the average pair of elephants breed only four children that live to have grandchildren, and suppose that there are only three generations in each century, and suppose that the parents die as soon as they have brought up the last child. Under these conditions these elephants will have sixteen great-grandchildren in the world after one century, 128 after two centuries, 1024 after three centuries . . . in five hundred years, there will be 66,000 descendants; in six hundred years there will be over 500,000 and after another century over 4,000,000 . . . in the thirty-second generation of descendants there will be 8,500,000,000—that is, five times the human population of the globe. After seven more centuries of increase there would not be standing room for the elephants, if they were packed close on every acre of land from pole to pole.¹

The struggle for survival.—The fact of overproduction in the world raises the question why the earth is not overrun by animal creation. The answer is that so few of the offspring survive that the number of each species remains relatively constant, and the explanation of this widespread destruction of life is to be found chiefly in the fact that the available food supply remains relatively constant from year to year. This situation led to Darwin's conclusion, namely, that in the impulse to survive every creature of the living world must needs engage in a struggle for survival. The contest may take one of several forms: (1) It may be a struggle with the environment. Every plant or animal must have certain conditions of temperature, nourishment, moisture, and protection. If nature denies these, or makes them too difficult, life will cease. If there is too much moisture, the germinating grain will perish through decay; if too little, through drought. The pine tree at the timber line must face extremes of temperature and the buffeting of tempests if it is to endure at all. (2) It may be a competition with fellows for a place

¹From *Evolution for John Doe*, by Henshaw Ward, copyright 1925. Used by special permission of the publishers, The Bobbs-Merrill Company.

in the environment. If there are too many stalks of corn in the same hill, some or all of them will be dwarfed or crowded out through lack of space to grow, or for lack of sustenance. (3) The struggle may be with one's fellows who wish to eliminate him from the competition.

Variation and natural selection.—In such a struggle it is the fit which are likely to survive and the unfit which are likely to perish. What determines which are the more fit? In answer to this question Darwin presented his conception of variation. It is a biological fact that every individual creature tends to differ from its parents. No two organisms that were ever brought into the world are exactly alike. Even "identical" twins differ in many particulars. This personal differentiation of each member from every other gives the physical basis for what is known as individuality. It means that every one of us is in some respect peculiarly and uniquely himself, and that no one of us is an exact replica or rubber stamp of anyone else. In this fact of individuality lies the peculiar quality which makes my Self peculiarly my own and distinguishable from all others; and this is true of every living creature.

The question as to the origin and explanation of these variations need not detain us at this point; the observed fact is that they do occur. Their significance in the explanation of the evolution of species is indicated in Darwin's contention that it is these variations that may enable an animal possessing them to survive in the universal struggle, whereas those which do not have them may perish. Examples of variations which under certain conditions may be advantageous to survival are: longer legs than others of the species, with a resulting greater swiftness of locomotion; variations which enhance "protective coloring"; or a thicker coat of fur or wool as protection against the cold. Darwin thought of the forces of nature as ever operating to bring about the more perfect adaptation of living creatures to their environment. In so doing, nature "selects" the fit and tends to reject the unfit; that is to say, the fit survive and the unfit tend to perish. Hence Darwin's conception of "natural selection" of those forms that are destined to live.

The adjustment of animals to their environment becomes a more pressing necessity in the question of survival when unusual changes occur. The reduction of the food supply through drought or other natural causes may intensify the struggle in a given area, or cause animals to migrate to another habitat. The rising of mountain

barriers through geological forces, or the formation of islands through the subsidence of a portion of a continent may bring about important changes of living condition. Such changes might well enhance the usefulness of certain variations.

The heritability of variations.—The final conclusion necessary to complete Darwin's theory is that these variations are heritable; that is to say, living things which have varied from the parent stock tend to reproduce these peculiar characteristics in their offspring. Furthermore, these differences produce new varieties, and the new varieties tend, in the course of time, to become new species.

In over-simplified form, the essentials of Darwin's theory may be put thus: Living things greatly overproduce their kind, but only a few survive because of the shortage of food or because of some other natural exigency. In the struggle for existence "nature" selects those for survival which are adapted to their environment by reason of characteristics acquired through variation, and rejects those which are not. Thus nature preserves those creatures in which useful variations have occurred. These variations are heritable, and mere differences in variety within one species tend to become differences in species. In this manner new species have gradually evolved.

Objections to the Lamarckian and Darwinian theories.—One of the most vulnerable points of attack upon the position of Lamarck, which Darwin accepted, was the belief that all acquired characteristics are transmissible by inheritance. This conclusion has undergone considerable modification through the work of two other outstanding contributors to the literature on evolution—de Vries and Weismann.

Hugo de Vries, a Dutch biologist, after many years of experimentation put forward, in 1900, an explanation which is an important expansion of the earlier idea. There are two possibilities, he writes¹; and both have been propounded by Darwin. One is the accumulation of the slight deviations of fluctuating variability; the other consists of successive "sports" or "leaps" taking place in the same direction. It is a commonly observed, and still unexplained, fact that in the midst of a great multitude of normal members of a given species an individual will suddenly appear which is conspicuously different from all its fellows; as for example, a single red ear of corn in a field of yellow corn. Such sports or leaps, designated

¹*Species and Varieties*, Open Court Publishing Company, 1905, p. 7.

as mutations, de Vries regarded as responsible for the great bulk of the modifications of species, rather than a slow accumulation of small variations, as proposed by Darwin. Such mutations, thought to have their origin in the germ plasm, are heritable; while the fluctuating variations are not. Thus the mutation theory of de Vries is accepted by many as a refutation, in some particulars, of the Darwinian theory. In the United States the conclusion of de Vries has had a wide acceptance, although it also has many critics.

The overthrow of the Lamarckian explanation of variation, so long undisputed, is primarily the result of nearly half a century of labor on the part of a German scholar, August Weismann, whose work was published in 1902. By repeated investigation he established to the satisfaction of most biologists the conviction that acquired characteristics cannot be passed on by heredity. His most famous experiment was that of cutting off the tails of mice for nineteen successive generations, only to find that the offspring of each generation obstinately persisted in being born with normal tails. On the basis of his work he advanced the theory that life and all of its characteristics are passed directly from the germ of one generation to the germ of the next without somatic (i.e. bodily) intervention; the germ-plasm itself being continuous and the sole carrier of all hereditary traits.

IMPORTANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CONCEPTION OF EVOLUTION

The work of Lamarck, Darwin, de Vries, and Weismann by no means exhausts the list of important attempts to explain how evolution has worked to produce existing species. Nor is it to be understood that all that has been done has explained the process in all its phases to the satisfaction of all scientists. Experiment proceeds, data continue to accumulate, and the discussion goes on.

But the fact should again be emphasized that so far as the general evolutionary point of view is concerned the scientific world in general accepts it as a working principle. The biologist accepts it because it explains the fundamental phenomena of life as he observes them, and until he makes discoveries that run counter to the principle he will continue to conduct his work on the assumption that evolution is a fact. Its illuminating effect upon the understanding of life processes and development, and its importance as a guide in their further study, have placed evolution among the greatest dis-

coveries of modern science. Nevertheless, no one has yet been able to demonstrate its truth experimentally so as to place it beyond all doubt.

Evolution, or rather a misconception of evolution, has been a stumbling block to many people who have not been able to reconcile it with certain of the older religious doctrines. In this connection it should be pointed out that evolution does not assume to explain the origin of life. Beginning with life, whatever its origin, it simply offers an explanation of a way in which that life has expressed itself in continuously ascending forms. The idea is in no sense a substitute for the theory of a Creator; it is, at most, simply an explanation of the way in which "creation" occurs.

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CHAPTER III

BEGINNINGS OF MAN AND HIS EVOLUTION

DOES the doctrine of organic evolution apply to man, or does he occupy a unique position in the matter of his biological history? Charles Darwin has answered the question in striking language in his *Descent of Man*, which appeared in 1871: "Man with all his noble qualities, with sympathy which feels for the most debased, with benevolence which extends not only to other men but to the humblest living creature, with his godlike intellect, which has penetrated into the movement and constitution of the solar system—with all these exalted powers—man still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin." The "indelible stamp" of man's organic continuity with other animals is revealed by essentially the same kind of evidence as that supporting the evolution of the other animals.

EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE THEORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF MAN

Man comes into the world by the same processes of generation and birth as do the other animals: both grow by means of nourishment derived from food; both require protection from the forces of nature, including the germs that are ready to attack them and produce disease at any point of weakness; both reach maturity, mate with others of their kind, and reproduce their own species; and in course of time the bodily structure of both becomes unable to resist the strain of nature, decline sets in, and, finally, death terminates their life cycle. The evidence of morphology applies as emphatically to man as to other species. Embryology affords an even more convincing demonstration. Moreover, in the fossil remains of sub-human creatures and of prehistoric man science presents the evidence linking man with the lower animals. Hence the biologist finds no difficulty in assigning man to his proper place in the classification of animal life. Man is a vertebrate along with other vertebrates; a mammal among other mammals; a primate along with

four families of monkeys and apes. He belongs to the genus *Homo*, and his species is *Sapiens*; and of both genus and species he is the sole representative.

Relation of man to the apes.—According to this classification, the order of man and existing life most similar to him is that of the primates, which includes apes and kindred species. The likeness between man and the apes is not a superficial resemblance merely. Thomson¹ has indicated four points of evidence of their interrelation. First, there is a structural similarity. The anatomical resemblance between man and apes is so close that every bone, muscle, and nerve in the one has its counterpart in the other. The parallelism continues out to minute details. With the exception of difference in brain and in vocal mechanism, to be referred to a little later, there is no organic difference between them which is functionally important. Some naturalists go so far as to assert that the resemblance continues even into the mental processes and that the difference between the mind of man and of animals is only one of degree and not of fundamental nature.² Vestigial structures present a second line of evidence. Something like three hundred muscles and other structural elements have been identified in the human body which perform no function at all at the present time, but which correspond precisely to structural parts still in use among sub-human primates. Examples of these are the embryonic third eyelid surviving in the inner upper corner of the eye, and the muscles used for moving the ear. The prenatal development of the embryo in man and in the apes reveals a striking parallelism down almost to the last stages. Finally, there is a close resemblance in the biological life-organization and in the physical functioning of both. There are even certain diseases, such as tuberculosis, to which both are susceptible.

The close resemblance of man to the lower primates has led to the rather widespread popular conception that evolution means that man is a direct descendant of the monkey. This belief is wholly erroneous. The teaching of science is not that man is descended from the apes, but that both ape and man are descended from a common source. Our conception of man's lineage should begin with the idea of some remote structural ancestor a million or more years ago, which was neither man nor monkey, but which was pos-

¹J. Arthur Thomson, *What Is Man?* G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1924, pp. 4-10.

²See George J. Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Animals and Mental Evolution in Man*.

sessed of ancestral antecedents characteristic of both. At some point a split in the stock occurred which resulted in the development of an anthropoid line, leading on the one hand to the orang, and on the other to the gorilla and chimpanzee; the main stem, continuing upward, not as man (*Homo*), however, but as man-like creatures (*Hominidae*), whose posterity eventually became true man—*Homo Sapiens*.¹

Nor should the resemblance of man to the ape blind one to the obvious fact that in the course of his evolution man has become so far differentiated from his simian cousins as to occupy a unique position in the animal world. The features which differentiate him will be considered in Chapter V in some detail. It is sufficient here simply to enumerate some of the important ones. (1) Man possesses a brain capable of mental processes beyond those attainable by any lower species. (2) Man has certain structural advantages: especially, vocal organs capable of transforming sound into the ordered meaningfulness involved in language, to a degree not possible in the other animals; erect posture; and more adaptive hands. (3) In the performance of their activities animals are almost wholly limited to their own bodies, in the matter of both instruments and power; while man extends his body, so to speak, by adopting tools and utilizing power from natural resources outside himself. (4) By reason of these three advantages man becomes a creator, a maker of culture, in a way that no subhuman creature can ever be; and, at the same time, he has acquired the power to preserve and transmit a social heritage accumulated from the past, while the inheritance of animals is almost exclusively within their own bodies and confined to biological transmission, a fact which means that each generation must start afresh at the beginning. Thus man has come to be unique in his possession of a civilization.

THE FOSSIL REMAINS OF MAN'S ANTECEDENTS

If man has descended from pre-existing forms of animal life and is most closely related to the anthropoid apes, it is pertinent to inquire whether it has been possible to find any "links" between the human and the subhuman. A partial answer is revealed by the discovery of certain fossil remains. The reconstruction of prehuman lineage


¹See Chart III, p. 33.

is especially difficult for the reason that man's body is not adapted to fossilization, as are those of animals having shells or hard outer coverings which leave an impression in materials that afterwards solidify into stone. We are wholly dependent for physical evidence upon accidental circumstances which have buried occasional bits of skeleton in geological strata, or have sheltered them in caves or other places protected from the disintegrating influence of weather. Slowly, however, a piece at a time, fragments are coming to light of prehistoric man-like creatures. These are gradually being established in chronological series. How are we able to establish their age or their place in geological succession? Simply by identifying them with the age of the geological strata in which they are found. For example, if we should find fragments of dishes, tools, and furniture in an old cellar under the débris of a house whose ruins had not been disturbed since the Civil War, we should, of course, know that these remains were at least as old as the Civil War period. Similarly, when we find human bones embedded in characteristic geological formation, we are sure that they belong to that geological period.

Man's pre-human antecedents.—Among the most noteworthy fragments of man's prehuman ancestry yet found is the *Pithecanthropus Erectus*, also called Java Man. It was found in a river bank, near Trinil, on the island of Java, in 1891. The fragments, which include the top of a skull, three teeth, and a thigh bone, probably belonged to the same creature. The skull indicates a subhuman brain, but the teeth are characteristically man-like, and the thigh bone is quite human and indicates erect posture. The location, once thought to be Pliocene, is now generally accepted as belonging to the geological deposits of the lower or middle Pleistocene, dating back perhaps half a million years. Within the same stratum and near *Pithecanthropus* were found the bones of twenty other kinds of mammals, all of which had long since been extinct. This Java Man, "the walking ape-man," represents the greatest distance we have been able to penetrate into man's prehuman ancestry on the basis of concrete material. His characteristics indicate that he is a definite branch of our central main stem of Hominidae.

The next evidence of the existence of subhuman creatures is represented by the so-called Heidelberg Man. The only trace of this individual so far discovered is a well-preserved jaw bone, the famous Heidelberg Jaw, which was found in 1907 in a sand pit near the old town of Heidelberg in southern Germany. The jaw is huge

CHART III. A GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE DESCENT OF MAN
AND HIS MAIN ETHNIC DIVISIONS



and ape-like, but the teeth clearly belong to the human species. The geological era to which the specimen belongs is also thought to be the lower Pleistocene, in a layer which includes the woolly rhinoceros, the mammoth and other preglacial mammals now extinct.

The Piltdown Man, also known as *Eoanthropus*, or "Dawn Man," was unearthed in 1912, in a gravel pit a few feet below the surface, near Piltdown, Sussex, England. The skeletal remains are far from complete, consisting of a skull which archeologists have pieced together from scattered fragments, together with a lower jaw originally found some distance away, but which after much careful study has been accepted as belonging to the same creature. The skull itself indicates a brain somewhere between *Pithecanthropus* and man. The jawbone is much less human than the Heidelberg Man, but the teeth are akin to those of present-day existing races. This curious combination of characteristics of both man and ape has led to much controversy over his place in prehuman lineage, some authorities placing him prior and others subsequent to Heidelberg Man. His place is further complicated by the fact that in Great Britain where he was found, there are no remains of anthropoid apes. The gravel deposits where the bones reposed are ascribed to the Third Inter-glacial period, which would place them about one hundred thousand years ago; it is possible, however, that they may have been washed out of still earlier strata into the one where found, and that in reality they go back to the First Glacial period, or the lower Pleistocene.

Important as these several fragments are, they have still left unsettled the question as to whether their originals were sufficiently "human" to use tools, for no artifacts have been found with them. For this reason, the most significant and illuminating remains of primitive man so far recovered, fossils which "mark a new epoch in human paleontology,"¹ are those of the Peking Man, *Sinanthropus Pekinensis*, found in 1929, by W. C. Pei, a Chinese paleontologist, forty miles southwest of the old Chinese capital. In addition to the first almost complete braincase, there have subsequently come to light in deposits which scientists definitely place in the early Pleistocene, skeletal remains, including many teeth, of no fewer than ten other individuals. Not only does the structure of these fragments

¹G. Elliott Smith, "The Discovery of Primitive Man in China," *Antiquity*, March, 1931.

plainly reveal close anatomical relationship to the human family, but, most important of all, they have been accompanied by artifacts and unmistakable evidence of the use of fire. This fact positively establishes them as makers and users of culture, therefore human-like in a sense impossible to animals. Furthermore, Peking Man possesses physical characteristics which resemble widely divergent features found in both Java Man on the one hand, and Piltdown Man on the other. This establishes a generic relationship between the latter two, not previously known; and it still further indicates that they also were members of a species potentially capable of a degree of culture similar to his. There is uncertainty as to which of the three originated first, and as to the period of their beginnings; but present judgment makes these particular individuals chronological contemporaries, though perhaps representing three different types, of possibly 500,000 years ago.

Many other fragments of fossil man which are of lesser significance or whose character is too uncertain to receive attention here, have been found in various places, among which the Rhodesian Man of South Africa is notable. But with archeological excavation proceeding apace in many parts of the world, we may confidently expect additional data at any time.

The earliest species to show relatively abundant signs of genuinely human-like culture is Neanderthal Man, named from the original skeleton found in 1856 in the Neanderthal, a valley near the Rhine. Since that date a number of Neanderthal skeletons have been found through central and western Europe and in parts of Asia, so that we have a fairly clear picture of him. R. S. Lull describes him as "of low stature, hardly exceeding five feet three inches for the males and less for the females. The posture was not fully erect but was probably no less erect than that of some slouching modern types. . . . The skeleton . . . points to a clumsy, shuffling, loose-jointed being of great muscular power. . . . The head was borne on the immensely muscular neck in such a way that the face was thrust forward in an ape-like manner." Although the brain capacity of the skull was approximately an eighth greater than that of modern man, there was under-development in the parts devoted to the higher mental functions. "Nevertheless, Neanderthal Man was a skilled worker in flints, had harnessed fire, and [gave] reverential burial to his dead, surrounded by beautifully wrought objects whose surrender implied a very real sacrifice on

the part of the survivors." This also points to a religious belief, as well as to some capacity for speech and social life.¹

Neanderthal Man as a race is completely extinct. Many conflicting ideas concerning his place in our ancestry have been advanced. Some regard him as definitely "ancestral to modern man, representing the Pleistocene stage in human evolution." Others regard him as a divergent branch of the human stem which had retained "an unusual share of ape-like traits." Sir Arthur Keith, who is perhaps the outstanding authority, regards him as "a separate and peculiar species of man" which died out during or soon after the Fourth Glacial period, some forty or fifty thousand years ago.

Man's prehistoric ancestors: the emergence of true man.—The brief sketch that has been given above indicates how limited is our information concerning the forerunners of modern man. The material itself is exceedingly scanty and does not permit a detailed history of the past, yet it is highly important, for these bits of evidence are milestones indicative of the nature and length of the journey the human race has traveled. The first four described above are probably neither descendants of each other nor direct ancestors of modern man, but are instead representative of various branchings from the main stem of Hominidae; and we are justified in regarding them as indicative of various biological phases in the transition to modern man. All of them are associated with periods antedating the termination of the Fourth Glacial period, in the Upper Pleistocene.

Not until the Post-glacial period do we come to true man in the modern sense. The outstanding representative among the first true men is the Cro-Magnon race, of which many skeletal remains have been found in various parts of Europe. They are associated with the Upper Paleolithic period, extending back thirty or forty thousand years. Physically they are among the finest human specimens known, the men averaging a little above six feet in height (the women smaller in proportion) and having a larger brain cavity than modern men. The general shape of skull, face and brain have the characteristics of modern Caucasian men, and except for difference in size there is probably no important biological differentiation from modern races. They have left remarkable evidence of artistic

¹Yale Sigma Xi Lectures, Yale University Press, 1929, *The Evolution of Earth and Man*, pp. 171-175.

skill in sculpture and in painting in the caves of northern Spain. There seems to have been an overlapping of Cro-Magnon and Neanderthal but there is no evidence of intermarriage, and the extinction of the latter may have been due to the superiority of the former.

Apparently contemporary with the Cro-Magnon is another type of the Upper Paleolithic man known as Grimaldi, whose features have been regarded by certain authorities as Negroid. While their remains are found in France, the theory has been advanced that they are a north African type which for a time may have invaded Europe. Still another type found in central Europe is known as the Brünn race, whose characteristics were similar to Cro-Magnon. All of these and others, which are discussed in more detailed volumes than this, are sometimes known as Reindeer Men, because of the prominence of these animals in their culture. They are regarded as direct ancestors of modern men.

During the long ages of his evolution in prehistoric times, man shows a fairly steady development toward those forms characteristic of the historic races. Lull has summarized the physical changes which took place as follows: (1) There developed an increasing cranial capacity along with the perfecting of the brain, especially in that part which is concerned with the higher intellectual faculties and with speech. (2) There was a change in the skull conformation, a heightening of the forehead and a receding of the brow ridges. (3) The jaw and dental arch were reduced, a change which resulted in giving form and prominence to the chin. (4) The teeth became progressively more human. (5) The stature increased and the position of the body became more erect.¹

Beginnings of man's culture.—What do we know of prehistoric man himself and his prehuman antecedents, of the character of their environment and the conditions under which they lived? His geological chronology tells us something. As we have seen, his beginnings possibly date back to the Pliocene period, perhaps a million years ago, and extend onward through the Pleistocene, modern man finally appearing in the Holocene, or recent.² During the Pleistocene, prior to the time of Neanderthal, earth conditions were such as to produce a succession of four glacial epochs over much of the northern hemisphere in regions now included in the

¹*Ibid.*, p. 37.

²See Chart II, pp. 16-17, and Chart IV, p. 39.

North Temperate Zone. The hardship produced by these conditions, together with the limitation of natural resources while the ice persisted, gave an added handicap to man's cultural development, which would naturally have been slow at best. In the animal world his contemporaries were the sabre-tooth tiger, the prehistoric elephant and hippopotamus, and a rhinoceros with a goat-like covering of curly hair. Later came the mammoth and the mastodon. Perhaps the only important animal that he knew which corresponds to existing animals was the reindeer, which the Reindeer Men seem to have domesticated and used for many purposes.

Of their culture much is known, as will be indicated in a later chapter. It will suffice to say here that culturally they belong to what is called the Stone Age—an age which, after a duration still not definitely determined, was to be followed by the Age of Bronze and the Age of Iron before races now existing were ushered in. The cultures of the Stone Age exhibit a steady progression in implements and art. The first attempt at implements was doubtless the utilization of stones adapted by nature to processes of cutting or hammering. Later nature's work was assisted by crude manufacturing and shaping of stones by design. Still later, the bones and horns of animals were used as materials, with chisels, punches, scrapers, wedges, spearpoints, and similar articles coming into existence.

THE RACES OF MAN

It has been pointed out how, in the process of evolution, all species of life tend to become differentiated into various subdivisions. The same thing occurs in man, but in less degree; for *Homo Sapiens* is a species in himself throughout the world, and strictly speaking there are no sub-species. The differentiation, however, takes the form of biological divergence of physical types known as races. Reference to Chart III will show how the stem of Hominidae, after true man finally appears, divides into various racial types. The problem of racial origins is as involved as the other problems we have already noted concerning the earth and its life. Where did man begin? We do not know. His remains, as we have noted, have been found in widely separated parts of the world. Obviously man must have appeared first in some part of the globe where conditions were favorable to human development and to its maintenance after it had

CHART IV—EARLIEST PREHISTORY OF EUROPE¹

Pleistocene	Recent	Modern Races	Iron	1900 A. D.
			Bronze	1000 B. C.
			Full Neolithic Early Neolithic	3000 B. C.
			Azilian	8000 B. C.
	Glacial Retreat	{ Cro-Magnon [Dominant] Brünn Cro-Magnon [Appears] Grimaldi	Magdalenian	10,000 B. C.
			Solutrean Aurignacian	
				Upper Paleolithic
	Würm Glacial Period	Neanderthal	Mousterian	25,000 B. C.
	Third Interglacial Period		Acheulean	50,000 B. C.
			Chellean	
			Eolithic	100,000 B. C.

¹Adapted from A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, Harcourt, Brace & Company, Revised Edition, 1933, p. 156.

appeared. The Tigris and Euphrates valleys are regarded by some as the most probable location, with the Yang-Tse valley in eastern China as a second suggestion. Still a third, and in some respects a more probable one, is the region of the Mediterranean basin, probably in territory which was once land but is now submerged.

Furthermore, two conflicting views occupy the field concerning the number of origins. The single stem (*monogenist*) theory maintains that wherever human beings originated, all subsequent human life has spread from that one center. The multiple stem (*polygenist*) theory holds that there were three, and possibly more, places where man originally developed, each "stem" biologically and geographically unrelated to the others. Whatever the facts may be, the proofs are lost in the dim mists of antiquity. We only know that long before the life of man became a matter of historical record he was widely scattered in racial groups over the face of the habitable world.

The criteria of racial classifications.—What do we mean by race? Two distinct and conflicting meanings of the term are now in use, to the confusion of both. The first confines it wholly to the biological or anatomical characteristics with which men are endowed; the second does not refer to physical markings at all except indirectly, but regards men as being of the same "race" if they have the same characteristics of culture. A clear discrimination between these two uses must be made at this point. In this immediate discussion we are accepting the first meaning, which is the usage of the anthropologists; that is, we shall use the word in a purely zoölogical sense, to refer to a collection of individuals enough differentiated by characteristic bodily traits to be regarded as a distinct variety of the human species. Thus, we refer to the Negro race, because generally speaking the people called "Negro" are sufficiently distinguished physically from other "racial" groups to be set off as a separate type. Similarly, the Alpines are regarded as a sub-racial unit because they are, on the whole, distinguishable from Nordic and Mediterranean.

Among the early anthropologists, the color of the skin was one of the commonest bases of the classification, and school books of the past made the easy and superficial separation of mankind into "white," "black," "red," "brown," and "yellow" races. Such a division has long been abandoned as having no scientific value. Numerous classifications have been made subsequently, upon the

basis of the presence or absence of various ethnic or physico-anthropologic characteristics. The several criteria which have been most used for this purpose in the past are: (1) stature, (2) cephalic index, or the ratio of the width of the skull to its length, (3) nasal index, or the ratio of the length of the nose to its width, (4) facial index, or prognathism, determined by the projection of the lower jaw from the facial plane, (5) skull capacity, (6) hair texture, (7) hairiness of the body, especially as to beard; and finally, (8) skin pigmentation, with which hair color and eye color are usually associated. A number of other criteria have been suggested from time to time, such as the shape of the teeth, or the eye, or the face. Standard categories will be found based on each of the criteria given above; and there are several built up from combinations of the most important ones.

Of late years most authorities recognize the texture of the hair as a valid criterion of race, and place special emphasis upon the cephalic index. Hair texture depends in part upon the diameter of each individual hair as revealed in cross section under the microscope, and in part upon the degree of straightness or curvature in the root sacs. The straight hair of the Mongoloid is flat oval in cross section; the wooly hair of the Negroid, round; the wavy hair of many Caucasians, oval. The cephalic index expresses in percentage form the ratio of the breadth to the length of the head. On this basis three types of heads are distinguishable: (1) broad or round heads (*brachycephalic*), in which the breadth is 80 per cent or more of the length; (2) medium heads (*mesocephalic*), in which the breadth is from 75 to 80 per cent of the length; and (3) long heads (*dolichocephalic*), in which the breadth is 75 per cent or less of the length. The cephalic index of mankind expressed as an average is 79.

Two typical classifications of man according to race.—Without going into the merits or demerits of particular classifications, we present herewith two which are widely accepted among American anthropologists today. It will be noted that they are so unlike that an amateur would find it impossible to translate either into terms of the other, yet they are equally valid. The reason for their wide divergence is that they are erected upon different criteria, because their authors' judgments on this point differed. Although both of these are accepted, we point out that no classification can be more than approximately accurate. Any classification of races, and the number of races discovered, are necessarily dependent upon the

number and nature of the indices used; and there is no final authority or standard to settle which criteria are best.

The first of these classifications of races is that of A. L. Kroeber:¹

- | | |
|----------------------|--------------------------------|
| (1) Caucasoid: | (3) Negroid: |
| Nordic | African Negro |
| Alpine | Melanesian Negro |
| Mediterranean | (Oceanic) |
| Hindu | Dwarf Black (including |
| | Negrito and Bushman) |
| (2) Mongoloid: | |
| Mongolian | (4) Of doubtful classification |
| Malaysian (including | Australian |
| Indonesian) | Indo-Australian |
| American Indian (in- | Polynesian |
| cluding Eskimo) | Ainu |

The second is the classification given by R. B. Dixon,² whose full list includes twenty-seven divisions; only the major headings are given here:

- | | |
|----------------------|------------------|
| (1) Caspian | (5) Alpine |
| (2) Mediterranean | (6) Ural |
| (3) Proto-Negroid | (7) Palae-Alpine |
| (4) Proto-Australoid | (8) Mongoloid |

Physical characteristics distinguishing races.—In Chart III, page 33, we present a tentative graphic representation of the descent of man, indicating his prehuman ancestry and the eventual appearance, according to Kroeber, of his main ethnic divisions. Following Kroeber's classification, let us consider briefly some of the physical characteristics underlying his differentiation of races.

Of the three major racial stems, the Caucasoid is the one to which the white populations of Europe, and their American descendents, belong. The Nordic branch, largely Teutonic, clustered about the North and Baltic seas, are long-headed, generally tall in stature, with light hair and complexion, and blue eyes. The Mediterranean, of which most of the Italians are typical, is also long-headed, medium in height and slender, with swarthy complexion and dark

¹Kroeber, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

²*The Racial History of Man*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923, pp. 3-23.

hair and eyes. Between these two is the Alpine, identified with Central Europe, broad-headed, above average in height, but of brown hair and eyes. By a curious turn in prehistoric migration, the fourth member of the family moved east and southward into Asia, becoming eventually the Hindus of India, whose original Caucasoid features have been modified through admixture of blood with Asiatic peoples.

The Mongoloid stock includes Eastern Asiatic groups, such as the Chinese and Japanese, the Malays of the Malay Peninsula and the East Indies, and the American Indians. Typically, the Mongoloid races have straight, black hair, little body hair, broad heads, brown skins (from light to dark brown), and broad faces. They are below the average in height, with the exception of the American Indian, who ranges from tall to medium. The oblique or "Mongolian" eye tends to be confined to the Eastern Asiatic branch of Mongoloids. Among the Malay groups the skin tends to be darker than that of the peoples of the East, especially so among the so-called "Indonesian" strain of the East Indies. The American Indian represents the Mongolian stock on the American continents. This group is usually characterized as having straight, coarse, black hair, prominent cheek bones, and large, wide noses.

The Negroid stock, the third main stem of mankind according to our classification, is generally characterized as having a black skin, woolly hair, little or no body hair, a narrow or long head, a broad nose, and a tendency toward thick and everted lips. Kroeber has divided the Negroid stock into three sub-races—viz., the Negro (of Africa, more especially of West and Central Africa); the Melanesian of the Melanesian Islands in the Pacific; and the Dwarf or pygmy blacks found in South and Central Africa, the Malay Peninsula, and the East Indies. Each of these groups is distinguishable in certain traits from the others. Thus, the pygmy groups are generally broad-headed instead of narrow-headed, and are short in stature, while the Negro of Africa tends to be tall, and the Melanesian medium in height.

The stocks given as of doubtful classification may be briefly described. The Australian, the first type given in this list, is tall and has a black skin—more accurately described as chocolate brown, varying from dark to lighter shades. He is narrow-headed and broad-nosed, and has wavy hair and a luxuriant growth of body hair. The Indo-Australians, including tribes in Ceylon and South-

east Asia, have wavy hair and a long head; they are short in stature and dark brown in color. Polynesians vary, but may be described typically as wavy-haired, medium in nose-width, brown of skin, and tall. The type in Polynesia is decidedly confused—naturally so, since he is the heir to both Mongoloid and Caucasoid strains and in certain regions has a Negroid admixture as well. The Ainu, perhaps the original “natives” of Japan, are often regarded as kinsmen of the Caucasoid. They are narrow-headed, wavy-haired, have noses of medium width, are light brown in color, and are medium in height.

Racial distribution and racial mixture.—Several points should be kept clearly in mind in any consideration of biological racial types. In the first place, the three major racial divisions are by no means limited in their distribution to a particular continent, or to any specific territorial area. While it is true that so far as numbers are concerned the Caucasoid is more definitely related to Europe, the Mongoloid to Asia, and the Negroid to Africa, all of them, as Kroeber points out, have long since become definitely intercontinental, and branches of each will be found in every continent. Again, no significant connection whatsoever exists between biological races and political nationalities. No nation illustrates this point better than the United States, which, while predominantly Caucasoid, nevertheless includes representatives and mixtures of every race. Furthermore, we must remember that even biologically speaking, the term “race” is an exceedingly indefinite and hypothetical term. Ethnologists tell us that with one or two possible but unimportant and uncertain exceptions, there is no such thing as a pure race. Long before the dawn of history, people had crossed with people to such an extent that exact biological differentiation is frequently impossible and in every case is problematical. It is difficult for us to realize this in view of our childhood training, which taught us to regard a Chinese as unequivocally a Chinese and a Negro as a Negro; but the findings of ethnology and anthropology are too certain upon this score for any informed person to believe that peoples or individuals can be found who have not somewhere along the line had their blood intermingled with that of other races.

The interfusion of peoples, with the resulting racial mixtures, is as inevitable as human nature itself. From time immemorial circumstances have brought people of different blood into juxtaposition.

Sometimes the reasons have been conquest, sometimes commerce, sometimes a wanderlust; but wherever any motive or circumstance has led to two races living side by side, individuals in each group have been attracted to those of the opposite sex in the other group. Sometimes it has been upon the basis of the conqueror and the conquered, sometimes as equals; but in any event, children have been born to the union in whose veins the blood of both has mingled. As a result, race has crossed with race, and their descendants have crossed with the descendants of other races until it is no longer possible to single out strains that are pure and unmixed. The process of migration, intermingling and amalgamation, indefinitely repeated through untold generations, has made not only America, but the whole world, a "melting pot" of races. This being the case, we should accept the fact that, save in a very general way, a biological racial designation is a pure fiction, or at least a hypothetical designation. Many individuals technically classified as Alpines may be distinctly Nordic in type. The Chinese merge imperceptibly into the Amerind. Many "blacks" are much fairer skinned than many "whites." It is impossible to adopt any criterion that is so exact and final as to make possible a convincing absolute differentiation.

To what extent is this amalgamation taking place? Edwin Grant Conklin¹ states that from fifteen to twenty per cent of the total Negro population of about ten and a half millions in the United States in 1900 were mulattoes, and these are increasing more rapidly than the pure blacks. In South America, according to Conklin, it has been estimated that there are about twenty million persons of mixed blood as compared with twenty-six millions of whites, Indians, and Negroes; while in Australia and New Zealand, where white men have been for about a century, there are already almost as many half-castes as full-blooded aborigines. With such an admixture of blood taking place among the three great racial bodies, we are not surprised to find amalgamation going on at a much more rapid pace between the several lesser ethnic subdivisions of each, where the kinship is closer. We have noted that the United States is an example of this, *par excellence*. Culturally our people are "American"; but aside from the American Indian, who is Mongoloid, there is no American "race" in this country. Our population

¹In the *Yale Review*, July, 1922.

is a collection of hybrids, representing blood combinations of practically all ethnic forms that have been listed, particularly those of Europe.

It is characteristic of mankind that as his ethnic contacts widen, they are reflected in his cross-mating; and this tendency is more pronounced now than ever before, because such contacts are more nearly universal than ever before. Conklin, noting this general tendency toward mating across racial lines, concludes that "if this movement goes on, as we have every right to expect that it will, it can only end in a more or less complete fusion of existing races, and it needs only the vision that can look ahead a few thousand years at most to see all races blended into a common stream."

POSSIBILITIES OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Our brief study of the beginnings of life upon the earth and of the beginnings of man and his evolution has disclosed a marvelous story of the advance of organic beings from the simplest unicellular creatures to the being who overtops the whole of animal creation—man. Superior to all other living things, he has made himself master of the world. Since the story of his emergence seems to point to ever higher levels and to greater and greater advances, one might well raise the question as to the limits of evolution. Does evolution suggest a guarantee of human progress? Our answer must take note of three lines along which the development of man has taken place through the ages.

The first is physical or bodily evolution. We have seen that *Homo Sapiens* represents the highest species that has been attained so far as biological knowledge records. The biologists tell us, however, that there has been no modification in the bodily structure of man during the past twenty thousand years or more, and that so far as we can judge it is permanently at a standstill. If this be true, we need not expect any race of physical supermen to arise in the future.

The second line of human evolution is mental. The brain structure itself has undergone no important change during the last several thousand years. From the evidence available, anthropologists infer that the brain of Cro-Magnon man was biologically as good as the brain of twentieth-century man; but the knowledge which that brain contains and the capacity to use the brain have enormously in-

creased. These changes are not organic but educational. Moreover, modern physiological psychology tends to establish the fact that the possibilities of brain use are so great that probably even the most advanced mind of the modern world has not touched more than a fraction of the possibilities his brain possesses.

The third line of human development is social—a development that relates to the collective activities of mankind within human society. The tremendous power of man individually and in association with his fellows has exhibited itself in an infinite number of ways. He has made successful war upon those creatures which have threatened to destroy him, from the great beasts of jungle and plain to the microscopic bacteria which prey upon him. He has overcome to a remarkable degree the physical environment which formerly laid limitations upon his achievement. He has harnessed the forces of nature to do his labor and to work his miracles. He has enriched his life with great creations of art and has piled up an astonishing heritage of literature, philosophy, and religion. All these things he has accomplished. Nothing seems to hold him in his soaring achievements. But one challenge he has not successfully met—that which lies in the realm of community life; it is the challenge of problems of human relations. They are the most vital to human well-being that confront him today. Can he, and will he, turn his power to their solution? The way that question is to be answered will go far in determining the future path of mankind. It is to a study of man as a social animal—to man living in society—that we now wish to turn.

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PART II
HUMAN CULTURE

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CHAPTER IV

MAN AND HIS CULTURE

IN THE course of ages too distant to be dated exactly and too long to be measured accurately, man, it is believed, emerged through a process of organic evolution. He seems to represent the apex of organic development, though distinctly related to animal creation. But the story of man the animal is but one aspect of the drama of human development. To complete the story it is necessary to understand the emergence of man as a social being and a culture builder. His superior body and mentality, his peculiar needs, made society inevitable and culture a necessity. These in turn enhanced his uniqueness and gave him an ascendant place in the order of life.

Human society and culture were born of the nature and needs of human beings. The beginning of human society implies the emergence of group associations, regularized contacts, modes of behavior, a shared life. Contemporary with the emergence of this organized existence, no doubt, was culture. That is, during the course of man's struggle to live, tools, techniques, elementary skills, language, customs, and institutions developed. The emergence of culture represents a memorable chapter in the long story of man. It symbolizes, not a break with his animal heritage, but the beginning of his humanness. In this chapter an effort is made to explain the nature of this distinctively human contribution.

What is culture?—We shall be able to get a comprehensive idea of the nature of culture if we turn first to the definitions given by recognized authorities and then proceed to examine some of the common characteristics displayed by existing cultures.

How, then, may we define culture? Perhaps the most famous definition is that of Tylor, an English scholar. He described culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, and any other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society." Dixon, an American student, says, "The term 'culture' has come to be used by anthropologists, sociologists, and others as a designation for that totality of a people's products

and activities, social and religious order, customs and beliefs which, in the case of the more advanced, we have been accustomed to call their civilization." Terminology and emphasis vary, but there is fair uniformity among students of culture as to its meaning.¹ Generally, it is discussed as a complex of techniques, technologies, customs, organizations, institutions, ideas, and values. It is assumed that this complex is a heritage from the past, that it is transmitted successively through the generations of men, and that it is communicated from individual to individual and from group to group. Were we to describe our own culture, consideration would have to be given to our techniques and machinery, our methods of making a living, our play-habits, etiquette, social ritual, our political institutions, family organization, morals, religion, art, literature, our theories, theologies, and values.²

A discussion, at this point, of some of the more significant characteristics of culture will make its meaning more specific.

First, culture appears to be unique to man. Apparently man alone of the higher animals possesses language; makes tools; has institutions, customs, traditions; and transmits his knowledge of all these things to other men. Facts seem to support the contention that he alone is a culture builder. And the possession of culture stamps man as unique, and distinguishes him in significant ways from the other members of the mammal group. Man's distinctly human qualities we may attribute to the organization of his life in

¹For other formulations see A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilizations*, Alfred A. Knopf, 1928, p. 15; J. K. Folsom, *Culture and Social Progress*, Longmans, Green & Company, 1928, p. 15; and E. E. Eubank, *Concepts of Sociology*, D. C. Heath and Company, 1932, p. 338.

²A thorough analysis of culture would require a description of its qualitatively different aspects. For example, material culture is sometimes distinguished from non-material culture, a tool from an idea, a machine from an economic structure, technology from social structure. Clearly, there is a difference, though one must remember that a tool or a machine, a material object, is significant only in relation to collective habits and non-material structures. A collection of items in a museum is not a culture, any more than a man's skeleton is a man. One may distinguish, also, folkways from mores—folkways implying customs in general, while mores refer to folkways or customs with a moral content, containing the notion of moral welfare (a distinction first used by W. G. Sumner in *Folkways*). Mores in our society are operative in our attitudes towards property, life-taking, marriage, and the relation of the sexes. Clearly the line between folkways and mores is tenuous, varying with situations, time, place, and type of persons involved. Many other points would have to be discussed in distinguishing the aspects of culture. And certainly the Wissler analysis of culture into traits, complexes, and patterns would have to be considered.

The aim of this chapter is not a complete, theoretical analysis of culture, but rather a general interpretation that will give the student a working conception of it. Naturally, therefore, much is left out that would be essential in a theoretical treatise.

terms of a culture. Denuded of culture, he would be merely an animal. Possessing culture, he is an animal, to be sure, but a human animal.

Not only is culture a unique heritage of man, but it is a possession of all men. Culture is now, and, in so far as we can trace human history, has always been, universal. No people known, past or present, is culturally naked. A folk's culture may be very simple, as that of the Veddahs of Ceylon; or very rude, as that of early man; but, simple or complex, culture has been an ever-present fact in the human world. Romantic persons, surfeited with the complexities of "civilization," have often dreamed of the delights of life among the "nature" peoples, alleged to be free of hampering institutions and rigid controls. But the student of culture can find no such "children of nature." Men everywhere seem to be children of culture. We do not know whether or not man could live without a culture. We only know that apparently there are no cases where he has done so. Culture is indispensable to human existence. Through it man adjusts himself to, and orders, his human and natural environments. Culture has thus emerged in the course of man's effort to live, and it is perpetuated because through it man's collective existence is secured.

Not only is culture universal, but all cultures seem to possess certain common essentials. Culture apparently conforms everywhere to a pattern, termed by Wissler the Universal Culture Pattern. Cultures radically diverse display, on closer examination, essentially similar elements. Thus no greater contrast between cultures could be imagined than that between the culture of the pygmy Semang of the Malay Peninsula forest and the culture of Western Europe. Yet both Semangs and Western Europeans have tools, economic organization, language, marriage, family organization, morality, religion, and so on. Differences in the detailed content of these cultures make the peoples total strangers. But clearly a common pattern is involved in each culture. Obviously, a Masai of East Africa and a Chinese are at opposite ends of the cultural pole; but, probably, both cultures conform to a common pattern. The Universal Culture Pattern idea implies that all cultures contain basically similar elements and conform to a common scheme or pattern.

If this be the case, it should be possible to discover these essential elements in the pattern. And in recent years the attempt has been made by a number of students. Wissler has recognized nine funda-

mental features of culture: speech, material traits, art, mythologies and scientific knowledge, religious practices, family and social systems, property, government, and war.¹ Under each of these nine heads he assembles the specific items belonging to that class. The important thing is not a given scheme, but the fact that culture does apparently everywhere tend to possess common elements. We may quarrel with the details of a given classification. For example, some students have insisted that war is not universal, although given a place in Wissler's scheme. However, war tends to be universal. Isolated simpler peoples lack any except the barest rudiments of political structure, but the people utterly lacking political organization are so few that it is practically accurate to say that political institutions are universal. Perhaps no scheme or classification could fit the details of every culture, for the content of cultures is too complicated and diversified.

The student, however, is not asked to test a given scheme or to accept any given classification of the basic elements of culture, but to investigate the idea. The notion of a Universal Culture Pattern does seem to have great utility. Thus it introduces order into the items of culture, enabling the investigator to distinguish and classify basic elements. Moreover, it suggests the basic kinship of all cultures, each culture being a variation of a universal fact and pattern. Culture is reduced to its common denominators. And perhaps the hypothesis suggests, though it by no means proves, that there is an underlying uniformity of human tendencies, needs, and conditions creating a fundamental similarity of cultures everywhere.

VARIATIONS IN CULTURES

Obviously, to recognize the basic similarity of cultures is not to deny their variability. One may distinguish numerous major differences or types of culture. The culture of Western Europe and that of China diverge radically, although both conform to the universal culture pattern idea; that is, these two represent different types of culture. The census taker of the world's cultures finds numerous major cultures which he recognizes as types. A given region of any extent usually presents varying types of culture. For example,

¹Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture*, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1923, p. 74. Wissler deserves credit for first clearly stating the idea and giving a classification. For a summary of other classifications see E. E. Eubank, *op. cit.*, pp. 339-343.

Wissler has isolated nine types for the Indians of the United States and Canada. As laymen we probably assume that all Indian cultures are alike. Students of Africa, Asia, and the Pacific region are able to distinguish a variety of cultures within each of these areas. The trained eye can always detect these variations, and even the casual observer can discover the grosser differences.

When we come to consider specific phases or aspects of culture, we discover manifold differences. Thus in economic organization is found everything from the hunting Bushmen of South Africa to the complicated, large-scale, machine production of modern Europe and the United States. In political structure, certain tribes of Eskimos and some of the pygmy groups of Malaysia practically without political organization stand at one end of the scale, with political leviathans such as Great Britain, Russia, and the United States at the other. Religious institutions and beliefs display a similar variety. We have Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islamism, Confucianism, Shintoism, hundreds of so-called "primitive" religions, as well as many varieties of each of the great "world" religions.

We are perhaps inclined to think that in such important matters as marriage, the family, and sex morals there would be uniformity. But variety obtains here too. Marriage forms range from "group" marriage, polygyny, and polyandry, to the monogamy familiar in our own society. Customs defining the relationships of wife and husband, child and parent, modes of mate selection, and methods of dissolving marriage are perplexingly varied. One convinced that there is only one right system of sex morals will be disturbed by the bewildering variety of customs and practices relative to sex behavior: the Veddahs of Ceylon glorify premarital chastity; many others, like the Samoans and some of the Melanesian and African tribes, regard premarital sex freedom as essential, and see nothing "immoral" about it.

This variability is equally present in the narrower aspects of social practices. Consider, for example, the astounding contrasts in the matter of food. The Kagoro in Nigeria, Africa, are said to be fond of a soup made from boiling rats, mice, bats, and millet ash. A Western European obviously could not endure such a concoction. Some tribes in Nigeria, as well as many other peoples, are fond of meat in a state of putrefaction. They think it delicious. Western taste-buds are outraged at the thoughts of such a dish. Until

recently, at least, the entire East-Asiatic world, inclusive of China, Korea, Japan, Indo-China, and Malaysia, regarded milk with deep aversion. A West African Grebo of the writer's acquaintance regarded the milk of the cow with disgust. To him it was a filthy excrement from the body of the cow. He had not been culturally conditioned to milk-drinking. Cannibalistic peoples have often wondered at the "silly" objection of the "civilized" to the eating of human flesh. The meat-eating Moslem of India does not appreciate the dietary qualms of his Hindu neighbor; and the Hindu hurls the epithet "cow-eater" at his Moslem compatriot. Both are the unwitting victims of a cultural tradition.

Cultural biases.—Illustrations of cultural variation might be drawn from numerous other aspects of social life. Those given will serve to suggest that variety rather than uniformity is the rule in the development of culture. A typical and rather natural expression of culture variation is cultural biases. Each culture group, being in a measure isolated from all others and living in terms of its own culture, tends to assume its way of life to be superior and its manners and morals to be "natural" and good. Other groups appear barbarous. Their customs are regarded as strange, queer, perhaps "immoral" and "unnatural." The old-fashioned missionaries, for example, were invariably shocked in the presence of nudity, polygamy, premarital sex freedom, and certain magical and religious practices of the peoples of Asia, Africa and the Pacific islands. What they saw convinced them that these people needed "salvation"—that is, needed to adopt the culture of the missionaries. No distinctive people is apparently free of this reaction of cultural bias, simple or civilized. Eskimos have it as do Americans. To each of the great nations of the past, its own achievements and culture have seemed superior to those of any other. The tendency to assume uniqueness on the part of peoples is apparently universal. In the modern world of the West and increasingly in the East, cultural biases take political form. Perhaps the core of nationalism and patriotism is a cultural bias. Certainly the sense of cultural differences aids and abets nationalistic sentiments.

Cultural biases vary in intensity from group to group and from person to person. The more isolated groups, with less experience of alien peoples, naturally are "narrower" in their reaction to strange folk and ways. Persons whose contacts are varied will be more tolerant of alien peoples, though not necessarily free from bias. Gen-

erally speaking, reading, travel, and diverse contacts extend the horizons of one's appreciation of cultural variations; to such, alien folk become "human." It is difficult for a person growing up in one culture to realize that the standards of that culture are relative, that good taste, conceptions of right and wrong, and "best" institutions reflect specific judgments. Fielding's parson in *Tom Jones* said that when he spoke of religion he meant the Christian religion, and when he spoke of the Christian religion he meant the Protestant religion, and when he spoke of the Protestant religion he meant the religion of the Established Church. Perhaps to the great mass of mankind ways other than their own are regarded as spurious. It should be clear to the student that judging a people from the angle of one's own culture is misjudgment. Seeing a people in terms of its own culture is the only way adequately to understand that people. Admittedly, this is a difficult feat, and few there are who accomplish it.

HOW CULTURES GROW AND CHANGE

In the beginning of this chapter it was suggested that culture is transmitted from generation to generation. It is not the product of any given group, generation, or time. Individuals die, even groups disappear; but culture seems immortal. This is not to say that every specific culture is continuous in its life. Cultures do wax and wane and ostensibly disappear. But culture as a whole, beginning with Paleolithic man, a hundred thousand years ago or more, has had a more or less continuous history. The break-up of culture in a given area or the decay of a specific culture has never meant the death knell of culture. The main stream has flowed on. The continuity of culture, implying the linkage of the past with the present and the dependence of any given generation upon a cultural inheritance from the past, is a fact of primary importance in understanding the growth or development of culture. Even though some peoples have no consciousness of a history, they all have a history, a history that makes them a link in the long chain of cultural continuity.

It is evident, then, that the culture of a given time and place is not the creation of the individuals and generation of that time and place. Culture is prior to the individuals of a given generation. Each generation is heir to a culture, which it may alter or modify, but which it cannot escape. Individuals, either unwittingly or

as a result of deliberate teaching, make the culture in which they grow up their own and in turn transmit it more or less intact to oncoming generations. In this way cultural continuity is assured.

The fact of cultural continuity does not mean that each generation receives a culture which it dutifully transmits to the next. Cultures are never wholly static. With the passing of time a given culture always shows signs of change. In an absolute sense, the characterizing of cultures as static and as changing is inaccurate. More accurately, we have slowly changing and rapidly changing cultures. The rate of change in some cases is slow, so slow that one doubts that they change at all; in others, rapid. In our day the slowly changing cultures are decreasing numerically—primarily, perhaps, because of the world-wide sweep of machinery, new methods of communication and transportation, and the propelling force of nationalism and democracy. In our day, practically everywhere, cultures are on the “move.”

How do we explain culture change? No explanation is completely adequate. Interpreters disagree in emphases and conclusions. It is clear, therefore, that in a short sketch justice cannot be done to a problem so complicated. Nevertheless a brief formulation of what appear to be the more important factors in culture change will be of some value. Three factors suggest themselves: failure to duplicate the past, invention, and diffusion.

Change through failure to duplicate the past.—As has been implied previously, no generation “makes” its own culture or starts with a “clean slate.” But it is equally true that no generation copies with exactitude the cultural heritage of the past. Exact duplication is approximated in isolated and comparatively static societies, but never quite realized. Each age is in some measure unique in its experiences, needs, and nature, with the result that it makes some change or modification of past culture, slight though the change may be.

Though it is true that with the lapse of time some changes in culture occur, it should be emphasized that the basic patterns of culture—such, for example, as economic organization, religion, marriage, and the family—can lay claim to an impressive vitality. These have been altered through time, but they have not been eliminated. It is the specific items of culture that are constantly changing. The path of history is strewn with dead customs, ideas, systems, beliefs, and techniques. In our own culture, for instance, we express amuse-

ment at bustles, pinched waists, old sentimental songs, old-fashioned ideas of love and courtship, and the manners in general of the past generation. Moreover, we speak today of the *new* status of woman and of the *new* morality, and thus give expression to our belief that we are moving away from the past—that the past is dead. At times, to be sure, attempts are made to revive elements that have been discarded by the majority of people of a given generation; but such attempts generally fail, because it is difficult to retrace steps culturally. These “survivals” may hang on in the minds of the old-fashioned and conservative or become embalmed in literature and history, but they have little or no vital connection with contemporary life and culture.

Invention and culture change.—Inventions probably occur, to some extent at least, in every culture. An invention may either represent a radical departure from the aspect of culture it represents, as was the case of the steam engine, the power loom, the automobile, the aeroplane, or the Soviet system of government and economic organization in Russia. Or it may represent but a slight addition to the culture heritage, the kind patented by thousands in the United States every year. An invention need not of necessity be mechanical. Any new process, technique, method, or organization might be termed an invention. The city-manager form of city government might be termed an invention. Vaccination is an invention, as is Esperanto, a kind of international language.

Inventions are always related to a culture background or culture base. They emerge not merely from the minds of individuals, but are inspired, and in a sense produced, by a given culture. The steam engine could not have been invented among the American Indians. Nothing in their culture could have made it possible. Neolithic man of 10,000 years ago in Europe probably had a mind as innately capable as that of man today, but he lacked thousands of basic culture items that modern man has. Ten thousand years of accumulated culture, and not brains, accounts for this. Americans are in the habit of assuming that our “peculiar mechanical genius” explains our mechanized world. Probably our peculiar cultural background has at least as much to do with it. Inventions, as a general principle, must always be viewed against a background of culture, a culture base; they cannot be explained when dissociated from their cultural setting. Even inventive genius must function in terms of a cultural setting. A Watt, an Edison, or a Marconi

growing up among the New Guinea cannibals might have excelled in some lines, but not as an inventor.

In a sense, as Ogburn has suggested, inventions under certain circumstances are inevitable. It was inevitable, for example, that the Industrial Revolution should release thousands of mechanical inventions. Mechanical inventiveness is to be expected in our society; hundreds of people, without knowing each other, work on the same thing; they share the same culture and respond to the same "drifts" or urges.¹ These illustrations of the relation of the cultural background to invention suggest the potency of culture in defining the needs, reactions, interests and mental activity of a people.

Clearly inventions vary as to their significance. Some transform culture; others effect few or no significant changes. A new method of wrapping cigarettes is an invention of little or no cultural importance; but there can be no doubt about the tremendous significance of the steam engine, wireless, telephone, long-range gun, locomotive, aëroplane, or the new economic and social organization in Russia. Such inventions are epochal in the life of humanity.

Diffusion in culture change.—The third and last factor to be discussed in culture change is diffusion. Diffusion refers to the process by which one culture absorbs items from another culture. Probably it is the basic factor in culture change. Culture does not change easily without contact with other cultures. Contact excites change; it promotes invention and stimulates new ideas and techniques. The culture of Japan changed slowly over a long period of time until the late nineteenth century, when broad contacts with the West began. Once linked with Western influences, Japanese culture underwent a rapid and radical modification. The sweeping changes in the cultures of Asia and Africa now in process may likewise be explained in terms of contacts with Western peoples. Most of the peoples of the world today are involved in numerous economic, political, and social contacts, which probably explains the dynamic, somewhat confused, rapidly changing nature of the world's cultures.

Diffusion has been a constant factor in culture change. It has operated throughout history. The Greeks borrowed much of their

¹Ogburn has shown this tendency for the same inventions to be made more or less simultaneously in the same or similar cultures. He has given a list of such inventions. See W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, Viking Press (1927 edition), pp. 90-102. Bernhard Stern has collected a similar list in his *Social Factors in Medical Progress*, Columbia University Press, 1927.

culture from the Near East. The Romans borrowed from the Greeks; and the culture of Rome in turn was scattered throughout its vast empire. The early settlers in the United States borrowed certain items of culture from the Indians, such as the use of maize or corn, the use of tobacco, foods like hominy and succotash, place names, and the like. In fact, this principle of diffusion has operated so extensively during the hundred thousand years or more of history that no people can lay claim to a culture original to itself. All peoples have borrowed. And if any given culture of our day had stripped from it the "alien" elements, probably there would be little left. In our day, as previously suggested, diffusion operates more intensively and extensively than ever before, due primarily to our mechanical methods of transportation and communication.

Resistance to culture change.—From the foregoing, contacts between cultures appear to be a primary factor in culture change, since contacts, direct or indirect, are essential to diffusion. But it does not invariably follow that contact between peoples means diffusion of cultural items. There may be contact without diffusion. Christian missionaries have been decidedly unsuccessful in Moslem countries. Their religion does not seem to "take" in these lands. Western culture is sweeping the world; but there are peoples resisting it. In fact, at no time does a people denude itself of its traditional culture and automatically absorb another diffusing culture. The degree to which diffusing traits are incorporated into a culture depends upon certain conditions, which tend to vary.

For one thing, the borrowing culture must be psychologically ready for change. China is now open to Western influence, but less than a hundred years ago it was hostile. Having been incorporated in a world society where Western culture is in vogue and has prestige and utility, the Chinese are now naturally eager to take over certain elements of Western culture. Isolated folk the world around fanatically oppose outside cultures. Psychologically, they are not yet ready for change. At the present time Americans are generally hostile to the Communistic system of Russia. The mind-set is against it, and elements of Communistic culture, if we may so characterize it, have little chance of diffusing in this country. With changes in our economic and social conditions a more favorable reaction to Communism may conceivably develop.

The prestige and utility of the diffusing culture have much to do with its acceptance. For example, the African cultures have little

chance for diffusion in Europe. They lack the utility and prestige. On the other hand, European cultures, having the kind of utility that the age demands, and possessing prestige as well, do spread to Africa. Perhaps Western culture is diffusing so extensively at present, not because it can claim an ultimate superiority, but because in the world as organized now it has greater utility than any other culture. Moreover, it is the culture of the conquering, imperialistic nations of our day, and hence all peoples must come to terms with it.

Even where diffusion does occur, the accepted item of culture does not remain unchanged. What usually happens is that it is modified, "naturalized" in keeping with the new culture setting. Thus, Japanese or Chinese Christianity is not the Christianity of the American missionary. Even today the Catholicism of the Mexican Indian is in some cases more "pagan" than Catholic. Any culture item introduced in a new culture will be transformed to some extent. Diffusion, then, is never a mere mechanical process. Accepted alien elements are stamped more or less with the "native" character.

SOME SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CULTURE CHANGE

One who observes culture change as a social phenomenon soon discovers striking contrasts in the speed with which changes are taking place in different parts of the world today. In the main, the cultures of the West are changing rapidly; those of the East and Africa, slowly. But if one compares the present with the past he will see that contemporary society the world over is in the grip of comparatively rapid culture changes. Even the remote and isolated areas of the earth are now undergoing significant modifications. Never before has this process of culture change operated upon so extensive a scale. This accounts, perhaps, for the conflicts, confusion, problems, and movements evident everywhere in the modern world.

Perhaps the problems of a changing culture would not be so severe if change operated consistently and evenly within that culture. But normally change occurs more rapidly in certain aspects of culture than in others. Thus, a culture in process of rapid change may be "advanced" in its tools, techniques, and machinery, but medieval in its religious beliefs, economic policies,

and political ideas. Apparently certain aspects of culture change with greater ease than do others. Such retardation along certain lines of development has been referred to as a "culture lag." It is observable that ideas, beliefs, social and political policies lag behind developments in technology, science, and economic conditions. This is clearly manifest in the cultures of the West as well as in the contemporary cultures of the East and Africa.

These rapid changes in culture, accompanied as they are by "culture lags," carry with them social consequences of significance both to society and to the individual. Under these conditions old controls lose their potency. New controls are difficult to establish. Maladjustments emerge, expressed in social problems of many sorts—political, economic, religious, and moral. The people as a whole become restless, confused, disturbed. Social division and conflict are symptomatic of the lack of balance and adjustment in the collective life. Naturally, under such circumstances life is not easy for the individual. There are many "proposed roads to freedom," but he does not know which to take. The very inconsistency of standards makes for confusion and inconsistency in conduct. In the words of Mr. Lippman, "Whirl is King." All sorts of gospels, programs, and movements emerge offering solutions for the ills of a changing society. But none can guarantee certitude and security. No better illustration of this perplexed condition can be found than that presented in the world today.

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CHAPTER V

BIOLOGICAL FACTORS IN CULTURE

DOES human culture admit of further analysis? And can we by further analysis separate out and study the factors that combine to produce it and to determine its character? We answer both of these questions affirmatively. But at the same time we must remember that problems of human association differ from those of chemistry and physics, and that they cannot be solved with mathematical precision. Every fact of civilization is the product of a variety of elements working together, each of which is potent only because of the presence of the others. No one factor can be accepted as a single cause; nor can its particular share in the result be weighed and measured. Therefore, when we select any particular element for special consideration, it is done merely for convenience and upon the postulate that each is truly intelligible only in terms of all the others.

With this caution constantly in mind we may proceed to the question: What are the interrelated factors which are jointly operative in the making and the continuous remaking of culture? Broadly speaking, they fall into three major divisions: (1) The biological—those which exist within the physiological organization of the human body; (2) the geographic—those which are found in the external world of nature; and (3) the social—those which result from human association. These three are to be discussed in this chapter and the two chapters following.

Our approach to the study of biological factors.—With the shifting of attention from culture to the biological forces that operate within it, we pass from product to producer; for, as already indicated, culture is the unique creation of man, and man owes his distinct position in this respect to certain biological advantages, to forces which have their seat within his own body, and which constitute the psycho-physical foundation of his behavior, thoughts, and feelings. These forces we call the biological factors. Thus we return to a further examination of man as a biological organism, a

complex mental and physical unit with inner appetites and desires which can be satisfied only by the utilization of the resources of the geographic and social environments. This biological organism is a complicated instrument which is capable of receiving stimuli from the outside world, of responding to these stimuli, and of adjusting itself, within limits, to changes in the geographic situation. Human culture arises primarily as modes of adjustment—that is, ways of acting, thinking, and feeling—which men have worked out and transmitted to others in the course of their associated attempts to adapt themselves and their group to the conditions of the physical world.

The discussion which follows has been centered around three questions: (1) What biological factors differentiate man from other animals and make it possible for him to develop a culture? (2) To what extent can biological factors furnish an explanation for the rise of differences in cultures, as, for example, differences between Chinese and British civilizations? (3) How and in what ways can biological factors be used to explain differences between persons and groups within a single civilization? Let us consider the first of these.

WHY MAN IS THE SOLE CULTURE-BUILDER

We have already seen that man as a biological creature is a product of organic evolution. Man is an animal, related to other animals, possessing numerous physiological characteristics in common with them. He exhibits similarities to his animal relatives in physical structure; in appetites such as hunger, thirst and sex; in simple behavior patterns such as reflexes; in physiological processes such as digestion, circulation and respiration; and in emotional seizures such as fear and rage. Man's behavior, in so far as can be observed, is always associated with his animal body and cannot be adequately understood apart from it.

It is not, however, the biological traits possessed by man in common with other animals that enable us to explain the development of culture as a uniquely human product. It is those mutant characteristics which differentiate him from other, non-cultured animals that possess significance. No one knows precisely when or how man's mutant characteristics made their appearance. We may admit, however, that the mutation theory represents the most adequate explanation that has been devised up to the present time.

The most important traits which make man unique among the animals are superior mental equipment, superior vocal apparatus, erect posture, tool-making hands, and greater plasticity. These characteristics are, of course, closely interrelated in equipping man as a culture builder and cannot be understood as isolated factors. It may be helpful, however, to discuss them separately.

The unique mental capacity of man.—Man has a larger brain, relative to the size of his body, than have other animals. The animals most nearly approaching man in the evolutionary scale, namely the anthropoid apes, have a cranial capacity of less than half that of man, although in bodily weight they frequently surpass him. It is seldom if ever that an anthropoid ape has a cranial capacity of more than 600 cubic centimetres, while it is unusual for a man of any modern civilized race to have one of less than 1200 cubic centimetres. *Pithecanthropus erectus* had a cranial capacity about midway between the upper limits of contemporary anthropoid apes and the lower limits of contemporary man.

Man's brain is not only larger than that of other animals, but it possesses characteristics which make it superior. Man's mental capacities seem different in quality from those of animals. The basic difference is his capacity for imagination. The power of abstract reasoning, which is ordinarily regarded as differentiating man from the animals, depends directly and definitely upon this same basic quality. Köhler, who has made an intensive study of the social and mental life of apes, states emphatically that these animals differ in mentality from human beings in that they have no capacity for imagination. A careful reading of Köhler's materials indicates that some of the apes, particularly the one he calls Sultan, approached very closely, if they did not actually achieve, the formulation of abstract concepts. But in spite of the evidence, Köhler and other careful students of animal life maintain that animals have no more than a trace of this imaginative ability. While there is no reason to be dogmatic on the question, the present weight of evidence supports the conclusion that animals are unable to reason. Even if further investigation demonstrates that animals possess some significant degree of imaginative power, it remains fairly certain that the difference in degree between them and man will remain so great that man may always be justly characterized as the animal possessing imagination and the consequent power to reason.

Imagination consists essentially in the ability to free one's self from the immediate situation of reality and to construct an unreal imagined situation by the utilization of free symbols. It is the inability of the animal to free himself from the limitations of the concrete situation that makes it impossible for him to develop culture. Reasoning consists primarily of comparative imagining. It occurs only in problem-solving situations. Man's ability to solve problems is, like that of animals, a trial-and-error process, but in the solving of a problem the animal must actually perform the overt random actions which may finally result in success, whereas man may project himself into the future and view possible alternatives on the basis of imagined situations before ever beginning his overt behavior. It is the ability to construct meaningful imaginative situations, to communicate them to his fellows, and to retain them as guides to future collective action that gives man his culture.

Man's superior vocal powers.—Man is able to communicate more effectively with his fellows than are other animals. This advantage is due, in part, to his superior brain. The power of imagination enables him to use free symbols—that is, signs which are not immediately dependent upon the reality being described—for purposes of communication. He has developed a series of these signs which are organized into what we call language. Language is, as we have already discovered, one of man's most important cultural traits. Animals do not have language. They are able to signal to one another by means of emotional cries and gestures, but they are not able to participate in a common meaning, which is the essential feature of human communication.

Related to man's supremacy in the matter of communication is his superior vocal apparatus. Because of the particular formation of his larynx and the roof of his mouth and the position in which his vocal cords are placed, man can produce a wider variety of sounds and tones than any other animal. This vocal ability was of particular importance in man's early development, especially when he began to use free symbols—that is, to make sounds that were something more than emotional cries. The ability to use a large number of free vocal symbols made it possible for man to develop a wider vocabulary and to communicate shades of meaning that would be impossible of expression with a less flexible vocal apparatus. Vocalization offers certain facilities for communication superior to those of any other form; the voice may be heard for considerable distances

in every direction from the one who makes the sounds, and it requires no equipment other than innate biological characteristics. These traits of vocalization were of particular importance prior to the invention of writing.

Man's superior manual dexterity.—Man's supremacy depends further on two other physical attributes—his tool-making hands and his erect posture. Man is the only truly tool-making and tool-using animal. The ape may use a stick or a stone for immediate purposes of adjustment to an existing situation but it makes no attempt to fashion tools for use in future emergencies. All of man's great inventions are the elaborate results of his tool-making ability.

The invention and use of tools depend, of course, upon man's superior brain; but his dexterity in their use is further explained by the erectness of his posture and the peculiar character of his hands. Man is the only animal that habitually assumes an upright posture. Although this is desirable for any animal having a large head and brain, it is not in itself of great importance. The significance of upright posture lies in the fact that it has left the hands free for purposes other than that of locomotion. Moreover, the human hand is better adapted to the manipulation of tools than the hand or paw of any other animal; man has tool-making hands, a characteristic due largely to his possession of the opposable thumb. The human thumb is sufficiently large and well-developed to be used for purposes of grasping, whereas the thumb of the ape is so small and weak and poorly located that it is difficult for it to grasp objects firmly between thumb and forefinger. This biological superiority has been of extreme importance in enabling man to utilize his free hands and superior mental powers in the development of tool-making and tool-using techniques.

Man's greater plasticity and its significance.—Man is unique in another way. He is more dependent during infancy than any other animal. The human infant is entirely helpless for a period after birth, unable to perform alone the most simple acts which will insure his survival. Even his hunger cannot be satisfied except through the coöperation of others. He cannot roll himself over; he cannot escape danger; he cannot even see or hear for a considerable period of time after birth. No other animal is so completely helpless. The infant mammals, such as the pig, calf, or colt, become relatively independent of their parents within a few days or weeks.

The human infant, however, must be cared for over a period of several years. During the entire first year of his life the infant learns only a few limited ways of acting which enable him to care for himself. In the whole animal world man's immaturity is the most prolonged, and with the increasing complexity of civilization the period of human helplessness is further extended. At first this appears to place man at a disadvantage. As a matter of fact the opposite is true.

As a biological consequence of man's prolonged infancy and more complete dependence he enjoys the advantage of greater plasticity. There is a saying that you cannot teach an old dog new tricks. And in this sense a dog becomes old quickly. His learning period is short because his period of plasticity is short. Herein lies the significance of man's protracted immaturity; his greater and longer-extended plasticity makes it possible to mold and educate him in almost any direction the group desires. Hence the great importance attached to the early formative period of life, for it is at this time that the patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting that determine in large measure the character of the future man as an individual and as a social being are fixed.

Man's plasticity and his capacity to learn.—Thus plasticity becomes another factor in man's supremacy, by reason of its providing a longer learning period. Man is *par excellence* an educable animal. The significance of this fact becomes clear when we consider how little of man's behavior is innate—that is, a result of his biological heredity alone—and how much is the result of his education during the period of plasticity. And by education we do not have reference merely to the formal process which goes by that name, but to the whole course of socialization whereby human behavior in all its aspects is brought into conformity with the cultural demands of the group. What types of behavior, then, are innate? What types are learned? What is their relative importance in the building of culture?

Heritable behavior.—A number of relatively simple and definite types of behavior which occur in response to definite situations are unquestionably inherited. These are ordinarily termed reflexes, and may be illustrated by the tendency of the foot to jerk upward when the knees are crossed and a sharp blow is struck just below the knee-cap, and by the tendency of the pupil of the eye to contract when the subject is brought suddenly into a bright light. These

types of behavior are so definite and universal that they are used by physicians for the purpose of medical diagnosis. An extensive list of them may be obtained by reference to a good medical dictionary. These inherited reflexes are, however, of little value in interpreting the social behavior of an adult human being.

Combinations of simple reflexes are also inherited. In a "chained reflex," such as swallowing, a simple stimulation may set off the first response, this response in turn becoming the stimulus for the succeeding response, the second response in turn setting off the third, and so on to the end of the act. In another combination known as the "circular reflex," a response becomes the stimulus for its own repetition. This circular reflex gives rise to rhythmic behavior, as in laughing. More complicated than these chained or circular reflexes are the physiological processes such as digestion, circulation, and respiration, all of which are inherited.

Watson, a psychologist, has described three simple groups of innate actions which may be induced in any normal infant by definite types of stimulations. One of these groups of reactions is described by him as "sudden catching of the breath, clutching randomly with the hands, . . . sudden closing of the eye-lids, puckering of the lips, then crying. . . ." This set of innate responses, which he calls fear, can be induced without learning by only two stimuli, (1) a sudden, loud sound, and (2) sudden withdrawal of support. Two other similar emotional seizures called rage and love have likewise been isolated and described by Watson. These emotional reactions refer only to such simple forms of behavior as were described in the above quotation. They bear little resemblance to the complex ways of acting, thinking, and feeling which an adult exhibits as fear, rage, or love. Like other innate ways of acting, these emotional seizures are of little importance in understanding the form of human culture.

An alleged type of innate behavior, more complex but less definite than the reflex, and presumably of more value in explaining culture, has been proposed by many authors under the name *instinct*. As used by them instinct is a relatively complex, relatively definite, innate way of acting in response to a definite type of stimulus. The following illustration of such an alleged instinct may be cited: Given the situation of a small object rolling away from a human being, there is a definite, unlearned tendency to pounce upon the object, to seize it, and to tear it to pieces. But when one attempts

to discover examples of these complex, innate ways of acting in adult human behavior he cannot find them.

Learned behavior.—How far are our complex ways of acting unlearned? Consider the behavior of a young infant in response to the drive of hunger. He has no innate behavior patterns by which to satisfy his hunger except the reflex of suckling, the chained reflex of swallowing, and the physiological process of digestion. When the infant is hungry he begins to display, not specific patterns of behavior, but a wide variety of more or less random movements together with certain reflexive actions such as crying, which become signals to mother or nurse that he is in need of something. The next step in satisfying the infant's appetite must, however, be taken by his attendant. He is entirely dependent upon some other person for the obtaining of food. He is so plastic that his taste for food, the time at which he demands it, and the way in which he takes it are, within the limits of his physiological capacity, all determined by the cultural patterns forced upon him by those who have him in charge. We must not forget, however, that human beings do inherit drives to action such as hunger, thirst, and sex. They also inherit the tendency to make relatively random movements when they are in need of satisfying some appetite. But the impulsive drives to action and the random movements take a specific form and direction, and become important factors in social behavior only as they are given definition by the culture of the group.

The human infant is a creature infinitely plastic, whose tastes, habits, attitudes, and ideas are dependent upon the culture in which he is reared. He inherits only a limited number of ways of acting—reflexes, physiological processes, emotional seizures—and these have but little social significance. The important facts are that he is born plastic, ready to be shaped by social contacts; and that he is taught most of his specific ways of acting, thinking, and feeling by his associates. It is in the course of this learning process that the human being adjusts himself to the complex requirements of his own civilization. Moreover, this capacity to acquire the accumulated culture of the group makes it possible for each human generation to start its creative efforts at the point where the preceding ones have stopped. Each generation is able to stand on the shoulders of its cultural ancestors and to add its own contribution to the total accumulation. This ability gives cultured man a decided advantage over non-cultured animals, among which each generation must start

from the same level as its ancestors. Man lives in a world that is culturally defined, not in a world of meaningless, mechanical surroundings.

DO BIOLOGICAL FACTORS EXPLAIN THE CHARACTER OF CULTURES?

The biological traits which have set men apart from the rest of the animal world and have given him his supreme place as a culture builder are now before us. May we go on now and say that the wide variations in the character of cultures are also to be explained on a biological basis? If some groups of men possessed more of these distinctive traits than others we might be drawn to the conclusion that herein lies the explanation of cultural variation. But such is not the fact. All groups of men of all biological types and of all cultural levels from the "lowest" preliterate to the "highest" civilized possess these distinctively human traits in common. Are we justified, then, in the conclusion that certain aggregates of human beings possess these traits in superior degree, that is, that they are superior biologically in mental and physical capacities, and consequently produce different types of civilization? This question cannot be answered with certainty without considerably more data than we now possess. Although the present state of knowledge permits only negative conclusions it may be helpful to state and examine some current, popularly-accepted assumptions. The present discussion will be limited to the effects of race in the development of different types of culture.

It will be necessary to recall the definitions of race which were presented in an earlier chapter.¹ Race was defined, biologically, as a collection of individuals sufficiently distinguished physically from other groups to be regarded as a variety of the human species. Let it be remembered that race, defined in this way, does not refer to a cultural or political group. There is no French, English, Semitic, or Aryan race. The differentiating earmarks of race are physical.

But it will be recalled that when the discussion of race was limited to the biological point of view difficulties were still encountered. Dixon, using one set of criteria, arrived at a totally different classification of races from that reached by Kroeber who depended on a different set of criteria. All such classifications are based upon more or less arbitrarily selected lists of biological criteria. There

¹See pages 38-42.

is no way of proving that one is basically more nearly correct than another.

Theories about race as a factor in culture.—Many writers have uncritically assumed that their own definitions and classifications of race are valid and have used them as a basis for explaining differences in the development of cultures. The most radical of these theorists are the Racial Determinists, who declare that the form of culture depends upon the racial factor. Prominent among these theorists are A. de Gobineau, Otto Amon, Houston Chamberlin, and Madison Grant. Lothrop Stoddard, a contemporary exponent of this point of view, states it as follows: "All these marvelous achievements [of Western civilization] were due solely to superior heredity, and the . . . maintenance of race values. Civilization of itself means nothing. It is merely an effect, whose cause is the creative urge of superior germ plasm." This extreme point of view, while held by only a small minority, contains the assumption of racial inequality which in a modified form is a widely accepted popular belief today. Let us examine some of the implications of this theory.

The Racial Determinists assume that race as a physical fact is causally correlated with types of mentality, temperament, and character traits. Thus it is asserted that the Nordic is mentally and socially different from the Alpine and the Mediterranean. The Nordic is said to be naturally more aggressive, warlike, and powerful than either of the others. He has a better abstract intelligence and a greater capacity for political organization. The Mediterranean is said to be more artistic, subtle, and volatile. The Alpine is pictured as stolid, slow, dull—the eternal peasant—with no such gift for government or large scale organization as the Nordic habitually displays. The Negro is thought to be sensuous and imaginative, but incapable of empire building, scientific achievement, and complex economic development.

Not only do the Racial Determinists assume that the races are different but that they may be graded on a scale of innate ability, some of them being far superior to the others. There is not complete uniformity among the theorists as to the relative position of the races on this scale, though there tends to be. Since most of the authors who write on the subject are Nordics, it is rather expected that they place the Negroid at the bottom and the Caucasoid at the top of the scale, with the Mongoloid in an intermediate

position. The sub-racial groups are likewise graded with the Nordic most frequently appearing at the top of the scale. Such is the popular belief in what is termed Nordic superiority or supremacy.

A corollary of the assumption that races differ in innate capacity is the belief that amalgamation is a menace to higher cultural development. Madison Grant, for example, in his volume *The Passing of the Great Race*, is certain that the biological mixture of European stocks will, if continued, lead to the downfall of the Nordics. Many others point warning fingers to this danger. They declare that the ancient cultures of Babylonia, Assyria, Greece, and Rome decayed because of the mixing of inferior with the better racial stocks. They point to South America, Central America, and Mexico as horrible examples of backwardness, and explain the sorry condition in these regions as the inevitable result of the infusion of inferior racial stocks. The United States is warned against the introduction of population strains from Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe if she would avoid racial deterioration.

The Racial Determinists believe further that race limits the possible cultural development of a people and that all great cultures have been the result of superior racial stocks. Thus they account for the superior achievements of Greeks, Romans, and later Western Europeans. Problems of the development of peoples which are frequently baffling to students of history and culture development are thus presumably solved by these Racial Determinists with their simple dogma of racial superiority.

A critical analysis of racial determinism.—What of the truth of these theories? This is a difficult question and in our present state of uncertain knowledge no satisfactory answer can be given. We may indicate, however, some of the evidence which is available. We shall start with a critical evaluation of the data concerning the relative equality of the races, using Kroeber's classification as the basis for discussion.

Some of these theorists have attempted to rest their conclusions on the assumption that the various races—Negroid, Mongoloid, Caucasoid—represent different stages in the biological evolutionary process. Those furthest advanced in the evolutionary scale are assumed to be biologically superior to the others. The degree of biological advance is supposedly measurable by the degree of divergence from the ape. Thus the Negroid is alleged to be inferior because of his supposed greater similarity to the anthropoid ape;

his prognathous jaw, receding forehead and broad, flat nose being cited in evidence. But if one compares the texture of the hair, thickness of lips, or amount of hair on the body, he finds that on the basis of these criteria the Caucasoid is more like the ape than is the Negroid. Kroeber finds that when one takes a sufficiently large number of physical criteria into account he discovers that each of the major races has as many points of similarity to the ape as any other, and that consequently no evidence of racial inequality is obtainable from this line of investigation.

The simpler biological traits—such as acuteness of the senses, bodily temperature, and respiration rate—show few significant differences between races. It is true that one writer, A. Hrdlicka, has stated that the Indians of the southwestern part of the United States have a pulse beat which is ten per minute slower than the white man's; and it is known that the average cranial capacity of races differs, the Negroid having a smaller brain than the Caucasoid. On the other hand, nothing of significance is known concerning the comparative glandular activity of different races. We conclude that such differences as have been discovered among the races have not been shown to be causally related to differences in the form of culture.

Intelligence tests have been applied to different races in the course of educational and military procedures. They indicate that for the United States the Negroid ranks lower, on the average, than the Caucasoid. But the range of intelligence in each group is very great; in fact, it has been found that nearly one-half of the Negroes tested have an intelligence rating above the average made by the white people tested. Granting these facts, we must point out that they prove nothing concerning the innate mentality of the races. The factor of experience enters into the simplest mental operations. Purely innate intelligence, unchanged by experience, cannot be accurately measured by any tests which have so far been devised. Furthermore, the intelligence tests which are ordinarily given do not test all the mental capacities, such as will, temperament, and special abilities. From current results of mental tests there is no basis for dogmatic conclusions concerning the relative mentality of races.

It is frequently argued that the development of a high culture by the Caucasoids is proof of their superior ability, but this by no means necessarily follows. The dominance of Western civilization

is a relatively recent thing. Civilizations rise and fall. The modern Caucasoid has not always been supreme. It would be rash to conclude that because his culture, itself a compound of the culture of people of many races, has been dominant in one section of the world for 5000 years, it will necessarily remain dominant throughout the next 100,000 years of culture history. Moreover, the whites of today have borrowed most of their basic elements of culture either from their preliterate ancestors or from other races, and Negroes and Orientals, living within the limits of Western civilization, are continually making inventions and discoveries which the Whites tend to think of as the products of their own race. Of course when one examines only the contemporary period of human history he is impressed with the supremacy of the white man's civilization; especially so, when he accepts the white man's criteria for evaluating its merits. This is the white man's day in court. What the historical morrow will bring forth no one can say.

Is amalgamation a menace? One cannot answer with certainty until he has more facts at his disposal. It may be noted, however, that amalgamation is one of the oldest facts of history. The mingling of races has been going on so long and so persistently that there are few, if any, pure racial types. The Racial Determinists note the facts of racial mixture and the facts of social decline and declare that these groups of facts are related; but their procedure is far from scientific, for the evidence available is meager and inconclusive and mostly of a negative character. It does not warrant a dogmatic conclusion.

Does race limit the cultural development of a people? Again we have to answer that we cannot be certain. Connected with this problem are several considerations which may be mentioned. In the first place cultures and races have crossed until there is no such thing as a racial culture; that is to say, there is no important culture which one can call the product of a single race. The Negro develops an American culture in the United States, an English, French, or German culture in various parts of Africa, an Oriental culture in China or India. In the second place, one cannot legitimately take the culture of his own groups as the standard for judging other cultures, particularly if he assumes that the latter are inferior in the degree to which they diverge from his own. Third, culture change is explicable, to some degree at least, in other terms than those of race. No reputable student of culture uses race as a basic

fact in explaining culture forms. He appeals to history, to the contacts of peoples, to geographic environment, and to other observable and describable facts to explain the course of development of specific culture complexes. Fourth, culture is constantly changing, whereas race is assumed to be relatively constant. Culture does seem to change in many instances without any noticeable change in race. Fifth, the evidence which may be gleaned from personal documents tends to show that an intelligent member of any race can assimilate the culture of any group in which he has been reared. This indicates that social contacts with others, rather than racial inheritance, determine the form of culture a person is likely to exhibit. It is the social rather than the biological heritage which is significant in determining the form that culture takes—at least for any given generation.

Can history be explained in terms of race? Few reputable historians have tried it. We learned in Chapter IV, and shall see later in the study of the development of our Western civilization that culture is a cumulative thing. Each people has borrowed a large share of its culture from its cultural ancestors and from its contemporary neighbors. The culture of the Greeks contains a surprising number of elements which came to it from the ancient civilizations of the Near East. Some students of culture have gone so far as to declare that all cultural development is the result of contacts of peoples. While such a position is probably extreme, we are forced to admit that in most historic instances the hypothesis that culture changes result from contacts of peoples is more tenable than the hypotheses of racial or geographic determinism.

Racial bias as a factor in culture.—So much for Racial Determinism. There is, however, another fact of considerable importance growing out of the position assumed by this school of theorists. Their writings have had considerable effect on popular attitudes and opinions. Race, as such, may not be an important factor in human affairs; but the ideas, the beliefs, the attitudes, and the sentiments associated with race are important elements in human history. Race *per se* may be nil in its influence, but what we think of race is of importance in social life. The Racial Determinists may be entirely wrong, but with their point of view widely diffused as it is, the concepts of racial difference and racial inequality are of importance in social relations. Our beliefs, ideas, feelings, senti-

ments, and attitudes, irrespective of the biological facts involved, determine our practices and policies with reference to other races, and hence are important elements in human affairs.

Consider the usual attitude of Caucasoids toward the Negro. The commonly accepted idea of his intrinsic inferiority is not based upon any adequate proof of inferiority—for there *is* no adequate proof—but rather upon the basis of concepts growing out of the usual practice of segregation and the low-caste status to which we assign him in our social system. That is to say, it is his historic background—the ideas, beliefs, and attitudes associated with him—rather than an established inferiority, that give him his low-caste position. It is this social concept of the Negro that commonly determines our behavior toward him, rather than authentic biological data; and the same principle holds true for our racial biases generally.

The powerful influence which race as a social concept plays in our culture may be made clear by two concrete illustrations. A mulatto family whose members were almost white moved into a small mid-western town, where the father opened a store. There were no Negroes in the town and the family was accepted by the citizens as white. They were received into church, club, and fraternal life. The children were well adjusted to school and play groups. But by accident it was learned that they had Negro blood. Immediately the bars of social isolation were set up, and the family was forced to leave town. Another case is that of a Hindu student who habitually wore a turban while attending a large university. When asked why he wore the oriental headdress while otherwise conforming to occidental styles, he replied that without the turban he was mistaken for a Negro and excluded from many groups to which he would be readily admitted as a Hindu.

In these cases it was not the facts of physical make-up or color of skin, that were responsible for the appearance of racial prejudice. Whenever a person was classed as a Negro, even though his skin was white and he had no other physical traits of the Negroid race, he was isolated from white society. On the other hand a person who was classed as a Hindu was treated as white, even though he had a black skin, and was admitted to groups from which a Negro would have been excluded. Biological traits are significant in race relations in that they are utilized to place a person in a racial category, so that we may react to him according to approved

cultural requirements. We do not react against the color of the skin as such, but against the culturally defined idea of the Negro race. The fact that this racial concept may have no valid basis in fact is of little concern to us in our daily actions.

DO BIOLOGICAL FACTORS EXPLAIN DIFFERENCES WITHIN A SINGLE CULTURE?

We come to the third task which we set ourselves at the beginning of this chapter: namely, a consideration of the part which biological differences play in certain social phenomena within a given culture. We shall confine the discussion to three aspects of the subject: To what extent do biological variations account for (1) the position of men versus women, (2) the stratification of a community into social classes, and (3) variations in individual behavior? Let us examine each of these briefly.

Biological differences and the status of women.—There are unquestionably important biological differences between the sexes. The most important of these are the characteristics which give male and female different functions in the production and perpetuation of the species. The primary sex characteristics are accompanied by other attributes, some of which are also important in explaining differences in the behavior of men and women. Space precludes any detailed treatment of these biological differences. It is sufficient for our purposes to indicate a few of them. The average height and weight of the male is greater than that of the female. In bodily proportions there are obvious differences: the male is broader in the shoulders and the female broader in the hips, relative to total bodily weight. Woman's brain is, on the average, smaller than that of man.

It is commonly believed that biological differences explain the position which women occupy in a given civilization and justify the limitation of their activities to certain spheres. What is the validity of such a belief? How far can one explain the occupations of men and women on the basis of biological differences? A survey of the division of labor in different cultures and at different periods of time shows clearly that sex does not determine occupation nearly so definitely as is ordinarily supposed. Durkheim's *Division of Labor* is a classical volume which supports the hypothesis that every occupation that at one time and place has been thought of as dis-

tinctly man's work has been at some other time and place performed regularly by women, and vice versa. This does not refer, of course, to the physiological functions of child bearing and feeding, but it does refer to other forms of care of children and to all sorts of tasks which we uncritically accept as belonging naturally either to man's or woman's sphere of work.

The conclusion must be drawn that with the exception of limits set by physiological differences, there is no biological reason for asserting that woman must refrain from certain types of work merely because she is a woman. It might be maintained, of course, that woman being smaller, and consequently weaker, should not be permitted to perform the heavier tasks. We find, however, that in some countries where woman is expected to perform manual labor she can do so surprisingly well, and that her strength exceeds that of man, who, in these countries, does not take part in the heavier occupations. The only logical basis for the division of labor on biological grounds would be a series of physical examinations in which the effects of certain occupations on the health of men and women would be clearly demonstrated. But such a basis has not been adopted for determining the position of man versus woman in any known civilization. We must state as a practical conclusion that the differences in the behavior of the sexes as they now exist are to be explained primarily on cultural rather than on biological grounds.

Biological differences and social stratification.—What of the relation of biological differences to social stratification? Social classes are sometimes thought to rest upon biological differences. The more extreme examples of social stratification, such as the caste system of India, were supposed to have a biological basis. The members of the superior caste thought of themselves as formed of a superior sort of clay, possessing a superior hereditary equipment. This same idea of biological superiority of one social class is found in exaggerated form in those civilizations where royalty occupies an important position. In some places the emphasis on the superiority of royal blood has led to close intermarriage between relatives, even, in some cases, to the marriage of brother and sister, on the assumption that no other persons have sufficiently pure blood to make them fit mates for royalty. No factual justification of this position has been established.

In other types of civilization where the social stratification is not

so formal and traditional and where the social order rests presumably on free competition between individuals, it is frequently assumed that the biologically superior types will be found in the higher classes. There is considerable reason to doubt the universality of the assumption of superiority of the "higher" social and economic classes in a civilization such as our own. We cannot be certain that all the members of our nation are found in that social class to which their ability would entitle them. For example, many persons who are physically and mentally inferior occupy positions of prominence because they have inherited a family name and fortune from able ancestors. On the other hand, our national history is marked by conspicuous cases of persons from parentage of relatively low social and economic status who have demonstrated remarkable ability. About the only thing we can conclude is that under conditions of free competition the individuals who have risen to high positions are possessed of good biological capacities. On the other hand, persons who do not achieve success are not necessarily inferior biological types. Misfortune or lack of opportunity may have prevented their attainment of higher positions. Under a genuinely competitive system we should normally expect a higher percentage of more capable persons in the upper classes, but further conclusions appear hazardous and unjustified.

Biological differences and individual behavior.—No one disputes the fact of individual biological differences. In the matter of physique it is obvious that any heavyweight athlete has a physical body superior to that of Tom Thumb, the midget, at least for certain purposes. In mental capacity it is unquestioned that some persons have excellent brains, while others lack the capacity to perform even the most simple acts for themselves. At the lower end of the scale of mentality we find idiots and imbeciles who require constant care throughout their lives, much as is required by an infant. There is no need to labor the subject; it is quite evident that, physically and mentally, men are not born equal. Present interest centers in the question as to how far such biological differences help to explain human behavior.

The answer is that individual biological differences do not necessarily determine the form of social behavior of a person. The type of behavior or the field of activity which is selected by the individual will, indeed, be limited by his physical and mental capacities, but his behavior may assume any pattern or form within the limits

of his capacity. For example, the man who is feeble-minded does not, because of his feeble-mindedness, tend more to criminal behavior than the man who is of average mentality. The feeble-minded one is led more easily in any direction by the person of superior mentality, and his tendency toward or away from criminal behavior depends primarily on the patterns that are set for him, rather than on his mental traits. It is true that the statistics of our penal institutions show a higher proportion of mental deficient than is characteristic of the total population. This may be due to the fact that it is the mentally deficient offender who is more frequently caught and convicted. Then, too, under our competitive social system the mentally defective are more likely to be forced to live in the less desirable sections of the city where disapproved social patterns are set for them. They are more likely to come into contact with vicious and criminal elements than if they lived in better residential areas. We would expect, therefore, that a larger than average number of them would be led into delinquency.

The eugenicists have recognized that without a minimum biological capacity one cannot be an efficient citizen of any group. They have therefore proposed methods for the elimination of the unfit through the control of mating. We do not need to discuss the implications and applications of a eugenics program in order to answer the questions which have been considered in this chapter.

A SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Certain conclusions have emerged from our discussion of the effect of biological factors in the development of culture, which may be stated in summary form. In the course of biological evolution man diverged from other species of the animal world and, in the process, acquired distinctive physical and mental characteristics. These unique traits made it possible for him to develop culture and to become human. As to the degree of advancement reached by a particular culture, the biological differences between groups of men have played a less important part than has ordinarily been supposed, the determining forces in cultural development being that complex set of influences emerging from the whole course of the history of a people. Within the limits of a given society, it is the biological appetites which furnish the basic motives which drive man to action. The nature of his biological equipment both gives him the capacity

for social behavior and sets limits upon what he can do. The form of man's behavior, however, is determined not by his biological equipment but by the culture which he assimilates in the course of his social life, particularly during his long period of plastic infancy. The forms into which his appetites, thoughts, desires, and ways of acting are cast depend not so much upon his race, sex, or mental capacity as upon the culture of the groups in which he lives, and particularly on the social rôles he plays and to which he aspires.

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CHAPTER VI

GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN CULTURE

THE geographic environment is the first and most inclusive of all the influences that enter into the individual and collective life of man. As here considered it embraces the entire world of nature, with the exception of man's own body, beginning with the ground upon which he stands and the atmosphere he breathes, and extending to the most distant reaches of the physical universe. It includes all material substances, both inorganic and organic, and all the forces and properties which these physical materials possess. Physical nature is the starting point of all else. So long as men live in material bodies they will be subjected to material needs and must go back ultimately to the material basis which nature affords, as a foundation for everything they have.

Nature and significance of geographic factors.—The importance of geographic factors in human society has long been observed and commented upon. Over 2000 years ago Herodotus, "Father of History," made reference to it, as did other ancient writers, including Thucydides and Polybius. Aristotle in his *Politics* discussed the influence of physical environment upon human society; and Hippocrates, nearly four hundred years before the Christian Era, in his *Airs, Waters, Places* gave what we are still justified in regarding as a notable analysis of this subject. In the centuries since, it has been one of the frequent topics for discourse and the subject of much speculation and theorizing.

One of the obvious facts of daily life is man's dependence upon this nature world. We could not live for five minutes if the supply of air were shut off from our lungs, and the atmosphere is a chemical combination of elements supplied by nature. We could not live more than a few days without water, nor more than a few weeks without food, and both water and food come directly or indirectly from the storehouse of nature. Rivers, lakes, and oceans form natural highways for the passage of vessels; valleys and plains form the most readily accessible roadways for land transportation; and

the location and distribution of population upon the earth are largely dependent upon channels of transportation. The occupations of people are greatly influenced by the proximity of natural resources. The amount and nature of wealth cannot go beyond the character and degree of nature's bounty. Again, the world's great cities are established with important reference to some advantage which nature has provided. Such cities as Athens, Constantinople, and Venice in the ancient world were located as they were in large degree because nature afforded means of easy defense; Babylon and the cities of ancient Egypt and China were located as they were primarily because of the agricultural advantages of the surrounding territory.

Everything that we are or that we possess is a transformation of materials of nature. Our bodies themselves are chemical and physical rearrangements of material which was once a part of the earth itself; and when life is gone, each body is again resolved into its component elements. Our energies of body and mind are dependent upon the nourishment which comes from assimilated food. The point of the pen with which these lines are written was once ore in the mountain side; its barrel is rubber drained from a tree in the heart of a tropic forest; its ink is colored by pigment taken from the soil; the paper upon which it traces these words was once the trunk of a tree brought from a Canadian forest; and the very thoughts that it writes down would be impossible were it not for the nourishment of foods which have grown in various soils. Small wonder that the name of "Mother" Nature should be given to a source upon which so much depends.

Geographic influences only relative.—Vital as geographic factors may be, it is important to understand, however, that with few exceptions, their influence is relative, not absolute. The nature, extent, and character of a given environmental influence are dependent in their turn upon the culture of the community. So far as communication and transportation are concerned, the presence of great waterways means little or nothing to a community which has not developed navigation. A people may be literally standing upon great reservoirs of mineral riches; but if they have not advanced to a point where they can utilize metals and oils, the wealth might just as well not exist so far as that particular society is concerned. The rich resources of America meant little to her original Indian in-

habitants. Under the more intelligent economic explorations of the Soviet government, present-day Russians are actually "discovering Russia"; they are utilizing natural resources unknown or neglected during the czarist régime. To the older Russia they meant nothing; to the new Russia they will become an important influence on the economic life of the people. The peasant population of Arabia has lived in Palestine for centuries in a state of wretchedness; the Zionist Jews who have gone into that country since the World War are, with aid from outside sources, transforming the land by scientific methods. When it comes to the "blessings of nature," a given culture will be influenced and benefited to the degree that it can utilize its geographic environment; and when it comes to the harmful effects of environment, the degree of danger will depend largely upon the knowledge and ability of a given society successfully to combat such influences. Thus, one of the signs of an advancing culture, particularly in its material aspects, is man's growing capacity to master and utilize his natural environment.

The influence of geography upon particular individuals will also vary in accordance with differences in the extent or nature of their mental abilities or appreciations. A person of superior intelligence may convert to his use what would be valueless, or even injurious, to one with a mind less able. To the typical Maine fisherman the rockbound coasts and the ocean waters are interpreted in economic terms; they mean a living to him and little else. To the artist, sensitive to the impressive beauty of the land and water, the environment may become a factor in enriching the aesthetic life of a community. The beautiful marbles of ancient Greece had no significance in Greek art until the Greeks had advanced to a point where they could utilize the product in their marvelous sculpture and architecture. To the ordinary farmer beautiful land is level, clear land fit for easy cultivation; the irregularities of landscape that strike the artist with delight are "bad lands" to one who tills the soil.

A classification of geographic factors.—It will help us to realize how numerous, various, and influential are the features of the physical world that play upon human life if we present them in some systematic form. The classification on the following page indicates the major differentiations.

- I. *Climate*, including weather: with particular reference to conditions of temperature, moisture, light, atmosphere, and their fluctuations, together with seasonal sequence.
- II. *Topography*: especially altitude, surface relief, land and water outlines, natural highways and barriers.
- III. *Resources*: mineral, including water; vegetable; animal.
 1. *Soil*: especially its chemical composition, and its properties making for or against fertility.
 2. *Raw materials*: basic substances which directly or indirectly provide food, clothing, shelter, and other supplies for human wants.
 3. *Energies*: natural forces which are sources of power for producing changes in the environment, exemplified by those manifested in air currents, tides, falling water, and various chemical reactions.
 4. *Processes*: particular forms of activity occurring in the world of nature:
 - (a) *Physical* (largely mechanical), such as radiation, gravitation, and the "flow" of electricity.
 - (b) *Chemical*, such as combustion, oxidation, and decomposition.
- IV. *Relationships*:
 1. *Organic*: beneficial or injurious contacts with living organisms, (as distinguished from "raw materials"), such as microbes, insects, and larger plants and beasts; especially the service of domesticated animals.
 2. *Territorial*: size and shape of territory, and its location with reference to degree of accessibility to and from other regions.

(To the list of geographic factors indicated above we might well add the astronomic forces, for each group of physical factors listed is immediately or ultimately dependent upon the relation of the earth to the heavenly bodies, and particularly to the sun.)

We cannot consider each of the items in the foregoing list, but we can note by way of illustration the operation of some of the most important of them to get a clearer comprehension of their influence in shaping culture.

Geographic factors and the development of culture.—Where the development of culture should begin and the directions in which it should spread, were determined by geographic conditions—largely by climate and natural facilities for movement or travel. This fact is strikingly illustrated in the rise and spread of the great

civilizations of history.¹ The earlier civilizations were developed in hot climates, afterwards passing to more temperate regions. The explanation of this movement is that the earlier phases of human evolution "had to be passed through where the resistances offered by inorganic conditions were least; and when the arts of life had been advanced, it became possible for societies to develop in regions where the resistance was greater; and that further developments in the arts of life, with a further discipline and coöperation accompanying them, enabled subsequent societies to take root and grow in regions which, by climatic and other conditions, offered relatively great resistances."²

The influence of climate upon the development of culture is clear. The warmer regions were more favorable to the earlier periods. Later, history indicates a "coldward" movement of civilization—that is, a movement northward. There the more rigorous climate had a decided effect upon the peoples concerned. Colder climates, provided they are not too extreme, have a definite bearing upon health, stability, and physical vigor; in a word, vitality is definitely conditioned by the degree of temperature to which the human body is subjected. If it is too warm, man is less energetic; and since the warmer climates are more likely to have tropic abundance, there is less need for him to work hard to supply his needs. On the other hand, while man can protect himself from the cold through a limited period of winter, if he lives permanently in a region that is too severe he will be retarded by physical difficulties, while at the same time his resources are far less.³

If we observe the pathways traced by the rise of the successive high civilizations that have appeared in history, we are impressed by the part which has been played by waterways in determining their march. The first great civilizations, those of India, China, Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria, were in the great river basins of the ancient world. Later, when man grew able to negotiate the inland seas, civilizations developed around such basins as the Mediterranean, the Black, and the Caspian Sea; and finally a point was reached where civilization began to group itself with reference to the open ocean. "The geographic setting of civilization evolves

¹See Franklin Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society*, The Century Company, 1925, particularly Chap. IX.

²Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, Chap. III, especially pp. 18-20.

³See S. C. Gilfillan, "The Coldward Course of Progress," *Political Science Quarterly*, 1920, pp. 393-410.

with the passage of time. It is limited to the more or less restrained region of certain unusually important river basins . . . it enlarges itself at a given moment to become mediterranean, then oceanic, . . . before becoming universal so as to include every habitable region of the world."¹

SOME SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS

When we speak of some specific ways in which geographic factors have affected human society we refer to cases in which they are of unusual importance or especially observable. The inference is not to be drawn that geography is the sole determining force involved in producing the results to which reference is made. Rarely, if ever, do geographic factors operate in human society without being modified or complicated by other factors, for, after all, geographic environment constitutes only one source of influence. These facts should be borne in mind throughout this discussion.

Influence upon economic and political life.—Generally speaking, geographic environment limits population. Where food is plentiful, large populations can be maintained; where it is meager, populations will be small; and where it is lacking altogether, as in great stretches of the Sahara or in the Arctic wastes, there will be no population at all. It is a self-evident proposition that in the absence of importations a population will be no larger than can be sustained by the food resources of the region upon which it depends. In periods of simple cultural development the region of supply was the immediate vicinity; with modern science, invention, and transportation, the region of supply has been extended to include almost the entire world. But even now this limiting influence is revealed in the United States in the thickly populated eastern seaboard, Middle West, and western seaboard, as contrasted with the thinly peopled regions of the mountainous and desert country of the great Rocky Mountain Plateau. Certain areas of the earth geographically favored, such as Japan, China, India, and Holland, have been able to build up dense populations because the people have learned how to cultivate good soil intensively. Other sections of the world, such as the Arabian Desert, will probably defy thick settlements permanently because of adverse conditions.

Types of occupation reflect the geographic setting of a popu-

¹I. Metchnikoff, *La civilisation et les grandes fleuves historiques*, pp. 155-156.

lation. Obviously an agricultural people can be developed only within agricultural territory, and a fishing people must have access to fishing grounds. Similarly, the ancient Phoenicians and the modern Britons could hardly have place among the world's notable maritime people but for the fact that geographical circumstances both tempted and thrust them into the ocean at their door. New England, whose niggardly soil made large-scale farming an impossibility, early became the manufacturing centre of the United States, her industry being stimulated by the advantages of water power, good harbors, and readier access to markets. The South, on the other hand, favored by soil and climate for the extensive growth of cotton, tobacco, and sugar cane, became conspicuously a region of great agriculture. The presence of coal and iron has been a powerful factor in the building up of great urban centers since the coming of machine production. Sixty-seven per cent of the great cities of Great Britain "stand on coal." The prosperity of other great cities like New York City, Liverpool, London, Hamburg, San Francisco, depends largely upon the excellent facilities for commerce afforded by their harbors. The romantic West was what it was because geographic conditions contributed to the colorful life that centers about mining towns and great ranches.

The political life of peoples has been hardly less responsive to geographic circumstances. Dividing barriers of mountain ranges have tended to produce local political units and to delay the political fusion of peoples. The rocky highlands of Scotland account in considerable degree for the fact that the unification of that country was accomplished much later than in England, where there were wide areas of comparatively level and accessible territory. In colonial New England, where conditions made for industry and commerce, village and town life become typical. This intimate neighborhood life encouraged the townsmen to establish local town meetings as a form of political organization, after the fashion of the parish organizations they had known in England. In Virginia, on the other hand, wide stretches of rich soil and favorable climatic conditions led to big plantations, widely separated, a circumstance which made it expedient to establish a representative form of government rather than direct democracies. The situation in New England thus encouraged democratic attitudes and ideals of government, despite minor limitations on the franchise; the situation in Virginia and other southern communities fostered aristocratic

tendencies, still further stimulated by the baronial manner of life encouraged by large slave holdings.

Influence upon religion and ethical standards.—Geographic conditions have affected religious life. The beliefs of peoples during the early cultural period were definitely tied up with mythologies and cosmic theories directly related to their geographic environment. This is particularly true with reference to physical features and natural phenomena which have affected the economic well-being and security of peoples. The sun gave the heat and light necessary to the growth of vegetation; the earth was the generative mother life; the rivers produced rich alluvial plains for the production of foods or were the source of destructive floods. Hence these and similar features entered into the religion of peoples of early history, as representing forces to be propitiated or guarded against. Thus, for example, deities of the Sun and the Nile became important in the religious beliefs of the Egyptians. The religion of the Chaldeans was an astrology encouraged by their favorable situation for study of the stars. In Scandinavia, land of cold and storm and thunder, appeared such rugged deities as Thor, Woden, and Freya.

Ethical standards and practices frequently reflect geographic circumstances. The southern states, where geographic conditions made slaves an economic asset, sanctioned slavery; whereas the northern states, which could derive little economic advantage from slave labor, much more promptly came to consider it an evil. On the cattle ranges of the West, where a man's life was dependent upon his horse, and his living dependent upon his cattle, cattle-rustling and horse-thieving became capital offenses, though they would not be so regarded in other regions. Stealing is a much more serious offense to a people whose manner of life makes private property a foundation for existence than it is to a nomadic people who have most of their goods in common.

Influence upon the interrelations of peoples.—The interrelations of peoples in the larger aspects of migration, trade, warfare, and political association are primarily determined by geographic factors. Human migrations, which were under way before the dawn of history and which have continued to the present moment, have been one of the foremost elements of change upon our planet; and migrations, in the last analysis, are greatly affected by the possibilities of transportation afforded by nature and, in the earlier periods of history, by variations in food supply as affected by

natural causes. The tendency of human beings is to follow the lines of least resistance in moving from place to place. River valleys and lake shores, for example, being accessible by natural highways, are the parts of the world to be first settled. Much of the history of modern Russia is written in terms of her struggle to obtain outlets through the Baltic and Black seas, and to the Pacific, channels of transportation which were controlled by other nations. The remarkable place which Constantinople has held for centuries in the history of the world must be understood in terms of her strategic position upon a necessary water doorway between Asia and Europe. The Treaty of Versailles created the Danzig Corridor, which cut Germany in two in order to give Poland access to ocean transportation. Any landlocked country is likely to seek outlets where success looks probable. England's naval power depends in no small measure upon the fact that she controls the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, which are the only two ocean entrances to the Mediterranean. By building and controlling the Panama Canal, the United States has an additional advantage in the western world beyond that of any other country.

Whoever controls channels of transportation has an advantage in the peaceful pursuits of international commerce, as well as in the destructive pursuits of war. Perhaps more wars have been waged over the control of transportation routes than over any other single cause; furthermore, war having begun, the greater advantage lies, of course, with those who control the avenues of movement. It was this which led Germany in the World War to concentrate upon her policy of submarine warfare, knowing well that if she could prevent contact between her enemies and neutral nations she would have a much better prospect of victory.

Conversely, whatever exists as a barrier to prevent transportation and communication serves to isolate a people, with all of the advantages and disadvantages which that involves. Great Britain has had a place in history which would have been totally different had she not been entirely surrounded by a natural moat of her encircling sea-channels. For more than a century the United States has been able to build up a national strength unparalleled in history, largely because of her "splendid isolation" afforded by an ocean on each side. Such isolation, however, becomes a barrier to progress as well as to invasion if there is no convenient way of establishing contacts with the outside world. The classic illustration of this

in our own country is that of the mountaineers of eastern Kentucky and the adjacent regions, who have had so little contact with the rest of the world that their very customs and traditions persist, little changed from generation to generation.

Influence upon manners, customs, and temperament.—Space precludes examination of all of the ways in which physical environment affects culture, but certain other features call for brief attention. The manners and customs of a people frequently have their roots in geographic conditions. These include fashions, conventions, beliefs, and the like. The farmer is characterized by certain “ways” which the city dweller likes to ridicule; on the other hand, the city dweller is equally marked as a “dude” when he goes out on the farm. Styles of clothing worn by a western ranchman—broad-brimmed sombrero, high-cuffed gloves, high leather boots with small heels adapted to the stirrup, and the rest of his cowboy costume—have grown up because of their special fitness for the needs of his occupation; and when the city man goes out from the East ignorant of horses and cattle and ranch life, he is unmistakably spotted as a “tenderfoot.” Moreover, the marks of the region from which one comes are exhibited in various ways. The Bontoc Igorot in the northern Philippines may be identified by many beliefs, customs, and ceremonials which are related to the mountains in which they live, and to the curious form of rice cultivation on their terraced mountain sides. The manner of life imposed on a desert dweller causes him to build up a habit pattern of thought and action especially related to the horse upon which he is so dependent. The tiger and cobra rituals found in certain parts of India, and certain techniques of hunting employed by natives in East Africa in the lion country, are altogether lacking in other parts of the world. To be sure, not all of them are the result of geographic conditions, but nature lays their foundation.

Moods, temperaments, emotions, and attitudes in the individual often appear to be affected by geographical conditions. The seafaring man finds himself cramped and hedged about when he is on land, and is uncomfortable without plenty of sea room. The Queen of Babylon was so lonely for her native hills that her royal consort built the Hanging Gardens, one of the seven wonders of the ancient world, in the effort to make her feel more at home. It is common observation that warm climates sap the vitality of the people and make them less energetic, while moderate or cool climates stimulate

energy and vigor. Everyone is aware of the buoyancy that commonly comes with bright, clear days and of the depressing effect of gloomy weather. Leffingwell has written of the effect that seasonal changes have upon conduct; Huntington explains the character of peoples in large measure in terms of temperamental variations due to weather conditions; and various other writers have maintained the thesis that differences of mood due to climatic conditions in different parts of the world are directly expressed in different characteristic types of behavior, including crime. Doubtless the influence of situation and climate upon temperament can easily be exaggerated, and caution must be exercised to prevent its being made too inclusive an explanation. On the other hand, their importance is impressed on everyone who takes the pains to study his changing moods as they appear to respond to external conditions of weather and climate.

HOW GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS ARE MODIFIED OR LIMITED

Up to this point attention has been largely confined to the ways in which the life of man is affected by the physical world about him. Some observers have been so impressed by the influence of man's physical environment that they have taken the extreme position that all that man does and thinks has its ultimate source in geographic environment. This view is designated as the theory of geographic determinism. Needless to say, that view is not accepted here. Biological and social factors have both been potent in determining that man, once a plaything in the hands of nature, has gradually risen to a position of mastery to a striking degree. One might write a worthy treatise on man's upward journey, centering his materials about this theme. From one standpoint, man's climb can be described as a progression from a position of victim to that of master in relation to the world of natural forces about him.

While it is true that man will never be able to make himself independent of nature, nor to exist without nature's aid, it is also true that as civilization advances, the relative importance of physical environment as a conditioning factor decreases, whereas the biological and cultural factors become correspondingly greater in import. Let us notice certain typical ways in which man has gradually modified the influence of nature upon him.

The most far-reaching in its consequences has been man's in-

vention of the machine, by means of which he has substituted mechanical energy for the direct forces of nature. By direct forces we mean those which are applied immediately and without change of form directly to the task at hand, such as those of winds, or falling water, or the energies of men or animals. Until a little over a century ago no method of transportation more rapid than a swift horse was available, and no greater usable power than that which could be developed from a paddle wheel in a rushing stream. The marvel of the past century has been the way in which man has learned to transform the latent and potential energies of nature indirectly, by the use of machinery, into kinetic energy of unbelievable quantity and degree. Formerly a skillful brickmaker could make, by hand methods, 450 bricks in a day; today, with the latest improved machinery, he can make 40,000 in the same length of time. Cro-magnon man had at his command only the strength of his own muscles, an average of one man-power per day; today in modern, industrialized United States, the machine has increased this to a potential average of 9,000,000 man-power per day. Of this incredible amount it has been estimated that 8,766,000 has developed since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, a century and a half ago; and the end is nowhere in sight.

Another remarkable result of mechanical invention is man's elimination of time and space. The telegraph, telephone, and radio have made instantaneous long-distance communication a commonplace; and as for space, neither climate nor former barriers of ocean, mountain, or desert prevent man from going wherever he desires. Not content with the annihilation of distance and time made possible by steamship, train, and automobile, he now journeys undersea and through the sky. Lindbergh flies the ocean alone; Admiral Byrd looks down upon both North and South Poles; planes speed from Atlantic to Pacific between sunrise and sunset; and the *Graf Zeppelin*, with seventy-six men aboard, touches earth only three times in encircling the globe.

Hardly less impressive is the way in which man has acquired a conscious control of health and physical well-being. The bubonic plague swept unchecked through medieval Europe, leaving its millions of dead. In modern times malaria, smallpox, yellow fever, typhus, and oriental cholera have been among the diseases before which society has been helpless. Now there is scarcely a disease known to man that is not subject to some degree of control, and

many of them have been rendered innocuous through improved medical techniques, including varieties of immunization. Coupled with medical skill have gone improved methods of hygiene and physical care and the building up of resistance to disease. Infant mortality has been cut in half and the expectation of life has been increased by a third during the past two generations.

Another remarkable example of man's control is his regulation and augmentation of the food supply. Primitive man, like the animals, obtained his food by direct appropriation, taking it where nature provided it, going from place to place as the supply shifted. Modern man not only decides when, where and what to plant, but by means of rotation of crops, fertilization of soil, and intensive methods of agriculture increases the quality and quantity of the supply. By the reclamation of waste lands and by irrigation he has greatly enlarged his area of production. By successful experimentation he has produced new and improved strains of plant and animal life, and by scientific selection he has brought species within reach which were originally unusable. Moreover, by means of refrigeration and methods of preservation and storage, he has made foods accessible at all times and places, as he could not have done otherwise. Probably the perfection of the hermetically sealed tin can has had more of a social effect than the invention of the airplane, for it has enabled us to have at all seasons of the year and in all parts of the world foods which would otherwise be limited to their local areas and seasons. The carrying on of the World War would have been more difficult without canned foods than it would have been without airplanes.

The foregoing are only a few of the numerous ways in which civilization has gradually accomplished a mastery over its world. Primitive man went to his food; modern man has his food brought to him in a variety and abundance of which the primitive never dreamed. Primitive man bowed before the forces of nature, and ascribed them to spirits and gods beyond his control; modern man takes these forces and harnesses them to his modern chariots. Primitive man lived in the midst of a world of treasures of which he had no conception; modern man draws upon the same metals and minerals and chemical elements for substances which give life, beauty, and riches. The history of civilization is indirectly a record of the steady advance of man in substituting his own conscious control for that of the world of nature.

With respect to the relation of the material universe to man we can hardly close with a more significant sentence than the words of Lowie. "Environment," he says, "furnishes the builders of cultural structures with brick and mortar, but it does not furnish the architect's plans." He might have added that neither does it determine the purposes for which the structures are to be used. These depend upon the human mind and spirit, without which no geographic environment, however rich its possibilities, will achieve cultural significance. In the last analysis man's rise has been marked by the conquest of mind over matter. That conquest is not complete and never will be complete; but, in this field at least, the victories of man's intelligence are becoming increasingly more startling with the passing of time.

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CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL FACTORS IN CULTURE

THE third set of factors operative in the development of culture we have designated as social. But it should be noted that when we use the term "social factors," we attach a distinctive meaning to the word "social." In this connotation it has no reference to good fellowship, as when we refer to a social affair; or to public spirit, as when we speak of one socially minded; or to humanity or charity, as implied in the term "social welfare." Social, as here used, refers to those phenomena—including culture—growing out of the group life of man.¹ The concept "human society" carries with it certain significant implications. Men not only live and move and have their being as independent and vital bodies, but they associate with other men and through a conscious interplay of mind upon mind influence and are influenced by one another. This realm of social living represents the highest attainment of man. Within it we are still dealing with organisms, for individually that is what each human being is. But we are dealing with them as more than living beings; they are also companions, fellows, associates, citizens, nationals. They are now possessed of certain mental qualities and powers which make it both possible and necessary for them to live in clusters whose members are united by psychic bonds. From this kind of living together grow the influences we designate here as social factors.

The medium of association is communication, a term used here to embrace all the ways by which the ideas in the mind of one individual are transferred to that of another. It is through communication that two or more sentient beings carry on a social existence. A social existence is invariably expressed through the group, which may be defined as two or more persons in conscious, mental interaction. The group is the most fundamental and inescapable fact in the existence of human society: all phenomena that are social are in some way related to the group.

¹Many animals, especially birds and mammals, carry on a collective life that is truly social. We are confining this discussion, however, to human beings.

A nature-world and a human-world.—Man is surrounded not only by a nature-world whose physical state, energies, and materials constantly condition his existence; he is surrounded also by a human-world whose influences continually impinge upon and modify him. The biological fact of mere existence would be impossible without the social fact of a father and a mother. The family which they have created protects and preserves him in childhood. From the family he acquires language, characteristics and bents of mind that continue with him throughout life, and his first knowledge of the world. As he grows older, the influences of the family are supplemented by the social influence of neighborhood, school, and church. Through them, he builds up or absorbs ideals, ambitions, prejudices, fears, and hopes that become a part of his individual make-up. From the moment of birth, his potential actions are modified by those with whom he associates. The likes and dislikes of those about him define the line of his behavior, and their opinions become his opinions. Eventually, he discovers that he is bound by formal rules and regulations which he must obey or suffer unhappy consequences. From the group about him comes the training whereby he is prepared to take his eventual place in the world; through the group comes the accumulation of knowledge, and the resources of the past; to the group he turns for guidance, comfort, and fellowship.

The physical world and the world of man, therefore, share joint responsibility for placing him upon the planet, for maintaining him here when he has appeared, and for molding the nature of the life he develops and the course he follows. The one sets the outer limits to his possibilities; the other provides the nurture which plays so large a part in shaping him within those limits. Nature and nurture, combined, form first the cradle for the infancy of man, and afterwards the highway that he travels.

The social world.—Just as a child is born into a family which is already a going concern, with established equipment and habits of life and thought, so he is at the same moment born into society—a much larger family—with its more elaborate equipment and far broader range of activity and influence. Let us liken this society to a strange new city to which one is introduced by the phenomenon of birth. Before he comes on the scene, the city is there. Its network of streets and parkways is already laid out; its factories and mills, intricate with machinery, are in operation; its stores are built

and filled with goods; its houses are erected and furnished. People are there, too, many of them. Most of the stores, factories, buildings, and equipment were constructed by men of earlier generations who have now left the city, but its present residents are hard at work where the others left off. In some cases they are bringing the unfinished work to completion; in others, they are modifying and changing its plan; in still others, they are tearing down the old structures and setting up their own models instead. Everything is in constant flux. New materials are being hauled in, old materials are being taken out. Every little while some workman, usually among the older ones, lays down his tools and departs from the city, not to return; but as he goes a younger workman steps into his place and the activity continues unabated.

At a great gateway of the city are many strangers, like himself, who have also been invited to live there and are waiting their turn to enter. They are admitted one at a time, for each must enter alone. Having passed through the gate, each is normally met by guardians assigned especially to him, whose duty and privilege it is to induct him into this new life. From them he learns the language of this strange people; by them he is fed and sheltered and protected from danger; from them come training and instruction which must be acquired before he is ready to take his full place in the scheme of community life.

Social factors.—It is evident that under the conditions just described the life of man will be vastly different from what it would have been had he been placed instead on an uninhabited island. In either case he would, of course, be subjected to the influence of weather, climate, and all the other elements of his physical environment; but here he will be subjected to many influences wholly lacking on the lonely island. What are these social factors? A mere inventory of them would be a lengthy list, indeed, but certain major divisions may be discerned.

First of all, we note that he would be directly influenced by the fact of human beings, as distinguished from animals and inanimate nature. These are, of course, a part of his physical environment, but their "humanness" is the primary fact of his ever-expanding social experience. The very presence of other people creates a stimulus quite unlike that existing anywhere in nature. Man has an impulse to gregariousness with his own kind, a desire to be with them on a basis different from that with any other species. He

lives, and eats, and works, and plays, with special groups. Some of them he is dependent on. Certain individuals he comes to know intimately, others not so well; for some, attachments and affections arise which lead to intimate ties, toward others antagonisms and oppositions will possibly develop. The mere presence of creatures like himself, whether as single human beings, or collectively in groups, is of profound importance. The gregariousness of man thus exposes him to influences which stamp his personality and character.

A second division of social factors may be designated as social control. Before long our new-comer will discover that he is not free to execute all of his own choices, for the will of the individual is hemmed in by the wills of others, and their preferences must be consulted as well as his own. Moreover, he is constantly in contact with individuals and groups who by word or action express their approval or disapproval of what he does, and so govern his actions. Much of the control man encounters is accomplished through the subtle influence of suggestion, whereby an idea is insinuated into the mind, but choice of action is left to his own decision. When suggestion is accompanied by an appeal, it becomes persuasion, which is a more forceful pressure. Control in its most compelling form is coercion, in which constraint or compulsion drives the person to do something against his will. Physical force or punishment may be employed as a last resort. This power to coerce he finds on every hand—in the home, the school, the church, the social club, and numerous other organized groups. The most complete and effective form of constraint is that possessed by the state, exercising its authority through government, whereby it may legally subject its citizens to custody, imprisonment, or even death. All these forms of persuasion and compulsion represent social forces which affect the character of culture.

A third body of social factors encountered by our new townsman in this hypothetical case are those involved in the processes and relationships that exist among its citizens. Certain characteristic forms of activity, and corresponding relationships, involve him. Conflicts arise, competitions develop, alliances are formed, co-operative enterprises are undertaken. Groups integrate and dis-integrate, institutions rise and fall; and he, although a participant, is carried along by them.

Finally, we note that he is influenced by that great body of social

elements known as culture, which we have discussed in Chapter IV. Culture is not society, but it is brought into being by human society; it is not association, but it is produced through human association. This culture is, on the one hand, our central object of attention; likewise it must be included among the factors of influence; for once created, it bends back upon itself, so to speak, and becomes a major element in producing and modifying succeeding forms of culture. In recognition of the fact that each child born into the world is the inheritor of a cultural accumulation from the past, we may regard this as a vast social heritage. The influence of the social heritage upon his own generation is of incalculable potency, as we shall see shortly.

Such is the picture of the individual in process of adjusting himself to his social environment. Each of us enters society through the gate of birth; death takes each of us away. During our stay we are continually subjected to the influence of elements wholly different from those in the world of nature. By reason of our gregariousness our thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and behavior generally, are colored by communication with our fellows. Through suggestion and persuasion our individual wills are inclined this way and that; and by agencies of social control our actions are bent, through coercive measures, if necessary, to conform to group demands. We are steadily brought under the influence of competitive or coöperative action and are impelled to learn the technique of getting on in society in the activities necessary for our own and community well-being. And all the while we are becoming more and more aware of the coercive power of group behavior.

SOME SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF SOCIAL FACTORS

Reminding ourselves again that no factor is a single explanation of causation, we may note certain ways in which these elements which we have defined as "social" are of especial influence in human society. We shall notice here the significance of the social heritage as an influence on culture.

The extent and degree of culture.—Man holds a unique place in the animal world by virtue of his ability, not merely to create culture, but to transmit it. Thus each generation inherits a degree of culture and hands it on to the next generation, augmented by the culture it has itself created. To the social heritage of each gener-

ation, therefore, is to be ascribed largely the degree of civilization enjoyed by that generation. We may go a step further and say that the difference in degree of advancement between primitive and modern man is not a difference in native mentality, but rather a difference in the extent of cultural heritage of each. Our Anglo-Saxon ancestors who only a few hundred years ago went about crudely clad, and armed with stone weapons, were probably as far advanced in native intelligence as this generation; our present advance is not due to superior brain power, but to a richer inheritance from the past. A primitive society remains primitive so long as its implements and resources are primitive. A simple pioneer society is limited by the fact that it has only hand tools and instruments for practicing handicraft. A modern industrial society reflects the power of the machine, so fundamental to modern civilization. Where there are books and literature, the minds of the people will manifest that fact; where these are lacking, ignorance prevails.

The basic pattern of culture.—Not only is there a relation between the social heritage and the degree and extent of a culture, but the basic pattern of a given culture is predetermined by the nature and form of its social heritage. In our study of culture we have observed two interesting and significant facts. The first is that among all civilizations from lowest to highest there is a broad and fundamental similarity as to basic features. Families, religions, governments; folk lore, mythologies, proverbs; implements of industry, of war, of art; jewelry and dress—all of these and many more are part of the “universal culture pattern” previously mentioned, which existed as definitely among the Indians who greeted Columbus as among ourselves. The second striking observation is the wide divergence which exists in regard to the details of the very things which are most universal. Language is everywhere, but philologists estimate that there are at least five thousand different tongues; cutting edges are found the world over, but no institution has a complete collection of all their varieties and formations; musical instruments are known to practically all races, but four large galleries in the New York Metropolitan Museum contain but a fraction of the kinds known to exist. Which particular language, or type of knives, or style of musical instruments any particular group has is, unless they have been modified by contacts with other people, an indication of their ancestral patterns; that is, they are determined by the character of the social inheritance. And what

is true of language, musical instruments, and knives is true of numberless other elements of our culture.

In this same connection, we observe that the nature and extent and distribution of wealth are of basic importance. Whatever "value" anything has, in the economic sense, results from the existence of a "market" for it; and a market is a social creation. Other things being equal, the prestige, influence, and capacity for effective activity, whether for man or nation, vary in proportion to the amount of his capital resources. "Poor folks have poor ways" largely because of lacking the means essential to changing their ways. The form of a people's wealth is also of great practical significance. A pastoral people will take on life-habits that relate to herding, grazing, riding, and moving from one pasture camp to another; an agricultural people, living a sedentary life, will acquire "rural" usages and manners; a capitalistic society will be sharply marked by factories, skyscrapers, and the hideous complexity of a metropolis.

Human behavior.—The attitudes and sentiments of our ancestors often color and shape the patterns of thought of our own generation. Even as Turkish mosques, Chinese pagodas, and French cathedrals reflect external differences among peoples, even more strikingly does the thought life of the people find its way into the lives of its posterity. The Chinese are Confucians and Buddhists, the Hindus are Brahmans, the Bulgarians are Greek Catholic, the Italians are Roman Catholic, the Arabs are Moslems, and the English are Protestants—in each case because of a long history of ancestral thought rather than as the result of reflective judgment. The traditions and sentiments of the past come as naturally to the children of each generation as the air they breathe. Sentiments such as those that find expression in the national songs of peoples continue to live because they are inculcated in their offspring by each passing generation. In the last analysis, many of the prejudices that color our behavior are to be explained not on any rational basis but on the basis of sentimental attitudes instilled in us by our antecedents. A child of German birth transferred to America in his infancy and reared as an American child would have adopted as a matter of course the sentiments of America toward Germany in the World War, just as an American child reared from infancy in Germany would have had the attitude of his foster country against the United States.

HOW THE SOCIAL HERITAGE IS INCULCATED

We might well inquire, at this point, how the individual members of society are brought to accept modes of behavior inherited from the past? There are certain universal ways in which the group exerts pressure upon its members to secure their acquiescence to accepted norms. We shall briefly discuss here some of the more important: (1) the pressure of crowd emotion, (2) the pressure of the folkways and mores, (3) the pressure of law, (4) the pressure of public opinion.

Crowd emotion.—The pressure of crowd emotion is the most elementary form of these. Every college student is familiar with the electrical contagion that runs through the "rooters section" of the grandstand at a tense football game and makes every loyal varsity son and daughter yell to hoarseness. Mobs destroy property, or lynch their victims, under a similar mass psychology. Many an individual who would never think of or sanction certain behavior for himself under ordinary circumstances, finds himself yielding in the excitement of the moment.

Folkways and mores.—Less dramatic than the foregoing, but far more influential, taken as a whole, is the coercive power of group behavior as expressed in what are called the folkways and mores.¹ Folkways and mores are unwritten regulations that are nowhere codified or put down in statute books. All custom, etiquette, convention, "manners," to which we commonly yield unthinking obedience, are included in folkways and mores. They are accepted, not because some authorized authority says they must be, but because of the common understanding within the group which the majority of its members unquestioningly accept. Thus the folkways and mores are constantly exerting pressure to make us conform to patterns of thought and action approved by the group.

Law and institutions.—As just indicated, folkways and mores are unwritten regulations. As civilization advances a point is finally reached where it becomes necessary for the group clearly to specify certain things that may or may not be done. This is formally expressed as law, specific regulations as to conduct of the people including, usually, a statement of a penalty for violation. Law in

¹The subject is discussed in detail by W. G. Sumner in *Folkways*, Ginn and Company, 1907.

its simplest form is an organized expression of the already existing mores. It is a formal and positive expression of the public will, differing from the mores chiefly in being more concrete and specific.

Closely related to law and partaking of certain of its characteristics are institutions. They, too, involve formalization of the mores. But, further, the family, the church, and above all the state, represent not merely a crystallization of the general will, but also a structure whereby it is made effective and operative in human relationships. Usually, though not always, institutions themselves rest upon a basis of legislation which gives them public sanction and to a certain extent indicates their powers and limitations.

Public opinion.—Public opinion represents another factor of societary control. More indefinite and elusive than laws and institutions, it is nevertheless the most compelling of all social influences. We have pointed out that the attitudes and sentiments of our ancestors have a far-reaching effect upon the thinking and acting of our own day and age; but our ancestors have passed away and can no longer exert a direct pressure. Whatever constraints are exercised upon us must be from living men, and public opinion is the most important of these. This it is which gives validity and strength to every expression, body of ideals, or requirements which bind us. Tradition, it is often said, is weighty because of its antiquity; a more correct way to express it is that tradition is weighty because the opinion of our group supports it and holds it in reverence. It is said that law compels; it is more true to say that the opinion of the public enforces the law. In other words, the focal point of all social control is the collective judgment of the contemporary group here and now.

Public opinion is in the last analysis the final word. When strongly aroused, it overrules all other opinion whether of individual or of minor groups within itself, and in emergencies it will suppress both. The folkways are merely a form of public opinion crystalized into customs. Every institution exists only by its support or consent, or at least by its passive acquiescence. Government itself, that stronghold of seeming finality, reflects public opinion, and will itself be altered when the supporting endorsement of its public undergoes sufficient change. Public opinion, then, must be regarded as actively or potentially the ultimate social factor, since it holds within itself the word of final approval or disapproval of the group on any question, and is backed by the physical resources

of the group for the enforcement of its decision. Traditions, rituals, mores, institutions, even law itself, would have small weight were it not for their acceptance and sanction by the opinion of the group.

HOW SOCIAL FACTORS ARE MODIFIED OR LIMITED

From the discussion thus far one might get the impression that the chief effect of social forces in culture is to stabilize and crystallize community life by preserving the social heritage and forcing the individual into conformity. They undoubtedly do have such an effect. They appear to lay a dead hand upon the individual and the community, and often seem to condemn society to an endless treading in the path of earlier generations. To the peasant in the field, to the soldier in the trenches, to the unemployed workman futilely walking the streets in search of a job, the social system, whose victim each is, may look like a juggernaut over whose course he has no control, and from which he cannot escape. But this is only one side of the picture. An earlier chapter has made it clear that cultures do change, and this is but another way of saying that social factors are subject to modification. Society never stands stock still; history is a story of a changing world.

How may the influence of social factors be limited or modified within a particular culture? Whatever the actual process by which change is brought about, four elements, largely within the range of human control, have a particular bearing upon it: (1) new knowledge, (2) new attitudes, (3) new resources, and (4) wider diffusion of knowledge, attitudes, and resources to an increasing number of people. Let us consider these in turn.

Existing social factors are modified through the acquisition of new knowledge. Inventions and discoveries constantly widen both our horizons and our abilities. When we know more, we can do more. Old systems of religion, philosophy, and science become archaic and out of date as better understanding takes their place. August Comte, the eminent French philosopher, pointed out a century ago that it is characteristic of the human mind to proceed from a stage in which everything is superstitiously ascribed to the arbitrary will of invisible supernatural beings to that of the positive explanation of all causation in terms of natural law. As knowledge increases, older beliefs are supplanted, and corresponding changes take place in the existing social order.

The expansion of knowledge leads to the gradual acquiring of new attitudes, and new attitudes lead to a modification of social factors. Changes in attitude represent alterations of the previous tendencies to behavior and a setting up of new standards and criteria of thought. Political autocracy, for example, was once taken for granted, but little by little political thought shifted until democracy became the ideal. The attitude towards slavery has changed from that of comfortable acceptance to that of condemnation and rejection. New attitudes toward nationalism have resulted in a League of Nations, a World Court, and other evidences of international thinking. The world seems now to be in process of shifting its attitude of unquestioning acceptance of war and imperialism, and to some extent even of capitalism. Other things being equal, the changes that take place in social life will be in direct proportion to the degree and extent that existing knowledge is made available to the masses. Such a diffusion is the proper function of education.

Social factors are changed by the bringing in of new resources. The Industrial Revolution was a child of a vast new resource—the machine—which made great factories possible; these in turn led to the development of the modern city with all of its complexities and problems. The telegraph, telephone, and radio have progressively reconstructed our entire system of communication and made possible a closeness of contact previously undreamed of. Steamship, train, automobile, and airplane have linked every part of the world as neighbor to every other part. Each of these great changes has been accompanied by a corresponding alteration of numerous factors within the previous social life of the people. Each new resource discovered or invented, and utilized by man, to a greater or less extent causes a modification of the existing social order.

THE INCREASING RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL FACTORS

One of the most interesting things which a study of the development of civilization brings to our attention is the increasing relative importance which the social factors assume, as compared with the geographic and the biological.

The diminishing direct importance of geographic factors in the lives of most of us may be illustrated by contrast with the experiences of such pioneers as Daniel Boone, who, over a century ago

made their way into the uncharted wilderness of the Middle West. Being alone at first, or in small groups, they wrested their sustenance first-hand from the immediately surrounding woods, fields, or streams. Theirs was of necessity largely a direct struggle with their geographic environment. With the receding of the frontier, the direct influence of nature receded and social forces advanced in importance. And now, the descendants of these pioneers, living in canyons of towering skyscrapers and surrounded by the confusion and complexity of modern life, each performing his limited, specialized task in an immense, world-wide division of labor, are hardly conscious of raw nature at all, so indirect is their touch with it.

Ultimately, of course, the city dweller is as dependent upon nature as he ever was. His residence, even though it be a room on the twentieth floor of a metropolitan hostelry, must rest its foundations upon solid earth; he must breathe nature's air, though it be filtered through a modern filtering system; his food, however many hands it passes through in the meantime, traces at last back to the soil from which it originated. But the social factors have relatively a much greater direct effect upon his form of life than upon that of his forefathers in the wilderness.

Similarly, social factors assume an increasing relative importance over the biological. Although man possesses, at birth, significant biological traits and capacities which differentiate him from other animals, and which give him the ability to develop culture, it is not these biological factors which make him distinctly human. His "humanness," as distinct from his animal nature, consists of his own personal organization of the customs, beliefs, sentiments, ideas, and deals which he acquires in the course of his social life.

In this sense, the child's "humanness" begins to develop the moment contact is established with those who assist at his birth. Within a very few hours, as his nurse knows, socially induced habits begin to be formed affecting his attitude toward his own world. Let him be fed on regular schedule and he soon falls in contentedly with the scheme; let the schedule be irregular, or let attention be given every time he wails, and he will soon rebel vigorously against all schedules. At first his cries are an unplanned, spontaneous reaction against discomfort in general; in an increasingly short time they change to positive demands for some particular thing or attention which he has learned from experience will produce satisfaction. From this point on through life, the social environment maintains a

never-ending stream and variety of impacts upon him. They are a part of his experience at every turn; and at every touch, however slight, there is some modification in his nature. It is these that transform the mere biological organism into that vastly more amazing thing, the human being.

So it is that the part played by society becomes proportionately greater as time goes on. It is true that my own bodily senses convey to me sensory impressions by which I first enter upon cognition of the world of nature and of man about me. My own eyes reveal to me, say, the lines of a Gothic interior; my ears inform me of music within. But without fellowmen to interpret line and sound, my cognition would be far less than it is and my comprehension of its meaning would be zero. Society selects for me much of the world of which I am to become cognizant, and is responsible for most of my interpretation of that world. The various groups to which I belong largely determine for me the objects of my attention and which of them shall become objects of value to be desired and sought. I am what I am, not merely because of being a living creature, adjusted to a geographic environment, but because in addition to these the factors of society have entered into my making; and the degree of my "humanness" is in direct proportion to the degree and manner in which I have been influenced by fellow men.

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
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PART III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN CULTURE

- VIII. Prehistoric Cultures
IX. The Transition to Historic Cultures
WILLIAM O. BROWN
X. Ancient Cultures of the Near East
XI. Ancient Greek Culture
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CHAPTER VIII

PREHISTORIC CULTURES

OUR examination of the character of culture and of the factors which have entered into its creation furnishes at once a guide and a point of view for the study of the historic cultures. History lifts the curtain on society in action. When man begins to write down what he thinks and what he does, the student acquires for the first time a basis for the reconstruction of early cultures. But even before the dawn of history the story of man's culture-building is not a closed book. Prehistoric man has left no written records of his life, but he has left far more than his own fossil remains to serve the anthropologist in his quest for enlightenment. Numerous utensils, tools, and weapons, drawings and paintings upon the walls of his caverns, remains of his dwellings, and other bits of evidence reveal to the trained archaeologist some knowledge of the nature of early cultures. It is upon that period that attention is now to be focused—the period of prehistoric man.

The unsolved problem of origins.—One who expects a complete answer to the question of the origin of culture is sure to be disappointed when he consults the writings of the authorities in the field. So far no one has been able to solve that problem. It is believed that such basic elements of culture as marriage, the family, economic organization, religion, and art are of great antiquity. But when, where, and how they began is not known, for the obtainable data offer no adequate basis for answers to those questions. Hence we can only speculate as to their original types. The ground is safer in discussing the origin of tools, pottery, the domestication of animals and plants, and the beginning of the textile arts, since visible evidence of their existence is available. Even here, however, inference rather than proved conclusions is the rule. Caution is the incessant command to the student of culture beginnings. The scarcity of evidence tends to stimulate interesting and valuable speculation, but speculation must not be mistaken for verified conclusions.

The reason for this uncertainty about the earliest cultures is not difficult to understand. In the absence of written records, the student must rely upon such cultural remains as he can find. A great amount of labor is necessary to recover these materials; and once they are obtained, the student must go through the much more exacting procedure of classifying them as to time, place, and type; otherwise they remain largely meaningless for his purpose. Gaps in the information are inevitable, and these make accuracy and certainty the more difficult to attain.

Nevertheless, remarkable progress has been made in the effort to reconstruct the earliest cultures. The prehistory of Europe, Asia, Africa, the Americas, and the islands of the Pacific has been explored with a considerable degree of completeness in some cases, inadequately in others. With growing endowments at their command, groups of highly trained scholars have journeyed into various regions to study visible remains and to uncover additional evidence by extensive excavations, with the result that the horizons of human knowledge have been considerably extended into the remote past. In the light of their discoveries, what can be said of the dawn and the development of prehistoric cultures?

Divisions of the prehistoric period.—The prehistoric period is popularly spoken of as the Stone Age, the name being suggested by the preëminence of stone as a material in the manufacture of implements. The Stone Age embraces three major divisions: the Eolithic, the “dawn” or earliest stage; the Paleolithic, the Old Stone Age; and the Neolithic, the New Stone Age. The latter two of the three periods are divided and subdivided, as will be indicated later, on the basis of advances or changes in certain characteristic elements of Stone Age culture.

Two facts should be made clear at the outset. First, our knowledge of the chronology of the prehistoric ages is often vague, there being much disagreement as to when one age ends and another begins.¹ Second, the development of the cultures represented by each is not uniform throughout the world, either as to time or content. For example, the Paleolithic cultures of western Asia apparently developed sooner than was the case of the culture either of western or northern Europe. In the Americas the Neolithic was definitely delayed as compared with its development in Europe. Moreover, it would be rash to assert that the Neolithic cultures of

¹For one set of estimates, see Chart IV, p. 39.

Western Europe bore a detailed resemblance to the Neolithic cultures of northern Europe. Apparently early in human culture regional variations developed.

PALEOLITHIC CULTURES

We may dismiss the Eolithic Age with a few words, since it is a matter of serious debate whether or not this remote period marks the beginning of culture. This is the age of the fossil or submen discussed in Chapter III. The controversy centers about certain stones called "eoliths." Some students believe that the eoliths were fashioned as tools by Eolithic man and therefore signify the beginnings of culture in that age; others contend that these stones could have been produced by pressure, cold, heat, or other natural forces. Thus far the weight of authoritative opinion supports the latter point of view. The submen of 500,000 years ago, more or less, probably were intelligent enough to use these eoliths as tools and weapons, even though they did not make them; but that they had a technique for making tools is as yet unproved.¹

As we pass from the Eolithic to the Paleolithic Age the evidence of the existence of culture becomes indisputable. According to Kroeber, Paleolithic culture dates back at least to 100,000 B. C. It was diffused over much of the world, and by the close of its period had doubtless undergone considerable variation from region to region. The whole period is divided into two sub-ages, the Upper and the Lower Paleolithic,² each of which is again divided into epochs, whose names are derived from the names of the stations at which the characteristic culture was found. Thus the Lower Paleolithic, according to the scheme which we are following, embraces the Chellean,³ Acheulean, and Mousterian epochs; while the Upper Paleolithic is divided into the Aurignacian, Solutrean, and Magdalenian.

Characteristics of Lower Paleolithic culture.—Naturally not much is known of Chellean man and his culture, since at least 100,000 years separate his time from our own. A great deal is

¹The recent discovery of artifacts in the graves of representatives of the Peking Man may force a revision of this skeptical point of view and lead to the definite conviction that human culture began much earlier than here suggested.

²See Chart IV. This division is given by Kroeber. Cleland, another authority, divides the Age into the Early, Middle, and Late Paleolithic.

³Some students recognize a Pre-Chellean interval as the beginning of human culture.

known, however, about his most distinctive artifact, the *coup de poing*, or hand axe. These hand axes were large, almond-shaped tools of flint, from four to ten inches long, in appearance not unlike two hands with the palms touching. The weapon was made by striking off large flakes of flint until the core emerged, shaped as described. Quite likely the man of this epoch had other implements, some of them made from wood. Apparently, the Chelleans were hunters. In Europe they probably lived in the open, bothered little by the weather, since they existed during the third interglacial epoch, a period of warm temperature.

The Acheulean epoch was marked by certain advances. The *coup de poing* remained, but the chipping was finer. Its top was finished off, suggesting that it may have been hafted to a handle instead of being held in the hand, as during the Chellean. Smaller implements of similar type appeared, perhaps used as skin scrapers or even as drills. Renard suggests that during these earlier epochs of the Paleolithic Age, ornaments made from seeds, teeth, and shells were used.¹ Clothes made from skin were probably worn to some extent. By the end of the Acheulean epoch man was widely distributed, living in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The population, however, was sparse, owing to geographic conditions and the uneven distribution of flint. No doubt existence was precarious.

The Mousterian epoch exhibits significant changes. Thus, man began to live in caves as a protection against the cold that came with the advance of the last great ice sheet. Further, a new method of tool manufacture was invented. This new process involved delicate chipping and flaking through pressure of a sharp implement on the material being worked. By this process large pieces of flake were split from flint nodules and new types of tools were obtained. The hand axe was generally reduced in size, at times being not more than two inches long. Scrapers in great abundance, awls for piercing hide, and thin flakes, dressed on one or both sides, to be used as knives, now appeared. Probably spears and daggers were also introduced. Flint continued to be the basic material for tools and implements; in fact, flint was an indispensable material throughout the Paleolithic Age, and flint mining was a major industry. Bone was also utilized during this epoch. It has been suggested that Mousterian man used bone anvils in his tool "shops." Hunting remained the important food-getting technique. Cracked bear

¹G. Renard, *Life and Work in Prehistoric Times*, Alfred A. Knopf, 1929, pp. 23-24.

skulls from the fossil remains of this period suggest that Mousterian man clubbed the bear as he emerged from the caves, caves in some cases inhabited by the Mousterian himself. And covered débris in the cave dwellings indicate that man had discovered the use of fire and learned the art of cooking, both of which are steps of great significance in the development of cultures. The depositing of utensils with the buried dead suggests that Mousterian man had a belief in an after-life.

Altogether, though man's pace was exceedingly slow during the Lower Paleolithic period, his upward climb appears remarkable when we look backward to the eoliths, over which scholars speculate and debate, as possible evidence of the first faint traces of the dawn of culture.

Characteristics of Upper Paleolithic culture.—The last three epochs of the Paleolithic—the Aurignacian, Solutrean and Magdalenian—are often discussed together. These epochs embraced perhaps 15,000 years and constitute a very fertile period of culture growth. There is no sharp differentiation between the Mousterian culture and the succeeding Aurignacian; there was, however, some advance. The Mousterian striking and flaking technique continued, but a wider variety of tools was used, such as scrapers, blades, gouges, and small points—these last perhaps used as engraving tools. The use of bone was greatly extended; bone wedges, awls, spear-heads, and rods (used, perhaps, for magical purposes), now appear. Necklaces and bracelets of bones, teeth, and shells testify to Paleolithic man's "vanity motive." Tubes filled with red ochre have also been found, probably used for painting the body. And finally, it was during the Aurignacian Period that the famous art of the Upper Paleolithic began to emerge, flowering richly several thousand years later, during the Magdalenian, the last epoch of the Paleolithic Age.

During the Solutrean epoch further additions were made to man's heritage of culture. Stone work, for example, reached a high point of perfection. Long blades resembling the laurel leaf, thin and sharp and delicately retouched, were manufactured. Apparently, however, there were also certain lapses. Thus, bone implements were fewer and poorer in quality than during the Aurignacian. And the development of art, beginning so propitiously during the Aurignacian, lagged during the Solutrean.

These apparent losses, however, were regained during the last

epoch of the Paleolithic, the Magdalenian. A new vitality was evident. "Long, narrow flint blades and gravers reappear as the typical Stone-Age implement. Bone harpoons with detachable barbed heads, the harpoon thrower, and bone lance heads show marked development in weapons of the chase, while delicately-shaped needles and bone plugs shaped somewhat like collar buttons suggest the possession of skin garments. Ornaments of bone, shell, and teeth become very common, while hammers and chisels of bone, flutes and whistles and objects of problematic use indicate a very highly developed culture, one which in many ways approximates that of the present-day Eskimo."¹

Perhaps the most distinctive achievement of the Magdalenian period is its art, the basis for which had been established several thousand years previously. Osborn has aptly called the Magdalenians "Paleolithic Greeks," so remarkable were their artistic achievements. The Magdalenian artists were painters, sculptors, and engravers. They painted or modeled bison, mammoths, wild horses, and other species of animals now extinct. Usually these sketches and carved or modeled figures were executed on the cavern walls. On the walls of the Magdalenian caves of France and Spain, figures of the bear, bison, reindeer, and horse have been found, modeled in clay or cut in high relief. Out of ivory or bone they carved animal figures and small models of human beings—"figurines," as they are called.

Students of this Upper Paleolithic art agree generally that it was not merely an expression of the artistic impulses of the man of this period. It probably represented an attempt to control the objects depicted. By engraving the outline of the figure of horse, deer, bear, or bison on the walls of the cavern, Paleolithic man believed that he had brought these animals into his power. His art was a magical aid in his quest for food.

Contributions of Paleolithic Man to civilization.—With the close of the Paleolithic Age the first 100,000 years—roughly—of culture growth draw to an end, a period covering about eleven-twelfths of the total time span of cultural development down to the present.² What were the outstanding achievements of Paleolithic

¹Fay-Cooper Cole in *The Nature of the World and of Man*, University of Chicago Press, 1927, pp. 359-360.

²This idea is graphically presented by Wilson D. Wallis in *An Introduction to Anthropology*, Harper and Brothers, 1926, p. 90.

man? Fairly considered, he had advanced far during the interval. He had acquired a fairly adequate technology, could make clothing to protect his body, had discovered how to produce fire and how to utilize it in the preparation of his food, and had created an art of surprising merit. Apparently he had developed some of the elements of social organization and a very elementary religion. To the modern man these may appear to be insignificant achievements for one hundred thousand years of toil; but considering that early Paleolithic man probably started with nothing and had to overcome great difficulties, we must fairly conclude that his advance had been remarkable. With the Paleolithic Age, then, ends the first great stage in the development of human culture.

The Paleolithic world.—By the end of the Paleolithic period culture and peoples were widely distributed. In Europe this culture was found in what are now Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, England, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Russia, Spain, and Switzerland. In Northern Africa there were traces of a culture comparable to the Magdalenian of Europe, and in Asia evidences of this late Paleolithic culture have been found in China, India, Siberia, and Syria. Even the Americas were apparently peopled by migrants from Northeastern Asia about the end of the Paleolithic Age, crossing perhaps at the Bering Strait, and ultimately scattering over the two continents, creating in some cases great cultures such as those of the Aztec, Inca, and Maya. Thus, the process of peopling the world was well under way by the end of the Paleolithic period.

What of the Old Stone Age man himself? Do we know anything of the racial types represented by those who built the Paleolithic cultures? The subhuman types referred to in Chapter III may have created the so-called Eolithic Culture, but the proof is inconclusive.¹ Uncertainty prevails as to the racial type existing until near the end of the Lower Paleolithic. The record then becomes clearer. Beginning with the Mousterian, the third epoch of the Paleolithic, Neanderthal Man appears. It will be recalled that he was a short, thick-set fellow, powerful in bone and musculature, slightly stooping at the knees and shoulders, with a thick neck, heavy jaws, and large head. In the Upper Paleolithic he disappears, giving way to the Cro-Magnon Man, a tall, lithe, well-formed type, a kinsman of Modern Man. During this period, too, there were

¹See footnote 1, p. 119.

found the Brünn and Grimaldi men, neither apparently very widely dispersed. Just what was the relation between the culture or cultures of the Old Stone Age and the racial types then existing we do not know.

NEOLITHIC CULTURE

The Paleolithic Age did not suddenly disappear, nor did it end everywhere at the same time. Late Paleolithic cultures are not sharply distinguishable from those of the Early Neolithic period. Between the end of the one age and the beginning of the other there were cultures that were neither Paleolithic nor Neolithic in characteristics. This fact has given rise to the complex problem of the so-called transitional cultures.¹ Perhaps these cultures succeeding the Paleolithic proper and preceding the genuine Neolithic are not really transitional, in the sense that they represent steps or stages from one age to another. One authority regards them, rather, as posthumous descendants of the Paleolithic. The Neolithic, then, does not—at least in Europe—represent merely a fuller development of the Paleolithic. In a sense it is a new culture. Its origin and its relation to the Paleolithic will be discussed in later pages of this chapter. At this point we shall discuss the distinctive characteristics of the Neolithic Age.

The Neolithic advance in technology.—The Neolithic or New Stone Age may be divided into the Early and the Late Neolithic. During the Early period at least five features were added to the cultural heritage. These were pottery, the bow and arrow, the abundant use of bone and horn—also utilized during the Late Paleolithic—the domestication of the dog, and the invention of the hewn axe. Clearly, pottery was an important invention. The new type of vessel could be used for storage purposes and for cooking; and various foods, such as soups, stews, and porridge—unknown to Paleolithic Man—could now be prepared. Moreover, pottery probably furnished a new vent for craftsmanship and artistry. The bow was likewise important. It made possible long-range fighting, the killing of small animals and the capture of

¹The period of these transitional cultures, if they may be so termed, are given various names, such as, Mesolithic, Epipaleolithic and Proto-Neolithic. Specific cultures within the period such as the Maglemose of Scandinavia, the Capsian of Spain, and the Tardenoisian of France are frequently discussed in the literature. Such authorities as Childe, Burkitt, Osborn, Obermaier and MacCurdy discuss these cultures and problems connected with them. A chapter of the nature of this one does not require a detailed discussion of the points raised by these writers.

large ones. Both inventions contributed appreciably to human security. By the increased use of bone and horn, and by the application of the rubbing process to these materials in the manufacture of such implements as chisels, awls, and needles, real contributions were made to technology. The domestication of the dog marked the first step in man's subjugation of the animal world to his use. The hewn axe, used both as an axe and as a wedge, was a valuable tool and weapon.

The contributions of the Late Neolithic to man's cultural inheritance are even more impressive than those of the Early Neolithic. One of the most significant inventions of this period was the new process of grinding stone, which made possible smooth and sharp edges for tools and weapons. The old chipping and flaking methods of implement making did not, of course, disappear. It has been suggested that probably the every-day tool was still made by old methods, since the grinding process was so very slow and tedious. Incidentally, this extensive use of stone made flint mining a major industry. The miner often sank his shaft to a depth of thirty feet. When the layer of superior flint was reached galleries were driven along the bed, radiating from the shaft somewhat like the spokes of a wheel. The equipment of the Neolithic miner was simple, comprising a deer-horn pick, the shoulder blade of an ox for a shovel, and a lamp consisting of a cup hollowed out from chalk and a wick fed from melted grease.

In still other fields of the industrial arts Neolithic man advanced beyond the achievements of the Paleolithic Age. He knew something of the textile arts—spinning, weaving, knitting, embroidery work, and basketry; both the spindle and the loom were inventions of Neolithic man. His growing skill in the making of fabrics improved the character of his clothing beyond that of the earlier periods. He practiced arts of embellishment, using such substances as teeth, bone, horn, shell, and stone, in the manufacture of ornaments. In the decoration of these ornaments and the embellishment of his pottery he displayed a degree of artistic skill. He also made decided advances in sculpture and particularly in architecture, as evidenced by certain megalithic structures, to be described presently.

The beginnings of agriculture.—Perhaps one of the greatest inventions of all time, if one may so term it, was agriculture, another achievement of the Late Neolithic period. Where agriculture

originated we do not know; Egypt, Western Asia, and Central Asia have been variously mentioned. Agriculture in Europe was probably derived from Crete, spreading from there to the Danubian cultures of Central Europe, and from this region to other parts of the Continent. The emergence of agriculture was accompanied by the introduction of rude implements. To loosen the soil Neolithic man used a plow probably constructed of wood. His reaping was done with a sickle made by taking a curved piece of notched flint and fastening it to a handle of wood. For grinding his grain he used a "mill" consisting of a hard, flat rock—probably of sandstone—on which he crushed the grain by means of a sort of stone rolling pin. All these were simple and inadequate devices measured by modern standards, and yet they were the prototypes of implements that were to serve man for several thousands of years, even down to the present.

The existence of agriculture in Neolithic times implies the domestication of plants. In Europe five domesticated food plants were utilized: barley, wheat, millet, peas, and lentils. To these must be added domesticated flax used in the textile arts by Neolithic man. In the New World, during the Neolithic Age, at least two other plants were added to the domesticated list—maize and tobacco. Along with the appearance of domesticated plants came the domestication of important animals. Goats, swine, sheep, cattle, and camels were all used by Neolithic man, and added much to his advancing security. It is believed that all of these were originally domesticated in Asia, whence their use was slowly disseminated over parts of the Neolithic world.

One can hardly overestimate the gain man made when he began to till the soil. Agriculture radically altered the life of man. His food supply was now secured as it had never been before, since he was no longer so dependent upon purely natural supplies. From a mere collector he became a producer of food. At the same time, the increased production of food made possible the support of larger populations and contributed greatly to the emergence of a stable and more orderly society.

Characteristics of Neolithic life.—Neolithic life was much more comfortable than life in Paleolithic times. As already indicated, Neolithic man was better clad against rigorous changes of weather and climate. He had also made definite improvements in habitation. In some cases houses were dug in the ground and

roofed with timber and earth. The Lake Dwellers of Switzerland, Southern Germany, parts of France, Northern Italy, and Austria built their villages over the water on platforms supported by piles. In general, Neolithic habitations were a decided improvement over the cave dwellings and out-of-door places of Paleolithic man.

Naturally, our knowledge of the intangible aspects of Neolithic life is scant. Probably there were real advances in social organization. The measure of security incident to the practice of agriculture, the consequent increase in population, the wider diffusion, and the multiplied contacts of the diverse groups of Neolithic times naturally enriched the social and mental life. But we have little tangible evidence as to the nature of this enrichment. There is, however, good evidence, at least in certain areas, of an intense preoccupation with religion. The megalithic tombs, referred to above, indicate a wide diffusion of a cult of the dead. These tombs were collective sepulchres of varying shapes and sizes constructed of huge stones or boulders. They were distributed, as evidenced by modern remains, along the coasts of Spain, Southern and Western France, Great Britain, Ireland, Holland, Northern Germany, Scandinavia, the Islands of the Western Mediterranean area, and in Northern Africa, India, Java and Madagascar. The building of the megaliths in many cases involved herculean expenditures of labor, as well as some architectural skill. Their existence is proof of a vital belief in survival after death.

The origin and spread of Neolithic culture.—Where did Neolithic culture begin? Such evidence as is available points to the conclusion that it originated in the lands bordering the Eastern Mediterranean—that is, in the Near East. Such characteristic elements of Neolithic culture as pottery, the domestication of animals, and agriculture were in all probability of oriental origin. Broadly speaking, the path of diffusion led from the eastern shores of the Mediterranean westward across the Aegean, by way of Cyprus, to Greece; thence extending northwestward into the Danubian area of Central Europe, then into Western Europe, and finally into northern regions. If this conclusion is correct,¹ the Neolithic cultures of Europe were largely compounded of Eastern elements. This is not to say that the Neolithic cultures of the

¹Such writers as Childe, Burkitt, Osborn, Kroeber and Obermaier all point with varying emphasis to the importance of the Near East in the development of the European Neolithic cultures.

West were exact duplicates of those of the East, for the Western cultures developed independently. They borrowed from the East but what they borrowed they adapted to their needs rather than copied.

The chronology of the period is quite consistent with the view stated above concerning the origin and spread of Neolithic culture. The rich Neolithic cultures of the Eastern Mediterranean range in origin from perhaps 8000 to 3000 B. C., the earliest being those of Egypt and the more favorable areas of the Asiatic Near East. Next to appear were those in the Aegean, particularly in Crete. In Europe their beginnings range, roughly, from 6000 to 2500 B. C. They appeared first in Greece, owing to the favorable contacts of Greek lands with the Aegean and Near-Eastern cultures; next they appeared in the Danubian area, and finally in Western and Northern Europe and in Northern Africa. It was not until much later that the great cultures of the Americas began their amazing development, later to culminate in the civilizations of the Mayas, Aztecs, and Incas. By the end of the Neolithic Age, cultural variation had emerged extensively, the basis being laid for the variegation of contemporary cultures. By that time, too, the process of racial differentiation discussed in Chapter III had proceeded apace, the status of man's biological development during the entire period being represented by the designation *Homo Sapiens*.

Our debt to Neolithic Man.—Viewed as an epoch in the development of civilization, the Neolithic period represents an impressive advance of the human race. In the words of Cleland:

The Neolithic is the greatest of all chapters in human history because the inventions and discoveries of that time are the broad foundations upon which the whole structure of modern civilization is built. Neolithic man invented agriculture. He domesticated animals. By these means he made himself more independent of the caprices of nature and was better able to cope with famine. He invented pottery and the baking oven and could cook his food nearly or quite as well as it is cooked today. He learned the art of spinning and weaving and, although cloth commonly was coarse, it was probably as warm as that made now. He learned to dye his cloth and thus satisfy his aesthetic taste. He learned to construct well-made, comfortable houses, and to lay out villages. As a result of living in organized communities, he invented the fundamentals of government. The only means of transportation, as far as known, was by foot and boat. But this was sufficient to enable him to spread over nearly

the whole world: over Asia, Africa, Europe, the Americas, and the islands of the sea. Then, progress was slow; now, it is rapid. It is merely a matter of degree.¹

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CHAPTER IX

THE TRANSITION TO HISTORIC CULTURES

IN THE preceding chapter we attempted to penetrate the mists which envelop the life of the Stone Age; to trace man's fitful cultural progress from the earliest beginnings to the end of the Neolithic Age, the last and richest of the Stone Age cultures. By the end of this age many of the fundamentals of human culture had emerged, such as tool-making, pottery, agriculture, and art, yet much was still lacking from the vantage point of the historic cultures to be described in the following chapters. The men of the Stone Age had no writing, no accurate means of measuring time, no system of weights and measures; they had not learned how to use metals, had no effective means of transportation and no elaborate trade and commerce; and they had built no great cities or complex social, political, and religious systems. All these are distinguishing characteristics of the historic cultures. Nevertheless, the historic cultures were definitely related to those of the prehistoric ages, and were rich precisely because of the heritage transmitted from prehistory. Moreover, while our own Western civilization is more directly related to the great historic cultures of the Near East, Egypt, the Aegean, Greece, and Rome, ultimately its parentage reaches back to the Stone Age.

The chronology of the transition.—The period of the historic cultures is impressively short compared to the long span of prehistory. History covers only about five or six thousand of the one hundred thousand years or more of culture development. The time span of prehistory is at least twenty or twenty-five times that of history.¹ And when the age of culture, both prehistoric and historic, is viewed in relation to the billion-year antiquity of the earth, the time span of culture seems short indeed. To make this idea graphic, Sir James Jeans, the eminent British scientist, uses, for purposes of comparison, Cleopatra's Needle, an Egyptian monolith which has been transferred to the banks of the Thames in London (a

¹See Chart IV, p. 39.

twin to the one in Central Park, New York). He says: "Let this shaft of stone represent in its height the past centuries of this small globe of ours. Place on its top a copper penny, and the thickness of the penny will represent the time humanity existed prior to the age of civilization (i.e., of history). On top of this penny place a postage stamp. The thickness of this stamp represents the five thousand years of civilization."

The comparison may come as a revelation to those who habitually think of the so-called "ancient" periods of history as remote from our own age. In point of time the period of man's life known to us through written records is truly limited; ancient history appears to draw surprisingly close to us. Yet during the short interval of history, human culture has been enriched infinitely more than it was during the one hundred thousand years preceding. This fact is no reflection on the man of prehistory. He laid the basis for culture building, and it is only natural, in the light of the cumulative nature of culture, that the cultural heritage should be enriched with increasing rapidity as time passed.

Just when does prehistory end and history begin? Answers to this question can only be approximations. Prehistory shades into history. There is a twilight period, a transitional epoch, when the line of demarcation between prehistory and history is blurred. Furthermore, the ending of the one and the beginning of the other vary regionally. Thus prehistory ends about 5000 B. C. in Egypt and Western Asia; 3000 B. C. in Southern and Eastern Europe; and from five hundred to a thousand years later in Western and Northern Europe.¹ These variations indicate simply that the cultural advance of man has not been uniform from one region to another.

SOME BASIC FACTORS IN THE TRANSITION

Our present purpose is to present the significant additions to man's culture which appeared during this twilight period of transition and which mark the beginnings of history. These additions have already been suggested at the opening of the chapter. Each addition constitutes an event of capital importance in the development of civilization. It hardly needs to be said that they did not spring suddenly complete from some superior intelligence; they

¹See Wallis, *An Introduction to Anthropology*, Harper and Brothers, 1926, p. 89.

emerged out of a cumulated experience, as a climax to the one hundred thousand years of effort of Stone-Age man.

The invention of writing.—In the development of writing, three stages may be distinguished: (1) the pictographic form—picture writing—which employs pictures of things and symbols of ideas; (2) the hieroglyphic form, whereby the representation of sounds begins, still through the abbreviation of pictures; (3) alphabet writing, commonly spoken of as the phonetic system of writing, which has come down to us from ancient times.¹

Pictographic writing is so old in the story of the human race that it is impossible to say when it first began, for the impulse to draw appears exceedingly early in the life of man. No one people invented it; it probably arose among many groups, and it is still employed by numerous primitive peoples in all parts of the world. It consists essentially of pictures or drawings of things and of acts. It is not a form of real writing. Its limitations as a means of communication are obvious. It is cumbersome, difficult, and inadequate.

The hieroglyphic form was also pictographic, but it marked an advance in that it used pictures or drawings to convey sounds as well as pictures of things and acts. Thus a picture of the human eye might be used to convey the sound of the letter *I*; the picture of a bee, to convey the sound of the verb *be*. The higher forms of the hieroglyphic system developed in Egypt, Western Asia, and Crete, in China, and in Central America (among the Mayas). These higher forms appeared in Egypt and Babylon between 5000 B. C. and 4000 B. C. Probably the demands of trade and commerce, and the need for written contracts and transactions had much to do with the invention of this art. Certainly its invention made possible literature, written historic records, and contracts—and hence a more complicated economic system. In Egypt the utility of hieroglyphic writing was enhanced by the introduction of papyrus, a “paper” made from the pith of the papyrus plant. In Western Asia records were preserved on clay tablets.

The third stage in the development of writing produced the phonetic alphabet. Alphabet writing, as we are familiar with it today, is a system of sound writing. This system appeared late historically, emerging perhaps about 1000 B. C., probably in West-

¹See A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1923, pp. 263-270.

ern Asia. It was not the creation of any one people. Since this mode of writing clearly belongs to the historical period, little need be said about it here.

The significance of writing in the development of culture can hardly be exaggerated. A recent writer refers to its invention as the most important thing occurring between 10,000 and 500 B. C. As Renard has put it: "On the day when a people learns how to preserve in written documents the memory of what it has accomplished, it passes out of prehistory."¹ With writing began the accumulation of documents and records to guide the historian in the reconstruction of the civilizations of the past. Writing stimulated learning, and enlarged the world of human knowledge. It aided in breaking down isolation and in multiplying contacts, and so emancipated man from the narrow world of his immediate experiences. Thus the cultural heritage that came to be embodied in written records was gradually disseminated among all peoples that had advanced to a point of interpreting them. In the field of economic life, as we have just observed, writing made possible the keeping of accurate records which facilitated transactions and led to the enlargement of trade and commerce. Its immediate effect upon early history was undoubtedly to contribute heavily to the long cultural dominance of Egypt and other Near Eastern lands; for these regions enjoyed a fairly adequate system of writing at a time when Europe and Eastern and Central Asia were yet deprived of this leverage of progress.

It is not to be implied, however, that the invention of writing transformed the whole group that possessed the technique. The masses remained illiterate, for the art of writing was in the keeping of a few, usually a privileged minority, who tended to make a cult and a mystery of it. It was a treasure to be kept from common men. Then, too, there was the absence of any cheap method of multiplying copies of what was written. Not until the invention of printing by means of movable type, in the fifteenth century A. D., and the introduction of modern paper was that great obstacle removed. Even so it is only recently that the masses have been taught to share the advantages of literacy; and then only in the countries of the West where the democratic ideal has acted as a leavening influence. The vast majority of the peoples of the world

¹G. Renard, *Life and Work in Prehistoric Times*, Alfred A. Knopf, 1929, p. 22.

are still unable to read and write, even though writing is known in their particular cultures:

The invention of measuring devices.—The transitional period marks a culminating point in the development of several measuring devices, most important of which was the calendar. Long before the invention of the calendar, man had rude methods of calculating time. He observed the recurrence of the seasons and fixed them in time by reference to natural events rather than by astronomical calculations. The credit for inventing the earliest calendar probably belongs to the Egyptians, who first devised a lunar calendar and later the more accurate solar calendar. When it is remembered that the Nile was, and is, the very life of Egypt, and that its prosperity then as now depended upon the regularity of the floods, it will be understood that the recurrence of this event challenged the Egyptians to devise some exact system of reckoning time. By a careful computation it has been determined that the solar calendar came into use in the year 4241 B. C., perhaps the earliest recorded date in history.

According to the Egyptian calendar the year was made to consist of twelve months of thirty days each, with five days added to each year. Its invention was made possible by reason of a considerable knowledge of astronomy, which both the Egyptians and Babylonians possessed. The use of the calendar passed in time to surrounding peoples and ultimately to practically all parts of the world, though in a modified form.

The calendar introduced order into the story of man's experiences. It made dating, timing, and sequence possible in human transactions—business, political, and cultural. It supplemented memory and oral tradition. Clearly, it was one of the few great inventions that laid the foundation for historic civilizations.

Other measuring devices were in process of development during the period under discussion, devices for measuring distances and angles and for determining weights; but most of these as cultural achievements belong to the early historical period. It is probable, however, that simple systems of counting, weighing, and measuring were known before the dawn of history. Weights of stone and bronze were sometimes used. All such devices naturally came increasingly into demand as trade developed.

The use of metals.—When man discovered the art of using metals he took another tremendous stride forward in the building

of civilization. The first metal to be used for practical purposes was copper. How it was discovered as a useful metal is not known but it is likely that the ease with which it could be worked attracted the attention of the tool-maker. As far as we know it was first used in Egypt about 5000 B. C. There is evidence that it was mined by the Egyptians in the Sinai Peninsula as early as 3700 B. C. By 3000 B. C. it was being used in Greece, Sicily, Hungary, and Spain; and by 2500 B. C. in Middle Europe, France, North Germany, and Scandinavia. But copper was never adequate for the manufacture of tools. It was too soft. Bronze was the answer to the need for a harder material. Bronze is an alloy of tin and copper, harder than copper, easy to melt and cast. It was probably in use in Western Asia by 4000 B. C.; certainly in Egypt before 3000 B. C. Its use was gradually diffused to Southern, Central, Western, and Northern Europe, reaching Scandinavia about 1900 B. C. A list of the more important articles made of bronze includes axes, chisels, knives, gouges, lances, sickles, molds for casting various articles, hammers, saws, swords, arrowheads, helmets, breastplates, shields, trumpets, buckles, bands (for the arms), bracelets, anklets, necklaces, safety pins, and pots of many sorts.

This enumeration of itself indicates the distinct cultural advance over the stone technology of the Neolithic period made by the introduction of bronze—of metals generally. Efficient though the Neolithic craftsmen and technicians were, they were nevertheless limited by their materials. With the introduction of metals, many tools, implements, and utensils, impossible during the age of stone, were added to the capital wealth of society. Tools and implements to do more things and to do them more expertly resulted in a more extended conquest of the physical environment, a higher standard of existence, and the release of time for activities other than those devoted to the elemental physical needs of man. The use of bronze placed better weapons in the hands of the soldier, made him a more efficient killer, and at the same time supplied him with a more effective armor of protection. The use of bronze represents the beginning of a steadily increasing utilization of a growing variety of metals by man, a march leading straight to our own time, which is, by long odds, the greatest age of metals in history.

It should be remembered, however, that in no case where bronze was introduced as an implement-making material did it suddenly

displace the older materials such as stone, bone, and wood. The New Stone Age and the Bronze Age cannot be so sharply distinguished as we are apt to think. Stone implements continued to be made and used. Knowing what we do about the general tendency for culture to change gradually we should expect this to be the case. Moreover, the tools and implements of the Bronze Age vary from area to area, and from time to time. This age must not be regarded as a stage of culture development uniform everywhere in its evolution and similar in all places in content.

Invention of new modes of transport.—Adequate methods of transportation have been essential in the development of culture. One writer has concluded that “means of transport are at the base of civilization.”¹ Lack of adequate transportation was one of the primary handicaps of Neolithic man. Limited in his means of transport, dependent upon crude log boats on water and his own carrying power on land, he was obviously narrowly circumscribed in his trade and contacts. During the twilight period of culture development now under review this handicap began to be removed.

One of the first significant developments in transport was the harnessing of animal motive power. Although Neolithic man possessed oxen and other tame beasts, he apparently never harnessed them to the plough or used them to carry loads; but early in the Bronze Age in the East the ox was yoked to the plough and set to work in the field. Perhaps in some cases the ox was used to pull loads placed on runners. The effective use, however, of animal motive power was dependent upon the introduction of the wheel, and with the invention of the wheel, “mankind set foot on the road that led to the motor car.”² The earliest wheel vehicles known have been brought to light from the tombs in Kish and Ur, dating from about 3000 B. C. These wheels were very clumsy, being made from three solid pieces of wood, shaped to sectors of a circle, and clamped together with leather for tires. Wagons of four wheels were made, and later the two-wheeled chariot was introduced. In historic times chariots drawn by horses were found in Chaldea, Egypt, Italy, Greece, and the Mediterranean area generally.

The invention of the wheel marks a milestone in human achievement. It has become fundamental in all forms of transportation

¹V. G. Childe, *The Bronze Age*, The Macmillan Company, 1930. Contains good account of early modes of transportation. See particularly pp. 49-52.

²*Op. cit.*, p. 49.

on land and sea, and through the air. The endless applications and adaptations made of it since its appearance testify to its important rôle in the history of culture.

Parallel with the development of land transport went the acceleration of water transportation. Even late Neolithic man had crude boats; but no true ship antedates the Copper Age. By 3000 B. C. Egyptian, Aegean, and Syrian ships were crossing the Mediterranean. As is indicated in succeeding chapters, the fertility of the Mediterranean cultures is partially attributable to the use of the Mediterranean for transportation and communication, made possible by the invention of the ship.

The potter's wheel.—The potter's wheel, invented in the early historic period, is an adaptation of the wheel to a new purpose. Here the wheel is placed in a horizontal position on a vertical axle and a simple contrivance is added for rotating the disc, at first by foot power. The date of its origin is somewhat uncertain. It was in use by at least 3000 B. C. in the Near East, and as early as 2700 B. C. in China. Apparently, it was known somewhat later in Crete and Southern Europe, and much later in Western and Northern Europe. Through its use beautiful pottery was produced, and produced much more rapidly than when Neolithic man had worked with his hands alone. The potter's wheel "not only facilitates the shaping of pieces, but it gives to them at the same time a regularity and symmetry which it would be very difficult to obtain otherwise; besides, the mechanical action of the workman modeling his piece during the rotating movement gives to the paste absolute homogeneity."¹ Thus this new device opened a new era in the advance of the ceramic arts.

Social advance through trade and commerce.—The history of civilization is the story, in part at least, of increasing contacts, of the breakdown of isolation, and of the establishment of commercial, political, and social relationships over increasingly wide areas. During the entire Paleolithic Age population was scattered, isolated, and sparse. By the end of the Neolithic Age this situation had been greatly altered, but still, in contrast with conditions obtaining in the historic cultures, man's opportunities for contacts, trade, and interchange of ideas, practices, and techniques were limited. By the end of the Neolithic Age and in the dawn of history, trade had

¹G. G. MacCurdy, *Human Origins: A Manual of Prehistory*, D. Appleton and Company, 1924, II, 81.

become rather extensive. The improvements in transportation previously referred to had made this possible. Especially in the Western Asiatic region and the Mediterranean basin was there a constant interchange of goods such as tools, pottery, weapons, ornaments, textiles, and grains. There was trading even with the hinterland of Central Europe. And ultimately some of the artifacts and goods of the Mediterranean area reached Western and Northern Europe. Along with the goods went ideas and new techniques, resulting ultimately in modifications of the native cultures.

In the course of time, and as a result of increasing population and commercial expansion, the city emerged as a type of economic and social organization. Such a development was not possible during the Paleolithic period; it had its beginning toward the close of the Neolithic; and with the opening of historical times the great cities of the ancient Near East began to emerge wherever natural conditions were most favorable for the support of larger populations. Among European cultures less advantageously situated, cities made their appearance much later. The rise of towns and cities is a most significant fact in the transition to a more advanced type of culture, for they introduce stability, complexity, and a measure of security into the life of man. Town life permits a stable sort of existence, allowing human culture to strike its roots more deeply and to thrive more luxuriously. It means a greater variety of occupations and hence a broader economic foundation upon which to build the superstructure of culture. Complex political, social, and religious institutions emerge. More men are set free to devote themselves to the enrichment of human culture in new directions.

THE BEGINNING OF HISTORY

Town life, with all that the term implies, marks a culminating point in the cultural achievements of mankind over more than a thousand centuries. During that long period, prehistoric man, beginning with nothing but his physical and mental powers, had acquired the characteristic tools which, basically, were to serve the human race almost down to our own day. Among them he had invented systems of writing. With the progress of writing, man began to see his life in perspective; he began to have a past as well as a present. His continuity with the past had always existed;

the written records of his life made that continuity real to his senses, as oral tradition had never succeeded in doing. With written records history—which one historian has defined as “the memory of things said and done”—actually began.

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CHAPTER X

ANCIENT CULTURES OF THE NEAR EAST

THAT the progress of civilization was greatly stimulated by the use of metals and by the development of writing will become apparent when we turn to the first historic cultures of the Near East. Advance henceforth was more and more rapid, for the simple village life of the late Neolithic period soon gave place to highly developed urban cultures in Egypt and Babylonia. Moreover, the very fact that the authors of the civilizations of these countries had learned to write makes it for the first time possible to use written record as a guide to our investigations. We can now state with more confidence what man thought and accomplished, and we can explain in much greater detail how and why organized life developed as it did. We can also see more clearly the relation between our own civilization and those remote cultures of the East. No longer shall we say with Kipling that "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet," for we shall discover that they did meet in ancient times. In fact, some of the most powerful germinative influences in history have come to the West out of the Orient particularly from that part of the Orient, the Near East, which by reason of its geographical proximity to the West, has affected European civilization in all stages of its history. A study of ancient cultures is therefore fundamental to an intelligent understanding of modern Western civilization.

In ancient and medieval times, the Mediterranean Sea was the center of the civilized world. It was perhaps the most important road of antiquity. It enabled peoples from east, west, north, and south to shift their homes and to intermingle with one another. The result was a fusion in which Oriental and Occidental cultures became inextricably mixed. Roman civilization in its later stages is an example of such a fusion, for it was, in the main, the product of a union between the Near East and two Occidental cultures, those of Greece and Italy. This Greco-Roman-Oriental cultural com-

ound, with certain later admixtures, was transmitted as a heritage to the modern European world, mainly through the Middle Ages.

Chronological and geographical limits of the ancient Near East.—As soon as man learned to write and to reckon the passage of time with comparative accuracy, he began to compile records sufficiently exact to enable us to establish a chronology of his achievements. Still we cannot date with certainty the beginnings of civilization in the Near East, for every new archaeological expedition extends our knowledge of the past further back into antiquity. It will be sufficient for our purpose to place the beginnings of Egyptian civilization in the fifth millennium B. C., for the date 4241 B.C. is generally, though not universally, accepted as that of the adoption of the solar calendar in Egypt. The development of Mesopotamian civilization was approximately contemporary with that of the Egyptian. The lower limit of this chapter is likewise indefinite, for the civilizations of the Near East did not cease to exist and to exert their influence upon the West when the eastern regions became subject to Greek and Roman political dominion. In general, however, we shall limit our study to developments before the destruction of the Persian Empire by Alexander the Great in the fourth century B. C.

Geographically the cultures to be studied here developed on or near the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea. Egypt, which owes its wealth and importance to the Nile River, extends southward into Africa from the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Along the eastern shore of the sea lies Syria, with Phoenicia and Palestine occupying the southern part. Beyond Syria is the middle course of the Euphrates River, which, rising in the mountains of Armenia, turns westward in a wide bend, touches Northern Syria, and then turns again in a southeasterly direction until it joins the Tigris River near the Persian Gulf. The valley between the two rivers in their lower courses is known as Mesopotamia, the cradle of a great civilization which rivaled that of ancient Egypt. Beyond the Tigris is the Arabian plateau; along the central Tigris rises the hilly Assyrian land.

Lying between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean is Asia Minor, frequently called Anatolia, a peninsula which, thrusting itself prominently toward Europe, served in ancient times to bring oriental culture to the very doors of the West. To the east of Ana-

tolia lies the mountainous region of Armenia where the Tigris and Euphrates have their rise. Since the cultures of Crete, the Aegean Islands, and Greece were closely related to that of western Anatolia, we might properly include them in this study, but it will be more convenient to defer consideration of them until we turn to the history of Greece. From the standpoint of culture, the Phoenician settlements in northern Africa, Sicily, and Spain are a part of the Near East, though geographically they are remote from the eastern Mediterranean.

Geographic factors in Near-Eastern civilization.—A study of the geographic factors in the civilization of the Near East will help us to understand why the Stone Age first came to a close there. To begin with, soil and climate produced conditions most suitable to the development of agriculture and the arts of an advanced civilization. Two regions were particularly favored—the valley of the Nile, and that of the Tigris-Euphrates rivers. The Nile, with its alluvium-carrying floods, annually fertilized the delta region at its mouth and a narrow strip along its banks; in like manner the Tigris and Euphrates rivers brought fresh soil and necessary moisture to the land called Mesopotamia at the head of the Persian Gulf. The result of this annual renewal of fertility was wealth far surpassing that of the neighboring mountains and deserts. The inhabitants of these favored valleys could live the simple life of a sub-tropical country with a minimum of exertion and a maximum of leisure.

Though Mesopotamia and Egypt were most favored of all the lands of the Near East, the envy of their neighbors, we must not forget that other regions had advantages of one sort or another which played a part in the extension of the original civilizations and in the development of others. For example, no study of the geography of the Near East can pass over the Fertile Crescent, the district bounding the deserts of Northern Arabia. On the west it includes Syria, on the north the middle course of the Euphrates, and on the east the Mesopotamian region which we have already considered. The western horn of this crescent was of great importance to all the Near East; it served as a common meeting ground for races on its borders, as a highway between north and south, east and west, and as a battleground between rival empires. Through Syria the Babylonian monarchs pushed their way to the Mediterranean in the third millennium B. C., when that sea was becoming one of the chief highroads of antiquity. Toward that objective, too, Egyptians



THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST, SHOWING THE APPROXIMATE EXTENT
OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE ABOUT 500 B. C.

pushed their conquests after occupying the intervening Sinai peninsula for its mineral wealth.

In the second place, valuable natural products, especially metals, were available in various parts of the Near East. Without copper, a metal indispensable in an age which used tools and implements of bronze, many of the advances which characterize the early historical period would have been impossible. The copper mines in the otherwise unproductive peninsula of Sinai, conveniently located for the Egyptian market, must therefore be regarded as an important factor in the development of Egyptian civilization. They were directly responsible for an early phase of Egyptian imperialism. Another source for copper was Cyprus, the island from which we derive the name of this metal. Gold was produced on the southeastern shores of the Black Sea, as the legend of the Golden Fleece suggests. Here, too, iron was mined and smelted during the second millennium B. C. when the use of iron was rare or unknown elsewhere. Of the other natural products, wood was perhaps the most important. The excellent timber of Cyprus made that island a valuable possession of the Egyptian Empire. In Phoenicia the cedars of Lebanon provided strong durable wood both for building ships and for such structures as the famous temple of Solomon in Jerusalem.

Finally, the Near East had the advantage of numerous waterways, both rivers and seas. At a time when travel by land was difficult and tedious, when the absence of roads made wheeled traffic impossible, and when the chief means of transport were caravans and pack animals, the importance of water routes was greatly enhanced. By facilitating commerce and promoting interchange of ideas and experiences, they hastened the advance of culture and its spread from group to group.

Economic factors in the advance of culture.—Fertile soil, with its possibility of easy living, and other valuable natural resources cannot by themselves create a high civilization, for cultural progress comes only from mental and physical labor devoted to pursuits other than those which provide men with food, clothing, and shelter. Palaces, temples, and pyramids; writing, sculpture, philosophy, and science—these are largely the creations of men who are interested in things other than the mere necessities of life. Favorable economic conditions then serve as an opportunity for men of genius to satisfy other needs and as a stimulus to other advances. They make it possible for men, either individually or

Collectively, to accumulate wealth which can be used to support a class freed from the necessity of agricultural labor. The so-called surplus produced in this fashion can then be devoted to a multiplicity of tasks ministering to the worship of the gods, to the military defence of the community, and to the glorification of individuals, whether kings or wealthy nobles. In the course of time, architecture, sculpture, painting, and literature are produced from this surplus.

One can readily see that surplus wealth is an essential element in the creation of a professional class. It leads also to the formation of other classes, artisans of various sorts, farmers, sailors, and the like. Differentiation of pursuits and division of labor are distinctive features of advanced civilization, for as man progresses, he depends more and more upon others to do work for which he is not trained and for which his own interests and pursuits leave him no time. Specialization results, and with specialization come skill and perfection in all the crafts which cater to the desires of the community. It follows, therefore, that a country well endowed by nature with a great variety of resources will progress more rapidly than its less fortunate neighbors.

Specialization leads also to greater productivity, thereby adding to the resources of a community. It thus becomes possible to satisfy a multitude of new wants and to raise the standard of living. Middlemen become necessary as the exchange of commodities becomes more active, and in time an extensive foreign trade in a great variety of articles develops. Communities lose their self-sufficiency, and as commerce and manufacturing increase, villages become towns, and towns are transformed into cities. So urban life begins to dominate civilization.

Economic changes such as these gradually transformed society in the Near East. The movement began in Egypt and Mesopotamia, districts specially favored by nature, and it spread through commerce and political conquests to neighboring lands as the historical period advanced.

Peoples of the ancient Near East.—The peoples of the Near East were numerous and varied. We have already learned how difficult it is to segregate races or to determine their part in the building of cultures. In the Near East the problem is particularly difficult. Though it would be hazardous to assert that any pure races as such played an important part in its history, we shall consider a

few important human stocks which apparently developed rather pronounced capacities during the course of their historical experiences.

First to be considered are the Aryan peoples. The prairie land of southern Russia lying to the north of the Black and Caspian seas was probably their original home, and from it they spread at different times westward into Greece, Italy, and Western Europe, and eastward to Anatolia, Persia, and India. They are frequently spoken of as the "Aryan Race," but however pure racially these peoples may have been originally, the group began to lose its purity as soon as it began to move.

During their wanderings the Aryans underwent marked changes in language, customs, government, and religion. Frequently their language was adopted by the non-Aryan peoples among whom various branches of the race settled and with whom they fused. For this reason language cannot always be used as a criterion of race. Consequently it is convenient to use the word "Aryan" only when we mean the racial stock. The term "Indo-European" is appropriately used to describe the group of languages which the Aryans propagated. In the East, varieties of Indo-European were spoken by the Hindus and the Persians; and in the West the most important European languages, ancient and modern—for example Greek, Latin, Gallic, German, English, and the Romance tongues—belong to this group.

In the Near East the Aryan stocks were at various times able to gain the supremacy to which their initiative, capacity for leadership, political ability, and flair for organization and administration entitled them. The Persians, who settled on the Iranian plateau east of the Tigris valley, provide the best example of an Aryan Empire in the sphere of the ancient Near East.

A second great ethnic stock to play a part in the Near East was the so-called Semitic race. Here again we encounter an important linguistic group rather than a true race. The Hebrews, Assyrians, and Phoenicians, were important branches of this group. It was one of the most prolific of the Near-Eastern stocks; its breeding place was the Arabian peninsula, from which wave after wave of emigrants poured forth in prehistoric and historic times to occupy neighboring lands. Some of them went westward into Egypt, where they combined with another great group, the Hamitic, and

with other invaders coming from east, west, and south, to form the Egyptian people. Others went into Mesopotamia, where they played an important rôle in the development of the fertile land of Babylonia. Assyria was also occupied by Semites; and Syria, the land bordering on the eastern Mediterranean, received successive waves of Semitic settlers.

There were other peoples in the lands of the Near East who were neither Semitic nor Aryan: (1) the Sumerians in Mesopotamia, struggling for mastery with the Semitic invaders; (2) the Elamites in the mountains to the east, ready to occupy the fertile valleys when opportunity offered; (3) a racial stock called Armenoid in Anatolia serving as a substratum for the population of historical times; and (4) a branch of the so-called Mediterranean race in Greece and the Aegean, about which we shall have more to say when we study the origins of Greek civilization.

Human factors, no less than geographic factors, have affected the progress of culture. To the natural wealth of the Near East we have ascribed the development of the earliest civilizations there; the character of these cultures was determined, in part at least, by the aptitudes of the peoples who created them. Semites and Aryans may be regarded as illustrations of this principle. From them have come three of the greatest religions of today, Judaism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity; by the other were built many of the great empires of ancient and modern times—the Persian, the Roman, and the British, to give only three examples.

Diversity of cultures in the ancient Near East.—The foregoing survey prepares us for the statement that diversity rather than uniformity characterizes the cultures which grew up in the Near East. The diversity is not a mere matter of names. It springs from differences in geographic environment, in the aptitudes of the people concerned, and in cultural contacts. In the fertile agricultural districts important cities developed, and as a result of the specialization which accompanied town life, society divided into classes—peasants, artisans, merchants, priests, and nobles. But when we leave the valleys of Mesopotamia and Egypt, a simpler form of society is found. The Semites in Arabia continued to lead their flocks and herds from pasturage to pasturage as the seasons changed, much as did the patriarch Abraham. The Semitic Phoenicians were led by the advantages of their location on the

coast of the Mediterranean to become the middlemen of the Near East; they lived in cities and obtained their livelihood from trade and manufacture. The Semitic herdsmen and hunters in the hills of Assyria differed from their cousins of the plains, for they developed into a race of fighters. So we could move from district to district, showing how other groups reacted to the geographic conditions of the region in which they chanced to settle.

It is impossible to review here all the civilizations which rose and fell in the ancient Near East. It will suffice to devote most of our attention to the oldest and the most advanced of the Near-Eastern cultures, those of Egypt and Mesopotamia, for in many respects conditions and development elsewhere were similar, though not identical.

POLITICAL FEATURES OF EGYPTIAN AND MESOPOTAMIAN CULTURES

Politically the general trend of history has been from local organization and authority toward a wider and wider association of peoples—that is, to political integration. To the extent that such a development brings increasingly large aggregations of people into a coöperative union for the betterment of society, it may be regarded as evidence of social advance. In the two great river valleys of the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates, this political integration was largely the result of the operation of economic forces.

Economic integration.—We begin with the rivers, for their floods, annually renewing the fertility of the lowlands with fresh soil brought down from the hills, largely determined the character of the nascent cultures. Near the mouths of the rivers the land was abundantly supplied with moisture, since centuries of floods had created great swamps in which islands suitable for habitation gradually formed. Other settlements on the edge of the flooded region shared in the wealth of the alluvium and in the moisture of the swampy land. During the long hot summers the water receded and the soil was used for crops. Now since each community was dependent upon the water and earth brought down by the rivers constant care was necessary to see that the river did not change its course, or that some energetic neighbor did not divert the water into other channels, thus robbing the original possessors of their means of living. Canals and irrigating ditches were needed to

protect what the community had acquired; by drying up the swamps, these extended the area suitable for cultivation and made it possible for the community to increase in wealth and numbers. In the course of time the swamps disappeared; canals and reservoirs were built to provide moisture when the hot sun threatened to bake the area over which the floods had passed and to render it unfit for agriculture. As the arable land grew in extent, villages once separated by swamps found themselves near neighbors, and their common interests induced them to coöperate and to unite.

Political integration.—Large irrigation enterprises, however, cannot be built without the coöperation of all members of the community benefiting from them. Communities, therefore, during this early period prospered in proportion to the ability of their leaders and the disciplined industry of the people. Dikes and ditches had to be kept in repair and the water-supply guarded, by force if necessary, against envious neighbors. Absolute submission to the welfare of the community was a first requisite for existence. Unification of neighboring communities made greater undertakings possible; and this in turn led to further unions, until the whole land was a network of irrigation canals, and the whole people became united under one head. The histories of the two great river valleys are much alike in this respect—city-states uniting to form small kingdoms, and small kingdoms growing until they encompassed the whole country.

We are able to trace this political integration in its later stages both in Egypt and in Mesopotamia. In Egypt it culminated about 3400 B.C. in the unification of North and South, two kingdoms which were themselves the products of earlier unions reaching far back into the prehistoric period. In Egypt, too, we see the part played by irrigation in the life and politics of the people, for in an early monument the Pharaoh or king is represented as chief engineer and benefactor of the land, digging the ditches which the country needed. In Mesopotamia, the cities which were the units in the larger unions played a more important part than they did in Egypt. Each of them in turn seems to have exercised dominion over the others, and in the days of complete unification the cities retained rights and privileges similar to those exercised by the towns of the Middle Ages. Unification in Mesopotamia was never so complete as in Egypt, but the necessity of coöperation was no less the cause of union.

The fertility of the soil affected the political history of these lands in still another way. Surrounded by peoples possessing less attractive homes, Egypt and Mesopotamia had always to fear invasions from envious neighbors. The Semites from the desert of Arabia tended to press upon their lands, and the inhabitants of the Iranian plateau to the east of the Tigris and those of the mountainous lands to the north of Mesopotamia were never backward about seizing the fertile valleys when they could. Since Egypt was more inaccessible than the Tigris-Euphrates valley, the problem was less acute there; still, Libyans from the west, Ethiopians from the south, and Semites from the east threatened at various times to break through the natural frontiers.

Oriental absolutism.—Since religion plays a much greater part in the life of a primitive people than it does in a more advanced age, it is not surprising to find that it placed its mark permanently upon government in these countries. The god of the tribe or of the city was in a sense simply a divine member of the community and the leader of the community became the medium of communication between the people and the god. Thus in Mesopotamia the kings were originally priest-kings, represented as ruling by divine right. Hammurabi, for example, is pictured on the stone tablet which bears his code as receiving the law directly from the supreme god of the community, just as Moses is supposed to have received stone tablets containing the Ten Commandments from the God of the Hebrews on Mt. Sinai.

In Egypt the Pharaohs were recognized as gods in their own persons, and in other lands we find in one form or another an intimate contact between secular and divine rule, as in the case of the early Hebrews. In Egypt, where the king himself was god, we find the most thorough-going absolutism. Legally all of the land was the property of the monarch, and all of the inhabitants were his servants. Although even here classes developed, of which the priests were important—occupying at times a dominant position in the state because of the immense revenues which they enjoyed from temple estates and foundations—still in theory all people, peasants, artisans, state officials, soldiers, and priests were on a dead level of uniformity, subjects of their divine Pharaoh.

Outside of Egypt also, particularly in Mesopotamia, much of the land belonged to the king; it was cultivated by slaves and tenant farmers who were obligated to work upon the dikes and

anals and to make payments of a share of the produce. Because of the conservatism of the East these types of landholding persisted throughout the long period of ancient history; and when Rome came to occupy the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, she fell heir to them and put into general practice what she learned from the East. The origin of medieval serfdom cannot be studied without reference to this long tradition.

Thus in the governments of the ancient East the interaction of religious and economic forces produced absolutism, whether the rulers were worshiped as gods incarnate or regarded as priests and representatives of the gods protecting their people from such manifestations of divine forces as floods, droughts, and pestilence, and defending them against the gods of hostile tribes anxious to seize their land. Hence we have come to regard the typical government of the East as absolute monarchy and to look upon the people as well-disciplined and submissive subjects, unaccustomed to freedom and unable to appreciate or use its benefits.

The historical importance of this type of government is not to be minimized, for it directly affected Alexander, the great Macedonian conqueror, and his successors, the Hellenistic kings. The ruler cult which they developed passed on to the Roman Empire, and in the time of the Roman emperor Diocletian, at the end of the third century A. D., Oriental absolutism in its full form was taken over by Rome. The crown of the later Roman Empire, representing the rays of the sun spreading from the emperor's head, is symbolic of his claim to be the Unconquerable Sun, a divinity commonly associated in the astrological literature of the Near East with supreme power. Through the Middle Ages the intimate bond between government and religion continued, and out of it developed modern theories about the divine right of kings.

Empires of the Near East.—Though the kings of Egypt and Babylonia attempted from time to time to establish empires, their success was limited, for there existed in the Near East neither racial nor cultural unity on which to build a stable political union. Furthermore, the early empires of the Near East failed because they lacked organization. The kings were content with annual payments of tribute, and they interfered little with local governments in conquered lands. Revolt was always easy, since the absence of garrisons and imperial officials, and the slowness of communica-

tions made it difficult for the king either to forestall revolts or to act effectively against rebellious subjects.

The Assyrians, however, created an empire on more stable foundations. By 700 B. C., the conquest of neighboring peoples had brought a considerable part of the ancient Near East under their sway. Their empire embraced the whole of the Fertile Crescent, much of the northern hinterland, and, for a short period of time, the valley of the Lower Nile.

Assyrian power rested on a strong, well-equipped standing army, in which an efficient force of cavalry facilitated rapid movement in times of crisis. The Assyrians also devised a rudimentary system of provincial administration. To minimize opportunities for revolt they deported subject peoples to far distant lands, replacing them with colonists from other parts of the empire. Although this practice tended to break down the barriers between different racial groups and cultures, and although there was much intercourse through trade and intermarriage, diversity was greater than uniformity, and the empire eventually disintegrated.

Greatest of all the empires in the ancient Orient was the Persian, built largely under the leadership of Cyrus in the sixth century B. C. By a succession of conquests, Media, Assyria, Anatolia, Babylonia, Syria, Egypt, and Thrace in Eastern Europe were brought under Persian sway. In the East the empire extended to the frontiers of India. For the first time in history the Near East was united politically. The union lasted until the death of the Macedonian Alexander the Great (323 B. C.), conqueror of the Persian king and successor to his throne. The Persian Empire was more stable than that of the Assyrians, largely because the Persians were able to establish political machinery suitable for the government of widely scattered lands. Conquered territory was divided into administrative provinces, ruled by governors adequately supported by military forces. Within the provinces, subject peoples were permitted a considerable amount of local control so long as they dutifully paid tribute and remained loyal. A second royal official was appointed for each province to watch over both subject peoples and governors, and to report to the king any sign of insubordination or revolt. Rapid and easy communications were secured by the establishment of a royal post-road with stations at convenient intervals where attendants stood ready at all times to speed the king's messengers on their way.

RELIGION IN THE NEAR EASTERN CULTURES

In contemporary Western civilization religion knows no boundary lines, for, generally speaking, Christianity is common to the whole Western world; but in the ancient Near East an important characteristic of religion was its variety. Cities and tribes worshiped their own ancestral divinities, and although political union sometimes resulted in the grouping of local divinities into families, subject to one supreme god, as in Egypt and Babylonia, political unity under the imperial states just described never resulted in religious unity, for each culture tended to develop a religion peculiar to itself. Thus, even where we find an apparent similarity of religious beliefs and practices, the final forms show important differences.

Worship of the Sun and of the Great Mother.—A characteristic of ancient religions was their close relationship to man's elementary needs and experiences. The chief objects of worship were the powers of nature, venerated as favorable and beneficent, or feared as agencies of destruction.

This fact explains in part why the sun was almost universally worshiped in the East. Its immediate influence upon the lives of men was apparent to all, for its rays promoted the growth of vegetation after the annual flood, and its deadly heat in midsummer was an ever present reminder of its great power. Since its course regulated the seasons, the sun came to be regarded in many places as the supreme deity, ruling over gods and men alike. On widely scattered monuments we see pictured the solar disk, sometimes, as in Egypt, with its rays terminating in hands to represent the creative power of the sun's heat. In Assyria the supreme god, Ashur, was the sun; in Persia, the god of light, Ahura-mazda, was regarded as the champion of righteousness against the powers of darkness and evil.

The tendency of the ancient Near East to deify natural forces beneficent to the community is again illustrated in the worship of the Great Mother, personifying the fertility of nature. In Egypt she was Isis, the wife of Osiris. In some places the goddess was identified with mother Earth; but however conceived, she was regarded as the wife of one or the other major male divinities of the country. In Anatolia, the Great Mother, sometimes called

Cybele, or Diana, was apparently the greatest of all local divinities until the invading Aryans brought in the god of the sky, represented as standing on the tops of the mountains wielding thunder and lightning. Then the Great Mother took her place beside the god of the invaders as wife and equal of her husband. It is not strange to find that the home of this powerful goddess was the land where the Greeks localized the legend of the Amazons.

The worship of these female divinities was not limited to the East, for when Rome had established her supremacy over the Mediterranean world, the cults of Isis and Magna Mater became popular in Rome, and in time they affected even Christian beliefs and practice. When pagans became Christians, it was impossible for them to sever all relations with the past, and thus Mary, the mother of Jesus, came to occupy a place analogous to that of Isis. In fact, our madonnas, as representations of the divine mother, are lineal descendants of Isis in ancient art. Likewise some of the female saints took over the characteristics of the great female divinities, along with their ancient shrines and cult practices.

Morality and the future life.—Among the Egyptians the eternal mysteries of life and death, night and day, the fertility of spring and summer followed by the death of vegetation in fall and winter are all fused in the mythological story of Osiris, killed and dismembered by his rival, Set, and brought back to life again by the devotion of his wife, Isis. To these original concepts the Egyptians added that of good and evil, barbarism and civilization; for Set represents the baneful forces of nature and the evil enemies of civilization, while Osiris and Isis represent justice and right. So Osiris came to be the king of the dead, the righteous judge, before whom all mortals must appear after death. The future happiness of individuals was thought to depend upon their actions in this life. Out of these conceptions the Egyptian religion developed a distinctive code of morality, more advanced than that of any other primitive nature worship. The interest of Egyptians in a future life is evidenced also by their pyramids and other monumental tombs, enduring witnesses to a belief in a life after death.

In the course of time the vitality of the ethical code declined; magic took the place of right living, and the priests profited by the superstitious fear of the people. For a brief moment there was a reform. An idealistic Egyptian monarch, Ikhnaton, tried to up-

root priestly power and popular superstition by substituting one god for the multitude of gods then worshiped throughout the Egyptian Empire. Ikhnaton's deity was Aton, the sun's disk, creator and father of mankind. Aton was not a tribal god; he belonged to no one city, and to no nation. Instead he was to become the universal god of all races, tribes, and cities. After the failure of this attempt to establish monotheism by legal enactment, Egypt again lapsed into polytheism.

In Babylonia, although a barren and shadowy existence of the soul was not denied, interest in this life was stronger than interest in the life to come. Thus the priest's function was to secure worldly blessings for his clients; and since the sun and the moon and the stars were regarded as gods influencing the affairs of men, the priests began to study their position in the heavens, to collect data about their movements, and to devise a system by which the future could be foretold. Thus astrology arose, a pseudo-science, out of which astronomy was eventually to grow.

Influences upon Western civilization.—Of the religions that came out of the ancient Orient, the most profound in its effect upon later civilization was Judaism. In the beginning the religion of the Hebrews differed not at all from that of other Semitic peoples. The Hebrew tribal god was the nature god of the Semites. In the course of centuries, however, the long political struggle for the maintenance of Jewish freedom and cultural integrity led the prophets to condemn the worship of foreign gods as both symptomatic of, and responsible for, the weakness of Israel. They regarded the worship of other gods as traitorous to the God of the Hebrews and to his chosen people. Only He had power to save them. After years of misfortune and constant reiteration of this theme by the prophets, the character of the jealous, brutal, tribal god gradually changed, and finally a monotheism developed destined to affect the future religious life of the whole western civilized world. Out of the Hebrew religion grew Christianity and Mohammedanism.

Of less importance in its effect upon later Christianity was the ancient Persian belief that the powers of darkness were engaged in an eternal struggle against the powers of light, a belief which has directly influenced Christianity in all periods, particularly in the first few centuries of its existence.

EGYPTIAN ARTS AND SCIENCES

The intellectual life of ancient peoples reveals the interests that were of greatest moment to their existence. In Egypt, where belief in a life after death was dominant, the influence of religion is deeply stamped upon literature, art, and architecture. The walls of the tombs were covered with inscriptions intended to secure a happy life for the deceased in the after world. Other forms of literature are of course preserved: hymns, accounts of victories won by the Egyptian Pharaohs, and biographical records of distinguished men; but for the most part these were intended not so much as a record of the past as a preparation for the future. The art of Egypt also emphasizes belief in a future life. The first task of sculpture was to create a likeness of the deceased which could be placed in his tomb; and since life after death was in many respects like that of this world, it became customary to represent on the walls of the tombs scenes from the daily life of the men who were to occupy them. Thus sculpture and painting rapidly improved in technique and execution. Architecture, too, was fostered, for tombs, pyramids, and mortuary temples were in constant demand, and the desire for permanent residences for the dead made the use of stone essential and tended to produce buildings more and more monumental.

Science also progressed. In this field the Egyptians were practical rather than theoretical. The demand for those impressive tombs, the pyramids, could hardly have been supplied without a knowledge of the principles of the inclined plane, the lever, and the pulley. Since the preservation of the body after death was an essential part of Egyptian religious belief, knowledge of embalming was acquired. In this fashion the study of medicine and human anatomy was stimulated among the Egyptians. The adoption of the solar calendar, as we have seen, was undoubtedly due to the necessity of regulating the year according to the stages of the Nile. Furthermore, the Nile floods must have been constantly at work obliterating landmarks and giving employment to professional surveyors. So the practical application of many geometric principles came to be known to the Egyptians, for geometry, as its name indicates, was originally concerned with the measurement of land.

The development of writing.—We must not forget that in Egypt the many needs of an advanced culture led to the creation and development of a form of writing which after many transformations has become the alphabet of the Western world. The Egyptians developed in early times the complicated hieroglyphic system. At first pictographic, it became syllabic when symbols were used to denote syllables or sounds and were combined to form words. Beyond this stage the Egyptians did not go in their development of script.

The next step apparently carries us into Syria. Though the evidence is not complete, it would seem that some Semitic trader, becoming familiar with Egyptian writing, found it too awkward for his needs. Choosing a few of the simpler Egyptian symbols, such as that for "ox head" and "house," he called them by the Semitic names of these objects and used them as we use letters today to represent sounds, preferably the initial sound of each word. In the course of time, this alphabetic system of writing became widespread among the Semitic peoples of Syria; and from there it spread westward to Greece, and later to Italy.

In Greece most of the letters kept their Semitic names, with slight changes due to differences of pronunciation. Thus the Greek *alpha* (our own "A") can be traced directly to the Egyptian ox head through its Semitic intermediaries; and *beta*, the Semitic *beth* (our "B"), was once the symbol for "house" in Egyptian. The horns of the ox head now point downward, and other simplifications and changes have been made throughout the alphabet; but the word "alphabet" itself affords significant evidence of its origin and spread. It is not unlikely that papyrus, the famous writing material of the Egyptians, came to Greece, along with the alphabet, by way of Byblus, a town on the coast of Syria; for the Greek word for papyrus is identical with the name of that city. The Greek word for books is *biblia*, and from this word is obviously derived the name of that collection of Semitic literature which we call the Bible. The Phoenician city Byblus has, therefore, though indirectly, supplied the name of the Holy Book of Western civilization.

ASPECTS OF BABYLONIAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE

Our knowledge of the intellectual life of the Babylonians is in large measure bound up with the interesting history of the de-

velopment of writing among this people. In Mesopotamia, as in Egypt, early writing was pictographic in form. Having no papyrus the inhabitants of Mesopotamia were clever enough to find a cheap substitute in the clay of the region, which when soft could be easily marked and when baked was almost indestructible. Since it was not easy to draw pictures in soft clay, the symbols were soon conventionalized until they resembled groups of wedge-shaped incisions. We call this form of writing cuneiform. The Babylonians employed it for the many permanent records required by their extensive and complex commercial life. Their widespread mercantile and political contacts with the outside world disseminated it far beyond the boundaries of Mesopotamia. For a time it was the generally accepted medium for the exchange of ideas in the Near East, used alike for all languages.

The contribution of Babylonian records to knowledge.—

Cuneiform script was convenient for other than business records. The Babylonians, being unconcerned about the future life, could devote their attention to a study of the past. In this way history developed. The Babylonians preserved, too, the legends of the country in which they dwelt. These traditions are particularly interesting to us, for comparison shows that the stories of the Creation and of the Flood which we find in the book of Genesis have parallels so close in Babylonian records as to make it certain that they have a common origin. Excavations have shown, too, that the legend of the Flood is a reminiscence of a catastrophe which constantly threatened the settlements in the lower valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. At Ur, whence Abraham set out on his westward journey, evidence has been found recently of a great flood which covered the early settlement with a deep layer of alluvium. The story of the Tower of Babel has a kernel of historical truth, for one of the commonest features of the Mesopotamian landscape was the stepped tower, the ziggurat, which, like the obelisks of Egypt, was erected in honor of the sun and formed a part of the Mesopotamian temple structures.

The libraries of burned brick tablets contain also the scientific records of Babylonia. Study of the heavens had created a body of astronomical data. This was preserved and steadily enlarged until the sky was mapped and the movements of sun, moon, and planets were charted. The records are so exact and so complete that they have been of great assistance to historians in their ef

ports to establish Babylonian chronology. The Babylonian calendar divided time into weeks of seven days, each identified with a planet; the day was divided into twelve hours, and each hour into sixty minutes or sixty times sixty seconds. Thus our present method of measuring time is a heritage of ancient Babylonian civilization. The division of the circle into 360 degrees is another contribution of ancient Babylonia to scientific reckoning. This useful combination of the decimal and the duodecimal system is found also in Babylonian weights and measures, some of which have passed on to Western Europe and modern times only slightly altered.

Babylonian architecture.—Architecturally, Mesopotamia is a land of clay. This building material seems to us prosaic enough, but when formed into brightly colored tiles and used as facing for unburned brick walls, it gave to the temples and palaces a richness well suited to a land of intense sunlight. To understand the importance and the permanence of this tradition in building one has only to visit a Mohammedan mosque where the tiles rival the work of their Mesopotamian prototypes, and where the minaret replaces the older ziggurat. Nor must we forget that the barrel vault and the dome, so important in later Western architecture, had their origin in Babylonia.

So much for the intellectual life of Egypt and Babylonia. Space forbids our extending this inquiry to other cultures of the Near East. In this brief study our interest has centered largely upon the heritage which the ancient Orient has passed on to Western civilizations. This we have tried to indicate as we have proceeded. There have been omissions; for example, we have said nothing about the introduction of metal coins, now so important an item in our everyday life. This contribution of inestimable significance to civilization came from Western Asia Minor. There may have been forerunners of coinage in lands farther east, but in Anatolia people first realized the advantages of using metal globules of convenient size, stamped to guarantee their purity and weight.

No better illustration of cultural diffusion and historical continuity—principles which we are trying to impress upon the readers of this book—can be found than early Hebrew literature, for, brought together in the Bible, it has become so much a part of our own literature as to make us frequently forget its Eastern origin.

The same is true of many oriental tales. Coming to us through the medium of Greece and Rome, many of these stories have been perpetuated by men like the Italian Boccaccio during the Renaissance, stories that have now become so completely modernized as to have lost contact with the remote antiquity in which they were born.

ROUTES OF THE TRANSFUSION OF NEAR EASTERN CULTURE

In conclusion, it will be interesting to trace some of the routes by which the civilizations of these Eastern lands reached Western peoples. The Mediterranean Sea, furnishing easy water transportation to the four corners of the Mediterranean world, so promoted the exchange of goods and ideas and so facilitated the mingling of peoples and their cultures that the dividing lines between East and West often became obliterated. This free diffusion of cultural elements made the Roman Empire, in the main, a product of union between the Near East and two Western cultures, those of Greece and Rome. We must remember, however, that although generalizations like this emphasize the continuity of history in East and West, the genealogy of civilization is not quite so simple as this statement makes it appear.

At the very first appearance of the Greeks in history, the Near East began to affect and modify their culture. When they came into Greece, they found a people with Anatolian connections; and when they crossed the Aegean and settled in Asia Minor, they intermarried with the natives and took over much of their culture. Here arose the first bloom of the culture that we call Greek. For the Anatolian Greeks as subjects of Persia the gates were opened wide to Eastern contacts. Nor must we forget that Greek traders and mercenaries were welcomed to Egypt in the last days of Egyptian greatness. The adoption of the alphabet by the Greeks is convincing proof of early contact between Greece and the Phoenician coast. Possibly even more important was the fusion which took place in the period after the death of Alexander (323 B.C.) the so-called Hellenistic age, about which we shall have more to say in the next chapter. Then the Greeks moved eastward and settled in the heart of the Near East. Though it is impossible to measure the debt which early Greek philosophy, science, and art owed to these Eastern lands, it must have been great.

Rome, too, from early times was in contact with the East. The Etruscans, after occupying Etruria, were her neighbors on the north, and for a time Etruscan princes ruled in the Eternal City. They had come from Asia Minor and they brought with them many ideas and practices which Rome learned and never forgot. In a later chapter we shall have occasion to indicate how Rome's conquest of Carthaginian territory affected Roman ideas. Possibly even more important than Carthage and Etruria for the spread of Eastern ideas among the Romans was the great stream of slaves which flowed into Italy when Rome began to expand eastward. They brought with them, among other things, their religions and their superstitions; and by the time Christianity began to spread, there were Jews in Rome to listen to Paul's preaching.

Thus the interaction of Eastern and Western cultures was a constant factor in the history of the Mediterranean lands, working in many ways, through migration, colonization, commercial intercourse, and conquest—first conquest of the East by the West, and later, conquest of the West by the East.

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CHAPTER XI

ANCIENT GREEK CULTURE

IN THE development of civilization the West lagged behind the East. While Egypt and Mesopotamia were building high civilizations, Europe was still living in the later Stone Age. Among European peoples, the ancient Greeks were the first to enter the historical period; but we cannot pass directly to a study of Greek culture in Europe, because the story of its development does not begin in Greece proper. Forerunners of Greek culture have been found in the island of Crete, in Western Asia Minor, and in the Aegean Islands, as well as in continental Greece. Because these areas in and about the Aegean developed a more or less homogeneous culture, it is usually designated as Aegean Civilization. Chronologically and geographically, these regions might have been included in our study of the Near East; as forerunners of Greek civilization they offer a proper introduction to the Greek world.

Examination of a map of the eastern Mediterranean area will help to explain why an advanced civilization developed in and about the Aegean before it did in Europe, and why Greece was the first of European lands to become civilized. In this area, Asia Minor thrusts the Oriental cultures farthest west, and the Greek peninsula extends southeastward to meet the Orient. Between the two, the comparatively small body of water called the Aegean was a connecting link, an ever-present invitation to trade and intercommunication between the peoples of the East and the peoples westward. Moreover, the Aegean is itself dotted by numerous islands which afforded easy stages in the westward movement of culture.

The Aegean civilization.—The focal center of Aegean civilization was Crete. Here the Neolithic Age came to an end and the Bronze Age began about 3000 B. C., somewhat earlier than on the mainland of Greece. Little is known about the origin of the Neolithic inhabitants, but the evidence of archaeology and place names

suggests that either they or their Bronze Age successors were closely related to the people living on the western coast of Asia Minor. In either case, it is probable that with the advent of the Bronze Age a new people entered the Aegean world. Crete then became the center of a culture rivaling that of the Eastern peoples which we studied in the previous chapter. This culture we call Minoan, from Minos who appears in Greek legends as a king of Crete. Excavations have revealed wealthy towns and large palaces, of which that at Knossos, the home of Minos, is most famous. Here, according to tradition, was the labyrinth, the home of the Minotaur; and here the ruins of the palace, with its many rooms and courts, give a certain amount of credibility to the Greek story. In this period we are in the twilight zone of history; contemporary written records have either perished or have become incomprehensible. Yet in Greek literature there are references to this remote past which were based upon more or less reliable traditions, as recent excavations tend to prove.

In the Aegean area the sea dominated the culture of the people. Through the maritime empire, the first in history, which the Cretans won for themselves, the island was brought into contact with foreign lands and with the earlier cultures of the East. Much of the wealth of the island was due to maritime pursuits and to tribute collected from less powerful communities. Its naval strength was so great as to enable it to dispense with armies and fortifications.

Artistically the people who produced this civilization were highly developed, as excavations have shown. Their pottery, both in form and in decoration, was remarkable, and the octopuses, seaweed, and other forms of marine life depicted on it are a constant reminder of Cretan acquaintance with the sea. Paintings on palace walls give most lifelike representations of processions, public gatherings, and other phases of life; and objects made of gold, silver, bronze, and ivory show a perfection of technique in plastic and other arts equal to that of Egypt and Babylonia.

In Greece the development was much slower than in Crete during the prehistoric period, and when Bronze Age civilization there reached its zenith we find significant differences between it and Cretan culture. Toward the beginning of the second millenium, bands of Aryan invaders began to seize strategic sites and to become masters of the country. During this millennium there were prob-

ably several waves of invasion, some of which extended eastward across the Aegean. About 1400 B. C. Knossos lost its position of primacy, and on the mainland of Greece, Mycenae, the home of Agamemnon, became the seat of a loosely knit empire. Hence we call the civilization of the mainland at this time Mycenaean.

By this time there was much unrest in all the Near East, both on land and sea. The invaders pressing into the Aegean area from north and west set people after people in motion. Many left their homes and migrated southward; Egyptian records preserve accounts of some of the more important migratory tribes and their attacks. One of these tribes, possibly of Cretan origin, the Philistines, finally settled in Palestine, where they played an important rôle in Hebrew history. When the movements of peoples were over, the Aegean civilization was destroyed; Troy, an important center of Aegean culture near the Dardanelles in Asia Minor, had been sacked and burned by the Greek forces of Agamemnon; the Dorians, the last wave of Aryan invaders, had entered the Peloponnesus and had brought the Iron Age into Greece, approximately 1000 B. C.

The first centuries of the last millennium B. C. may be called the medieval period of Greek history, for the untutored invaders, like the Teutonic tribes who settled in the Western Roman Empire, were unable to maintain the high standards of Minoan and Mycenaean art. Hence there was a decline which all but wiped out the glories of the past. Memory of this glory was perpetuated in classical times by picturesque legends which ascribed the surviving monuments of past generations to an heroic people descended from the gods.

The geographic limits of the Greek world.—To attempt to fix geographically the boundaries of the Greek world would prove difficult and misleading, for to a Greek the word "Hellas" had a cultural rather than a geographic connotation. It embraced all districts to which the Hellenes (Greeks) carried their language and their customs. Thus its extent differed from century to century. That part of the Balkan peninsula which lies south of Macedonia, a land considered Greek by some writers, barbarian by others, was the first home of the Greek people. Here was its birthplace, for until the Aryan conquerors of the peninsula, speaking an Indo-European language, had intermarried with the native population, itself a mixture of a Neolithic people and a branch of the Mediterranean race, the Greek people of historical times did not exist.

During the age of migration toward the end of the second millennium B. C., the Greeks, as we have seen, seized the islands in their passage across the Aegean and occupied the western coast of Asia Minor. As wealth and commerce grew, and as social and political life changed, Hellas expanded still further. Beginning in the eighth century B. C., colonies were dispatched, like swarms from a hive, to more fertile lands or to strategic points of commercial importance on the shores of many seas. Thus the Propontis, with its important fisheries, was transformed into a Greek lake, and the Bosphorus became the Greek gateway to the Euxine Sea. Here was founded Byzantium, the most important of all Hellenic foundations, the city refounded and renamed by Constantine. Grain and other raw products from Southern Russia attracted colonies to the north shore of the Euxine, and in time the whole sea was surrounded by an Hellenic ring. Meanwhile the coasts of Thrace and Macedonia, rich in precious metals and famed for their vineyards, and the islands of the northern Aegean received their quota of colonies.

Nor was the Mediterranean littoral in the West neglected. Massilia, the modern Marseilles, one of the three greatest Mediterranean ports of today, shows how well sites for Greek colonies were chosen. Neapolis (Naples) and Cumae on the Bay of Naples mark their farthest advance northward in Italy, but south of this point the peninsula was known as Magna Graecia (Great Greece) because of the number, wealth, and culture of the Greek settlements. In Sicily, Greek colonies lined the shores, except at the western end where Carthage maintained a foothold; and in the southern Adriatic, colonies on the islands and on both shores served as a bridge to Italy. In Africa there were few settlements of Greeks, for Phoenician competition was great; but even here Cyrene and Egypt offered shelter for limited numbers.

Thus Hellas in the classical period was widely scattered. Possessing no sort of political unity, it was held together mainly by the bonds of its common civilization. Community of religion, language, customs, and traditions was strong enough to preserve Greeks from losing their Hellenic heritage even though settled in the midst of barbarian peoples. We use the term "barbarian" here, as the Greeks used it, to denote men who had no share in Hellenic culture; only in so far as Greeks prided themselves on their achievements and regarded their civilization as superior to all others did they give to the word an invidious connotation.

Geographic factors in Greek culture.—Greece itself is a poor land; much of it is unsuitable for cultivation, and even the arable land is not particularly productive. The main crops were grain and vegetables until an agricultural revolution taught Greece how to secure a modest wealth from the cultivation of vines and olives. On the mountain slopes herds of sheep and goats were pastured to supply the people with meat and clothing. Throughout history, shepherds have been an important element in the population of Greece.

Geographically, Greece is a conglomeration of small valleys, more or less fertile, in which were situated the farms of the wealthy nobles and the more prosperous peasants, surrounded by hills and mountains on which the poorer peasants tried to eke out a precarious existence with their small unfertile plots, their herds, and their charcoal furnaces. Each of these valleys had its own political center, situated near an acropolis dominating the plain. These valleys and encircling mountains give the key to Greek political life, for they served to divide the country into a checkerboard of communities economically and politically self-sufficing. When city life began, each valley had its city (*polis*), ready to defend its independence at all costs.

Political life in Greece, therefore, was city life, for there existed no common economic need sufficiently powerful to bring about coöperation between cities. Where the valley was broad and fertile, the state became large and powerful, as did Sparta from her long control of the valley of the Eurotas in Lacedaemon. Where the hills were low and easily crossed, there was a constant struggle between the forces of separation and union. Where a series of small valleys was cut off by a ring of high mountains, as in Attica, there was frequently a city-state composed of several smaller units whose identity had been lost. Thus valleys and mountains created geographic units so fixed that time developed a local patriotism much more important than the national pride of the Greek people. The history of Greece is that of modern Europe in miniature, for the city-states, like modern nations, were always jealous of one another and ready to ally themselves with neighbors, either European or Asiatic, for the furtherance of their own selfish ends.

Scarcely less important than the influence of the mountains upon the Greeks was that of the sea, which served both to separate and to unite them. Hardly a district in Greece was without its sea-

coast and harbors. In the age of migrations, as we have seen, the Greeks occupied the Aegean islands and the western coast of Asia Minor. Their westward movement came later, when seamanship had improved, and when a characteristic Hellenic civilization had already taken form under the tuition of Anatolia. But wherever they went, the sea served as their road up to the time when Alexander's conquests opened to them the Persian Empire. Thus almost never do we find a Greek colony situated inland, or a Greek land empire. Greek colonies always remained isolated nuclei of Hellenism on the shores of barbarian lands. They were bound to the homeland largely by sentimental ties and by constant maritime intercourse. We must realize, however, that although the sea served as a means of preserving Greek language, customs, and religion in lands widely separated from Greece, it was not less influential in preventing political unity, for colonies had to rely mainly upon their own endeavors to hold the territory they had occupied. Each colony was an independent offshoot of the parent stock; it had its own magistrates and its own political organization. Thus the sea helped to perpetuate in alien lands that spirit of particularism which was so characteristic of Greek lands at home.

Human factors in Greek culture.—The Greeks were not a pure race, for there were three distinct strains in their blood—Neolithic, Mediterranean, and Aryan. Each of these stocks made distinctive contributions to Hellenic civilization. The Mediterranean race possibly contributed that delicacy of feeling and artistic sense which enabled the Greeks to produce masterpieces in architecture, sculpture, and literature unsurpassed in ancient and modern times. It has been customary, we know, to ascribe the supremacy of the Greeks in art to the fact that mountains and sea make Greece an extraordinarily beautiful land, or to the fact that the marbles which one finds scattered through its limestone hills offer a material for architecture and sculpture eminently appropriate to the genius of its inhabitants. But the beauty of Greek marbles and the inspiration derived from beautiful landscapes, great though they are as an influence on the art of a people, cannot alone explain the rapid development of Greek art. Italy, too, has landscapes of surpassing loveliness, and the Italian marbles are not inferior to the Greek. But when we compare the artistic creations of the Greeks with the works of the Romans—as well as with those of other peoples—the superiority of the Greek is unmistakable.

One must therefore ascribe Greek artistic genius to a strain in the population not present in the Latin people; and since the Mediterranean stock, which was settled in Greece and Crete when the Aryan invaders entered the country, was itself possessed of great artistic ability, we may perhaps give it credit for the artistic strain in Greek blood.

However, side by side with fine taste and expression, we find in Greek art and literature a crudeness and vulgarity that shock our modern sensibilities. It appears in the plays of Aristophanes and the Satyrs and Pans of art. This is possibly a direct heritage from the Neolithic people which once occupied the peninsula.

From their Aryan forefathers the Greeks inherited first of all their language. To them likewise the Greeks owed their belligerency, their love of adventure, their prowess as hunters, and their fondness for athletic sports. Finally, we can ascribe to the Aryan heritage Greek initiative, political ability, and love of liberty.

The influence of the Orient.—In the development of Greek civilization the Orient played its part, for the Greek cities nearest to the Orient, those of Ionia in Asia Minor, were far ahead of their continental cousins during the seventh and sixth centuries B. C. They were in constant contact with Anatolian Lydia until they were made subject to it, and then they passed over into the Persian Empire when (in 546 B. C.) Cyrus the Persian defeated Croesus, the last Lydian king. Many of the earliest Greek poets came from the Anatolian coast or the adjacent islands; Thales, scientist and philosopher, and successive heads of early philosophic schools were Ionians, or could trace their descent to Ionia. In sculpture, the Ionian schools led the way; in engineering, the waterworks of Samos served as models for the aqueducts and fountains built for the Greek tyrants of Athens, Megara, and Corinth. One must not, however, exaggerate the part played by the East in stimulating Greek thought, for the earliest literary-historical work of the Greek people, the epic poetry of Homer, though undoubtedly written in Asia Minor, is characteristically Greek, almost untouched by the hybrid Greco-Anatolian civilization in which it came into being.

With this caution, we may indicate some of the contacts between Greece and the Orient. Extensive trade with the interior of Asia Minor and countries farther east was facilitated by the valleys leading up from the Ionian coast. Contacts came through commercial settlements in Egypt, service in the armies of the Pharaohs, and

competition with the Phoenicians. As we have seen, the Greeks were a maritime people, and when they turned from piracy to commerce, their business led them far afield. Their contact with Lydia was so close that it is now impossible to tell whether Ionian Greeks or Lydians invented coinage. In either case, all of the great commercial city-states of Greece, realizing its advantages, soon established mints of their own. It is probable, too, that the accumulated knowledge of the East served as a foundation for Greek science, particularly in the fields of medicine and astronomy.

GREEK POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

As already indicated, geography played a decisive part in determining the character of Greek political life. There was no national Greek state. In its place there were many cities, each of which with its environs formed a politically self-contained unit, like the national state of the present day. These were the city-states of Greece. The study of Greek politics resolves itself therefore into a consideration of the evolution of the city-state. Greek political society was dynamic; its character changed with each generation as political privileges and control were placed on broader and broader foundations. Thus the Greeks normally progressed from monarchy to aristocracy, and then, if conditions were favorable, they advanced to democracy. Though this was the general trend of political development in Hellas, local factors and local needs produced a great diversity of governments. So the constitutions of Athens and Sparta, for example, were dissimilar, not only from one another, but, in certain respects at least, from the constitutions of most Greek city-states. In Athens democratic government was more advanced and more stable than was usual in Greece. In Sparta, however, conservative tendencies prevailed to such an extent that its government retained many features which disappeared in other parts of Hellas. It, too, was stable.

Relation of military defense to political privilege.—In a land of rival and often hostile city-states, military protection became an outstanding need in each community. It consequently influenced political development. The city-state of Sparta offers an excellent illustration. Sparta was larger than the majority of her neighbors, having acquired two districts in southern Peloponnesus, Lacedaemon and Messenia. The inhabitants of these two districts comprised

state-serfs who worked the land for their Spartan lords, and merchants and artisans who lived in the towns. Although these townspeople were free, and although they possessed a certain amount of self-government in their local municipalities, they were subjects, not citizens, of the Spartan State. Political rights were limited exclusively to men of Spartan birth whose training and daily life conformed to rules and regulations made by the government. Preservation of the state was the chief end of government; consequently, military service came to be the citizen's sole profession. Sparta's army, therefore, was a professional organization, made up of all able-bodied citizens of military age. Sparta's wealth in land and state-serfs made this system possible, for it relieved individual Spartan citizens from the necessity of earning their own living. Their life tended to be communistic.

Such a system of military communism expresses in an exaggerated form a fundamental ideal of Greek political life, for the Greeks held the theory that every citizen should be ready to sacrifice himself and his personal interests for the welfare of the state—in other words, that individuals should be subordinate to the community in which they live. In most Greek states complete subordination was difficult of realization. In Sparta, however, local needs and conditions were responsible for the establishment of the régime just described; once this régime was established, the need of maintaining strict discipline over a numerically superior subject population served to crystallize and perpetuate a system originally designed to give Sparta military supremacy over her neighbors. The result was an iron discipline for the ruling class, as well as for the subject peoples.

Elsewhere in Greece, although individualism had an opportunity to develop by slow degrees, military needs played a part in constitutional and social development. In the days of Homer, kings were leaders in battle, judges, and priests. The wealthy nobles, who alone were able to supply themselves with expensive armor, horses, and chariots, formed a warrior class. In the course of time, since military and political power tend to be inseparable, this class became sufficiently powerful to restrict the authority of the monarch. His tenure of office was limited; new magistracies were created to take over first one and then another of his functions; and his advisory council, of which the nobles alone were members, gradually assumed control of the administration. During this period of transition

from monarchy to aristocracy, chariots were replaced by cavalry in Greek armies. This change in military tactics, however, did little to alter the fundamental basis of political power; for until the state should provide pay, equipment, and horses, only landlords of wealth were able to bear the financial burden of military service. In this fashion Homeric monarchy finally gave place to aristocracy.

The next development was stimulated by the military reforms of Sparta. Armies became larger, and new tactics were introduced. Heavy-armed foot-soldiers, fighting in close formation, took the place once occupied by the cavalry and became the first line of defence for the city-state. Sparta was sufficiently wealthy to support a permanent force of this type; but neighboring cities, lacking the resources of Sparta and threatened by her rapid territorial advance in the Peloponnesus, called into military service all able-bodied men who could afford to provide themselves with heavy armor. Out of this "competition in armaments" came new political privileges for the wealthier peasants. Since the state depended upon them for its protection, it was forced to grant them political rights commensurate with their services. The aristocracy thus began to broaden into democracy. This state is sometimes called *timocracy*, for the wealth of citizens determined their military obligations and political rights. The poorer peasants, the shepherds and charcoal burners of the highlands, the sailors and fishers of the coast, since they could not afford a suit of heavy armor, were not regarded as equally privileged with their more prosperous neighbors.

Influence of economic forces on political privilege.—Another advance toward democracy came as a final result of changing economic conditions. So long as Greece was mainly agricultural, land and its products were the criterion by which a man was rated. But when coinage appeared in Greece during the seventh century, specially favored cities began to develop commerce and manufacturing. Merchants and artisans, two classes which had as yet no place in the existing scheme of government, became wealthy. At the same time a revolution in agricultural methods brought ruin to the small farmer and greatly enhanced the wealth of landlords who could afford to change from grain to olives, fruits, and vines.

After a time, when long-continued possession of power had made the aristocratic leaders selfish in the exercise of their rights, the people, becoming discontented with the state of politics, began to question long-established customs. Factions developed, and the

ld agricultural nobility was forced to fight for control against leaders representing the unenfranchised elements in the state. In many cities where commerce and manufacturing were not highly developed, the nobles were victorious. In others, the new forces, making use of rivalries between aristocratic clans, gained the upper hand.

The first step toward real democracy was Greek *tyranny*, a curious political phenomenon somewhat resembling the rule of the Medici in Renaissance Florence and the position of the bosses in our American cities. The tyrants rose to power through the support of the common people whose cause they championed. Though the rule of the *tyrants* was unconstitutional, and though their treatment of the nobility who opposed them was necessarily brutal, still they brought many benefits to their communities. In the first place, they broadened the basis of political life to suit the needs of the new age, and they weakened the hold of the aristocrats upon the organs of government. In Athens, for example, they created a broader Athenian patriotism by the introduction of festivals like the Panathenaea in honor of Athena, a celebration symbolizing the union of all classes of Athenian citizens. On the Acropolis was centered the worship of Dionysus, god of wine, a divinity in which rich and poor had an equal interest. In his honor was celebrated the Dionysia, another of the major festivals of the Athenian state. In this way official cults of great magnificence were established, cults in which the spirit of the Athenian people was destined to find expression. Thus Greek drama was brought to perfection at the festivals of Dionysus, and the elevation of Athena to preëminence in Attica eventually bore fruit in the construction of her most famous temple, the Parthenon. In ways like these the cults in which the nobles had an hereditary monopoly were overshadowed, and the power of the nobles in religious affairs was curtailed.

Tyranny helped to give the Greek world a new sense of values. The common man found his place in society, and under the tyrants he gained some idea of government. He was prepared in some measure for the broader democracy which normally followed the fall of tyranny. In Athens the movement was accelerated in the fifth century B. C. by the growth of maritime power, for this gave to the poorest citizens a place of importance in the defense of Athenian interests. They served as rowers in the fleet, and as an essential part in the Athenian military system they obtained equality in most of the work of government. Thus political rights became

coextensive with the free native population of the city-state. In Athens, at times, even Greeks from other cities were freely admitted to citizenship; and some of the fifth-century statesmen traced their descent to non-Athenians. But ordinarily, Greek cities were unwilling to admit to political rights Greeks from other towns; and conversely, a Greek exiled from his native city felt himself an alien even among fellow-Greeks. Such was the pride of the Greek in his city.

Greek democracy and its problems.—Since most Greek cities were small, the citizen body was limited. Thus the democracy of such a state was quite different from the so-called democratic governments of today. The whole voting population of a community could meet together for the election of officials and for the transaction of public business. The citizens knew one another, if not personally, at least by reputation; and when wars arose they had better opportunity to know why they were fighting, and whether the cause was worth fighting for. The success of any democratic form of government is dependent largely upon the intelligent participation of the whole citizen body; hence the smallness of the city-states, their primary assemblies, and the close contact between the citizens and the government were factors in the maintenance of the democratic system. Athens, however, since it was larger than the ordinary city-states, had to combine representative government with its primary assembly. So the Athenian Boule (Senate), composed of members representing the various local divisions of Attica, became the chief organ of government.

As a state becomes larger and its citizens grow more numerous, economic interests become more diverse and politics more complicated. Under these conditions, too, democratic government tends to lose its efficiency; for individuals are too ready to neglect public business when they feel that it concerns them only indirectly, or they try to exploit the state when a conflict between classes arises. Thus, as urban life in Athens and its commercial suburb, the Peiræus, developed, a breach was created between the country and the city which resulted in conflicts between them. In the end, numerical superiority brought victory to the urban element.

So instead of being governed by the whole citizen body for the good of all, Athens came to possess a perverted form of democracy in which the masses (*demos*) ruled the state for their own class interests, exploiting the wealthy in the process. Interest was transferred from the welfare of the state to the welfare of individuals.

citizens; and in the fourth century, Demosthenes, the great Athenian orator, charged his fellow citizens with political indifference, absorption in private affairs, desire to make money, and unwillingness to serve in the Athenian army. These characteristics marked the decline of democratic government. Individualism and specialization had been victorious. When we contrast the age of Pericles with the age of Demosthenes, we see the difference: Sophocles, the dramatist of Periclean Athens, was a citizen first, general and treasurer of the state; Socrates, the great philosopher, served in the Athenian army. The fourth century, however, saw teachers and literary men aloof from affairs of state. Professional politicians ran the government, and professional soldiers commanded armies made up of soldiers of fortune like the French Foreign Legion, men who were actuated by no motives of patriotism. The wealthy citizens paid the bills. Thus politics had degenerated into exploitation of the wealthy by professional politicians, for themselves and for the masses who held the balance of power.

In other city-states of Greece the problem of reconciling social classes, rich and poor, urban and agricultural, was even more acute than in Athens, where democracy had become firmly entrenched during the fifth century. Failure to effect an understanding between classes produced conflicts between aristocrats and democrats. When democrats were in power, they exiled the wealthy and confiscated their estates. The exiles then sought assistance in some neighboring state, and when they returned to power it was the turn of the democrats to leave the city. Greece was filled with exiles, exciting city to war against city, and class against class. These internecine wars were therefore one of the greatest problems Greece had to face and one of the most serious evils in the city-state form of government.

Greek political theory.—Greek thinkers hold an exceedingly high place in the history of political theory. Yet it was difficult for even the greatest of them to conceive of a broader foundation for government than that of the city-state. Both Plato and Aristotle considered the problem of government from the standpoint of the *polis* (city-state)—Plato in his *Republic*, the most famous of Greek treatises on government, and Aristotle in his *Politics*. Their ideal state was a city with sufficient territory around it to make it self-sufficing, with inhabitants enough to defend it against aggression, yet small enough to avoid the disadvantages which come from large communities.

Plato, however, like his master Socrates, perceived the faults of democracy. Democratic Athens had put Socrates to death. At the same time he saw the stability of Sparta, a stability produced by keeping each class in its place and by giving government to those who by special education and by profession were trained for their work. Thus the ideal government depicted by Plato in his *Republic* was aristocratic, the rule of the best, namely, those who were fitted by intellect and long training to dispense justice. The ordinary man, suited only for labor on the farms or in the shops, would be unable to upset the smooth working of this machine; and security would be assured by specially trained guardians of the state. Each man would then do the work for which he was best adapted. In Plato's opinion this was the essence of justice.

Attempts at political union.—Although the city-state ideal was dominant in Greek political thought and practice, the evils of particularism brought thinkers to a realization that only through union could Greece avoid constant warfare among the city-states, prevent the immense destruction of life and property which resulted from interminable invasions, and ward off the danger of subjection to foreign powers. From time to time unions of city-states were created to meet definite crises, or to serve definite needs. The military power of Sparta in the sixth century placed the Spartans at the head of a loose confederation which might have embraced the whole Greek peninsula when Greece was attacked by Persia (fifth century B. C.), if local hatreds had not prevented. Other attempts at union followed, all equally unsuccessful. Neither the evils of internal strife nor the dangers of foreign invasion were able to create a Greek national spirit capable of overcoming local pride and local jealousies.

Two attempts at confederation in Hellenistic times, the Achaean and Aetolian leagues, are of special interest to American students for they offered numerous object lessons in federal government to the authors of our Constitution. Those who advocated the formation of a closely-knit federal union constantly emphasized the fact that the weaknesses and failures of these Greek leagues were identical with those which characterized our government after the Revolution, under the Articles of Confederation. Fundamentally conditions were the same. The rivalries and jealousies harbored by the sovereign American states toward one another were like those which prevented united action among the Greek city-states. In Greece, tradition and long-established customs operated to preserv

the so-called sovereign rights of city-states, even when joined in federal unions, thereby preventing effective coöperation in peace and paralyzing the leagues in time of war. In America the doctrine of state sovereignty produced similar results. Thus, profiting from American experience supplemented by lessons which these Greek experiments taught, the fathers of our Constitution gave to the federal government increased authority, including the power to tax and the power to raise and maintain armies.

Politically, the Greeks made experiment after experiment; and the records of these experiments have provided material for political theorists from that day to this. Our names for the different types of government,—monarchy, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy—are all Greek, and the definitions which we give to these terms are taken from Aristotle. As political theorists, the Greeks have been the teachers of mankind.

THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD OF GREEK CIVILIZATION

At the end of the fourth century B. C., the character of Greek civilization underwent marked changes as a result of the conquests made by the Macedonian kings Philip and Alexander. Through their efforts most of the city-states of Greece and Anatolia lost all but the semblance of liberty; and Alexander, in a double capacity, as king of Macedonia and commander-in-chief of a Pan-Hellenic league, led an expedition into Asia destined to change the course of history throughout the Near East. Persia was conquered, and on its ruins was founded the greatest empire known to antiquity before the rise of Rome. It embraced Greece, Macedonia, Thrace, and all the lands which had been subject to the Persian king.

Although the empire of Alexander almost immediately disintegrated, the forces which he set in motion continued to operate. His successors, for the most part Macedonian generals, usurped royal authority over such lands as they could seize and hold. Since the Hellenized monarchs preferred Macedonians and Greeks as soldiers and officials, political authority in large sections of the Near East came to be concentrated in the hands of Greeks. The Near East had become the land of opportunity, providing a safety valve and an outlet for Greek energy and adventure. The discontented, the ambitious, the exiles driven from home by revolution, all streamed eastward and settled in the many Greek colonies founded

by Alexander and his successors as nuclei of Greek culture among the peoples of the Near East. Of these colonies, Egyptian Alexandria is most famous. Through the influence of these foundations urban civilization in the Near East became Greek, or at least strove to appear Greek. Government used the Greek language; merchants found it a convenient medium; Greek theatres were built; Greek drama became popular; and educated men everywhere were trained in Greek literature and philosophy.

In its new environment, however, Greek culture underwent changes as it succumbed to the permeating influences of the older Eastern civilizations. It ceased to be purely Hellenic. Instead we call it Hellenistic, and we use the word also to designate that period which followed the death of Alexander. Politically we find ourselves again in the absolutist monarchies of oriental lands, and we see the city-states disappearing from the center of the Greek political stage as territorial states arise on every hand. These changes were not without effect upon Greek thought. Philosophers discussed such problems as the nature of kingship, the source and character of law, and the brotherhood of man; among them, the Stoics held that there was a universal law of nature, superior to the laws and customs of petty cities and kingdoms. According to this natural law all men were equal, Greeks and barbarians, slaves and freemen. So culture, becoming international and cosmopolitan, developed an outlook upon life destined to affect men's thoughts for centuries to come.

GREEK RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, AND SCIENCE

To us who have come to regard Athens as the center of Greek intellectual life, it is at first surprising to learn that Ionia and Italy were the homes of Greek literature, art, philosophy, and science before Greece itself. The reason for this was the poverty of Greece. The Ionian and the Italian settlements possessed greater wealth, due to the fertility of their soil, to manufacturing, and to commerce; and the leisure thus made possible served as an incentive to the development of ideas. The mere fact of settlement in new lands and contacts with new environments and new peoples helped to break down conservatism.

Greece itself was not slow to imitate its Ionian and Italian cousins, especially after the defeat of the Persians at Marathon and Salamis had stimulated Athenian pride and energies. In the centuries

ury and a half which followed, Athens was the school of Hellas; and although many of the teachers came to Athens from outlying regions of the Hellenic world, of whom Aristotle was preëminent, still Athens was the center of thought. Even Aristotle was the product of an Athenian school, for his teacher was Plato, a pure Athenian by birth and training. Henceforth, Athens was destined to bulk large in Greek history, with the result that our histories of Greece are filled with the achievements of Athenians.

During the Hellenistic period Athens continued to be the philosophical center of the Greek world; but the wealth and patronage of the Hellenistic monarchs tended to create rival centers of learning, and artists of all sorts flocked to the monarchs who wished to glorify themselves by erecting statues and magnificent buildings for the adornment of their cities, and to patronize laudatory poets and historians. Thus in their capital, Alexandria, the Egyptian kings founded a magnificent library wherein was collected all important Greek literature. Its well-paid librarians were alike authors and professional scholars engaged in editing ancient texts. Scientific studies also flourished under the patronage of monarchs.

Greek religion.—Greek religion, philosophy, and science must be studied together, for they represent different aspects of the search for ultimate truth. Our earliest picture of Greek religion is found in Homer. In his writings the gods are represented as immortal persons, behaving very much like human beings possessed of superhuman power. Their life together on Mt. Olympus under the overlordship of Zeus was a counterpart of feudal society in the Mycenaean empire. Though Zeus was lord and master, the gods, like Agamemnon's vassals, were frequently unruly and insubordinate. A religion such as this is called polytheistic and anthropomorphic. We cannot discuss the origin and function of the various divinities, but it is easy to see that Zeus, wielding his thunderbolt and living on the highest mountain-top in Greece, was the Aryan god of the sky. So too we can recognize in Aphrodite and other female divinities the goddess of fertility who had been held in reverence by the non-Aryan, Bronze-Age inhabitants of Greece and Crete. Thus the religion was a fusion of two or more alien elements.

Homer's picture, however, is an artistic generalization from which most of the detail has disappeared. It scarcely corresponds with conditions of a later age, when political disunity in Greece emphasized the anarchy which was apparent even among Homer's Olym-

pian gods. The religion of the historic Greeks was chiefly local and civic. It is true there were national centers, such as Olympia, where Greeks came to honor Zeus at the Olympic games, and Delphi, the seat of Apollo's oracle; but in the main, Athena, who was the patron goddess of Athens, was a different person from the Athena of a rival city like Sparta.

Since religion was civic, worship tended to be formal, for it was the duty of the state to see that its gods were properly honored. Temples were erected by the state not as places of congregation for worship, but to house cult statues and to provide store-rooms for sacred treasures. Sacrifices were state functions over which state officials presided. Though the people shared in the feasts which accompanied the sacrifices, either gratuitously or by the payment of a fee, still there was little personal religion in this form of worship.

Side by side with the state religion, there grew up a form of worship in which Greek individualism found expression. This worship centered at Eleusis in Attica, where Demeter and Persephone, goddesses of agriculture, had an ancient shrine. With them was associated Dionysus, god of wine, a divinity increasingly popular after the extension of viticulture in the eighth and seventh centuries B. C. At Eleusis, only the initiated could participate in the sacred mysteries, and here a large hall was constructed for the meetings. In these mystery religions emphasis was laid upon right living, purification from sin, and the future life.

Greek philosophy.—Philosophy was born when thinking Greeks, realizing that polytheism and anthropomorphism meant religious anarchy, began to consider various questions concerning the nature of divinity, what it is, and how it acts upon men and material things.

Underlying Greek polytheism there had always been a belief in a divine force superior to the Olympian gods, for even in Homer these divinities, being subject to fate or necessity, were not omnipotent. So the Greeks came to believe in a great causal or creative force which brought things to pass, itself a substance endowed with life and able to create a living universe out of itself. Speculation about the character of this force produced Greek philosophy. Attempts to define it and to discover how it works resulted in philosophical systems, each one trying to correct the imperfections of its predecessors. Into these systems we cannot go. It is su

cient to state here that the earliest philosophers, those of Ionia and Magna Graecia, had an intense belief that certain substances were spiritual as well as material and were themselves causes of the universe. They first fixed upon water, then air, and then fire, as the supreme cause of all things. Thus they progressively made the supreme cause more rare and more abstract; and by the fourth century it was widely held that pure reason was the supreme cause, or god of the universe.

In time there developed a new phase of philosophic study, that which concerned itself both abstractly and concretely with human conduct. Out of this grew ethics and political science. In these two fields Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle made lasting contributions to human thought. Socrates, the famous Athenian teacher, in the very midst of a life-and-death struggle between Athens and Sparta attempted to give his fellow citizens a truer sense of ethical values. In a dialogue called the *Republic*, Plato, most eminent of the pupils of Socrates, presented his plan for an ideal state—that is, one in which justice should be supreme. In it he sought to define justice. The greatest of this trio was Aristotle, the pupil of Plato. His writings illustrate the breadth of ancient philosophy, for they range from ethics, political science, logic, metaphysics, and literary criticism, to the natural sciences. In these fields he laid foundations for all later studies.

These men lived and worked before the death of Alexander the Great. The latter's conquests, as we have seen, widened the horizon of the Greeks and changed their outlook on life. When freedom departed from the majority of city-states, and political power came to be concentrated in the hands of monarchs, prominent citizens of a city that once ranked as a major power became unimportant subjects of an alien ruler, and cities like Sparta and Athens, even when they retained their freedom, no longer determined the course of history. These political changes were reflected in philosophy as soon as men realized the futility of individual endeavor. Politically, the philosophy of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle had been dominated by the conception that city-states were ideally constituted to satisfy man's social needs. Now philosophy was confronted with a form of government in which kings were absolute, and with states in which the old political frontiers were meaningless. In harmony with these conditions, the Skeptics and the Stoics likewise transcended political frontiers and preached the brother-

hood of man. Furthermore, justifying the paradox that rich men are slaves and poor men alone are free, the Stoics developed a philosophy of kingship in which absolutism found its place. The kings, as embodiments of divine law, were regarded as the chief servants of the communities over which they ruled.

The two most famous philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period were Epicureanism and Stoicism, the one laying emphasis upon natural laws and denying the existence of spiritual causes, the other approaching the problem of the universe from the standpoint of pantheism. Both emphasized right living, but since Epicureanism denied the future life and judged actions by their results, its original purity was easily lost. Hence the motto of the Epicurean masses, "Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow ye die."

Stoicism, on the other hand, established a scale of values based upon Natural Law, or the Law of Reason. Obedience to this law was virtue, and the result was happiness for the man who realized that man's nature was primarily rational, and therefore subject to the Law of Reason. These philosophies, each in its own way, were typical of the age which produced them. Stoicism appealed to an age which saw the disappearance of the local political and cultural boundaries. The Law of Nature transcended places and nations, for it was universal like the Hellenistic culture which produced it. Since loyalty to city-states was dying out, it was fitting that a higher loyalty to mankind should take its place. In this atmosphere a belief in the common brotherhood of man developed. Stoicism had an important effect upon early Christian doctrine: the writings of St. Paul are permeated with Stoic turns of expression and ways of thought. No less important was the influence of Stoicism upon thoughtful Romans, particularly in the first centuries of the Christian Era.

Greek science.—Epicureanism, with its negation of the intervention of personal gods in the affairs of human life, represents the critical skepticism of the Hellenistic Age; and its search for physical causes was one eminently suited to an age hardly less materialistic than our own. This was an age of science. Mathematics flourished; at this time Euclid standardized the study of geometry in a work which was used for many centuries by all students of the subject, and which still serves as the basis for our school textbooks. Astronomy made rapid advances: the earth's shape and size were computed, its relation to the sun was discovered, and astronomy

a pure science was divorced from astrology. To Hellenistic astronomers we owe our calendar, for one of them persuaded Julius Caesar to introduce into Rome the old Egyptian solar calendar, slightly modified and corrected. The addition of an extra day once in four years made it more accurate. Archimedes devoted himself to physical studies. Applying his scientific knowledge to contrive weapons of defense, he caused great losses to the Romans when they besieged Syracuse, the city in which he lived. If economic necessity had been as great as military necessity, the ancient world would probably have developed the steam engine as a source of power. Medicine likewise felt the influence of the scientific spirit. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible even to enumerate in this book the scientific discoveries of the age. Considered as a whole, they testify to the great intellectual acumen of the Greek people.

The modern world has taken centuries to relearn what was common knowledge to students in the Hellenistic Age. So, for example, geocentric Christian theologians, postulating the subjection of science to religion, fought bitterly and long against astronomers who taught that the earth moved about the sun; or, to state the matter in a different way, the shift from scientific investigation to religion, which characterized the first three centuries of the Christian Era, was in large measure responsible for the oblivion that hid the discoveries of Hellenistic science during the Middle Ages. When mankind as a whole turned its attention chiefly to the future life of the soul, magic and superstitious practices were substituted for medicine, and theological works took the place of scientific treatises on library shelves. Led by philosophy, the whole Roman world became intensely religious. As Stoicism and Neo-Platonism gained in strength, science rapidly declined.

GREEK ART, ARCHITECTURE, AND LITERATURE

In art, Greece is much more important than the Orient as an instructor for Western artists. It is unnecessary to consider here the development of Greek art in detail. For us its two most important branches are sculpture and architecture, since Greek painting, in which an advanced technique was developed, was not preserved sufficiently to enable Renaissance and modern painters to use it as an inspiration for their work. In sculpture we can trace a

rapid advance from the crudity and stiffness of archaic art to the perfection realized by the marble statues of the Parthenon, now the chief glory of the British Museum.

Greek sculpture and its development.—Two factors in the swift mastery of technique may well be noted here: (1) the belief of the Greeks that the gods bore human forms, more beautiful than those of their human descendants; and (2) the fondness of the Greeks for athletic exercises. In the games at the great Hellenic religious festivals, Greek artists had abundant opportunity to view the nude human form in its perfection; and they were not slow to analyze it from the standpoint of both anatomy and art. Thus in the structure and proportion we find rapid progress. Nor did the Greeks lack opportunity to practice what they learned. The centers of the Greek games were filled with statues of victorious athletes, and the towns from which the victors came were equally ready to honor their favorite sons. Likenesses of priests, priestesses, and other benefactors adorned temple precincts; within the temples were statues of divinities, sometimes made of gold and ivory like Phidias' Athena in the Parthenon and his Zeus at Olympia; and on the buildings themselves were pediments, metopes, and friezes filled with statues and reliefs depicting scenes from appropriate legends.

One ought not to forget that the marble quarries of Greece offered a material for sculpture and architecture worthy of the best talents of the artists. Yet much of the best work was done in bronze, a metal so useful that later vandals melted the statues for utilitarian purposes. The perfection of Greek work can be recognized in the many silver and gold coins which have come down to us from hundreds of city-states, large and small, scattered through the Greek world. From the coins we can trace step by step the advancing technique, the stylistic periods, and the varying tendencies of the art; and we come away with a new appreciation of the widespread artistic ability and taste of the Hellenic world. When towns, many almost unknown, could produce such work, the average artistic level must have been very high indeed.

The development of art follows closely the tendencies of the age. In its earlier stages art was primarily, though not wholly, civic, for the building and ornamentation of temples was a community enterprise. The gods were simply divine partners, or even citizens of the city in which they were worshiped. Thus glorification of

the god and beautification of the city went hand in hand. We have seen how the *tyrants* created a national Athenian spirit by fostering cults in which all Athenians could share. In the time of Pericles the Acropolis, newly crowned by the Parthenon and the Propylaea, was symbolic of the greatness of the Delian League and its Athenian capital, a monument to the victory which Athens and her allies had won over the Persians who had burned the older temples there. The calm dignity and idealized human beauty of the Parthenon sculptures played an important part in forming the artistic taste of nineteenth-century Europe, after they had been removed to the British Museum in London by Lord Elgin.

In the fourth century, when sculptors had achieved mastery over their materials and had learned the principles of human anatomy, growing individualism led to realism. Then artists began to give to their statues faces and bodily postures expressive of violent suffering and passionate emotion. When we pass to Alexander and the Hellenistic Age, we find realism well established. Beginning with Lysippus, Alexander's favorite sculptor, artists devoted more and more of their time to the portrayal of monarchs, so successfully that we can see in a king's successive portraits the effects of age and dissipation upon his face. Hellenistic striving for effect can be illustrated by the Laocoön, a group which in modern times was once considered the acme of perfection in ancient art. At a time when knowledge of Greek sculpture was based upon Roman copies, dug up and preserved when Italy became conscious of the greatness of Greco-Roman civilization, it was not surprising that the fondness of Rome for Hellenistic art should determine the taste of modern times. Our standards of judgment, however, are now more critical, for we know much more than our Renaissance ancestors about the works of the great fifth and fourth century Greek masters. Yet we must not underrate the importance of the uncritical Renaissance admiration for ancient art, since it served as an inspiration to painters and sculptors alike.

Greek architecture.—In architecture, as in sculpture, we recognize the civic nature of Greek civilization. The finest of Greek buildings were for the gods of the city-state. In the great age of the fifth century, men dwelt in simple houses; splendid marble wellings were reserved for the divinities who brought glory to their worshippers. The Athenian Acropolis, with the Parthenon, the Erechtheum, the processional gateway called the Propylaea,

the little temple of Wingless Victory on the summit, and the theatre of Dionysus, in which the great dramatic festivals were given by the city, show the place of architecture in Greek life.

Greek temples were usually simple in plan. They were rectangular, and they had gabled roofs supported by walls or columns. The result was an harmonious whole in which ornamentation was subordinated to architecture. Infinite pains and long training produced these monuments.

A study of temples built during different ages shows how Greek architects improved the general plan and the details of construction as their artistic sense grew towards perfection. The ratio of length to breadth was altered to give better proportion; in the Parthenon, for example, this ratio was changed even after the foundations had been laid. So, too, experience taught Greek architects how to make the low Doric columns and their simple capitals more graceful. In order to obviate optical illusions of sagging foundations and slanting columns they introduced refinements of line so minute as to escape the notice of the casual observer. Since the plain Doric order was unsuited for all buildings and all parts, the Ionic order with its more slender columns was used to give variety and greater ornament. Finally the ornate Corinthian capital became a popular substitute for the Ionic, particularly in Roman times.

Greek classical architecture was not of monumental size. In Hellenistic times, however, when monarchs became the builders, there was a tendency to measure the glory of kings by the size of their buildings; and in architecture, as in sculpture, deterioration in taste resulted from that constant striving for effect which characterizes art when it becomes a servant of individualism enthroned.

Greek literature.—Western literature begins with Homer's poems: the *Iliad*, dealing with the quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon during the siege of Troy; and the *Odyssey*, which relates the adventurous return of Odysseus to his home in Ithaca. These epics have been schoolbooks for generations of young students—Greek, Roman, German, French, English, and American; and they have set the style for epic poets in every age. For the Greeks they became a sort of Bible; in Rome they helped to transform the animistic gods of early Latium into beings with human bodies and minds like those of men. Virgil, Dante, and Milton, each in his own way and in his own time, have carried on the tradition.

Just as Homer created the epic, so later Greek writers created other types of literature. The objective narrative of Homer was followed by the lyric poets, who sang of personal experiences and passions, love and hate, the dangers of war and the delights of peace, the quieter pleasures of the mind, and the attractions of the wine-cup. Sappho writing for the girls who were her friends and pupils—and about them, too—has given her name to a meter much used by Horace. Other poets turned their minds to the composition of choral odes to be sung by groups of dancers; and when drama came into being in honor of the god Dionysus, choral poetry became an integral part of dramatic structure. The plots themselves were based on incidents chosen from the myths and legends of Greece, culled largely from epic sources.

To these oft-told tales the three great fifth-century Athenian tragedians, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, gave an enduring value, for in their hands the stories became a medium for the discussion of the changing moral problems of the age. Of the three, probably Euripides the modernist suits our taste the best, just as he suited the restless skepticism of the Hellenistic Age. Comedy also developed. Though Aristophanes used it for political satire, it soon became the polite comedy of manners, and as such it has come down to the modern theater through the medium of the Latin plays of Plautus and Terence.

When people recognized that prose was also a suitable means of literary expression, history began to appear. Herodotus, the Father of History and one of the greatest story-tellers of all times, wrote the history of the Persian campaigns of Marathon and Salamis; and to show the immensity of the struggle he compiled from many sources an account of the history of the Near East. The first critical history, written by Thucydides, deals with the causes and events of the Peloponnesian War, which, in its magnitude and results, was as significant to the Greek world as the World War is to our own.

Oratory was no less important than history, for the Greeks were forced by their system of popular government to make much greater use of the spoken word to persuade their fellows than would be possible today. Moreover, in the comparatively simple society of Greece, men pleaded their own cases in court; instead of hiring lawyers, they frequently employed writers to compose speeches for them. Thus Demosthenes not only employed his

talents for the defense of Greece against the menace of Macedon, but also wrote orations for other men to deliver.

Another prose type was the dialogue, used effectively by Plato in his philosophic writings, as truly literature in his hands as other forms of literary art.

Although it is customary to speak slightly of the literature of the Hellenistic period and to call it polished and artificial rather than inspired, many of the things which were then written still live; Hellenistic writings did much to mold Latin literature, and modern literature through the Latin. When Rome first began to admire and to imitate Greece, Homer and the Hellenistic poets were her models. Virgil's pastoral poetry and his story of Dido's love for Aeneas show that he owes as much to his Hellenistic predecessors as he does to Homer, for pastoral poetry was an outgrowth of Hellenistic urban life, and love was a popular motif in Hellenistic literature.

THE GREEK CONTRIBUTION TO MODERN CIVILIZATION

The intellectual achievements of the Greeks constitute the splendid contribution they made to world culture. The Greek people were preëminently thinkers and artists. Much of their work in these fields has been preserved because the ancient world recognized its excellence. Thus it has never ceased to influence the life of the Mediterranean world and its successors; it continues to affect each generation according to the needs and conditions of the age. Even the works that were not preserved have not been without effect, for in the days when Rome went to Greece for her education, copies, abridgments, translations, and imitations were made which enable us to understand and estimate the service rendered by Greece to Rome, and thus, indirectly, to the modern world. Cicero, for example, in his philosophical writings, preserves the ideas of many Greek philosophers whose work influenced him and all succeeding ages through his writings. Even Cicero's oratorical style, which was the result of a close study of Greek orators, has been of inestimable value in molding literary style in many modern languages.

The great constructive period of Greek civilization covered the fifth and fourth centuries B. C. In the Hellenistic period we observed the decline of the city-state, social and political upheavals,

a scattering of Hellenic energies among the Greco-Oriental monarchies, and the creation of new centers of culture embedded in the absolutism of the East. But even then Greece continued to take the lead in civilization. Greeks were the teachers of Orientals and Romans alike. Greek civilization was so far superior to the Roman that it never lost its preëminence. When all the Western world learned to speak Latin, the Orient continued to use Greek, and it remained the language of educated men for generations. Marcus Aurelius, a Roman emperor, wrote his philosophic meditations in Greek, and the Stoic philosophy which he professed was that of an Athenian school. Nor must we forget the most famous biographer and moralist of antiquity, Plutarch, who wrote his lives of Greeks and Romans during the second century of the Empire.

When the western half of the Roman Empire had disintegrated under the force of the Teutonic invasions, Greece continued to live throughout the Middle Ages until the capture of Constantinople in the fifteenth century; and during the Renaissance revival of interest in classical learning, Greece became again the tutor of the West, partly through the ancient books which had been preserved, partly through the scholars from Constantinople who could read the ancient language. Earlier than this, too, Greek thought had come to Western universities through the Arabic culture of Spain. No greater proof of the regard in which Greek thinkers were held in the Middle Ages can be found than the place occupied by Aristotle in the theology of the medieval schoolmen. He was the Master of men who know.

In our summary account of Hellenic culture we have indicated from time to time the chief contributions made by the Greeks to the modern world. To recapitulate briefly, the Greeks were a people possessed of great imagination, eager always to learn and to improve upon the achievements of their predecessors. Their curiosity prompted them to investigate such things as ultimate cause, the nature of God, the relation between mind and matter, the basis of human existence, and the nature of the Good. From these investigations we have philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, and politics, a multitude of systems evolved in the course of long-continued criticism of earlier teachings. Their investigation of nature laid foundations, not always recognized today, for our natural sciences. Their improvement of Oriental mathematics made the name Euclid synonymous with geometry. In art and

literature, as well as in thought, although later peoples have created new literary types, the Greeks have always been a source, an inspiration, and a model for writers, sculptors, painters, and architects.

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
CHAPTER XII

ANCIENT ROMAN CULTURE

WITH the development of Greek civilization an advanced culture entered the gates of Europe. The Romans carried it westward along the Mediterranean.

Rome began, so the legends say, as a band of outlaws settled on the Palatine, one of the seven hills on the Tiber. Significantly enough, from the name of this hill we get our word "palace," the home of rulers. Whatever be the truth about the outlaw band gathered together under the leadership of Romulus, it is doubtless true, as another story leads us to infer, that an early Latin settlement on the Palatine united with other settlements on the neighboring hills. Thus the city grew until the marshy land between the hills was drained to become the Forum, or market place, of the enlarged community. This gradual absorption of neighboring lands was typical of Rome's future growth.

Geographic factors in Roman culture.—At first Rome was only one of many towns constituting the Latin tribe settled in the small plain (Latium) south of the lower Tiber. In time, however, she became the leader of the tribe, and then, like the ripples which form in ever-widening circles when a stone is dropped into a quiet pond, the boundaries of Rome's sphere of influence widened until she became the head of a confederation embracing all Italy. Once mistress of Italy, she next proceeded to extend her power in all directions—into northern Africa and Spain against Carthage, into the Balkans, into Hellenistic Greece—until by the middle of the second century B. C. Rome had become the greatest Mediterranean power. She next spread into Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. Striking westward, she brought Gaul under her control, and finally, leaping the English Channel, possessed herself of Britain as far north as the Scottish Highlands. By the early years of the second century A. D., she had brought her conquests to full circle. A ring of Roman provinces completely surrounding the Mediterranean had transformed that sea into a Roman lake. Possibly more sig-



THE ROMAN EMPIRE

nificant for the history of Europe was the extension of Roman rule to the Rhine and the Danube. In Dacia (Roumania), Southern Germany, and along the shore of the North Sea, Rome even pushed beyond these rivers. In this fashion Rome set a permanent stamp upon the civilization of Western Europe. To Rome's northern conquests, too, we must ascribe in large measure the shift in civilization from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.

When we try to analyze the geographic factors which affected the rise of Roman civilization, we must remember that each step in the growth of Roman power brought new factors into operation. In the end we are faced with a problem extending from Scotland in the west to the Euphrates in the east, and from the Sahara desert on the south to the Black forest in the north. We can therefore consider only a few of the important geographic features here.

Italy's backbone is formed by the Apennines, a range of mountains skirting the east coast. Plains suitable for agriculture all lie on the western side of the peninsula. About midway on the western coast is the plain of Latium. Here, on the river Tiber, a few miles from the sea, was Rome. Rome, then, faced westward away from the civilization of the East. Thus it developed culturally much more slowly than Greece, for the Greeks, as we have already seen, were able at all times to borrow largely from the cultures of the Near East. Long after Athens had become the center of an advanced civilization Rome remained an uneducated peasant community, without a literature and without a native art.

Moreover, since Italy faces westward, Rome's first great transmarine enemy was Carthage. With the defeat of Carthage in the first two Punic Wars, Rome became mistress of the western Mediterranean. The importance of this cannot be overestimated, for it meant the ultimate extension of the Greco-Roman civilization westward. Moreover, the central location of Italy in the Mediterranean made it possible for Rome to hold both East and West, and to serve as a medium by which the East came to the West, modified and changed, and then disseminated in all the western provinces by the Latin language. In many of these lands, languages directly descended from Latin are still spoken.

Human factors in Roman culture.—When we come to consider the human factors involved in Roman culture, we are confronted by a medley of racial stocks, each of which contributed something to the ultimate product. During the second millen-

ium B. C., about the time when Aryan invaders were coming into Greece, a closely related group of peoples speaking an Indo-European language came into northern Italy. Settling first in the lake region, they extended from there southward into the Po valley and across the Apennines, until they occupied a large part of the peninsula. When we come down to historical times we find Italy held by many tribes speaking different, though closely related, languages. This group of tribes we call Italian. Latin was the language spoken by the small tribe which occupied the plain of Latium.

The Italians of historical times, however, were probably not pure descendants of the Aryan invaders, for before their advent Italy was inhabited by a Neolithic people of Mediterranean stock, some of whom retreated before the invaders into the mountainous regions to the south or the northwest. Others, however, probably remained and intermarried with the invaders. Just how great the intermixture was it is now difficult to say, but whatever its extent, the Italian element in the peninsula remained so homogeneous that it readily absorbed Latin culture and the Latin language wherever Rome sent her colonists to occupy strategic positions among them. While the Italians were allies of Rome, they served in her armies side by side with the legions; when they became citizens of Rome they were readily amalgamated with their Roman cousins. Thus Roman greatness, to a large degree, was Italian.

The Etruscans, a mysterious people who entered the peninsula later than the Italians, were probably of Anatolian origin. They occupied the region called Etruria, north of the Tiber. They were aliens, speaking a strange language (not even yet deciphered), and their political dominion was that of energetic foreigners exploiting the more numerous native population to secure power and wealth for themselves. When Rome finally overcame Etruria, the Etruscan culture was so firmly established that amalgamation of the Romans and the Etruscans was more difficult than amalgamation of the Romans with other peoples in the Italian regions of the peninsula. Yet the Latinization of Etruria was inevitable. Roman literature owes a great debt to the Etruscan Maecenas, friend of Augustus and patron of Virgil and Horace.

Another alien element in Italy was introduced by the Greek colonies settled in the south. Their influence was varied: they played an important part in the development of Roman art and

literature; they provided ships and trained sailors for Rome's fleets; and they became the merchants and manufacturers of Italy at a time when Rome was wholly engaged in agriculture.

Finally we must mention the Gauls, an Aryan people whose home in historic times was France, Belgium, and Western Germany. They came into Italy during the fourth century B. C., and after driving the Etruscans out of the Po valley, settled there as a more or less constant menace to Italian security. In the course of time, however, Roman colonies propagated Latin civilization in Cisalpine Gaul, and the Roman frontier moved northward to the Alps. By the first century A. D., the inhabitants of the Po valley were scarcely distinguishable from the Romans, for Gauls, both here and in the land beyond the Alps, were readily assimilated and became active agents in spreading and preserving Roman civilization.

Such were the peoples who inhabited Italy in the years of Roman expansion in the peninsula. When Rome became involved in wars beyond the seas, another element entered to affect in greater and greater measure the character of the Roman people. Every military campaign meant the importation of hordes of slaves, and when small peasant farms gave way to great estates, the wealthy land-lords relied more and more upon cheap slave labor, much of it imported from the East. Roman urban households likewise were staffed with servants of this kind. Thus Greeks and Orientals of all types came more and more to swell the urban proletariat and to take the place of native Italian labor in the country. In the course of generations, when manumission had done its work, their descendants became a part of the free population of Italy.

The extension of Roman citizenship.—It is clear from this brief review of the peoples who inhabited the Roman world that racially the term "Roman" changes with the centuries. In republican times, the Roman was, for the most part, a Latin, slightly mixed with the blood of kindred Italian tribes. But as time passed the word lost that significance, for the Roman policy with respect to the granting of citizenship was liberal—much more liberal than that of the city-states of Greece. During her advance to domination in Italy it was not unusual for Rome to admit conquered peoples to full equality of citizen rights, sometimes after a period of probation, sometimes immediately. By the first century B. C. the whole free population of Italy from the Alps to the toe of the boot, including the Gauls of the Po valley, had become Romans. Slaves

also, irrespective of race and origin, were admitted to citizenship upon emancipation. The ease with which a slave could obtain his freedom was a noteworthy feature of Roman life.

During the last years of the Republic and under the Empire, the haven of Roman citizenship was extended to provinces east and west, chiefly to individuals whose wealth or influence or ability made such grants expedient. Thus we find senators of Greek, Oriental, and Gallic origin. The Greek biographer Plutarch, the Athenian philosopher Herodes Atticus, and the Apostle Paul were Romans. Finally, at the beginning of the third century A. D., a grant of citizenship was made to all freemen of the empire.

Greek and Oriental influences in Roman culture.—The first alien influence to affect Latin culture was the Etruscan. In the eighth century B. C., the Etruscans, bent on extending their commercial contacts, occupied Rome and Latium. Thus the Latins were brought under the influence of a higher civilization, which, through commerce, was in constant touch with Greece and Carthage. During the Etruscan domination, and later when Rome herself had interests in Campania, a mixture of Oriental ideas and beliefs began to work upon the simple Latin people. They began to think of their primitive agricultural spirits as gods in the likeness of men, for the Etruscans, following the Greek fashion, had introduced statues of the gods. The Latin gods were now equated with the Greek divinities of Olympus. Thus Jupiter and Juno were worshiped as husband and wife, the Latin counterparts of Zeus and Hera. For these divinities the Etruscans built the first temple in Rome. The Etruscans also taught the Romans how to foretell the future by the entrails of animals and the flight of birds. They taught them how to drain their swamps. They gave them insignia for their magistrates, such as the double-headed axe in the fasces borne by the consuls, a familiar symbol of power in Crete. Greek elements were inextricably mixed with Oriental in this culture, for the alphabet brought to Italy by the Greeks living around the Bay of Naples became eventually the Latin alphabet used by Rome and all of Western Europe today.

Centuries later, Roman conquest and trade, together with the liberality of Roman policy, opened the door wide to the influence of the East. Greeks became the schoolmasters of Rome. They taught the Roman boys Greek language and literature when the Romans were sufficiently trained to appreciate their beauty. They

translated Greek poems for the training of their pupils. They introduced Rome to Greek legends, and they flattered Roman pride by ascribing to Romulus and Remus descent from the Trojan hero Aeneas. Thus belatedly Rome claimed for herself a place in the Homeric legends.

"Conquered Greece took Rome her captor captive," so Horace wrote. By this he meant that Rome's contacts with Greek lands soon convinced thoughtful Romans that Greek culture was far superior to Roman. During the first Punic War (264-241 B. C.), Roman armies were quartered for a time in Sicily. Here the soldiers whiled away their idle moments in Greek cities like Syracuse, learned a little Greek, read the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, went to Greek plays in the theatres, and came home with the idea that Rome was most uncultured. To celebrate the victorious end of the war, Greek plays translated into Latin were produced. Roman literature had begun. In the second century B. C., Roman armies were serving in Greece itself. Philhellenism became the vogue; and thenceforth it became customary to study under Greek masters, either in Rome, or at one of the seats of Greek learning, preferably Athens.

Later, when Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt had been incorporated in the Roman Empire, Rome's direct contact with the Near East began. At first, however, the effect of Oriental civilization upon the upper strata of Roman society was slight, for the culture of the educated classes in Rome's eastern provinces was Greek. Still the advent of Oriental princes and princesses to Rome and constant intercourse between Roman governors and provincials served to inoculate even the aristocracy with Oriental religions and law. Slaves from the Near East, living as nurses and domestic servants in Roman households, likewise exercised an ever-growing influence, particularly upon women and children. As soon as an Oriental group could afford a permanent place of worship, it erected a temple or shrine to the local Oriental deity which it had worshiped at home. Rome then became filled with the meeting places of a multitude of queer religious sects. In time, descendants of manumitted slaves climbed higher and higher in the social scale, and they too exerted a marked effect on Roman society. Thus Paul found an audience in Rome for his Christian teaching. Even relatives of an emperor were charged with adherence to some non-Roman belief. Outside of Rome, the soldiers recruited in the Eastern

provinces were active missionaries for the spread of Oriental cults, just at a time when Christian missionaries were carrying the Gospel to all parts of the Empire.

ROMAN CHARACTERISTICS

What were the distinguishing characteristics of the Roman? Naturally they changed or developed as changing times brought new forces, both material and human, to bear upon him. We possibly think of the Romans as warriors first and last, and of Mars, the god of war, as their patron deity. But to the early Latins Mars was a god of vegetation, an agricultural divinity. It would be much more accurate to think of Romans as peasants cultivating the fields of Latium, for they preserved their peasant psychology for centuries. They were hard-working, practical, unimaginative, egal-minded, conservative, law-abiding, self-reliant, intrepid in the defense of their property, faithful to their allies, devoted to their families, and jealous of their freedom. They early developed a strong feeling for property rights. Their central location, on a plain surrounded by a ring of mountains inhabited by tribes eager to push down into the cultivated land, made their position precarious; and the necessity of military discipline in the face of constant invasions turned them into soldiers. Still it must be remembered that until the end of the second century B. C., when Marius changed the system of recruiting, Rome depended upon her citizen militia to form her legions. The story of Cincinnatus and his plow is symbolic of Rome's peasant armies. Even the nobles were scarcely more than rich peasants until the luxuries of the East made the capital a cosmopolitan center.

One of the chief characteristics of Roman culture was its ability to grow steadily and surely, adapting itself to the needs of the age, and absorbing whatever would assist its growth. Roman law, for example, Rome's greatest contribution to civilization, was itself the outgrowth of long-continued experience with the laws of many nations. In fact, it is hard to say which was the greater, the influence of the provinces on Rome, or the influence of Rome upon the provinces.

No less remarkable than Rome's powers of assimilation was her capacity for civilizing alien races, not by coercive measures but by infiltration and assimilation. Thus Rome Latinized Italy,

and Italy Romanized Spain and Gaul. The Romanization of Gaul is the more remarkable, for Gaul possessed wealth and a culture of its own before Caesar's conquest. Even to the last, when Rome's assimilative power had declined, Roman civilization possessed enough vitality to put its stamp upon the Teutonic invaders, for in the course of time these conquerors were amalgamated and ceased to be German.

Another quality in Roman character was a broad-minded conservatism. Unlike the Greeks, the Romans were averse to experiments and revolutions. From the expulsion of the kings (509 B. C.) to the time of the Gracchi (132 B. C.), there had been no civil war. Instead, by compromise and by recognition of the common interests of conflicting parties, Rome had passed through many serious internal crises. The Roman people possessed a fund of sound common sense which enabled them to build for the future without destroying the work of the past. Thus the government established by Augustus was an attempt to avoid the evils of anarchy which had threatened Rome during the last century of the Republic, without utterly destroying the old system of government. Augustus was a true Roman. He was practical and conservative, well able to understand the needs of the time and to act accordingly. He was not a theorist as were so many of the Greeks.

There was tolerance, too, in Rome's relations with other peoples; a tolerance due in part to her practical mind, and in part to a recognition of the right of every people to adhere to its ancestral customs. This toleration was particularly noticeable in the realms of law and religion. The Romans might try to prevent Romans from practicing foreign rites considered detrimental to morals or discipline, but for the most part they laid no restrictions on aliens. When the emperors persecuted Christians, they did so with no intention of uprooting Christianity as a religion; their purpose rather was to secure the allegiance of individuals whose religious convictions prevented them from doing honor to the emperor in the fashion of the time. The Christians were considered a disintegrating political influence; and Marcus Aurelius, though he was a most conscientious, tolerant, and kind-hearted ruler, was more active in persecuting Christians than his predecessors had been, largely because the state needed the loyal support of its whole population. Thus, despite their persecution of Christians, we can still regard the Romans as a tolerant people. Their tolerance

oward subject peoples undoubtedly played a large part in making them the greatest empire-builders of antiquity, for coupled with the excellence of the culture which Rome had to offer, it explains why the peoples of Western Europe made comparatively little resistance to the infiltration of Roman ideas. Thus it was an important factor in the rapid Romanization which resulted.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ROMAN CIVILIZATION

Agriculture was the dominant concern of the Romans. Until the very end of the Republic (first century B. C.) the Roman governing class was interested in agriculture. The senators and other men of wealth preferred investments in land. In fact, magistrates, provincial governors, and senators were debarred by custom and law from engaging in commerce. Towards the end of the Republic, it is true, there developed a class of business men whose influence became more and more important in determining the policies of Rome, but they were money-lenders, tax-gatherers, and contractors for public works. Commerce, for the most part, remained in the hands of Rome's subjects in the provinces and in the municipalities of Southern Italy.

During the earlier period of the Republic much of the land had been held and worked by small farmers, who, when occasion demanded, fought in the Roman legions. Since they continued to form the backbone of Roman armies even when the legions were campaigning in far distant provinces, the land was gradually drained of its supply of agricultural labor, and a situation arose which contributed to a transformation of Roman farming. The tendency was now toward the displacement of small holders by a class of wealthy proprietors who established themselves in luxurious villas and employed on their extensive estates thousands of slaves captured in war or purchased in the slave markets of the East. Thus began the decay of the free agricultural class. These changes were accompanied by the adoption of Greek scientific agricultural methods. On the large estates olives, fruits, and vines were substituted for grain, hitherto the chief Italian crop; and in many parts of Italy large ranches took the place of farms.

Manufacturing, like commerce, was held in low esteem by the governing classes. If we ignore for the moment certain exceptions, we may describe Roman industry as belonging to the handicraft

stage, carried on under a guild organization in small shops for local consumption. The labor was largely performed by slaves, and this fact accounts in part for the slow industrial progress. But technical skill was highly developed, and in some places special factors stimulated manufacturing and made possible a wide market. Thus the pottery of Arretium was found in all parts of the Empire during the first century B. C.; in Puteoli on the Bay of Naples there was a large metal industry with transmarine markets. Here factory methods were employed, and production was on a large scale. But the ancient Roman world, despite the ease with which one could travel, the peace which reigned within its borders, and the free trade which Rome never tried to break down by the imposition of customs barriers, remained in large measure economically a collection of more or less self-sufficing communities. In other words the cost of producing and distributing inexpensive manufactured products was at no place reduced to the point where one favored district could gain a world monopoly. Manufacturing required little capital; tools were simple and inexpensive; technical skill could be acquired. Thus popular articles could readily be imitated wherever the demand promised a small market.

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ROMAN CULTURE

Roman government outside Italy.—From the time when Rome gained her first province, Sicily (241 B.C.), to the grant of citizenship to provincials in 212 A.D., a sharp distinction was drawn between the government of Italy and that of the provinces. Italy was free soil, not subject to taxation. When Rome entered upon her career of conquest overseas, the Italian cities were independent allies of Rome, bound to her by a system of alliances which secured their rights; before the end of the Republic they had become Roman municipalities with all the rights and privileges of citizenship. In Italy the powers of Roman magistrates were subject to important constitutional limitations designed to prevent abuse of power. Both Romans and Italians were therefore privileged. They were the rulers.

In the provinces, on the other hand, Rome took over the rights and property of the rulers whom she dispossessed, setting up provincial governments modeled on the governments which she found in operation. Where despotism was the rule, Rome assumed

control. Where there were free governments, Rome ordinarily respected the existing system, varying the amount of freedom with local conditions. Thus in many provinces, particularly where Greek city-states existed, free cities exempt from taxation and interference by the governor continued to exist. Athens is a noteworthy example, but countless others could be named. Other cities maintained their own municipal government, paying a stipulated tax collected by themselves to Rome. In general, however, the governor as the representative of Rome was master, a petty king in fact, possessing full judicial, military, and civil authority; and the taxes collected from the subject communities and the rents which came from confiscated public lands of the defeated government were at Rome's disposal. Though each province had a constitution defining its rights and obligations, there was at first no effective check against arbitrary exactions by Roman governors. In the course of time, however, more and more stringent laws were passed to safeguard provincial inhabitants from extortion.

The decline of the city-state.—We must remember that Rome was a city-state which grew into an empire of city-states. But important as was the city-state, both as a factor in ancient civilization and as an integral part of the Roman system of government, Rome created conditions which made its decline inevitable. The first step toward this decline was taken in the early days of the Republic when the boundaries of Rome were extended north and south to include the lands of neighboring peoples. Rome's liberal policy of admitting Italian peoples to citizenship carried with it the seeds of decay; for as the population and territory of a city-state increases, the efficiency of its government tends to decrease. When a city-state embraces the extensive territory of a peninsula like Italy, as Rome did in the last days of the Republic, it is idle to talk about popular sovereignty and democratic government, for the elections and legislative acts of the assemblies represent nothing more than the momentary pleasure of that group of citizens which chance or the political leaders have brought together at the time of voting.

In the case of Rome the result was that government was left more and more to the Senate, a body of wealthy landlords, who spent their lives in political service at home and in the provinces. This body alone was competent, by reason of its political experience and intimate knowledge of the intricate problems of foreign and domestic

affairs, to care for the administrative details of government. By common consent, after popular sovereignty had been gained by the plebeians from the patrician aristocracy, the Senate became the dominant ruling body in Rome, and its members formed a new aristocracy of service to the state.

This arrangement went almost unchallenged until all classes of Romans realized that Rome's political supremacy was an economic asset which could be made to pay dividends. Exploitation of subject peoples then became a serious evil. The poor of Rome wanted cheap grain from the provincial taxes; the wealthy businessmen wanted opportunities to invest money and the privilege of collecting taxes in the provinces; the senatorial nobles learned how to make their governorships profitable. The military problem became acute, for each provincial governor possessed full civil and military power in his own province. He recruited his troops from volunteers, and his soldiers were of course loyal to him alone. Thus there was no longer a unified Roman army and responsible control, for the Senate, divided into factions, was powerless to curb rival leaders backed by military force. So the way was opened for provincial governors like Caesar to seize control of Rome and Italy. Anarchy and civil war were inevitable.

The transition to the Empire.—In order to end this dangerous situation Augustus introduced reforms destined to change the Roman Republic into a monarchy. Realizing that effective government was impossible unless the army could be controlled, he centered military control in one individual—the emperor himself. (The word “emperor” comes from the Latin *imperator*, which means “commander.”) This move was both wise and practical, for long experience had shown that a political body like the Roman Senate was an ineffective instrument in military matters. In other respects, however, Augustus' program of reform tended to be conservative. He revived the old theory that senators were servants of the state, and he, as first citizen of Rome and as the most influential member of the senate, showed them by example that governors must rule for the good of their subjects. For two centuries this ideal remained theoretically in force, for the best emperors were hard-working rulers, holding themselves and the senators to strict accountability, and even many of the worst emperors were stern in the punishment of provincial misgovernment. Thus under the Empire exploitation of the provinces ceased, for a

ime. It began again when Italy and the subject districts of the Empire were brought to a dead level of uniformity.

In the course of this change, more and more authority came to enter in the emperor, and the vitality of the city-state declined. The zeal of the central government and the growing indifference to local affairs which was created by the deadening influence of the imperial system brought about the appointment of imperial supervisors for municipalities. More and more frequently governors and provincial cities referred matters to the emperor for advice; the Roman senate tended to lose its initiative; and bureaucratic government ensued, at first paternalistic, and later, when the problems of government became acute, despotic.

The political history of Rome, therefore, presents at least three well-defined steps. In the first stage, Rome, a city-state, gained and maintained by honesty and fair dealing toward its allies uncontested leadership in a confederation of Italian peoples. In this period Rome's political sagacity developed a well-balanced government resting upon popular sovereignty, a political system suitable for the conditions of the time. In the second stage, democratic Rome gained a vast empire, but her political system broke down because the simple machinery of a government devoted mainly to peace and self-protection was unsuited to the rule of an empire requiring standing armies. The temptation of Roman officials to use for selfish purposes the power concentrated in their hands resulted in the exploitation of Italy and the provinces alike. In the third stage Rome lost her democracy, for the very efforts initiated by Augustus to remedy the abuses of the late years of the Republic led straight to monarchy, to the decay of the tradition of self-government, and to a renewal of Oriental despotism.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROMAN LAW

Early Roman conceptions of law were much like those held by the Greeks in a similar stage of development. Law was the inherited custom of the tribe, unwritten, and limited in scope to the ordinary problems of existence. Little machinery was necessary, for the government gave only a minimum of assistance to individuals in enforcing their claims. Within the family group the *pater familias*, with the advice of the family council, dealt out even-handed justice. The rich patricians advised and assisted their clients,

tenants, and poorer neighbors, who in turn were bound to support their patrons. Crimes were few, and permanent criminal courts were established only a short time before the end of the Republic. Civil suits sufficed for the settlement of disputes about land, the collection of debts, and the awarding of compensation for loss of life or limb or for the destruction of property in personal quarrels. When a decision had been rendered, the parties to the suit were left to make final settlement. In many cases the responsibility of the government ceased when it had invoked the gods to bring penalties upon the aggressor.

The growth of Roman written law.—In the fifth century B. C. this unwritten law became more and more uncertain in its operation for the patrician magistrates, who alone presided over the courts, were likely to interpret the law as best suited the interests of their own class. Moreover, life had become more complicated, and the old customs were no longer adequate. The first scientific reform of the Roman legal code resulted—the compilation of the Twelve Tables, a work which showed Rome's willingness to learn from her more experienced neighbors. A commission was sent to Greece to consult the Delphic oracle—but in general the Tables did not strike out into new fields; they embodied, rather, ancient Roman customs. They continued in use for more than two and a half centuries.

Another important step in the development of Roman law followed the establishment of the praetorship, an office primarily judicial in its scope. Hitherto the consuls, with a few minor officials had been competent to handle the business of state, to command the armies, to preside over the courts, and to care for the administration of other matters which the simple needs of the community placed in their hands. But in the fourth century B. C. the newly created praetors relieved the consuls of their judicial tasks and introduced a greater degree of specialization into the administration of justice. They now presided over the civil courts, and the creation of the great body of Roman Civil Law was due to them. They were little hampered by legislative acts. The basis of Roman law continued to be ancient custom as embodied in the Twelve Tables but when precedent failed to take into consideration factors that developed with the complexity of business, the praetors could apply new principles based on equity rather than on custom and law. Finally, it became customary for the praetor who was in charge of

suits between Roman citizens—the *Praetor Urbanus*, as he was called—to draw up each year a statement of legal principles which would be used by him in the settlement of disputes. In this way, as succeeding praetors made changes and additions, Roman law grew continually and steadily, discarding obsolete rules, and replacing them with others more suitable. On these praetors' edicts was based the codification of civil law which was undertaken during the Empire.

Rome, however, was too broad-minded to think it necessary to settle all disputes according to her own local customs. A second praetor, the *Praetor Peregrinus*, presided over suits arising between aliens in Rome, or between aliens and citizens. In his court, justice was rendered in accordance with the customs of the people who were parties to the suit. Rome thus became acquainted with a wide variety of customs or laws, and since many of these were conflicting, principles of equity were often substituted for law. The opportunity to compare their own customs with those of alien peoples gave the Romans a basis of knowledge of great value in amending their own laws. This was specially true when the Empire brought about fusion between East and West. Thus the Law of Nations tended to supersede the Law of the City (Civil Law), and both in turn were affected by the Law of Nature which the Stoic philosophers emphasized.

The Justinian Code and its descent to modern times.—Under the Empire, as the functions of the Emperors grew, the administration of law came to be more and more the province of the central imperial government. The highest legal authorities were the commanders of the *Praetorian Guard*, many of whom were jurists. Note—for example, Ulpian, who did much for the adaptation of Civil Law to the needs of the Empire. Finally, when the law lost its vitality and had ceased to grow, Justinian (527–565) through his ministers condensed and codified the large mass of existing legal literature. It was thus rendered suitable for preservation until later generations in the mediæval ages felt the need of learning what Roman experience had to teach them. In the universities of the Middle Ages, Roman law was one of the most popular studies. It is still the basis of many European codes, and directly or indirectly has affected the development of all modern systems of law, including international law.

ROMAN RELIGION

In their religious experiences the Romans passed through several stages, each one corresponding with a period in their cultural and political history.

Early Roman religion.—Originally there was little correspondence between the divinities of Rome and those Olympian Gods of Greece with whom their names and identities were coupled in later times. The early Latins were simple peasants, and their religion was associated with their farms and simple firesides; it was animistic, not anthropomorphic; that is to say, it was a belief in a physical world moved by spirits, not a belief in gods with human attributes. Janus was the spirit who watched over the doorway; Vesta the spirit of the fire on the hearth. The Penates guarded the family cupboard; the household Lar was the spirit of the family fortune. The Genius of the family came later to be regarded as a sort of double of the master of the house, and with the Genius there was a Juno for the master's wife. The spirits of the deceased were held down into a shadowy underworld, and in their memory were held festivals of propitiation designed to ward off evil influences which they might otherwise exert. Most of the early festivals were connected with sowing, harvesting, and other activities of an agricultural people.

In addition to the religion of the household, there was an official cult; for the gods of the Romans, like those of the Greeks, were regarded as members of the community. In this cult the primitive sky god of the Aryans, Jupiter, came to be regarded as supreme; associated with him were Juno and Minerva, the trinity for whom the first Roman temple was built. In this public religion, the priests were state officials chosen from the body of citizens to see that the gods were honored according to the ritual which had been handed down from earliest times, a ritual that had lost its meaning and had become unintelligible to the Romans long before Cicero's day. Much of it had originally been designed to bring agricultural wealth to the Roman state.

The influences of outside contacts.—The second period in religious development began when the Romans were brought into contact with the more advanced cultures of the Etruscans and the Greeks. Having no mythology of their own, they borrowed from Greek myths and identified their own gods with Greek divinities.

They now built temples, and erected statues of the gods. Later, when the Romans came into contact with Greek philosophy, they gradually lost their early religious faith, and by the end of the republic the state religion had little meaning for educated Romans. Among the peasants, however, the old agricultural animism still continued.

The third stage in Roman religion was a product of the Empire. Rome now was no longer a primitive agricultural community. It embraced the whole of the civilized world, and its inhabitants were gathered from all countries subject to it. Thus foreign religious influences were increasingly powerful; their effect was felt (1) in the lives of the people, and (2) in the establishment of the imperial cult.

The early Christian Era was an age when people were eagerly seeking some form of personal religion that would bring salvation, purification from sins, atonement, and assurance of a life in the world to come happier than that of this world. In this atmosphere many of the old cults of the Near East, purified of their grosser elements, found adherents and flourished, for they promised hope and consolation to the weak and oppressed. The Great Mother of Anatolia, Isis of Egypt, Mithras of Persia, and many others, each made its appeal to the Roman world and found widespread acceptance. In competition with these pagan cults sprung from the Near East, Christianity, another Eastern religion, was able, because of the devotion of its adherents and the assurance of its promises, to secure so strong a foothold that Constantine enrolled it as an ally in his struggle to gain control of the Roman Empire. When Constantine triumphed, Christianity also triumphed. It became the accepted religion, first of the court, and then of the many who had hitherto resisted its purely religious appeal.

Side by side with the growth of personal religions among the masses in the Roman Empire there was developed a new state cult, universal in its scope. In the Hellenistic Age a ruler cult had developed out of a mixture of Greek and eastern ideas and practices. Since philosophers had recognized in each mortal man a spark of divinity, and since rulers were far superior to ordinary men in power, it was not hard for the Greeks to regard men like Alexander the Great as gods incarnate. The Eastern tendency to look upon kings as gods or ministers of the gods was operative too. Thus when Rome fell heir to the dominions of the Hellenistic monarchs and

became acquainted with Hellenistic peoples, the Romans easily combined their own belief in a personal Genius with Eastern ideas. Even before the time of Caesar and Augustus, individual Roman generals operating in Greece had been honored with statues and altars. Thus the world over which Rome ruled was prepared to honor the emperors and members of their families as more than human. Augustus, knowing that public sentiment in Italy disapproved of giving worship to living men, tried to avoid criticism by refusing to accept divine honors in Rome and Italy. In the provinces, however, loyalty to the emperor tended to take the form of worship.

The imperial cult was therefore a form of patriotism, giving an opportunity to provincial magnates to show their loyalty and devotion to the head of the Empire. Religious festivals of great magnificence were established in his honor. In Rome the simple ceremonies connected with the cult—libations to the Genius of the emperor and vows for his health and preservation—were analogous to the symbolic homage which we pay to our flag. In an age of polytheism and philosophic pantheism, the imperial cult would be religiously unobjectionable, except to those who regarded the worship of pagan divinities as disloyalty to the Christian God. Such recusants could not see that the essence of the cult was political, not religious. To them pagan divinities were none the less real because they were false. Christianity became a crime against the state, not because its positive religious teachings were objectionable but because Christians manifested a disloyalty to the emperor when they obstinately refused to take part in the imperial cult. Persecution after persecution resulted.

ROMAN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

To philosophy and science Rome made few contributions, although some Romans did devote themselves to the study of the philosophies of the Greeks. Cicero's writings have preserved for us much information about Greek philosophy. More inspired was the Epicurean Lucretius. His attack on superstition, presented with missionary zeal and poetic fervor in a poem on the *Nature of Things*, was based on the thesis that scientific laws govern the course of nature. He discussed such things as evolution, the indestructibility of matter, and the atomic theory.

Epicureanism, however, was not a popular philosophy among the Romans. More to their taste was Stoicism, for its teachings were of practical value to a people destined to govern the world, and Stoic virtues were those which Rome had cultivated of old. During the second century A. D., the Stoic ideal of kingship was exemplified in the lives of the five Good Emperors. According to this ideal the emperors were the first servants of the state, chosen because of their fitness and training for the work which they had to do. In his *Meditations*, a little volume still popular today, Marcus Aurelius, the last emperor of this line, left to posterity his comments on Stoic morality. It is not surprising then, to find that the institutions of the Roman Empire, especially Roman Law, were imbued with Stoic ideals. The doctrine of natural law and natural right, as written into Roman Law by Stoic lawyers, has been preserved to our time; it is embodied in such documents as the American Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.

Roman education.—Since the Romans as a people were not philosophically inclined, scientific studies played little part in their education. Still, Roman education followed Greek models; and many Greeks had considered a knowledge of elementary mathematics and astronomy as an essential part of their training. But in the development of the curriculum, as in other things, Rome modified and adapted the technique learned from the Greeks. Since the chief business of a Roman was government, whether at Rome as magistrate or senator, or in the provinces commanding troops and administering justice, the Roman curriculum aimed at preparation for public life. Boys should learn how to speak and to write; hence they were taught language—both Greek and Latin—a study that included grammar, rhetoric; and literature, supplemented by dialectics or logic. During the period of the Empire, schools became widespread; in the West, those of Gaul were famous at the time when the barbarian tribes were overrunning the frontiers. These schools continued for generations to follow the old traditions of education; out of their curricula grew the standard education of the Middle Ages.

ROMAN ARCHITECTURE AND ART

The Romans possessed orderly and logical minds. To this fact may be ascribed their preëminence in law; to it also may be ascribed the essential qualities of their architectural achievements. The

towns which they laid out—some of which still stand in the Sahara as deserted monuments of the prosperity which Roman engineers brought to Northern Africa—had straight, well paved streets, and broad market places surrounded by shops and public buildings. They would be a credit to any age. The Romans were practical builders. They built for use and permanence—aqueducts, baths, temples, and public buildings. During the days of the Empire, Rome's water supply was better than it has been at any time since, except possibly in very recent years. Athens, until a short time ago, depended for her water almost exclusively upon an aqueduct built by the Roman Emperor Hadrian. It is obvious, too, that the Romans took delight in the great size of the structures they erected. In this respect we in America resemble them. Possibly we resemble them also in laying greater emphasis upon engineering than upon architecture.

The Greeks influenced Roman building at all times: Roman temples, like the Greek, were rectangular in shape; Roman columns were of the ornate Corinthian order. But the Romans used round arches and vaults more freely than did the Greeks, and they used brick, tiles, and concrete in place of stone. The marble Rome, of which Augustus is said to have boasted, was really a brick core covered with marble facing. This is typical of Roman work—ornament was applied to buildings; it was not an integral part of their structure. Yet Rome has always been a school for architects. Its basilicas, with central naves and lower aisles, became the model for early churches. Its vaulted buildings were the inspiration of the Romanesque churches, and from them descended the Gothic cathedrals. Byzantine architecture owes much to Rome; and Renaissance Europe was charmed by the simplicity of the Roman buildings which had survived.

Great builders are ordinarily not great artists, and the Romans were no exception to this rule. They owed much to the Greeks, in art as in other fields, and doubtless much of Roman art was produced by Greeks. There is no doubt, however, about Roman appreciation of Greek art, for the museums are filled with Roman copies of Greek sculpture found on Italian soil, and ancient records tell of the immense number of ancient statues taken by Roman generals and emperors to adorn their Italian palaces. But Roman sculpture was not Greek. It possessed qualities which were characteristic of Rome's greatness. One of its qualities was realism, a

realism which makes the busts of Roman generals and emperors almost live again for us. This is apparent in the reliefs on the triumphal arches, and particularly those on the column of Trajan, giving a pictorial record of that emperor's Dacian Wars. There is a dignity in Roman work, so well illustrated in the reliefs on the Augustan Altar of Peace. We see Roman family pride and affection, calm and restrained. When the Romans turned to symbolism, the same calm restraint is apparent, as may be seen from a relief which represents the Goddess Rome surrounded by the blessings which Roman peace had brought to the world.

ROMAN LITERATURE

Great as was the literary debt of Rome to Greece, still in the field of literature, as in art, the Romans impressed their own personality upon what they borrowed. In the closing years of the Republic, Catullus, schooled in Hellenistic verse, wrote love poetry so genuine and so beautiful as to give to Rome a place in literature. Cicero's orations, letters, and essays are expressions of Rome's spirit, as it appeared in the courts, the forum, the Senate, and the lives of educated Romans who were conscious of their Roman birth and traditions even when most under the influence of Greek civilization. For pure literary objectivity, Caesar's account of his Gallic campaigns is hard to equal. These men made the Latin language a serviceable medium for the writers of the Augustan Age.

To the age of Augustus belongs Virgil, the poet who gave again to epic poetry the breath of life. His *Aeneid* is not a mere feeble imitation of Homer and of the Hellenistic epic from which the love motif was taken. It is a glorification of Rome and of the Julian family. Pious Aeneas is typical of Roman manhood, devoted to the memory of his ancestors, and loyal to the commands of duty. Rome called, and the citizen served. Livy's prose history was as much an object lesson in Roman virtues as it was an historic account of Rome's past. In the poems of Horace we see a Roman gentleman, polished and urbane, fond of ease, and possessed of humor to the point where it was hard for him to take life seriously; yet underneath this exterior we can distinguish in the poems of Horace the deep religious feeling of the Roman peasant, his love for the soil, his longing for peace, and his loyalty to the man who had ended war.

Of the writers of the Empire we can mention only a few: Juvenal,

in whose hand satire, a peculiarly Roman literary form, was perfected; Tacitus, whose historical writings show us the early Roman emperors; the African Apuleius, in whose romantic tales oriental influence becomes dominant; and the Church Fathers whose theological writings lead straight to the Middle Ages. Latin remained living tongue for centuries, and the influence of the pagan Latin literature which escaped the fanaticism of the Church cannot be calculated. St. Augustine was ashamed of his fondness for Virgil, but Virgil lived to become both a Christian prophet and a magician. In the Middle Ages his books were a favorite means of ascertaining the future. A German nun wrote plays in imitation of Terence; and when Italy became interested again in her pagan past, the Italian humanists were prouder of their ability to imitate the prose of Cicero or the poetry of Virgil than of their Italian works which have made them famous.

THE ROMAN CONTRIBUTION TO MODERN CIVILIZATION

The numerous contributions of Rome to modern civilization have been specifically mentioned in the course of this chapter. It is not necessary to repeat them here. Every important phase of Roman culture has left some mark upon the modern world. In politics and law, religion, economic life, education, philosophy, literature, architecture, and other phases of art we are indebted to ancient Rome. The whole can be summed up in a sentence: Rome acted as a medium by which her own civilization, the philosophy, science, and art of the Greeks, and the varied cultures of the East, including Christianity, were passed on to the West, and thence to us, by direct descent through the Middle Ages and by imitation after the Renaissance. With this significant thought in mind we approach the study of medieval culture.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE CULTURE OF THE MIDDLE AGES

IN OUR survey of the ancient Mediterranean world we have covered a span of some five thousand years, from the dawn of history to the collapse of Roman civilization in the West in the fifth century A. D. Of this span, the Greeks occupy, roughly, five and a half centuries, counting only to the time when the Greek world fell under the dominion of Rome; while Roman civilization covers somewhat less than a thousand years, if we reckon from the beginnings of Rome's long conquest of Italy. The barbarian invasions and the ruin of Roman civilization, following the overthrow of the last Roman emperor in the West in 476 A. D., constitute a turning point in history. The period which follows, of approximately a thousand years, is called the Middle Ages.

The Middle Ages and the Renaissance.—Where do the Middle Ages end? The answer is not simple. By 1300, and even earlier, medieval culture was undergoing changes so pronounced that students have seen fit to regard the three centuries following, that is, from 1300 to 1600, as a transition to modern times. The interval is called the Renaissance. Somewhere within this interval the medieval period comes to a close; as to just where, there is considerable disagreement. The capture of Constantinople by the Turks, in 1453, has been considered a convenient turning point by some historians; the discovery of America in 1492, by others; the beginning of the Reformation in 1519, by still others. We shall not attempt to set an arbitrary date, but shall merely state that somewhere between 1300 and 1600 the characteristic features of the Middle Ages fade out sufficiently to justify our saying that the period is at an end. We shall say little of the margin overlapping the Renaissance.

Though we speak of the Renaissance as a transition to modern times, we must not depreciate the contribution of the centuries preceding the fourteenth in the making of modern civilization.

Society did not stand still for a thousand years. In a sense the whole period from the fifth to the seventeenth century might be regarded as a transition to the modern age. But during a considerable part of that time European society might be thought of as passing through a new period of its nonage, when the barbarism of the Teutonic invaders and the decadence of the Roman population combined to incapacitate men for the appreciation or utilization of the fruits of the Greco-Roman-Oriental culture. Only after a long interval of probation and preparation did society reach that full stature in experience and intellectual equipment which enabled it at last to turn a comprehending and appreciative eye upon the splendid achievements of the past and to appropriate them to its use and advancement. That probation did not begin with the fourteenth century; it was a cumulative experience slowly generating the energy which burst into bloom during the Renaissance.

The medieval world.—The geographical limits of the medieval world were not constant. They advanced as the civilizing forces of the Mediterranean penetrated ever deeper into the surrounding regions of barbarism. It is perhaps defensible to identify medieval civilization with Christendom, for the Christian Church furnished the machinery, the energy, and the zeal by which medieval civilization was spread. But Christian civilization once established did not everywhere maintain itself. A militant Mohammedanism, coming out of the East, drove deep wedges in Christendom and established lasting enclaves of oriental culture, which we are forced to include as disturbing but vitalizing areas in the medieval world. Thus our medieval map presents contrasting shades of culture, the Christian and the Mohammedan.

We shall follow the dominant currents of Christianity first. By the close of the sixth century, Christendom was practically identical with the Roman Empire at its height. The fringe of the Sahara was the southern limit of the Christian world. To the north the Rhine, the Danube, and the Black Sea formed a natural boundary. At the extreme east, the boundary slanted diagonally southwestward from the western shores of the Caspian to the upper waters of the Red Sea. In the Continental West, the Atlantic was the natural frontier. In the British Isles Christianity had triumphed where the Roman legions had failed, and Scotland, Ireland, the extreme western part of England, and Wales had been won; only

in Eastern and Central England had paganism temporarily driven Christianity back with the conquests of the still unconverted Angles and Saxons. By the beginning of the ninth century Christianity had crossed the Rhine and Danube and penetrated as far north-eastward as the river Elbe, and the whole of the British Isles was Christian. By the close of the thirteenth century practically all of Europe had fallen under the sway of the Greek or the Roman cross; only in northeastern Russia, northern Finland, and the extreme north of the Scandinavian peninsula were the peoples of Europe still outside the pale of Christianity.

In the meantime, Christianity had had to give way in the East and the Southwest before the advancing forces of Mohammedanism. In the Near East a new religion had arisen in the hitherto stagnant society of the Arabs. Like an electric shock it galvanized the Arabian tribes into thought and action. In the seventh century Mohammedanism swept over Arabia, Syria, and Persia, thus driving in the eastern frontiers of Christendom. Then turning westward across northern Africa, it conquered the whole of the Christian land in that area. In the eighth century Arabs and Berbers crossed into Spain, and before long they had penetrated France as far as the river Loire. There at a notable battle near Tours (732) they were defeated and checked. From then on the retreat of Mohammedanism in the West began, but not until the close of the medieval period were the invaders finally driven from Spain by the Christian forces; in northern Africa Mohammedans still remain.

Had it not been for the stout resistance of the Christians in the East, the Arabian tide would have entered Europe in that quarter as well. The danger became more grave in the eleventh century, when a new Mohammedan foe appeared in Asia Minor. The newcomers were the Seljuk Turks, a barbarous Asiatic people, who showed as little appreciation for the Arabian as for the Christian civilization of the East. Before the close of the century they had pushed their conquests to the walls of Constantinople. It was this threat to Christian power that set going a militant Christianity to wage the prolonged conflict known as the Crusades. The Christian dyke held until the fourteenth century, when still more dangerous enemies appeared, namely, the Ottoman Turks, who swept into the Balkan peninsula, and in the fifteenth century took Constantinople itself, a strategic post which they have held ever since. Mohammedanism had again penetrated Europe.

THE PEOPLES OF THE MEDIEVAL WORLD

The Arabs exerted an important influence upon medieval culture, as we shall see presently. Just now we are interested in the peoples of the medieval Christian world. Of these, one major group is already well known to us, the medley of peoples who made up the populations of the Roman Empire. It was the newcomers who introduced unknown elements into the social compound and exerted an important influence in forming the new cultural product. Chief among these were the Teutonic peoples who swarmed over the western Roman lands, or remained north and east of the Rhine-Danube frontier to lay the foundations of the Teutonic states. Of others who played a rôle in medieval society we shall later give brief consideration to two—the Slavs and the Celts.

The Teutonic peoples.—We have seen how groups of the Indo-European family made their way into the Near East, into the Greek world, and into Italy, where they played a conspicuous part in the building of the civilizations of those lands. The invading Teutons were also a branch of the Indo-European peoples. They belonged to the Nordic race and were the direct ancestors of the Scandinavians, Danes, Germans, Austrians, and Dutch of our own time. Much Teutonic blood also runs in the veins of the English, the Flemish, and the Swiss. Physically, these newcomers contrasted sharply with the shorter and darker Mediterranean stock. They were powerfully built, tall, fair-haired, and blue-eyed.

In the development of culture the Teutons were backward. Cut off for centuries from the quickening currents of the Mediterranean civilizations, and living in more or less isolated groups in the northern forests, they had advanced slowly. They had reached the Iron Age and knew the use of metals, but they had no writing. Their culture was essentially like that of other peoples of the same stage of advancement. They lived in small villages; they herded, hunted, and practiced some simple agriculture. They had their vices; they were much given to quarreling, gambling, and sloth. They had their virtues too; they were brave in war, placed a high value upon truth and loyalty, and possessed a passion for liberty. Politically they had not advanced beyond a tribal organization; their law was local custom. Of art, science, and philosophy they knew nothing in the Greek or Roman sense.

Their homeland has been a matter of some dispute. It is prob-

able that they once occupied the region about the southern end of the Baltic, and from there moved toward the southwest and the southeast. As early as the second century A. D. they began to threaten the Roman Empire. From time to time thousands were admitted across the Rhine-Danube frontier, to become soldiers in the Roman legions; in the course of time they were assimilated and lost their German identity. In the fourth century, the Teutons driven hard against the Roman frontier by a fierce Asiatic people the Huns, were permitted to cross the Danube in large numbers. From then on, successive waves of Teutonic peoples overflowed the Empire and, as we have seen, in the fifth century put an end to the Empire in the West. They encountered a civilization already disintegrating and added their influence to hasten its barbarization.

For several centuries subsequent to the fall of Rome the Mediterranean area was disturbed and terrorized at intervals by raiding or migrating bands of Teutons coming from still farther north—from the Danish or the Scandinavian peninsula. Thus there was a new set-back to the development of civilization in the regions affected. These marauders from the North also took to the sea: they settled in Normandy; they established themselves in England and Ireland.

The Teutonic peoples were to play a conspicuous part in the building of medieval and modern civilization. Barbarians though they were when they first came into contact with the Mediterranean culture, they possessed great capacity to learn, and steadily rose in the scale of civilization. They displayed marked ability in social organization and government; they excelled in the practical arts; they made notable contributions in literature, music, science, and philosophy. To the decadent populations of southern Europe moreover, they made a distinct contribution by the introduction of a new strain of blood that invigorated the races of the ancient world.

Effect of the Latin culture on the Teutons.—The influx of Germanic peoples did not destroy completely the continuity of Roman civilization. The invaders clung to many of their customs locally; but they were unable to give a Teutonic cast to the lands they invaded, and ultimately they amalgamated with the Latin populations and lost their identity, except as here and there the physical characteristics of the Nordic crop out in Mediterranean lands; Latin culture, though weakened and barbarized, predominated. In Italy the Latin influence was strongest. Here the

Latin language persisted, corrupted into Italian; Roman law, education, literature, and Roman ways held as by a thread but did not give way. In the Roman provinces, where we should expect Latin culture to be less potent, much of the old survived. In France, for example, despite the great influx of Germans, it was Romance, and not a German, tongue that evolved. Roman Christianity, Roman laws, Roman institutions and customs continued to dominate. Here the ultimate result, as one authority has expressed it, was neither German nor altogether Latin, but a culture which was later to be styled French. In Spain results were similar.

The history of the Germanic tribes that remained north of the Roman frontier was quite different. The German lands to the north had never been conquered. Augustus had once tried to push the Roman frontier to the Elbe but had failed. Thus the Latinizing of the northern peoples had never been effected. The German blood strain remained essentially German; the language remained German. Similar was the situation in the British Isles. A portion of the Islands,—what was later to be England—was, to be sure, conquered by Rome, and the population was to a degree Latinized; but with the invasions of the Anglo-Saxons in the fifth century the Roman culture was completely wiped out, and England like the German lands was to preserve her Anglo-Saxon language and was to build her culture in the English mold and in the English spirit.

The Slavs.—The Slavic groups constituted another element in the medieval world. Slavic blood predominates among the populations of Russia, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and the Balkan countries outside Greece. These too speak an Indo-European language, but racially they differ from the Teutons and the Celts, being mainly Alpine. Vast in numbers, the Slavs were for the most part too far removed from the Mediterranean area to advance as fast as peoples farther south, and they played a less important part during the medieval period.

The Celts.—The Celts were a smaller group. They were the ancestors of many of the Irish, Scotch, and Welsh, and of the inhabitants of Brittany in France. They represent still another branch of the Indo-European family, similar to the Teutons in racial characteristics and probably related to them. Despite their limited number, they possessed qualities that enabled them to play a conspicuous part in history, both in the medieval and in the modern period.

THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH AS A FACTOR IN MEDIEVAL CULTURE

Such were the peoples who made up the human compound of the medieval world, save in the Greek lands of the southeast, which can be more conveniently treated later. Just now our attention shifts to the problem of examining the chief forces which were to stamp a peculiar and distinctive character upon the civilization of the Middle Ages. The Roman Church was such a force. Of the religious function of the Church we shall have little to say in this chapter, since the subject will be treated in detail later.¹ Here we are more interested in the Church as a medium of civilization in aspects other than religious.

The Christian Church dominated medieval society as no other institution did. It was the one institution in the Roman structure that stood intact against the disintegrating influences of a decadent Roman society and the tide of barbarian invasion. It came to absorb to a remarkable degree the interests of the Roman people, as their earlier interests and activities weakened and disappeared with the decay of earlier Roman institutions. In other words, the Church came to fill a void that was created when the rich and active life of the old Roman world receded from men's experience. With the fall of the Empire in the West, the disappearance of old landmarks together with the miseries and perplexities attending the invasions heightened the influence of the Church, picturing, as the latter did, a release from a painful earthly existence and the achievement of an everlasting happiness in a paradise beyond the grave. This power the Church wielded, to be sure, by virtue of its unique position as the sole instrumentality whereby man might assure himself of salvation. But, as we shall see presently, the influence of the Church was not religious alone; it made its presence felt decisively in all the important activities of medieval society, temporal as well as spiritual.

Roman influence on the Church organization.—The effectiveness of the Church in the exercise of its power is to be explained partly by the remarkable organization which it built up. Under the guiding genius of the Roman for government and administration Christendom took on something of the face and feature of the Roman Empire itself. No longer able to find expression for that

¹See Chapter XXXVII.

genius in the service of the Roman state, men sought an outlet in the service of the Church which had arisen on the foundations of the Empire and which, in some respects, preserved the continuity of the Empire in the medieval world. There was some similarity in the underlying conception of both Church and Empire; the Roman conceived a world state which should extend the beneficent rule of Rome to all men; the Christian conceived a brotherhood of man joined together by the holy bonds of Mother Church. The one aimed at worldly achievement, a fullness of life under law, order, and the Roman peace; the other sought, from the point of view of the Christian, a higher goal, a spiritual one, the disciplining of man in holy living in preparation for eternal life.

This parallel between Church and Empire may be carried further. Rome, the Eternal City, center and capital of the Roman world, was fittingly appropriated as the center and capital of the Christian world—God's kingdom on earth, the earthly expression of the eternal kingdom of heaven. The Emperor, autocrat of all the Romans, gave way to the Roman pontiff or pope, autocrat of all the Christians in the West. The Roman law, which had bound all citizens of the Roman world, was modified and appropriated to the use of the Church to bind the populations of Christendom. It was now canon law, and was administered by the clergy in the courts of the Church. The Latin language, which had made a conquest of the whole Empire, save in some eastern parts, where Greek persisted, became the universal official language of the Roman Catholic Church. After the adoption of Christianity as the state religion of Rome in the fourth century, the administrative system of the Church had been deliberately coördinated with the administrative system of the Empire—almost completely so in the East, not so fully in the West. Part of that system the medieval Church retained in the East; particularly was this true of the Roman municipality which the Church found admirably adapted to the administrative purposes of the diocese. Here the bishop, the most important administrative officer, established his official residence; the cathedral church was the bishop's church, and only those municipalities that contained cathedrals were called cities. Finally, Rome had used the sword to extend her power. Lay members of the Church used the same weapon in the initial process of converting pagans into Christians, and the militant Church itself sometimes used armies for its purposes. The real legions of the Church, however, were

certain monastic orders. These used no lethal weapons, but with tremendous missionary zeal they waged unceasing war against paganism.

Roman culture preserved by the Christian Church.—From the foregoing it is evident that certain elements of Roman culture were woven into the very fabric of the Church. Those elements continued to live in the body of the institution, and the Church carried them wherever it established itself as an influence upon the community. This point is worth closer examination. The conception of a universal Church helped to preserve the Roman idea of a universal empire, as the political counterpart of the universal Church; and that idea, as we shall see, exerted a profound influence upon the political history of Europe during medieval and modern times. So far as the Catholics of the world are concerned the ideal of a world-wide brotherhood has never lost its force. It cannot be said that Roman law would have been lost to the world had the Church not preserved some of its principles in the canon law, but it can truly be said that the universal use of the canon law throughout Christendom promoted study of the Roman law and familiarity with its administration, until a later recovery of the Justinian Code gave Europe a deeper and more accurate understanding.

Again, the Latin language, which was the universal language of the scholar, was, along with Greek, the key which unlocked the hidden treasures of Greek and Latin culture when Europe intellectually awoke to their merit in the closing centuries of the Middle Ages. It was the Church which carried the Latin language throughout Western Europe and kept it alive. This remains true even though it became necessary for the scholars of a later period to purge the Latin of impurities before it became an effective instrument. Classical literature, science, and philosophy were likewise preserved by churchmen; in fragments, to be sure, and sometimes distorted by the all-pervading influence of theology; nevertheless the service is not to be completely discounted. Such were some of the most conspicuous elements of Roman culture which the Church passed on to become a part of medieval civilization.

The temporal influence of the Church.—It has already been suggested that the Church became involved in all of the important activities of medieval life. The situation came about, at least in the beginning, more by accident than design. As *Pontifex Maxi*

us the Roman emperor exercised authority over the church. In the exercise of his powers the emperor did not always discriminate between civil and spiritual service; members of the clergy were sometimes called to officiate in the courts and to perform other lay services. With the collapse of government after the barbarian invasions, more and more of the functions of government fell from the weakening hands of the state and were from time to time taken up by the Church. The Church kept open courts, acted as mediators between the victorious invaders and Rome, and even led armies in defense of the Empire. Thus in a disintegrating society the Church stepped into the breach, and became deeply involved with the temporal affairs of the people.

The Church was a political as well as a religious institution. The pope was not merely the head of the religious world of the West; he became the lay head of the states of the Church in Central Italy, which he ruled like any other prince. In the beginning the Church had adhered to the ideal of a Church independent of the state. Later it came to assert, on the analogy of the superiority of the spiritual over the temporal, the supremacy of the Church over the state. According to that theory princes were subject to the pope and accountable to him as trustees for the just rule of their subjects. The pope asserted the right to decide in controversies between princes, and did so decide on a number of occasions. He asserted, also, the right to absolve the subjects of princes from obedience, or even to depose princes, as disciplinary measures. It was the actual exercise of authority in these matters that led to a long and bitter struggle between Church and State during the Middle Ages.

The temporal authority of the Church exhibited itself in other ways. It had come into possession of from one-fourth to one-third of the occupied land of Western Europe. These lands were a source of wealth to the Church. They were held to be exempt from taxation by the prince within whose dominion the lands lay, except as the clergy granted free gifts to him. At the same time the Church enjoyed the privilege of laying taxes upon the faithful throughout Christendom. Church revenues were used to support the administrative system and to maintain the magnificent papal establishment in Rome. To its power to tax must be added its authority in the administration of the canon law. Into the ecclesiastical courts were drawn not only questions of religion but what we should call civil cases as well—cases growing out of usury, litigation over sworn

contracts, the probating of wills, questions of divorce, and the like. The clergy were themselves privileged to be tried only in the courts of the Church, where penalties were comparatively light. And we must not overlook the great influence which churchmen frequently possessed in the councils of ruling princes, who chose them for high places, largely because they were the only educated class available until the later Middle Ages.

The influence of the monks.—Finally, the work of the monks in promoting the advance of culture should be considered. The ascetic ideal of medieval Christianity—the idea that man might best promote the spiritual life by withdrawal from a sinful and corrupting world—led finally to the monastic establishments. Often enough the monks grew soft, indolent, and worldly; but at their best the monasteries became vitalizing centers of industry. One English writer has called them “Christian industrial colonies.” Because hard labor tested religious zeal and disciplined the flesh, the monks frequently chose unpromising situations for their establishments. They drained swamps, cleared the land, and laid out fields, gardens, orchards, and vineyards. In the art of agriculture they were the furthest advanced of all, and they taught their improved methods to the peasants about them. They were likewise advanced in industry and did much to preserve mechanical skills which might easily have been lost to the medieval world. In an age when communities were well-nigh isolated, they built roads and repaired bridges. As the only hostelrys of the time, the monasteries entertained the travelers passing about Europe and became clearing houses for gossip and news, thus fostering the exchange of ideas.

Also important as a civilizing force was the intellectual labor of the monks. But for their industry in copying manuscripts, many a document of priceless value to later historians and much of classical literature would have been lost. In education, too, the influence of the monks was decisive. In the last centuries of the Roman Empire schools were established in all the larger municipalities, but with the invasions they largely disappeared in the West, and schools might well have passed from men’s memories had not the Church added to its other services the function of education. In this field the monasteries were among the most important centers. In the seventh and eighth centuries when churchmen sought to provide textbooks for the purpose, it is interesting to notice that they turned to the Roman models; the “seven liberal arts” came to comprise

the materials for the educational process: the *trivium*, consisting of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic or logic; and the *quadrivium*—arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music—then itself a form of mathematical study. What the monks preserved in these fields was meager enough, and it was still more meager as compared with the Greek conception of the “liberal arts,” yet it was immensely better than nothing. The monks were truly the schoolmasters of Europe during the ages that may, at least comparatively speaking, be described as “dark ages.”

It is well, too, to remember what has already been suggested, that the monks were the soldiers of the Church, ever widening the frontiers of Christendom. Wherever they established themselves the influences noted above were borne in upon the surrounding peoples. Monasticism “was a constant proclamation, in the midst of a barbarous and crude and warlike society, of the duty and the glory of another sort of life, of the virtues of peace and self-sacrifice and poverty and labor. It was a perpetual reminder that some things supremely worth having were not to be gained by strife or self-assertion or pride of place, but that passive virtues and gentle lives might be full of power.”¹

A summary evaluation.—This brief description of the extensive powers of the Church, the splendid machinery which it created and maintained for the exercise of these powers, and its numerous points of contact with medieval society should make clear the commanding position which it enjoyed. It had many faults, and its influence was not always good; but when the debits and credits of its account are summed up the fact remains that it was the greatest single force in the advancement of civilization in the medieval world. In a disorderly and brutal age it represented order, discipline, and humanity. Authority, respect for authority, and obedience were implicit in the organization itself; and it taught these lessons unceasingly by precept and by example. It stood ordinarily by the side of ruling princes to lend strength to their authority and to inculcate obedience in their subjects. In a world not yet emerged from barbarism it preserved many of the elements of the civilizations which had gone before. In a period of ignorance it kept burning practically the only lamps of education—narrowly conceived though that education was.

¹George B. Adams, *Civilization during the Middle Ages*, Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1914, pp. 131-132.

THE CHRISTIAN EAST: THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE

The medieval world may be divided along fairly sharp lines into an eastern and a western half. The latter comprehended roughly Italy, France, Spain, the German lands beyond the Rhine and the Danube, and the British Isles; the former advanced and receded as time went on, but we may get some idea of its geography if we speak of it as that part of the Roman Empire which lay east of the Adriatic. The western portion has received almost exclusive attention, because its significance to medieval and modern civilization bulks decidedly greater. One reason for the difference lies in the fact that the eastern half represents Roman civilization during a protracted period of decadence, little affected by the Teutonic invasions, which never secured a foothold there. The West had been barbarized, but it had been renewed, was youthful and vigorous, and looked to the future. Nevertheless, the Christian East calls for some attention not only because it was an important part of the medieval world but because both the Eastern Empire and the Eastern Church were important forces in the change by which Western Europe finally recovered the great ancient cultures.

The gradual separation of the Eastern or Byzantine Empire from the West resulted from an accumulation of influences. When Constantine, the first of the Christian Emperors, moved the capital of the Empire from Rome to Constantinople, in the fourth century, the separation may be said to have begun. The new capital stood on the site of an ancient Greek colony called Byzantium. Quickly it became the dominating center of the Byzantine civilization. Language also played a part; the West was Latin or Germanic; the East remained Greek, and Greek ultimately became the official language of the government. Finally, differences in religious belief tended to push the two regions farther apart. The upshot of the divergence was that by the eleventh century the schism was complete. The Byzantine emperor and the patriarch of Constantinople refused to recognize the supremacy of the pope at Rome. The Greek Orthodox Church became a separate and distinct institution in medieval civilization, a fact which had an important influence in shaping the currents of European history.

The character of Byzantine culture.—With the checkered history of the Byzantine Empire we are not concerned. It lasted for nearly a thousand years until, in the fifteenth century, it was over-

thrown by the Ottoman Turks. What of the contribution of Byzantine culture? We have characterized Byzantine civilization as a continuation, in the eastern half of the Empire, of the declining civilization of Rome. But the Eastern Empire, despite its decadence, maintained a civilization superior, in many respects, to anything in the contemporary West. The elements of its culture were Roman, Greek, and Oriental. Its essential service to the West was that of preserving and passing on valuable features of that culture. The Eastern Empire was an island in which a great civilization of the past found its last refuge from attack by barbarism. There the classical literature continued to be studied, classified, and imitated; there much of Greek science was preserved; there the vast legal learning of the Romans was, under the emperor Justinian, collected and codified.

In some directions culture in the Eastern Empire went beyond what had already been created, particularly in discoveries of new medicines and new methods for the treatment of disease and in the improvement of surgical methods. In architecture, a distinctive style called Byzantine was developed—a style distinguished by the extensive employment of domes, vaults, cupolas, and the lavish use of a highly developed art of mosaic for decorative purposes. The great church of St. Sophia in Constantinople is its most widely known example. In its general effect Byzantine architecture gives the impression of more grace—lighter walls, larger openings, more graceful columns—than does the Roman architecture of the West. In the minor arts the Byzantines displayed highly developed skill and elements of originality, notably in enamel work and jewelry.

Dissemination of Byzantine culture.—These elements of Byzantine culture were carried to the West, generally through the channels of commerce; for the Byzantines, controlling the great commercial gateway at Constantinople, commanded the trade between the Near East and Europe. Along with his merchandise the Byzantine shipped his ideas. Thus Western Europe came to be permeated by Eastern influences. Because of their superior skill, artisans of the East were borrowed to teach the industrial arts in the West. Here and there in Italy, Sicily, France, and Spain, churches in the Byzantine style attest the wide influence of the East; and old Venice, long connected commercially with Constantinople, is stamped with an Eastern impress.

To these influences of the Byzantine culture on the medieval

world must be added that of the Greek Orthodox Church. This church, like the Roman Catholic, early developed missionary zeal. Its missionaries were particularly active in the Balkans and among the Slavic peoples in Russia. The Bible was translated into the Slavic language, and Greek churches were set up among the barbarian converts. Thus, as the Roman Church had carried Roman culture to the Germans, the Greek Church carried the culture of the Eastern Empire to the Slavs. The Christians of the East looked to Constantinople, to the emperor and the patriarch, for guidance, much, though the grip was not so strong, as the Christians of the West looked to Rome. It was this influence of the Greek Church that gave the Slavs an opportunity to play at least a minor part in medieval civilization. The contact established between Constantinople and the North at first stimulated Slavic culture, and in the twelfth century Russia was probably more advanced than Germany; but in the long run the contacts of Rome with the Germanic peoples were more vitalizing and more vigorously sustained than those of Constantinople with the Slavs.

ARABIC CIVILIZATION AND ITS INFLUENCES

Mention has been made of the fact that an unwelcome guest, the Mohammedan, thrust himself into Christian society—the Turks in the East, and the Moors in Spain. The Byzantine Empire checked these invasions for a time, and no doubt performed a valuable service to Christendom in holding the eastern gate at Constantinople against the Mohammedan power until Europe had gained the strength to prevent a complete Turkish inundation. As it was, the Balkans were overrun, and the Byzantine civilization was depressed, where it was not practically destroyed by the invaders; all southeastern Europe was thus subjected to still another setback which helps to account for its lagging development. From the time of its establishment down to our own day, the Ottoman Empire in Europe has been a source of disturbance and embarrassment to the Christian nations; it is bound up with some of the most vital problems of European society.

The Mohammedan civilization carried into Spain by the Arabian invaders of the eighth century was very different from that of the Ottoman Turks. Arabian civilization towered far above that of the Turks, and in fact was, in many respects, far superior to that of

contemporary Christian countries. "While Europe was lost in the darkness of barbarian ignorance, scarcely pierced by a single ray, the capitals of Islamism were flooded with a great light of literature, philosophy, art, and industry." It is true that originality was not a characteristic feature of Arabian genius; the Arabs had borrowed much from the Greeks, from the Persians, and from the peoples of India. But much of what they borrowed they stamped with their own character, and in some notable cases they made original contributions.

In communication or actual contact with the Greek culture of the Near East, the Arabs developed some appreciation of the Greek intellect. They borrowed largely from the Greek philosophers; Aristotle, in fact, was revealed to medieval Europe more through the Arabian influence than through any other. From the Greeks, too, they borrowed a knowledge of medicine and surgery, but they pushed the horizon of medical science beyond that of the Greeks. Their hospital service, particularly for the insane, far surpassed that of the Christians. They studied chemistry as alchemy, but in the process they "discovered new elements and produced new and valuable compounds, such as potash, alcohol, corrosive sublimate, sulphate of silver, and nitric and sulphuric acid." They were advanced in geographical knowledge; they accepted the rotundity of the earth, and are said to have taught geography from globes. In mathematics they were particularly apt. Algebra is one of their contributions to the world. A treatise on this subject written by an Arab in the ninth century served as a textbook for Europe until the beginning of the modern period. They produced a notable literature in both poetry and prose. The delightful *Thousand and One Tales of the Arabian Nights' Entertainments* has become a classic in the field of literature. To architecture they gave a sufficient impress of their own spirit to produce a striking style. Their mosques and palaces are characterized by domes and graceful minarets, round or horseshoe arches, and decorative arabesques distinguished by geometrical design and a pleasing combination of color. On Arabian painting and sculpture the Mohammedan religion laid a cold hand by its prohibition of the depicting of living things.

As one might well surmise, these intellectual accomplishments were sustained by an advanced material civilization. The Arabians excelled in agriculture; they understood the art of irrigation, used

fertilizers, introduced new products. They were highly skilled in the making of metal and leather goods, and in weaving. They established an extensive trade, and for a long period were the middlemen who carried oriental goods from the far interior to the ports of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, to be conveyed thence by European traders for Western consumption.

Despite its accomplishments, Arabic civilization did not long maintain its high place. It reached its peak early in the ninth century, and in the same century began to decline. Its essential contribution, so far as Europe was concerned, was that of conserving and passing on what it had borrowed and what it had created to a more vigorous people with a fairer opportunity not only to maintain its cultural gains but to go forward. Not until the later centuries of the Middle Ages was Europe in a position to discover the debt which it owed to the Arabians; then it was revealed how many of the Greek treasures were sealed up in the Arabic writings.

CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF MEDIEVAL CULTURE

Thus far we have been concerned largely with the ingredients, ethnological and cultural, which entered into the compound called medieval civilization, and with the devious ways by which these ingredients were brought together and fused to produce that civilization. Having arrived so far we might well pause to examine the product. What were the characteristics of medieval culture that distinguish it from the modern? In contrasting one with the other, we must remember that we cannot draw sharp boundaries all along the line. The earlier period merges into the later, and many medieval influences continue to operate in European society down to the present. Nor is it to be forgotten that the generalizations which follow indicate main trends merely; space permitting, one might find numerous deviations which become more pronounced as the medieval period nears its close. With this caution we may enumerate as characteristic of medieval culture (1) the solidarity of medieval society, (2) its emphasis on authority, (3) its other-worldliness, (4) its comparatively static quality, and (5) its subordination of the individual.

The solidarity of medieval society.—A greater solidarity of society is a characteristic of medieval civilization, a sense of unity, of universality. Our modern world exhibits no such unity. It is

partitioned off by national walls. The national state is the political unit; its religion is nationalized; it has a national language, a national literature, national systems of education, national characteristics. In defense of all these things within the walls the national group is bound by powerful emotional ties which we call patriotism. In the Middle Ages, at least until the closing period, there were no such walls marking off peoples; there were no national states, no traditions of nationalism, no national patriotism. The tradition which influenced medieval society was a tradition of world unity which came straight from Rome. The Church, fashioned after the Empire, was a realization of universality in the religious life; the Holy Roman Empire, established in the tenth century, and the still earlier empire of Charlemagne were, in some degree, deliberate attempts to realize world unity in political life. Latin was not merely the universal language of the Church, but was everywhere in the West the written language of the educated, and, regarded as eternal, was considered to be the only fit medium for the perpetuation of thought. Education everywhere set up the same goal, dealt with the same subject matter, and used the same language as a medium of instruction. It was this universal pattern stamped on society that gave a sense of solidarity now lost to the European world.

The emphasis on authority.—In medieval society the emphasis was on authority rather than liberty. The commanding position of the Church has been indicated. If we would judge its permeating authority with discrimination, however, we must measure it in its own social setting. The cherishing of liberty may be regarded as a "trait" of modern peoples. Perhaps we are not so free as we imagine. Science, for example, exercises a sort of tyranny over our minds comparable in some respects to the sway of religion in the Middle Ages. But science has no political power to enforce belief in its teachings; whereas the Church had such political power to impose its dogmas. We accept and support science because it appears to serve us; similarly, medieval man accepted and supported religion and the Church because they were the one source of much that was worth while according to the medieval standard of values. This point of view of medieval man must be kept in mind if we would understand the authority enjoyed by the Church. With a conviction of its supreme greatness and importance as the one instrumentality through which man might achieve salvation, and with its

roots in the Rome of the Empire—when absolute authority had become the accepted pattern—the Church logically assumed an autocratic position in the medieval world. Man's part, so far as the uninformed masses were concerned, was to believe that he might be saved. The unenlightened must not question; credulity was a virtue; curiosity was suspect. The Church, representing the one existing body of trained minds, was the keeper of truth; to question its authority was presumptuous and blasphemous. And since the clergy were the only ones competent to interpret the Scriptures, they were given the sole right to perform that function.

In economic and political activity a similar tone—one of subjection to authority—prevailed. Since the vast majority of the population lived in a state of comparative isolation, it was natural that tradition and custom should occupy a place of compelling authority and tend to mold and standardize economic life. Under a fixed routine endlessly repeated there was little opportunity for individual initiative or variation. In political development the trend was toward the exercise of authority from above untempered by the exercise of any effective control by the governed. It is true that the sense of liberty was strong among the Germanic peoples, and that during the feudal period the feudal aristocracy enjoyed liberty to the extent of license, but the feudal aristocracy represented only a small minority of the population; the common man enjoyed no political rights in the modern sense. As national monarchies developed, the tide set in definitely toward absolutism.

Otherworldliness.—The otherworldliness which characterized medieval society offers an additional reason why medieval man was disposed to submit to the directing authority of the Church. The modern mind typically turns to earth and things earthly, but the medieval mind turned characteristically to the other world, to matters of the spirit. This earth literally offered little but drudgery and want to all but a favored few who studied in monasteries or ruled in castles. There was no great goal for medieval man this side of the grave. Man's life on earth was at best but a short sojourn which should be devoted to the spiritual life. Any golden age on this earth had been lost through original sin; what remained was the golden age of a literal heaven. If there was any "progress" worth achieving it was progress towards salvation.

The static character of society.—It was suggested above that medieval communities were more or less isolated. The facilities for

munication and transportation that tend to bind modern peoples together are largely out of the picture of the Middle Ages. Consequently social change was exceedingly slow.

In our day and age we are obsessed by the idea of "progress." It is almost a cult with us. We accept progressive change as the normal condition of mankind. Such a conception would have deeply puzzled the medieval man. With him social stability was to be preserved by maintaining things as they were. Society, conceived as divinely ordered, was stratified more or less rigidly into "orders": a clergy born to pray, a lay nobility born to rule and to fight, the great mass of mankind born to labor for the physical maintenance of the higher orders. The two upper orders were noble and privileged; the third was ignoble and unprivileged. Man was born into his privileges. If he was born into the privileged classes his superiority in authority was fixed and was to be clearly recognized by those below, who were expected to keep their place and labor diligently in the "station to which God had assigned them." Outside the Church, which did give opportunity for merit to rise, there was little chance for one to change his condition socially. Nevertheless, when we speak of medieval society as static, it is to be remembered that we are using the term relatively; society never remains completely stationary.

The subordination of the individual.—The foregoing characterization of society points unmistakably to the subordination of the individual. While great thinkers arose—and distinguished themselves by the individuality of their thought—the general tendency was to stress the deed more than the doer. Monks engaged in constructive tasks or in literary or artistic work frequently did not sign their works, for the glory of the cause was more essential than credit to one's self. Men were like so many atoms in the social compound, not necessarily all molded on one pattern but each too intrinsic a part of the whole to be conspicuous in his own right. He enjoyed his place in society not as an individual right but because he was a member of the integrated group. Deprived of formal fellowship in the Church, he became an outcast. Outside his appointed place in the village community, existence was virtually denied him in most parts of Europe, for neither land nor protection was to be had. Above the common level of society the medieval man could hardly find a tolerable status outside the feudal system. Outside the medieval guilds, industrial and commercial activity was

next to impossible. Thus the spirit of the time was largely coöperative rather than competitive; communistic rather than individualistic. The collective welfare rather than individual welfare was the dominant principle.

Such is our sketch of medieval society. The medieval world was a more unified world than our own, tied together with certain universal bonds; a simpler world than ours, not so diversified by the presence of independent national states. It was a world in which authority emanating from above was more exalted than in our time. It presents a slowly changing society, which, in comparison with our own, appears to have been perpetually treading in a circle of custom and tradition. It was a world in which the general mind appeared to turn heavenward as persistently as the general mind today appears to turn earthward. Finally, it was a world in which man found the most complete realization of self in the corporate life about him rather than in a full expression of individuality.

Economic and political life.—The picture is far from complete. What of the everyday life of medieval man? How did he make a living? What of his political life, and the relations of one community to another? These questions will have to await a detailed answer in later chapters. A suggestion here will have to suffice.

As to its economic life, we shall have a fairly accurate picture of medieval society before the eleventh century if we imagine a great number of villages and small towns in which practically the whole population of Europe gained a simple, frugal existence by means of a rude form of agriculture, each community more or less isolated from the outside world, subsisting almost wholly on its own products. Manufacture held a secondary place. It was largely unspecialized, and was carried on in the huts of the peasantry or in the manor house or castle of the landlord. Of trade there was little between villages and towns, and between Europe and the outside world still less. By the eleventh century a change had taken place: town life had established itself; industry had become more and more specialized. A class of town dwellers, the bourgeoisie, had emerged interested in industry and commerce rather than in agriculture. Thenceforth we find existing side by side the agricultural village life still carrying on its simple industry as an incidental occupation, and the industrial and commercial life of the towns.

Political interests and institutions were relatively less important in medieval society than they are now, overshadowed as they were

ere by the Church. Political thought centered largely in the major question involved in the controversy between Church and state as to which was supreme. In political organization the Roman tradition of a world-state powerfully influenced the minds of rulers. The attempt of the Byzantine emperor to extend his authority over the West, the attempts of Charlemagne in the ninth century and of the Holy Roman emperors later, and the political ambitions of the Church to dominate Europe are all expressions of the great desire to recreate a universal empire. But those attempts all failed to reach the ultimate goal.

The inability of emperors and petty kings to maintain order within and to protect communities from attack from without led to the gradual establishment of feudalism, a form of local government in direct contrast with the centralized universal authority implicit in the imperial idea and system. Under the feudal system Europe presented a checkerboard of many hundreds of feudal states, large and small, governed almost absolutely by dukes, counts, and barons who made war on each other incessantly and plunged Europe into a state of general disorder. But the feudal lords were not able to maintain their power permanently. It was the bourgeoisie who first freed themselves from the authority of the feudal nobility and established the right to form their own governments. In the case of towns favorably situated, as in Italy, these rights developed so far as to produce powerful city-states wholly independent of outside authority. But the final death blow to feudalism as a political force came with the rise of the national monarchies in the last centuries of the Middle Ages.

MEDIEVAL LITERATURE

Medieval literature reflects the age that produced it. This is to say that the bulk of it was devoted to theology and related subjects, and that most of it was composed by the clergy. Prose predominated; still a considerable body of poetry in imitation of the classical poets was composed, some of it as early as the ninth century. The medieval writers wrote by hand on parchment. Some of their manuscripts are beautifully illuminated. The language used was medieval Latin.

As national languages developed, however, enthusiasms and interests of a more worldly character found literary expression in

subjects drawn from the colorful aspects of the feudal world. The finest examples appeared in France, in Old French. These were the *chansons de geste*, narrative poems detailing the deeds of heroes in the earlier brutal age of feudalism—deeds performed during the wars against the Mohammedans, or in the perpetual conflicts of the feudal barons among themselves. Most famous of all in this period is the *Song of Roland*, a long narrative poem celebrating the valor of Roland, a hero of Charlemagne's court. Later appeared in Western Europe the romances of chivalry, reflecting the softened manners and courtesy of the period—tales of love and adventure, of the great deeds of the tournament, and of medieval festivals. Much material was drawn from the fabulous tales of Arthur, the Celtic king, and his knights; matter entering into the Arthurian Legend, one of the most famous in European literature. Of the feudal poetry of the Germans, perhaps the finest example is the *Nibelungenlied*, the *Song of the Nibelungs*, the basis of Wagner's musical drama. To the Teutonic contribution should be added the German poems of the Minnesingers and the literature of Norse mythology, some of which appeared in far-off Iceland—the poems called the *Eddas* and the prose narratives, the *Sagas*.

ARCHITECTURE AND ART

In architecture only did the Middle Ages produce a major masterpiece. This was the Gothic church.

After the Teutonic invasions Roman architecture declined, but the early Christians did not at once create a style to supplant it. At first they adapted the Roman courts of law, the basilicas, to their use. Their earliest independent structures in the West were a combination of features borrowed mainly from the Roman and the Byzantine—a style called Romanesque, dating from about the tenth century. But in the twelfth century, while the Romanesque still flourished, there appeared a new style of architecture in northern France. By the thirteenth century this new style had reached its maturity and perfection. It was not until much later—in the early modern period—that critics gave to this style the name "Gothic," a term apparently used in derision, and born of a lack of appreciation in an age that felt that it had outgrown the barbaric taste of the earlier period. And yet today we can speak of this style as the glory of the Middle Ages, as an artistic expression of

life and spirit. One can hardly imagine a more perfect embodiment of the medieval religious spirit than the Gothic cathedral with its pointed arches and tall spires ever drawing the eyes of the Christian heavenward.

Practically all the art achievements of the Middle Ages were harnessed into the service of the Church—architecture, sculpture, painting, stained glass, illuminated manuscripts. Never, perhaps, were the three arts of architecture, sculpture, and painting more perfectly amalgamated as one art than in the Gothic style, for painting and sculpture can hardly be said to have enjoyed an independent existence in the Middle Ages; both were the handmaidens of architecture. Sculpture was less an expression of beauty than an art devoted to the ends of religion and the Church. It was stiffly conventional because its conventions were symbols significant in the teaching of the Christian beliefs, sermons in stone, as they have been called. The like was true of painting and mosaic. Sensuous beauty had no accepted place in the art of the early Church. Painting, like sculpture, was valuable as a means of symbolical presentation of its teachings. The medieval artists were limited by their understanding of color; they did not understand perspective; they gave no particular heed to the elusive features that give charm and beauty to the human form; the essence of their art was spiritual, not secular.

Such were the characteristic features of the Gothic. It found its best expression in France and the British Isles. In German lands, particularly in the north, it did not reach perfection; and in Italy it was like a plant set in an uncongenial soil; here the influence of Roman and Greek forms never gave way completely enough to permit the Gothic to evolve in its completeness.

MEDIEVAL EDUCATION

Three distinct types of training developed during the Middle Ages, each being fostered by the class or institution that it served: feudalism and chivalry produced an elaborate and, to us, fantastic training to prepare the noble for a knightly career; the industrial guilds of the towns developed the necessary skill of their artisans by a system of apprenticeship; and the Church developed education to prepare for service in the Church and to promote the Christian life. Hence it was the Church that produced the only public system of

education in the Middle Ages, it is to this system that we refer when we speak of medieval education.

Something has already been said of the service of the Church in fostering education. A little reflection will make it clear why the Church assumed direction and control. No other corporate body had an interest in fostering a system of education for the whole Christian world. The interests of chivalry and of the industrial guilds were narrow class interests. The Church was universal and, as the dominating institution in medieval society, was, naturally, concerned in promoting the Christian way of life and its own interest as an institution. Education, therefore, was essentially religious in character. Instruction aimed to inculcate medieval culture, just as modern education sets up as one of its important aims the inculcating of the fundamentals of our own culture. During the first few centuries of the Middle Ages the educated class was practically confined to the clergy, and outside the clerical ranks few even learned to read or write. During later centuries, however, until the rise of the universities, though education continued to be thought of as a possession peculiar to clericals, the number educated outside their ranks had doubtless greatly increased.

The rise of the universities in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was an event of first importance in the history of education and intellectual life. They appear to have been a kind of spontaneous outgrowth of a remarkable enthusiasm for learning that had become increasingly evident from the eleventh century on. New information, such as was coming in especially from Greek and Arabian sources, stimulated curiosity and eager discussion. Such problems as the reconciliation of faith and reason and the question of the merits of the direct study of nature led to such an influx of questioners to the cathedrals that separate teaching faculties were eventually licensed. About 1200 the University of Paris became a separate institution from the cathedral of Notre Dame. Sometimes spoken of as the mother university, the University of Paris served as a model for others. As early as the twelfth century there were four outstanding centers of learning: Paris and Oxford, with kindred interests in scholasticism; Bologna, famous for its law; and Salerno, equally famous in the field of medicine. Since few books were available, instruction was performed by lecture and discussion. With the coming of the printed page the massing of books in university libraries began, and education took on a new and modern phase.

FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN THE MIDDLE AGES

To one living in the twentieth century, in a period in which individual liberty is exalted, much proclaimed, and, supposedly, fully enjoyed, the picture of medieval society may appear depressing. Under the influence of our own cultural biases we may overlook the point of view of medieval man and get an unrealistic picture of his intellectual life. We might conclude that the domination of medieval theology compelled all men to think alike, but the conclusion would not be accurate. Theology acted upon intellectual life at once as a stimulus and as a drag. But even as a drag, it was not so much that theology pulled backward, as that it confined the intellectual advance to one channel. To comprehend the alliance of thought with the interests of religion we must recall the place of the Church in medieval culture.

There was a general feeling that of the various theories which intellectual leaders might expound, those were to be favored which supported or did least damage to the established tenets and dogma of religion. Such an attitude can be understood when it is remembered that religion in its organized and institutionalized form promoted the general welfare of the people, gave them a sense of security, furnished their architecture and art, their pageants, their wars and peace. Above all, it laid out the way of salvation. Such religion seemed indispensable to the people of those times, and the intellectual atmosphere was bound to be favorable to it; the official authority exercised by the Church was accepted as a necessary part of the means of security.

Nevertheless the Middle Ages witnessed much intellectual independence, and a great amount of honest thinking on vital issues was permitted, and even encouraged. When, for example, in a belatedly recovered work of Aristotle, the statement was found that the world had no beginning—a statement in contradiction to the Church's faith in the account of creation given in the Book of Genesis—the Church did not prohibit debate of the question as to which was right. Must Aristotle be accepted or rejected? This issue involved decades of arguments and public hearings on the pros and cons, just as recently we have had debates on whether to allow the teaching of evolution. Aristotle's works on nature were banned in 1203, but in 1250, rather than have them studied without regard to theological interests, the ban was removed.

Seldom in history has there been a time of more vigorous intellectual disagreement among scholars of note than from the ninth to the thirteenth century. During this period, and most notably in the twelfth century, the Jewish-Christian tradition, Greek philosophy, and Arabian science all found a place in medieval Europe. In the thirteenth century the peak of medieval activity was reached, and since that century stands at the threshold to the Renaissance, it might be said that there was no abrupt change from the earlier period to the latter; rather, that the remarkable intellectual outburst of the Renaissance was clearly in the stage of preparation in those preceding centuries. The discussion concerning the nature of the world is an illustration in point. Granted that there is one God and that this is his world, what is the importance of things in this world? Rather commonly it is supposed that the thinkers of the Middle Ages unanimously answered, "They are of no importance"; but the fact is that they considered the question so important that the thought devoted to it from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries paved the way to modern science.

SCIENCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES

Measured by modern standards, medieval man knew exceedingly little about natural science and cared for it hardly at all until the closing centuries of the period. The low esteem in which science was generally held is understandable when we remember that medieval thought was largely absorbed in the world after death. This other-worldliness made theology dominant. The ancient cultures—particularly the Greek, as we have seen—had developed a considerable body of science; but upon it the Christian world turned its back during the early centuries of the Christian era, and Greek science was temporarily lost. Since science was pagan and secular, it was held in suspicion in most of its phases. Theology was thought to be the key to all learning worth while to a Christian. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), one of the greatest of the medieval scholars, held that God thinks this world into being as the best of all possible worlds, and that the eternal ideas are God's, and that they are, therefore, more real and important than anything else can be. Consequently his theory of education was that the study of nature was mere elementary practice, and that theology was the apex of the pyramid of knowledge and the crowning glory of a

arning. A papal order in 1279 made Aquinas's works the basis of all teaching.

But the word of Aquinas was not the last word. Natural science is born of a deep interest in, and an intense curiosity about, the world of nature. The swing from heaven to earth was already in progress in Aquinas's day. The year following the papal order of 1279, William of Occam was born, an English Franciscan friar, who became a leader among those who came to take a position opposed to that of Aquinas. Though a churchman himself, the effect of his teachings ultimately contributed to the separation of Church and State and gave an impetus to scientific interests. A devout believer in God, he was, nevertheless, convinced that this world is the proper object of study, and that all knowledge which cannot be gained through sense perceptions must be a matter of faith rather than reason. The particular objects around us are, therefore, the ones we can hope to know best. It is our duty to worship God, but we must use our minds primarily to understand the natural world in which we live. Thus Occam paved the way to that all-absorbing interest in this immediate world which became the object of absorbing interest during the Renaissance, and from which modern science developed. He furthermore gave to science the much used Law of Parsimony, still often called "Occam's razor." It is not a law, but the general principle that when two or more theories explain equally well a given fact or phenomenon, the simpler is to be preferred. Occam's writings were banned at the University of Paris eight years before his death, but other universities such as Prague, Vienna, and Heidelberg permitted similarly-minded thinkers to carry on the same line of thought and teaching.

The attitude of the Church toward science.—Much has been said and written of the obstacles put in the way of the development of scientific knowledge by the medieval Church. The Church does owe much to answer for in this regard, but it should be remembered that her opposition to freedom of thought manifested itself more in a later age than in the medieval period itself. It tolerated the vigorous debates that stimulated the minds of Occam and Aquinas. It was after Occam's time that the Church reacted strongly against secular interests, became more rigid in its views, and resorted to persecution to dispose of conflicting views. It was after the opening of the Renaissance that science paid its sad price in lives and prohibited works of genius—a price which included the burning of

Bruno at the stake for his views on nature and the forcing of the aged Galileo to his knees to recant his belief in the Copernican theory of an earth which moves. In the Middle Ages before the Renaissance there had been bigotry and intolerance, but all in all that early period had really stimulated controversial thought, and many of the newer views then born in the Church gained enough vitality to persist alone even after the Church disowned them and tried to suppress them by force.

The absence of experimental method.—Despite the tempo of honest investigation which characterized the constructive period of medieval thought, the intellectual leaders of that time—the scholastics, as they were called—failed to produce that essential instrument of progress in scientific knowledge, the experimental approach in the study of natural phenomena. Although there is some evidence that the experimental method was used earlier—in medicine and anatomy, for example—the rule of the scholastic was to consult recognized authorities, such as the Bible and Aristotle, and the early Church Fathers, or to depend on sheer reason, rather than to seek what their sense organs could reveal to them of the nature of things about them. The medieval student got his science in the library rather than in the laboratory or in the world of nature about him. It has been said with some truth that he was inclined to accept everything but the evidence of his own eyes.

This attitude persisted among many intellectuals even down into the Renaissance. An illustration of this overlapping of medieval and Renaissance habits of mind is furnished by a Padua professor whom Galileo entreated in vain to look at the moon and planets through his telescope to verify certain new discoveries in astronomy. "There are seven windows given to animals in the domicile of the head," said the Padua professor, "through which air is admitted to the tabernacle of the body, to enlighten, to warm, to nourish it. What are these parts of the microcosmos? Two nostrils, two eyes, two ears, and a mouth. So in the heavens, as in the microcosmos there are two favorable stars, two unpropitious, two luminaries and Mercury undecided and indifferent. From this and many other similarities in nature, such as the seven metals, etc., which it were tedious to enumerate, we gather that the number of planets is necessarily seven." It was Galileo, with his eyes, his telescope, and his mathematical data, who together with some of his contemporaries and followers ultimately corrected the habits of mind and the

methods of thinking of men like the Padua professor and ushered in the new age of science. But that is a story that belongs to a later period, the Renaissance and modern times.

THE HERITAGE OF THE MIDDLE AGES

The study of the Renaissance reveals, as we shall presently see, the passing of the Middle Ages and the birth of the modern era. But it should hardly be necessary to point out that words may mislead or be misconstrued. What this survey has particularly sought to emphasize is the idea that medieval society passed on to us elements of the ancient cultures that still live in our civilization. It added to the elements it had assimilated elements that were peculiarly its own, and the compound is what we call medieval culture. The Middle Ages passed, but the medieval heritage persists in our lives to a degree that we do not suspect. How true this is will be apparent later when we turn to examine the customs, traditions, and practices that cluster about marriage and the family; our economic foundations; the development of our political ideas and institutions; our religious beliefs; our education; our moral standards; our social manners, attitudes, and beliefs; and our literature, art, and architecture. Then it is that we begin to realize how close to modern man stand the cultures of the ancient and the medieval world.

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CHAPTER XIV

THE TRANSITION TO MODERN CULTURE

IN THE preceding chapter the view was expressed that the whole period from the fifth to the seventeenth century might in a sense be regarded as a transition from ancient to modern civilization, during which a slow assimilation of the ancient cultures was taking place. In general, assimilation was accelerated with the passing of the centuries. From the fourteenth century on the discovery of ancient culture proceeded with such speed as to generate forces which the bulwarks of medieval authority and tradition could no longer resist. Antique civilization, for the first time, was being seen as a consistent whole and from a new point of view. The human mind was set free to range beyond the bounds of the medieval world. With that freedom the Middle Ages gradually passed and the modern age began.

The scholars of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were not aware of the transformation. The superiority of their own enlightened era to that which had preceded was to them so apparent that they gave to the earlier period the contemptuous label, "The Dark Ages." Under the influence of this light from the ancient world, the men of the new transition epoch cast aside many ideals of medieval Christianity and revived an older conception of "the good life." In so far as their efforts could achieve it, classical civilization was reborn in their day. They were so successful that later French scholars named their period "the Renaissance," its rebirth.

The character of the change.—The contrast between medieval and Renaissance ways of life, great though it was, was not the product of any sharp break between the two. Signs of coming change in the centuries leading up to the Renaissance have already been noticed in the preceding chapter. Still more impressive were the changes observable in Southern Italy under the stimulating influence of Frederick II (1212-1250), king of Sicily and Holy Roman Emperor, who had placed reason above divine revelation

and who had "tried to wrest the world from the grip of the Church." The older custom among historians of attributing to refugee Greek from Constantinople (after its fall in 1453) the responsibility for introducing the Renaissance by reviving Greek studies in Italy and Northern Europe has long since been shown to be a mistake. Greek studies were undertaken long before 1453. Moreover, the "revival of learning" in the classic literatures was but one aspect of a more extensive and more complex cultural change to all of which the name "Renaissance" has been applied.¹ Thus broadly conceived it involved change in religious thought and institutions, in economic and political life, in education, in art, architecture, and science. There was hardly an aspect of life that it did not touch.

Any date given as the beginning of the Renaissance must be recognized as indicating the time when the shift to the new civilization becomes clearly apparent, not as the date of a sharp break with the past, not as the date when any single all-important agency of renovation began to operate, but the time when the transition from old to new was unmistakable. We have taken 1300 as the opening of the Renaissance because Dante's masterpiece, *The Divine Comedy*, ushered in the fourteenth century with evidence of a new spirit of individuality; because Petrarch, Boccaccio, and Chaucer in the succeeding years gave unmistakable assurance that a new spirit moved in the field of literature; and because such political changes occurred in Italy and north of the Alps soon after 1300 that the new civilization is definitely seen to have been on the march.

ITALY ON THE EVE OF THE RENAISSANCE

It was in the Italian peninsula that the Renaissance began. The reasons are not far to seek. There, more than in any other part of Europe, conditions were propitious. First to be noted is the economic prosperity of its many cities. Several, notably Genoa and Venice, had become mid-points in the commerce which sprang up between the Near East and Western Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Later, into the stream of Oriental goods taken north of the Alps, increasing quantities of Italian products, the output of her orchards, her vineyards and her artisans, had been poured. By the fourteenth century, trade was carried on not only between continents and regions; it was widely developed within limited

¹Walter Pater, *The Renaissance*, p. xiii.

localities as well. As a result of economic specialization, Italy was the scene of a richer and more varied condition of material well-being than ever obtained in the Middle Ages. Part of this wealth permitted the resort to an economic luxury, and the gratification of the love of beauty. A class of scholars and artists could now be maintained.

The effect of political and social conditions.—Politically the thirteenth century witnessed the emergence of a host of independent Italian cities over which the Holy Roman emperor could exercise no control, and the pope, not enough control to effect a unification. In each of these cities, some variety of local self-government developed; most frequently, after an experiment in democracy and oligarchy, a species of petty tyranny. The rivalries between cities involved them in constant warfare, but this was made the business of mercenary troops under professional chieftains, the *condottieri*, not the concern of the ordinary citizen, who was left in comparative peace and security. Frequently the *condottieri* were placed at the head of the civil as well as the military establishments, perhaps only in a temporary emergency, but often for longer terms. Making themselves permanent despots, they eventually become the founders of subsequent dynasties, married into noble houses, patronized artists and scholars, and expanded their power over surrounding communities. This concentration of power within the cities in one man was paralleled by the concentration of power within all Italy in the grip of five leading city-states. As time passed, Milan, Venice, Florence, Rome, and Naples became the "great powers" of the Italian peninsula, dominating rural districts and subordinate cities, rivaling each other in the accumulation of wealth and in literary and artistic achievement, and holding each other in check by equally powerful diplomatic alliances.

Into the five great Italian cities and their satellites the Italian nobles moved in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, turning from landed proprietorship to trade and manufacturing. The result was an unusual burgher class. To normal burgher interests, more aristocratic tastes and traditions were united. It was to this group that the new culture of the Italian Renaissance made its greatest appeal. As Italians, the revival of the great Roman past was to them most appealing. They sought to recover the old civilization in its entirety; north of the Alps, the revival was more deliberately elective and partial, as well as later in time.

The effect of Roman culture.—Moreover, the peoples of Italy were linked to the culture of classical Rome by many ties. About them lay the remains of the ancient empire—roads, temples, aqueducts, bridges—some in ruins, some entire, all mute but tangible evidences of a glorious past. In the libraries of medieval monasteries the writings of classical authors were preserved, occasionally studied for their aid in understanding Scripture but not for the purpose which they were to serve in the Renaissance, the cultivation of individual personality. The Latin tongue, much modified though it was, was the ancient language of Italy from which the vernacular had been derived, and to which an earnest Italian student might again be led unhampered by the difficulties confronting students of other lands. Throughout the Middle Ages Rome had been to Western Europe the great mother city; but while to North Europeans it was the place of St. Peter and St. Paul, to the Italians it was also the great capital, with political as well as religious claims to grandeur. Once the Italian suspected the life of the ancients could equal or even surpass that of the thirteenth century he could strive for its recovery with the conviction that he was regaining his own.

The recovery of classical literature and art.—The social situation in fourteenth-century Italy might have induced a clear break with medieval, traditional ideals. What actually occurred, however, was the revival, in that situation, by various noteworthy individuals, of the study of Latin, then of Greek, language and literature, and through that study, the recovery of ideals and customs dominant in ancient times. From the crumbling libraries where they lay, disregarded, the writings of Cicero, Virgil, and the other ancients were rescued, recopied, and read. From Athens, Constantinople, and other Greek cities in Asia Minor, texts of the Greek authors were obtained for Italian scholars and Italian libraries. Translations into Latin were made, improving from generation to generation, while eventually the original language was itself mastered under the instruction of Greek tutors who came to Italy.

Museums developed for the custody of ancient coins, statues and fragmentary sculpture, and for casts of the masterpieces not otherwise to be studied. Merchants in the Far East, trading from the Black Sea to Cairo, secreted in their cargoes such works of classical art as came their way, knowing full well the market for

hem in Italian cities. Italian artists gained immeasurably from their careful scrutiny of collections in these museums. Thus, by the fifteenth century, Italy was transformed; and in the north, along the routes of trade and travel, the new wonders of Florence, Venice, and the rest were known about and partly copied; the new ideas, in part, discussed and welcomed.

THE SPIRIT OF THE RENAISSANCE

The major differences between Renaissance and medieval civilization may be traced to the sharply conflicting attitudes toward life dominant in each. In the Middle Ages, the main thing of consequence to man was the divine spark within him, his soul. Exiled on earth in a human body, the soul's true happiness awaited its entrance into Heaven. Eternal blessedness could be won by purifying the human soul of sin through the ministrations of the Church and a strict denial of all promptings of the flesh. Medieval man, in consequence, thought of life as merely a brief preparation for eternity; he ran a gauntlet of earthly temptations. Peace awaited him at the end, if he persevered in a straight course; hell's infinite sufferings, should he be diverted to earthly joys on the way.

The revolt against medieval attitudes.—In the Renaissance what man prized was not his soul but his humanity, of which the soul was but a part. He extolled as "the good life" an earthly blessedness, to be attained through the full perfection of human personality. Not "otherworldliness" but "this-worldliness"; not asceticism, but versatility; not self-denial, but self-assertion won the applause of Renaissance man. Thus he stands as the embodiment of the spirit of rebellion against the medieval authority of Church, dogma, and tradition, accepting, instead, the older authority of the classical literatures. In Italy, versatility and self-assertion usually went far beyond the bounds of classical moderation. By a few in Italy, and by relatively more in northern Europe, notably Erasmus and Milton, the development and assertion of personality were reconciled with the ethical restraint either of religion or the old Greek ideal, "nothing in excess." These men, although they abandoned the medieval attitude toward life and sought an earthly well-being, considered human felicity to be best secured by some variety of self-control rather than, as has of late been advocated, by all varieties of "self-expression."

Where the medieval man thought of himself as at all times part of a larger unit, family, manor, corporation, people, or race, the man of the Renaissance was accustomed to regard himself as a unit. Instead of the protective association which the medieval man preferred, he prized independence and freedom, for which he equipped himself by greater knowledge. Instead of the reward for excellence which came beyond the grave, he sought a reward on earth, though he was undoubtedly willing to accept a subsequent reward in addition.

The cultivation of individuality.—This new individualism and secularism found expression in a passion for fame, which became a guiding motive for the actions of men. Desiring it for themselves, they strove to gain it by excellence in human accomplishments. Even further, they maintained the fame of others, crowning poets, marking and preserving birthplaces and tombs, and writing biographies for posterity to read. Paralleling the desire for fame was the sense of individual honor, a powerful factor in ethical situations, restraining men from acts of meanness, but not always suppressing selfishness, and occasionally prompting outrageous deeds for the ostensible protection of honor. The autobiography of Benvenuto Cellini, the goldsmith, illustrates the combination of the sense of honor and thirst for fame in one passionate personality of considerable distinction. Cellini was furiously resentful whenever he thought himself deprived of credit due him for his artistic performances or subjected to slights and reflections upon his courage. His feats of artistry were interspersed with countless quarrels and all too frequent murders and brawls. He describes them all with the most apparent egotism and complacency.

Renaissance man cultivated his individuality through both his mind and his will. The rich personalities produced by this culture included some of astonishing versatility. The Medici, famous political masters of Florence, in addition to being great merchants, extensive farmers, and bankers with enormous financial interests, were students of classical literature, collectors of coins, manuscripts, and works of art, and discriminating patrons of artists and scholars. In the case of Lorenzo, "the Magnificent" (died in 1492), they included a poet and man of letters. Michelangelo (died in 1564) devoted his eighty-nine years to sculpture, painting, poetry, and architecture of a high order. Outstanding, perhaps, was Leon Battista Alberti (died in 1472), self-taught musician and composer,

painter, sculptor, architect, author in two languages of novels, legends, eclogues, and speeches, defender of Christianity, student of science and lover of nature, whose bodily strength, moreover, was developed to the point that he could vault from a standing position over the head of a man, and could fling a coin to a cathedral's roof.¹ In addition to these persons who neared the Italian Renaissance ideal of the "universal man," there were hundreds of less prominent men and women whose versatile accomplishments attest the prevalence of that ideal.

Such was the spirit of the Renaissance. When the Renaissance man turned from thoughts and feelings to deeds, we should expect to find expression of that spirit in his intellectual achievements. And so it was. The great accomplishments of the period lay in the fields of art, science, and religion. In each, the dominant, new characteristics appear to be individualism and secularism; that is, his-worldliness, fostered by an ethics and an education similarly changed. Let us turn first to architecture.

ART, LITERATURE, AND EDUCATION

Architecture.—The Renaissance was an era of unexampled artistic creation. In architecture both the revival of classical styles and the introduction of new elements of beauty were the concern of the same individual architects. For centuries the major patrons of the arts had been church corporations and ecclesiastics of high degree. The thirteenth century had seen the creation of numerous superb edifices in a new style of great beauty—much later called Gothic—a style previously described as the apex of medieval achievement in the realm of art, and as strikingly expressive of the spirit of the age that produced it.

The Gothic fittingly belonged to an age of otherworldliness. With the coming of the Renaissance, new ideals emerged in the whole field of art, new patrons appeared, and new uses were developed. The ruling aristocratic houses of Italian city-states, great merchant princes emerging from Europe's growing middle class, the rulers of new national states—all sought the services of artists to dignify their stations. Their wealth sustained an increasingly nu-

¹Jacob Burckhart, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (London, 1921, 8th ed.). p. 137-138.

merous artistic fraternity but was bestowed only with new demands on its talent. Even among the ecclesiastics, who still continued to be great patrons, the new demand was for decorative workmanship on themes which had no devotional significance. In architecture these changing demands were most strikingly evidenced.

The new political organizations required public buildings; the growing mercantile wealth was partly diverted to city palaces; the end of the feudal wars made possible the construction of luxurious country villas and châteaux which were far removed from the style of the medieval castle. These changed uses necessarily induced architectural novelties. In another respect, the Renaissance builders departed widely from what today we call the Gothic style, for the later edifices deliberately sought a solid setting close to a highly valued earth. The humanistic concept of the appropriate mode of life was paralleled in the most highly-prized elements of architectural beauty; namely, balance and symmetry. Beauty in their buildings, as in American colonial structures, rested on exquisite proportion rather than on the more mysterious and wonder-inspiring features of the Gothic. Greek, and especially Roman, architecture formed the models to which Renaissance architects paid increasing respect. Some of them became slavish imitators, meticulous followers of the directions laid down by the writer, Palladio, in his text on architectural design. Most, however, while eager to adopt the classical standards of beauty, insisted upon adapting the classical modes of realizing such standards to the new uses, the new materials, and the new surroundings of the Renaissance.

From 1406 when the Florentine Brunelleschi determined to erect a great octagonal dome on the cathedral in that city, to the 17th century completion of St. Peter's Church in Rome, architectural designs, from Italy to England, were constantly modified. During that period the individualism of the Renaissance was well illustrated by the emergence of scores of individual, famous architects, each with a reputation built upon his own performances and sedulously maintained by him. The Middle Ages, even the period of great Gothic building, did not yield such individuals; architects in those days usually remained nameless members of guilds and orders. The great buildings then were coöperative enterprises, not individual achievements as in the Renaissance period.

Painting and sculpture.—The Renaissance marked a conspicuous advance in painting and sculpture over the earlier medieval

art, and produced a host of men of genius in those fields. The advance appears not only in a broader conception of the ideals of art and the uses to which it might be put, but also in technique and in the knowledge of color. Painting was primarily utilized as a new form of wall decoration, replacing with frescoes the older mosaic. It was, however, adapted to the decoration of bridal chests, and of altar pieces, and eventually was applied to easel pictures. The Renaissance esteem for the world and its human occupants encouraged a closer scrutiny of nature and of man, and made it seem more worth while to represent selected examples in painting. Giotto, who first combined the painting knowledge of Florentines and Romans into a single style, opened the fourteenth century with work of unprecedented merit. One hundred years elapsed before advances were made on Giotto's art, and one hundred and fifty before the high noon was reached with Leonardo da Vinci, Raphael of Urbino, Michelangelo, and Titian.

In the meantime, realistic painting was more and more closely approximated through the growing technical proficiency in the use of color, the representation of mass, and of perspective. Eventually it became possible to meet the requirements set forth by Leonardo:

What should first be judged in seeing if a picture be good is whether the movements are appropriate to the mind of the figure that moves. Secondly, the creation of relief (projection) where there is none [is to be satisfactorily accomplished].¹

Renaissance painters turned from the painting of symbolic figures, whose appeal to the observer was the secondary attraction of significance; instead they created paintings which were first of all beautiful in form and color, and secondly, pleasing in their meaning as well. They broadened the range of subjects—to Christian legend adding Greek mythology and secular themes. Their delight in human beauty was in great contrast to the medieval disparagement of the body. In place of the conventionalized, elongated, heavily draped human figure of medieval mosaic and sculpture, the Renaissance painters (and sculptors, also) freely portrayed nude human bodies of superlative beauty. Both painters and sculptors strove

¹Frank J. Mather, Jr., *A History of Italian Painting*, p. 1.

for anatomical correctness, until, in some of the strenuous productions of Michelangelo, mastery in this field led to positive "athletism" for the sake of displaying excessively muscular men in an astounding variety of postures—a display of technical proficiency at the expense of realistic beauty.

In Venice and Milan, in Florence and in Rome, in the many smaller but important cities which lay between them, new buildings were adorned with new paintings and sculpture. In northern Europe in lesser measure, and a little later in time, the same activity could have been noted. Today much has been lost from earthquake and fire. Wars have led to plundering, and northern cities boast many a masterpiece carried off from Italy in her days of weakness. But great museums have gathered what they could: the Doge's palace in Venice, the Uffizi gallery and the Bargello and the Pitti palace in Florence, and the Vatican and St. Peter's in Rome remain to reward the visitor with the rich residues of an unparalleled era of varied artistic creation.

Literature.—In literature, as in the other arts, the Renaissance interest in man above all other subjects is observable. The central themes were no longer the miracles of God's providence or the wonders and weird aspects of nature; they were the activities of free-willed men, working out their earthly careers. Ranging from the religious to the obscene, the literature of the period reveals a primary interest in human earthly concerns. As there was a change in theme, so was there a change in the language used. From the appearance of Dante's masterpiece *The Divine Comedy* in the early fourteenth century to the publication of Montaigne's essays in the latter part of the sixteenth century, the language of medieval writing, debased Latin, was rivaled by rising vernacular tongues. Italian, French, Spanish, German, and English developed as literary tongues, aided in their progress by discriminating writers and, later, by academies.

Latin, of course, continued to be used; as a result of studious recourse to classical models, however, it retained but little resemblance to the literary language of the Middle Ages. A host of scholars in Latin and Greek literature, to whom in the nineteenth century the name *humanists* was given, edited manuscript texts and composed translations from Greek into Latin; in addition they wrote in Latin on topics of contemporary importance, and to these tried to apply the teachings of the classic sages.

Education.—The spirit of the Renaissance penetrated the field of education; a new objective, a new ideal arose in opposition to the medieval conception.

The Middle Age acknowledged two specific types of education: that of the knight and that of the clerk, whether lawyer or ecclesiastic. Both types of training were professional; the first, indeed, was more than that, or it was limited to a caste, that of the lords of the soil. Each was the counterpart of the root-idea of medieval society—organization by rank, class, and corporate unit. With the advent of a new concept—the express creation of Italy, or, at least, her rediscovery—of man as a layman, neither soldier nor clerk; of man as an individual, not a nameless fraction of a group, personality became the conscious goal of development.¹

Inevitably, a new type of education was demanded to meet the new ideal. Some of the leading humanists wrote on the subject; others were great schoolmasters themselves; and from the efforts of these two groups we have as results some outstanding personalities and influential treatises. Among the famous teachers of the world should be numbered Guarino da Verona, Vittorino da Feltre, and John Colet (founder of St. Paul's School in London), who were directly responsible for the education of scholars, princes, and men of affairs, and worked out new methods of instruction. Famous books outlining the requirements of the new age, with much of interest and value for the present, have come down to us, such as *The Institution of the Prince*, which William Budé composed for the edification of Francis I; *The Book of the Governor*, by Thomas Eliot; and *The Perfect Courtier*, a famous book by Castiglione. Leon Battista Alberti, Rudolph Agricola, and Desiderius Erasmus exerted a strong influence in a series of writings on educational objectives and methods. All were concerned with utilizing classical literature and language, mathematics, music, and natural science, healthful games and athletic exercises to develop fine, rich personalities "for the due service of the community and of God."

The ideal humanistic education was, therefore, secular and individualistic. It was, moreover, beyond the powers of many. It was expected to yield "an order of the learned," to be the privilege of a minority, but of a minority "in no way determined by birth

¹W. H. Woodward, *Studies in Education during the Age of the Renaissance, 1400-1600* (The Macmillan Co., 1906), pp. 244-245.

or wealth, but by capacity. Yet its tendency was to set up a class, not narrow or professional in type, rather an educated upper-middle class upon which (in Italy) were falling the responsibilities now slipping from feudal society."¹ It was to be aristocratic in the true sense. Unfortunately, education and learning both fell into the hands of many who used them as an outlet for their egotism, men who were pedants and not scholars. Before the end of the Renaissance, those who degraded the humanistic ideal had, by very numbers, overwhelmed those who still maintained it; these pedants it was, and not the humanists, who provoked and merited the contempt so frequently expressed.

Admission of the New Learning to the universities.—One other aspect of education in the Renaissance is to be noted, besides its utilization of the "new learning" primarily for the development of personality. Both education and learning in the Renaissance centered at points of distinctly secular importance. Since the older universities repelled the new studies as long as possible, the courts of princes and the free cities of the North became the principal seats of classical scholarship. The scholars who there found patrons and students carried on a long warfare with the universities, persistent exponents of the obsolete medieval system. In the end humanism triumphed; one by one the universities reluctantly admitted the new learning on terms of equality.

It might be said in passing that a somewhat similar situation exists in the present relationship of the custodians of classical culture to the exponents of newer learning, principally in natural science. Greek and Latin studies have fallen in public esteem; those devoted to them are said to be maintaining an outgrown "badge" of culture, dead languages, at the expense of what is valid and appropriate for the present era. They are declared to be maintaining something barren, and thus to be diverting energy and attention from what is substantial and worth while. A certain plausibility is given to this contention because the classical studies usually remain at such an elementary level on the one hand, and because the discoveries of science have been so rich on the other. The contemporary victory of the scientists has a certain historic justice in that during the Renaissance classical studies in the field of letters were undoubtedly pressed to a degree which curtailed the scientific investigations then under way.

¹Woodward, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

SCIENCE DURING THE RENAISSANCE

Although a growing interest in scientific knowledge was foreshadowed in the last centuries of the medieval period, modern science begins with the Renaissance, when thirst for new achievement and discovery and interest in all things pertaining to man and earth fostered a keen and critical observation of natural phenomena and the formulation of hypotheses to explain them. In the light of the preponderant influence of science in modern civilization, its beginnings are, for the student of culture, a matter of cardinal interest.

Renaissance interest in the world of nature.—The spirit of inquiry is well exemplified in Leonardo da Vinci. In Leonardo, who was primarily a scientist, curiosity about nature was practically endless. He gave his attention to monsters, analyzing their fearfulness; to birds, noting carefully their mode of flight; to beautiful human bodies, calculating their mathematical proportions. Geological evidences of the Flood, mechanical devices, and engines of war—all received his interested and inventive attention. He was an unflinching advocate of mathematics as an important branch of learning. He was a persistent and continuous observer of all about him. "Try to be a calm spectator," he taught students of painting, "of how people laugh and weep, hate and love, blanch from horror and cry out in pain; look, learn, investigate, observe, in order that thou mayest come to know the expression of all human notion."¹

Advances in science.—Leonardo's scientific accomplishments were less than they might have been, because of the dispersion of his energies. The same scientific temper in others, when restricted to narrower scope, yielded important fruits. Medicine made great advances as the result, first, of a thorough mastery of classical source books by Hippocrates and Galen, and second, of a resort to objective studies of human physiology. Anatomical dissection was practiced and much was learned about the circulation of the blood. Chemistry became more than the alchemistic search for the "philosopher's stone." Paracelsus (died in 1541) led the way for the alliance of chemistry with pharmacy. Botany and zoölogy were both pursued for the understanding they might contribute toward the physical

¹D. Merejkowski, *The Romance of Leonardo da Vinci*, p. 169.

life of man. Botanical gardens and menageries could be found in the establishments of rulers and men of wealth.

More striking still were the advances in physical science. For them preparation was made, first, by the development of mathematical principles and formulae with which to demonstrate in quantitative terms the discoveries which ensued, and secondly, by the invention of instruments of finer accuracy. It became possible for Copernicus (1473-1543) to sustain with elaborate reasoning the theory (suggested to him by reading the Pythagorean philosophers) that the earth revolves on its own axis and with other planets forms part of a solar system whose center is the sun. It was then possible for Galileo (1564-1642) to use his telescope (constructed in 1609) to discover ratifications of the Copernican hypothesis. Both these men, in advancing the new explanation founded it on the logical basis urged by the fourteenth century philosopher, William of Occam, namely, the Law of Parsimony, that of two otherwise equally satisfactory hypotheses, the simpler is to be preferred as the true.

Additional scientific achievements stand to the credit of Galileo. In the cathedral at Pisa the sight of a swinging chandelier, which to others meant nothing significant, revealed to his observant mind the laws of pendular motion. From the Leaning Tower of Pisa his experiments in timing falling bodies demonstrated that rate of descent bore no relation to weight, that the heavier did not fall faster than the lighter. Like Leonardo, he was an incessant observer, but unlike Leonardo, he was inclined to test his guesses by carefully controlled "experiments." From the Renaissance came that experimental method accepted by later ages as the key to the secrets of nature.

Scientific knowledge was also extended in the field of geography—an expression again of the Renaissance man's insatiable curiosity about the world he lived in. This was a period when men's wonder and expectation were tremendously stimulated by thrilling discoveries of new continents of whose existence they had never dreamed. Using a perfected compass and other instruments of navigation, pursuing a theory sustained by the beliefs of the ancients, Christopher Columbus set out from Spain in 1492 and sailed westward into the sea. Marco Polo and others had toiled over land and sea for thousands of miles and rediscovered the farther East which had been a sealed book to the earlier Middle Ages. Colum

s, whose estimate of the earth's circumference was very much too low, expected to reach the lands of the Great Khan by a shorter journey to the west. He returned from his quest the discoverer of an immense new continent, to which he returned on subsequent voyages, and to which Spain, Portugal, France, and England sent explorers, soldiers, and colonists in succeeding years. Gold and silver from America made their way into Europe, stimulating commerce and encouraging colonial enterprises, destined ultimately to carry European culture around the globe. Whatever Columbus contributed to geographical science was promptly "applied." Exploration continued. In 1497 Vasco da Gama, the Portuguese, found the sea route to the Orient (for which Columbus had been searching) when he circled Africa, crossed the Indian Ocean, and made his way to the west coast of India. In 1519 Magellan began a three-years' voyage which carried him round the world.

The scientific method.—In point of time, Francis Bacon and Descartes bridge the Renaissance and the modern era. They are notable in the history of development of natural science not because they made great discoveries, but because they pointed the way so clearly for the future extension of knowledge. Bacon in his *Novum Organum* and in his *Advancement of Learning*, and Descartes in his *Discourse on Method*, presented the major features of the inductive method which scholars have ever since attempted to follow. The scholar is to approach his subject in a spirit of doubt; he must free the mind from bias and preconceptions; he must distrust mere authority. Observation and experience, and not reason, must be his guide; reason alone, without the supporting evidence of his senses, leads to error and confusion rather than to truth. Bacon emphasized the need of continued probing into hitherto unknown fields as a means of increasing human control over natural forces, and thus of continuously enlarging human happiness. The foundations of a doctrine of human progress through scientific discoveries were laid by him.

The scientific accomplishments of the Renaissance might have been much greater had the activity which produced them not been restricted by the greater valuation laid upon art and letters and by the absorption of intelligence in the religious problems connected with the Protestant and Catholic Reformations. As it was, Galileo met most determined opposition from the Church; other men of scientific bent turned to historical problems to test their

critical powers; and generally among the men of first intelligence scholarship in classical letters and religious literature was also esteemed. After the invention of the printing press (1455), many of the best minds of Europe were occupied in preparing original and critical editions of ancient works for publication.

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE RENAISSANCE

In political theory and practice the Renaissance foreshadowed the modern age. In general, the dominance of ecclesiastical interests gave ground to the rising importance of the secular. In political thought, strong opposition developed to the medieval claims of papal political authority, and support was given instead to the pretensions of the rising secular princes. Theories of sovereignty were discussed that asserted the rights of princes, but at the same time, interestingly enough, limited royal authority by the theory that all governments rest upon the consent of the governed. The basis for this doctrine of popular liberties, thinkers found in the ancient theory of natural rights. This conception of a political state in which authority is limited and the governed enjoy "natural rights" was eagerly seized upon in the modern period to justify transforming the absolute monarchies into constitutional governments.

The development of political nationalism.—But neither during the Renaissance nor in the early centuries of modern times were these theories translated into fact. In political practice the dominant currents ran powerfully towards the development of national monarchies, in which the master hand was that of an absolute prince—the "strong man," who was largely the architect of the new national state. This rising tide of dynastic nationalism was, for future ages, perhaps the period's most significant political phenomenon. During the Renaissance, England, France, Spain, and Portugal achieved political unity under absolute kings. Italy was not so fortunate, divided as the peninsula was into strong city-states and the dominions of the Church. Central Europe likewise lagged far behind, its feudal houses still retaining the realities of sovereignty.

The rise of the national monarchies was clearly a revolt against the medieval theory of a universal state as broad as the frontiers of Christendom. Here, too, was a revolt against the localism or particularism exemplified in the medieval feudal states. Political

tegration—political enlargement—was the accepted order. The political influence of the medieval Church was fast diminishing. A prolonged development had begun in which the sense of a local corporate existence and a local patriotism were to be swallowed up in the new conceptions of a more inclusive political community—the nation. Moreover, religious loyalties of the medieval period were to be transmuted into political loyalties; that is, loyalties to the new monarchies.

Machiavelli and his theories of statecraft.—Among the political theorists, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) was the prophet of the new age. In the diplomatic service of Florence he had observed the methods of princes, popes, and emperors, the conditions of life among the Italian people, and especially the evils resulting from Italian weakness and inefficient political organization. He longed for Italian unity, that the Italian people might free themselves forever from the domination of popes and perpetual invasions by French kings and emperors of the Holy Roman Empire. He declared that government by consent of the governed was the ideal form; but, being a realist, he saw the hopelessness of attaining such a goal under existing conditions in the Italian peninsula. And so he threw himself into the defense of the “strong men” as the great hope of liberation. With an objectivity which paid no heed to moral scruples, he outlined in two of his works, *The Prince* and *Discourses of the First Ten Books of Livy*, the way for a prince to get and keep a throne, and once there, to build up a strong state and extend its boundaries. His illustrations were mostly drawn from Italian politics. In his mind the Church had no special claims to favorable treatment by ruling princes. It is the state which he considers so important that anything may be done for its good, the end justifying the means, the “reason of state” excusing cruelty, violence, and bad faith. For from the state, society derived the real benefits which Machiavelli esteemed. Here was a pattern followed by the early modern kings, even though they raised their voices in deprecation of Machiavellian statecraft.

THE RENAISSANCE AND THE MEDIEVAL CHURCH

The growing worldliness of the Church.—Religion inevitably felt the impact of secularism and individualism. Even among ecclesiastics paganism all too frequently replaced piety. The

Roman Church fell under the sway of men of mundane interests. Spiritual guidance was abandoned by popes who ranged from serene viciousness to urbane worldliness, who were far more occupied in strengthening their political position as rulers of the Papal State or in patronizing scholars and artists and rebuilding the city of Rome than in attending to the religious needs of a new epoch. "Let us enjoy the Papacy," said Leo X (1513-1521), "now that God has given it to us."¹ With such leadership, many churches became permeated with impiety.

The story of St. Peter's Church in Rome may be taken to symbolize the condition of the Church. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the old St. Peter's was torn down to make way for a new edifice which should bear testimony in the grand manner to the glory of God and his Saints. When it came to constructing the new church, the ground plan, superstructure, and decorative details were changed again and again by successive chief architects appointed by a series of short-lived popes. Approximately a century after its beginnings, it was completed in its present form. Slight attention had been paid to liturgical requirements or religious feeling. It was, more especially, an edifice of splendor, with vast and impressive proportions and rich decorative detail, surmounted by Michelangelo's vigorous dome, faced by Bernini's flaring colonnade and constructed, it must be said, at an enormous cost.

The growing worldliness of the Church did not go unheeded. In Italy itself, to be sure, the humanists were so engrossed in the literature and art of the classical culture and so far indifferent to the Church that they took little notice of what went on in the religious world about them. But elsewhere—in the German lands, in France, in Switzerland, and in England—the enquiring and critical temper of the time revealed itself in the examination of the documentary sources of Church history, in new translations of the Bible, and in efforts to reconstruct primitive, uncorrupted Christianity. Men like the Dutch humanist, Desiderius Erasmus; the German vagabond scholar, Ulrich von Hutten; and Sir Thomas More, a distinguished English lawyer—all contemporaries who lived during the close of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century—wrote works emphasizing the need of reform. Erasmus particularly in his *Praise of Folly*, pilloried the clergy for their worldliness, sloth, ignorance, and superstition. They made it abundantly

¹J. A. Symonds, *The Revival of Learning*, p. 17.

ear that the church was no longer performing its basic function. Such influences, coupled with other powerful forces and interests, prepared the setting for a religious explosion.

The revolt against the Church.—But the religious explosion itself was not the work of the humanists; they had no desire for such an event.¹ The actual upheaval was the work mainly of pious churchmen reacting against a Church which had surrendered too far to the free and worldly spirit engendered by the Renaissance; and it may be said that one of the effects of their work was, in fact, to stimulate a renewed interest in certain medieval religious attitudes from which the Renaissance movement sought to free society. The leader of the movement which culminated in the Reformation was Martin Luther, a devout German priest, who was drawn into the controversy by his protest against the means employed to augment the papal treasury for the completion of St. Peter's church. Out of this need for money arose a serious abuse of the Church's old custom of granting indulgences,—an indulgence being a relief from penance granted to a repentant sinner by the authority of the pope. Under the pressure of an unusual demand for revenue, the indulgence tended to become a money commutation for penance, and in the early sixteenth century it was sold rather indiscriminately to sinners in no sense repentant, with very evil effects on the morals of the community which became a market for it. It was this abuse that excited Luther's protest, and led him at the same time to challenge the position of the Roman Church on certain other important matters. What looked at first like a harmless squabble between an obscure priest and the Roman Church rapidly developed into a widespread religious revolt. In defending his stand, Luther was led into a discussion of the relative authority of the individual human conscience and of the corporate inspiration of the Church. When Luther declared that not only the pope but even a church council could err in matters of religious faith, when he insisted that the ultimate guide was the informed human conscience, he took a truly individualistic stand which made of the Church a mere human auxiliary rather than an indispensable divine agent in the salvation of human souls. The Church could, perhaps, remain indifferent to his reforming zeal: it could not suffer its divine nature and supreme authority to be denied by one of its own priests. Luther was

¹While this is not strictly true of von Hutten, it was essentially a political, and not a religious, end which he wished to achieve.

promptly declared a heretic, and when he refused to recant, became an object of persecution.

As an object of persecution he found himself a rallying point for thousands who seemed to be waiting for leadership. There came to his support those who found an interest in stripping the Church of some of its power and privileges—German nobles who desired the rich lands of the Church and political freedom from interference of pope and emperor, German knights who dreamed of giving political unity to the German peoples and creating a fatherland, thousands from the common ranks who sincerely sought religious and moral reform and relief from the heavy burden laid upon them in the form of church exactions. The Church had met with serious opposition in the past, but it had put it down with inflexible determination and, if need be, with ruthlessness. In the sixteenth century the seeds of revolt were too widely scattered. By insisting upon living for itself and its own worldly interests instead of ministering to the religious needs of its people, the Church had fallen out of the affections and the respect of such great numbers that only by unprecedented exertion of force could the revolt be stopped. The decentralized political organization in Germany made it possible for Luther to obtain there protection against the Pope and the Emperor. The wars in Italy absorbed the energies of Emperor Charles V and prevented him from marshaling the might of the Church to stamp out the rebellion in its earlier stages.

Establishment of the modern religious order.—The Protestant Reformation, spreading rapidly into Switzerland, France, England and other parts of Europe, ushered in the modern religious order. Despite some success in regaining communicants, the Church had lost its medieval position. The unity of Christendom in Western Europe was no more. Universalism in religion, the characteristic ideal of medieval Christianity, gave way to nationalism and individualism in this as in other fields. There were attendant difficulties. The individualistic tenets of Protestantism gave rise to constant disagreement over articles of belief. Frequent secessions and schisms led to new sects promoting varying interpretations of Biblical teaching. Religious bitterness and intolerance, civil wars of religion, and international conflicts reduced Western Europe, through three centuries of suffering, to a realization that harmony must be found in the new and diverse society by admitting the right of differences in religious belief; that is to say, harmony

through toleration. Only in the nineteenth century was the Protestant Reformation to bear its fruit of religious liberty based upon law; so far as individuals are concerned, religious intolerance is still a source of unhappiness and injustice.

THE SPREAD OF THE RENAISSANCE

We have seen that the extensive and complex cultural change of this epoch of transition from the strictly medieval to the strictly modern was first observable in Italy. There it was gradual in its progress. Through Northern Europe, also, it developed by degrees, spreading from Italy as the source and center. The new ideas, the new spirit, and the new customs of the Renaissance were disseminated in various ways. In the fourteenth century traveling merchants, clergymen, and soldiers found their way back from Italy to northern towns and villages, with visible evidences and numerous tales of the new wonders they had observed. In the next century teachers—particularly a semi-monastic order known as the Brethren of the Common Life, whose principal function was the maintenance of schools for boys—propagated the new studies in Germany and England. In the late fifteenth century notable humanistic scholars arose from these schools, to criticize outworn institutions and customs, and to spread the new learning more widely than before.

Two inventions were of supreme importance in the transmission of ideas current in the new epoch. One was the introduction into Western Europe, by the Mohammedans in Spain, of paper—a commodity whose original invention is credited to the Chinese some thirteen centuries before. Paper greatly reduced the cost of one means of spreading knowledge, for it took the place of expensive parchment prepared from animal skins. The second invention was that of movable type for printing (about 1455), attributed to John Gutenberg of Mainz. This invention was productive of still further reduction in cost and a very much greater degree of speed in the reproduction of thought upon paper in numerous identical copies. Europe became relatively flooded with the production of its own greatest minds, and with editions of the outstanding writings from the ancient past.

It must be recognized, however, that while the transformation spread from Italy to the North, it was never complete even in its

place of origin. The Renaissance did not penetrate all communities alike, or to the same degree, or at the same rate. In England and France, for example, the climax of the Renaissance movement was reached in the late sixteenth century—the Elizabethan period in England and the period of Rabelais and Montaigne in France. But at this time the Netherlands, Flanders, and Spain were just beginning to feel the effects of the new currents; and the German and Scandinavian countries were still absorbed in the religious revolt. The Balkans, continuing under the authority of the Turk, and Russia had felt their influence not at all. With the arrival of the seventeenth century the modern world was not in evidence everywhere in Europe, while nowhere had the medieval stamp entirely disappeared. In fact, in many communities and in many individuals medieval attitudes still prevail. The transition is still continuing down to our own day.

THEN AND NOW

From the Renaissance Europe moved into the modern era somewhat more slowly than she had turned from the Middle Ages, but whatever the Renaissance had discovered or rediscovered, the later age has either developed more fully or has abandoned. In politics the national state of the Renaissance became the model for the rest of the world. In economic life, the new areas of the expanded world of Renaissance exploration became the basis of a commercial revolution and of great colonial development. Scholarship in letters has flagged, and so has artistic production, but natural science has been developed as never before. The scientific method has become the most extensively used instrument of knowledge; applied to the natural environment, it has yielded invention after invention through which natural forces and resources have been harnessed for man's material advancement.

The *Utopia* of Sir Thomas More and the *Atlantis* of Francis Bacon reflect the combined Renaissance influences of scholarship, geographical discovery, and optimism for the future. Since their day perfect societies have been pictured by many authors. Before them such societies were thought of as remote in time, back in the Golden Age. In their day, they were remote in distance, out in some undiscovered country from whose bourne no traveler returns. Of late Utopias, having failed in nineteenth-century Europe and America, are placed by imaginative writers at some point far distant in space.

on some undiscovered planet from which no rocket-airship ever makes its way again to earth. Some twentieth-century Utopians have been captivated by Bacon's dream of human progress through the discoveries of science. They picture an age when science shall have eased the burden of human labor and set men free, with an abundance of time to enjoy the best of all possible worlds which science is to create. But happiness still eludes mankind.

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CHAPTER XV

MODERN CULTURE

By the opening of the seventeenth century, European civilization had come to bear a sufficiently marked family resemblance to our own to make it look somewhat familiar, at least in certain fundamental aspects. The dominating influence of religious institutions was in retreat; interest in the world of material and living things, and in science, was on the ascent. The political localism of the feudal age, together with the imperial conception of a universal State, and the religious conception of a universal Church, were all fading into the past over a considerable part of Europe; the national state had emerged, placing its familiar stamp both on political and on religious institutions. The Renaissance had introduced a new vitalizing spirit that was not permitted to die. These are but a few of the obvious indications that proclaim the arrival of a new age. Yet, as suggested in the preceding chapter, the process of change was far from complete by 1600. It continues on down to our own time. It might be said that during the whole period that we call modern we have been in process of becoming modern, slowly sloughing off elements of medieval culture and medieval attitudes with the passing of time.

Three periods of modern culture.—Progress has not been uniform; down to the latter part of the eighteenth century society moved slowly. The time was not yet ripe for a full realization of the rich promises of the Renaissance. Amid signs of a new era there were currents of reaction. Then, in the eighteenth century there began a remarkable period that we may call the Age of Revolution. Ideas that had lain dormant since the Renaissance, again became dynamic; medieval institutions, traditions, and attitudes were challenged on all sides; society rose to sweep outworn modes from its path, and by reform or violent revolutions to construct a new social order on the basis of new conceptions in politics, religion, and economics. But even then the goal was not to be won in a day. Conservatism and reaction struggled desperately to preserve ancient

privileges and ancient ways, so that the whole nineteenth century witnessed in this or that part of the Western world the conflict between the old and the new.

It is evident, then, that we cannot generalize over the whole modern period when we describe modern culture. We can distinguish three periods: (1) the period of the Old Order, (2) the Age of Revolution, (3) the Bourgeois Era. The Western world before the Age of Revolution presents a culture widely different from that which emerged under the bourgeoisie during the second half of the nineteenth century. The Age of Revolution, the interval between the two, may be regarded as a transitional period, during which considerable parts of Europe passed from the Old Order to the bourgeois Era. Dates attached to these periods must be accepted with caution, for the cultural changes set going during the period of revolution did not affect all parts of Europe at the same time or with the same force. We shall, more or less arbitrarily, place the Old Order in the period between 1600 and the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789. The Bourgeois Era begins in the twenties of the nineteenth century and comes down to the present. The Age of Revolution lies between these two periods.

THE FIRST PERIOD OF MODERN CULTURE: THE OLD ORDER

Economic society.—Economic society before the Age of Revolution was still essentially medieval. A serf of the twelfth century returned to earth sometime in the seventeenth or eighteenth century would have found little change in rural society. He would have found the bulk of the inhabitants still living in villages, and except here and there—in England and in certain parts of France—still bound to the soil, held to a monotonous routine of the manorial system. He would have found no perplexity on taking his place by the side of these “modern” tillers of the soil. He would have seen clumsy tools like those he had used six hundred years earlier; he would have found himself familiar with the crops and the methods of tillage and with the services exacted by the landlord.

A member of the medieval burgher class would likewise have found little more to excite his wonder in the towns. The old familiar sights and odors would have greeted his senses. He would have found the towns somewhat larger, perhaps, and the burghers in the market place and on the dirty streets more portly and more

prosperous. In a coast town he would have wondered a little at the large and more splendid ships, at the increased activity along the wharves, and at certain strange cargoes brought from lands not even dreamed of in his day. But he would have seen much to reassure him if he had looked into the shops anywhere outside of England; he would have seen apprentices, journeymen, and masters working at the bench in the old medieval fashion with the same kind of hand tools, and under the same sort of guidance of the guilds. Could he have pried into the mysteries of commerce he would have found much to astonish him, but to the casual eye this "modern" world would not have looked modern at all, but strikingly medieval, so far as its economic life was concerned.

Political changes.—A feudal lord making a pilgrimage back to earth in the eighteenth century would not have found the modern world so reassuring. Society in general would have been quite to his liking: a small minority of nobles still born into numerous privileges and favored with exemptions and still possessing their great estates; a vast majority of common folk still born to labor for their support and in most places, as serfs, still furnishing the customary services they had performed in the Middle Ages. Despite these indications of continued dignity and prestige, however, he would have discovered signs of disturbing alterations in the position of grandeur which the nobility had once maintained. He would have found that in important particulars the landed aristocracy was but a shadow of its former self.

Politically, the feudal age had run its course. Strong national monarchies had been established in England, France, Spain, and Portugal. In the states of Central Europe, it is true, a national monarchy had not been set up, and the Holy Roman Empire had become little more than a name, the emperor hardly more than a figurehead; but even here powerful princes were autocrats in their own realms. In Italy the city-states still flourished, but the feudal nobility could find no place as a class under the political order there. And the same was true in the republic of Holland and in Switzerland, both of which had entered the family of national states in 1648. The feudal armies of the nobles had passed; nobles and knights could no longer achieve glory and power in feudal wars. And with the loss of his military power the noble had lost political authority as well. So it had become the rule in the seventeenth century that princes governed, not in theory merely but in fact. Armies were now armies

f the prince, and the king's peace—the law and order of the prince—was established in society.

Such were the changes that had come over political Europe, distinguishing the modern from the medieval age. The prince imagined by Machiavelli had become in large measure a reality on the thrones of Europe. The earlier political ideas of the Renaissance thinkers—ideas of equality, of natural rights, of government by consent—had not yet obtained a foothold in practical politics. Only in England was absolutism seriously disputed. On the Continent the prince was the state. The Church and the feudal nobility, the two forces that frequently had limited his power in the Middle Ages, were now mastered. Within the royal person was vested all political and military power; he largely dictated the religion of his subjects; he invaded the economic activity of the people by imposing a mass of regulations on agriculture, industry, and commerce. This was a momentous change. It meant that the local economy of the Middle Ages had disappeared in a more inclusive national economy. This paternalistic policy was based on an economic theory called mercantilism. Mercantilism taught that national prosperity, in general, and the prosperity of the prince in particular, could be achieved only by the development of an economically self-supporting state.¹ This complete and many-sided authority of the ruling prince was supported and secured by the accepted theory of divine right. Royal power was said to be bestowed by God himself; to revolt against it was not merely treason but an affront to religion and to God.

Religious changes.—In religion, as in politics, the Old Order is in strong contrast to the Middle Ages. The unity of Christendom in the West, which had characterized the Middle Ages, had been destroyed by the Protestant Revolt; and Europe was not only divided between Catholic and Protestant, but Protestant Europe was subdivided by at least three major forms of religious faith—Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anglican; while the whole religious map of Europe was shaded by the rise of independent monarchies, for everywhere, in Protestant and Catholic countries alike, churches were becoming national churches, joined in a powerful union with the state. There had been many common men who had dreamed that the religious revolution was to mean religious liberty and tolerance.

¹For a more complete exposition of mercantilism, see pp. 363–365.

But like some other dreams of the Renaissance intellectuals, no such result was to be realized for a long time to come. With a fear of the demoralizing effect of religious individualism came reaction. Princes were quick to anticipate disorder from religious tolerance, and as quick to recognize the political advantage of religious uniformity together with an obedient clergy to inculcate reverence and passive obedience among the people. So the guiding principle was accepted that "he who has the rule has the religion." In consequence, with few exceptions to prove the rule, the period is marked by religious intolerance and persecution. Liberty of conscience was still a prize to be won.

Intellectual activity.—As one pictures the depressing effect of the reassertion of authority by Church and State, he is likely to conclude that intellectual activity during the early modern period must have felt a crushing weight. That is true in some respects. It is hardly to be expected that the Renaissance ideal of liberating the human intellect should have found a hospitable reception. With Church and State joined in sympathetic partnership to preserve the existing order of things, it was natural that the expression of men's thoughts and feelings should be guarded by a strict censorship, lest such thoughts and feelings become seriously critical of existing traditions and institutions. The publication of objectionable works was generally forbidden, and frequently objectionable books, once published, were burned. Even England, notable, in many ways, for her advance over the Continent, maintained a system of licensing the publication of writings until well toward the end of the seventeenth century.

Holland offered a conspicuous exception to the rule. Once Holland had freed herself from the Spanish yoke in the beginning of the seventeenth century, she became the refuge of intellectuals who feared to publish their thoughts at home. It was there that John Locke, an English philosopher, lived for five years in exile, formulating the philosophical ideas for later writings which were to help turn society upside down in the eighteenth century. When Louis XIV (1643-1715) of France was preparing to make war on the Calvinists, Pierre Bayle, a Protestant, left his own country to settle in the Netherlands for the purpose of writing in support of religious toleration. It was in the Netherlands that the French philosopher Descartes produced his notable works advocating the importance of reason in the advancing of human knowledge. And

ere also lived the great philosopher Spinoza, driven from his own wish community for his liberality of thought. While his hands ere busy grinding lenses, his mind was busy with thoughts for his philosophical works, in which a dominant theme was intellectual eedom as a requisite of human progress. But even Holland could times be oppressive enough, for she drove her famous son Hugo otius from his native land because of his liberal views on religion d his opposition to the Stadholder. Thus it was that his great ork *On the Law of War and Peace* was written and published not the Netherlands but in Paris, 1625.

The intellectual vigor of Holland was not evidenced in Italy d Central Europe. In Italy, decline set in after the sixteenth ntury in every intellectual field that had earlier distinguished alian life. A combination of circumstances explains the change. he Italian lands, torn by almost incessant war and foreign invasion d by political upheaval, deprived of their great commercial osperity by the transfer of trade from the Mediterranean after e revolutionary discoveries of the fifteenth century, and subjected the rigid surveillance of the Roman Church imposed by the al session of the Council of Trent (1562-1563), were no longer ngential to the creative spirit of the Renaissance. In the German ates the Renaissance spent its force in religious thought and con- oversy. Disunited Germany, like disunited Italy, became the ttle-ground of contending dynasties. With the close of the irtiry Years' War (1618-1648), Central Europe lay impoverished d in ruins. We must wait till the second half of the eighteenth ntury for the decisive beginning of that outburst of literature, usic, and philosophy which constitutes the splendid contribution Germany to modern culture in those fields.

Neither Holland, with its liberty and rich intellectual activity, r Italy and Germany, enfeebled by adverse conditions, repre- ented a situation typical of Western Europe in the early modern riod. In such countries as England, France, and Spain, the soil as not altogether congenial to the germination of the seeds of the enaissance; yet those countries made notable advances in a variety fields. They were unable to maintain the heights attained in the e arts during the Renaissance, but they passed on to great achieve- ents in literature,¹ and to far greater accomplishments in science an the Renaissance period was able to show.

¹See p. 302 ff.

Art and architecture.—By way of generalization touching fine arts, about all one can say is that the trend was downward at the Renaissance. But as soon as we examine separate countries we see how misleading the generalization is. In Italy and the German lands the trend was sharply downward. Seventeenth-century France produced numerous painters and sculptors, but they had all touch with nature and were devoid of the fire and freedom of the Renaissance artists; French art became excessively formalized and mechanical. In the eighteenth century there was a revolt in favor of natural spontaneity, free from the restraints of form, and the French artists attempted to return "to nature, to truth, and to life." In Spain, on the other hand, the Renaissance influence became visible in the seventeenth century; two artists of high order appeared—Velasquez and Murillo. The one was a court painter, excelling in portraiture; the other worked in the service of the Church. In addition, both pictured the ordinary people and life of their time. In Holland, Frans Hals and Rembrandt are only two outstanding figures among many artists of merit. Both of these found subjects for their canvases in the varied and colorful everyday life of their own land. In the Spanish Netherlands two outstanding names were added to the list of modern painters—Van Dyck, one of the truly great portrait painters of all time, and Peter Paul Rubens, distinguished though less excellent artist.

In England seventeenth-century puritanism laid a cold and discouraging hand on art. The eminent artists of the time were borrowed from the Continent—Holbein from Germany, Rubens and Van Dyck from the Spanish Netherlands. After the Restoration (1660) Charles II imported a number of inferior artists from France and Germany. Hogarth, an Englishman, made a place for himself in the early eighteenth century; but a real national school of English art did not exist until the century had passed the half-way point. Then there appeared a galaxy of artists—Reynolds, Gainsborough, Ramsay, Romney, and Constable—to give England a notable place in the history of painting.

In architecture the early modern period reflected the influence of the Renaissance styles. But the effects of the new forms did not reveal themselves at the same time or to the same degree in the various national cultures. Everywhere there is evidence of the transition from the medieval Gothic to the Renaissance, and of the influence of the national history. In Germany and the Netherlands

conflicting aims of the architects produced a conglomeration of architectural features that stamped Renaissance architecture as a failure. In Spain the Moorish influence stood in the way of the development of a genuine Renaissance style. In England the Gothic influence held on until Inigo Jones and Christopher Wren introduced pure Renaissance buildings in the last part of the seventeenth century. Speaking generally, as the early modern period wore on the Renaissance style grew decadent. The decline was shown in the trend toward over-elaboration, as had been the case with the Gothic—the introduction of endless and meaningless ornamental forms and grotesque capitals. The change became apparent in France in the Age of Louis XIV, and it was the French who applied the word *rococo* to describe the innovation. In Germany and Holland over-elaboration was carried to an extreme. These signs of decay were symptomatic of a coming change in national taste.

The change is known as the Classical Revival. It began in France during the reign of Louis XV (1715–1774) and spread to other countries during the same century, except in Italy, where the Renaissance persisted with only slight influence from the new movement. The Classical Revival was characterized by a revolt against the over-embellishment of the *rococo* style and by a return to the simplicity and sincerity of the Greek and Roman builders. In Germany it resulted in a highly successful adaptation of classical models to modern needs. In England the break with the Renaissance style was not sufficiently clean-cut to produce many successful buildings. In the United States it was the Classical Revival which introduced the so-called colonial architecture.

Progress in science.—In the early modern period science was becoming a robust youth facing the future with the romantic spirit of the discoverer and explorer, and animated by the strong conviction that it was some day to liberate mankind. Science had not yet broken down the opposition of the humanists in the universities; although some scientific discussion and experimentation were carried on within their walls, the conspicuous contributions were made by individuals and groups outside. These men sat humbly at the feet of Nature to learn her ways. Patiently and persistently, even in obscurity and sometimes in the face of the opposition of churchmen, they observed, experimented, gathered data, and presented their findings before scientific societies. In the seventeenth

century the Royal Society of England was founded in London to promote the new scientific learning, and in France the government established the Academy of Science and endowed its work. As a result of all these activities, science began a vigorous advance that has proceeded with ever more startling discoveries down to our own day.

First and foremost in the seventeenth century was Sir Isaac Newton, whose *Principia*, published in 1687, is spoken of by one scholar as representing perhaps "the highest of individual achievement in the realms of pure thought." Born of humble English parents, Newton quickly rose to distinction for his brilliant accomplishments in mathematics. He shares with Leibnitz, a German philosopher, the honor of devising differential calculus, which was to become one of the valuable instruments in the advancement of scientific learning. In the field of astronomy Newton took up and carried to greater heights the contributions of Copernicus and Galileo. He designed a telescope, observed the stars, and wondered by what forces they were held in their courses; the ultimate result of his speculations was his famous law of universal gravitation. Every body, he concluded, exerts a force upon every other body—the sun upon the earth, the earth upon the sun, the stars upon each other, and so forth—and thus the heavenly bodies are held in a state of perpetual equilibrium. It was Newton who formulated the now familiar law that the force of gravity increases directly in proportion to the product of the masses, and inversely in proportion to the square of the distances. But Newton's discoveries did far more than furnish the modern world with a formula of fundamental importance; they administered the decisive blow to astrology, provided a new conception of the solar system, and disclosed the mechanical nature of the universe, now shown to be reduced to order by the workings of natural law.

The eighteenth century produced no such luminary as Newton, but it added names of distinction to the history of science. In the preceding century Robert Boyle had done important foundation work in the field of chemistry, which was considerably extended in the eighteenth. New chemical elements were discovered, and new compounds were produced. A famous Frenchman, Lavoisier, collected the experimental results of his contemporaries, reduced them to a systematic body of knowledge, and thus facilitated the further advance of chemistry. Meanwhile, discoveries in anatomy

physiology, and medicine were adding to man's knowledge of the human body and were arming society to some extent against the ravages of disease. The circulation of the blood had already been discovered during the seventeenth century; the relation between microbes and disease was beginning to be understood; vaccination against the dreaded smallpox was introduced; and a German scientist, Haller, was practicing vivisection as a means of advancing physiology. There was progress also in other fields. Benjamin Franklin demonstrated the identity of lightning and electricity; two Italians, Volta and Galvani, invented the voltaic cell and made other additions to physics; Linnaeus, a Swede, contributed to the foundations of botany. In the field of geology observers were studying the stratification of the earth's surface; fossils were collected, examined, and arranged.

This bare and incomplete catalogue of achievements may at least suggest the variety and extent of men's scientific interests in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The eighteenth century is sometimes characterized as the Age of Reason. Emotionalism was distrusted as a hindrance to clear thinking and sound judgments. Facts visible to the eye, and conclusions dictated by observation and the test of reason, were held to be the only sure guide to the advancement of knowledge. These attitudes were perhaps fostered by the progress of science; and, in their turn, they stimulated a greater interest in scientific study, for the temper and methods of the scientist fitted in admirably with the spirit of the age. Science became a popular subject. Translations of important books were made; popularizations of scholarly studies appeared; scientific discoveries became a common topic of conversation and speculation. As we shall see presently, science was to have a significant influence when society turned critical eyes on the Old Order, in the last years preceding the revolutionary period.

THE SECOND PERIOD OF MODERN CULTURE: THE AGE OF REVOLUTION

To an ordinary observer surveying the scene in the middle of the eighteenth century, the social structure would have appeared stable and secure. There were no visible signs of an approaching storm. Yet, to the critical and penetrating eye the signs were there, for European society, particularly in France, was outgrowing existing institutions and traditional ways of thought. Society was about

to enter another period of profound change. History was revealing itself in characteristic form—a period of authority and stability alternating with a period of liberty and rapid change. We have observed these phenomena all through the development of Western culture. The Middle Ages represent essentially a period of authority and stability; social changes were slow. In the period of the Renaissance society pulled its stakes and set off for a promised land. With the dawn of the modern age, society regained its balance; effective authority was again established by the absolute princes, and society settled down to a slower pace. The Age of Revolution represents another period of liberty and rapid change. How is this historical cycle to be explained?

The explanation lies in facts that have been observed earlier in this work. In the final analysis, a given civilization is an expression of society's conception of what satisfies its needs. When it ceases to satisfy those needs, a few penetrating minds first discover the fact and proclaim it. Then the masses begin to see, and society enters upon an interval of instability. If the outworn elements of the civilization—its institutions, let us say—can be changed by orderly processes and brought into a new adjustment, society may move on without resort to force. If rigid conservatism interposes itself as an immovable barrier to change, then the opposing elements of society are likely to turn to violence. Such, in brief, was the situation in certain areas of Western civilization on the eve of what we have called the Age of Revolution.

Why society was outgrowing the Old Order.—Toward the close of the eighteenth century it was becoming increasingly evident in Western Europe that the institutions of the Old Order were no longer functioning to the satisfaction of large sections of society. This was particularly true in France, where the upheaval began. When we reflect upon the state of the people during the early modern period we can understand the sources of instability. To the upper classes generally all seemed to be right with the world. In France the great nobles, the archbishops, the bishops, and the abbots were with few exceptions, quite content with the existing order; they could hardly be expected to admit that there was anything fundamentally wrong with it. Hence they stood in almost solid ranks to defend it. But to the unprivileged merchants, bankers, shopkeepers, lawyers, doctors, journalists, and the mass of manual workers, French institutions looked sadly out of joint. Nor did the

existing order satisfy the great body of serfs and tenants who lived on the land. All of these groups together, urban and rural, composed the so-called Third Estate and made up more than ninety per cent of the total population. These formed the ranks of the opposition.

Their grievances were just. France had become like a prison for all except the privileged few. Between these privileged ones and the great mass of people there was no equality: the aristocrats held the land and enjoyed its revenues; the serfs tilled the land and were bound to it; the urban groups were shackled in their economic activity by numerous regulations imposed from above. The unprivileged majority bore the brunt of the taxes, yet had no voice in laying them, nor in determining how the state income should be spent. There was no equality before the law: the poor man found the courts difficult of access; penalties were brutal and often out of all proportion to the nature of the offense. Conditions like these caused the more enlightened to believe that French institutions needed drastic overhauling.

The French Third Estate had not always been so restless or so critical of the Old Order. Earlier they had generally borne their burdens with much patience and little grumbling. The great majority of them had never experienced any more comfortable existence; they were inclined to think of their hard lot in life, if they ever thought of it at all, as an inevitable part of their existence. But new influences were making themselves felt in French society, and the Third Estate was becoming less manageable. With the great discoveries of Da Gama and Columbus, commerce was released from the narrow confines of the Mediterranean, the Baltic, and the coastal waters of Europe; it became world-wide. Commercial expansion produced industrial expansion. As an inevitable result, the class which had to do with industry and trade grew in numbers, wealth, and knowledge. Before these changes, only the upper crust of the bourgeoisie had been able to improve their position in France, sometimes breaking through the barriers into the privileged classes, sometimes winning the favor of the king and opening the way into important offices; but as a class, the bourgeoisie had remained ignoble and unprivileged. Now that class was in a position to stand erect before absolute princes and a privileged aristocracy, and demand a voice in the affairs of France. It was largely the bourgeoisie that assumed the leadership in the French Revolution.

Influence of the eighteenth-century philosophers.—The growing opposition of the bourgeoisie, and of the Third Estate generally, was stimulated and strengthened by a new enlightenment that came at first from a few intellectuals, commonly called the eighteenth-century philosophers. These not only made an effective minority conscious of their grievances, but attempted to suggest means by which these grievances could be remedied. Students of revolutionary phenomena tell us that revolutions are made before what we are accustomed to call the revolution has begun. This means that before a physical upheaval begins, a revolution in men's minds has preceded it and made it possible. It is the revolution in their ideas, beliefs, and attitudes that leads men to action to redress their grievances. It was the intellectuals of the eighteenth century and their disciples who created the revolution in men's thinking as a forerunner to the assault that finally transformed the society of the Old Order.

A complete list of those who contributed to the philosophy of revolt would be a long one. Among the most influential were the French thinkers Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Diderot. To these names should be added that of the Scotch philosopher and economist Adam Smith. Among French economists there were still others of less fame who helped to shape the course of events. It is not the striking originality of ideas that has given these men an important place in the history of European thought. Much of what they wrote they borrowed from Renaissance and classical writers. What they did, largely, was to elaborate the ideas, and to adapt them admirably to the needs of those who finally planned the assault upon institutions hallowed by time and buttressed by medieval tradition. The French writers, particularly, made these ideas "catching" because they, instead of sealing their thoughts in forbidding volumes of abstractions, dressed them up in brilliant essays, appealing novels and dramas, and histories, not always accurate, but always stimulating.

The interest of most of these men was not academic; they consciously sought to bring about fundamental changes. Addressing some of his associates in the great enterprise, Voltaire wrote "Come, brave Diderot, intrepid d'Alembert, ally yourselves to overwhelm the fanatics and the knaves, destroy the insipid declamations, the miserable sophistries, the lying history, . . . the absurdities without number; do not let those who have sense be

subjected to those who have none; and the generation which is being born will owe to us its reason and liberty." And again he writes: Everything that I see appears to be throwing broadcast the seed of Revolution which must some day inevitably come, but which I shall not have the pleasure of seeing. . . . Light extends so far from neighbor to neighbor, that there will be a splendid outburst on the first occasion; and then there will be a rare commotion. The young are fortunate; they will see fine things."

The philosophers' goal for a new society.—To the philosophers, surveying society under the Old Order, the supreme need was liberty, the liberty of the individual to think and act; for the common man appeared to be a prisoner, bound and gagged by a mass of ancient traditions and by numberless regulations imposed by a government in which he had no voice. A passion for liberty had been a characteristic of the Renaissance. In the eighteenth century the passion was revived, but with a broader and more effective application; liberty was to penetrate every aspect of life throughout society. "Liberty," said Voltaire, "embraces all." It became the first of the three magic words that French revolutionists placed everywhere before their eyes.

It was one thing to put the finger on the supreme need of liberty; it was quite another matter to dislodge authority and privilege established by tradition. The accepted standards of right and wrong were heavily weighted in support of society as history had made it. How could the privileges of the aristocracy and of the church be branded as wrong or unjust when hallowed custom declared them to be right and just? The philosophers found a fulcrum for their lever in a new standard—the doctrine of natural rights. Man, they declared, was born with certain natural rights conferred by God himself. The natural rights of man were the highest expression of human reason, or, as Rousseau thought, an expression of man's inborn feeling of what is right. What is "natural," then, became the philosopher's measuring stick. Institutions or laws or customs that deprived man of his natural rights could not be justified and should be changed or destroyed, antiquity and history to the contrary notwithstanding. The doctrine became a powerful instrument in the hands of the revolutionists, since it appeared to offer a justification for the demolition of every arbitrary obstacle in the path of freedom.

Applied to economic life, the doctrine of natural rights led straight

to economic individualism, or economic liberty. In his *Wealth of Nations*, published in the year when the American Declaration of Independence was signed, Adam Smith painstakingly exposed the fallacy of the theory of mercantilism¹ as a drag upon the material advance of the individual and of the nation. "To prohibit a great people from making all that they can of every part of their products," he wrote, "or from employing their stock and industry in the way that they judge most advantageous to themselves, is a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of man." According to the eighteenth-century economists the road to individual and national wealth was to be found not under government regulation but in the freedom of the individual to exercise his powers in the pursuit of material fortune. In France the doctrine received the name of "laissez-faire." For the better part of a century laissez-faire became the rallying cry against the mercantilist system created under the Old Order.

Applied to religion, the idea of natural rights seemed to justify a new conception of man's relation to the Church and of the relation of the Church to the State. It was held that it was not a proper function of the Church or the State to pry into a man's conscience and to impose a particular religious belief, and that the union of Church and State, permitting the one to utilize the coercive power of the other to maintain religious uniformity, was therefore reprehensible and should be dissolved. Liberty of conscience, for which many had hoped in vain during the Protestant Reformation was now given a permanent place in European thought.

The application of the doctrine of natural rights to the conception of society that had been accepted under the Old Order produced a revolution in men's thinking. If men "were born free and equal," the medieval idea of a rigidly stratified society divinely ordained could no longer go unchallenged. Eighteenth-century thought envisaged a society of individuals with equality of rights, not a society of classes possessing privileges in one case and denied them in another. Here was the accepted basis for the French conception of a brotherhood joined to promote the common good of the French nation. So to "liberty" the French added "equality" and "fraternity" to characterize the high and inspiring goal of the Revolution. Thenceforth political nationalism took on a new meaning

¹See Chapter XX.

in Europe, and became a driving force among millions of men in the struggle for political freedom during the nineteenth century.

But however great the desirability of human freedom, a doctrine alone could hardly prevail against the conservative spirit of the Old Order. Asserted rights could become realities only if their champions could achieve political power, for it was hardly likely that princes and aristocrats would surrender those existing institutions whose vested interests gave them the distinction and high place they held in society. How could absolutism, supported as it was by the accepted theory of divine right, be successfully attacked? Eighteenth-century philosophy produced an answer in a counter theory concerning the origin and character of government. It is known as the social-compact theory. The philosophers asserted that the source of the superior authority of princes was not divine, but human; that, in the final analysis, it was the people, not God, who conferred upon princes the authority to rule, to the end that their superior authority might be used to preserve social union and to protect the ruled in their rights. Thus government was contractual in its nature. If the ruler failed in his functions, he violated the compact and might be removed from power. This idea of the political sovereignty of the people lies at the bottom of our modern conceptions of popular government—government founded on the consent of the governed.

The idealism of the early revolutionary period.—The historical significance of this body of doctrines and beliefs is that they presented a picture in ideal form of the new society which many hoped would one day be realized, and at the same time offered a justification for the onslaught on the Old Order. It was these ideas that found lodgment in the minds of the leaders in the American revolution; they gave fervor and direction to the French in the revolution of 1789; they found their way into Latin America and here stirred the Spanish colonists to wage war on the Old Order in Spain; they reappeared on the Continent in a succession of revolutionary movements down to the middle of the nineteenth century.

As we look back over the period from our vantage point in the twentieth century, we may find it difficult to understand the optimism and faith of the idealists of the revolutionary period. Modern history offers no parallel, says Lord Acton, the distinguished English historian, to the sublime courage of the French in the

completeness with which they broke with the past, and the faith with which they faced the unknown future.

It is beyond the scope of this discussion to enter into a full explanation of the spirit of the period. It would lead us more deeply into the philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and back to a consideration of the contribution of science. Into the first source we shall not venture, but the influence of science calls for a word of explanation. In the eighteenth century the accepted social implications of natural science constituted its chief hold upon popular imagination. In the eighteenth century the astonishing achievements of science looked like the fulfillment of man's hope for a better world. If a Newton could reduce the physical universe to order and reveal the natural laws that governed its motions, could not the philosophers also discover the natural laws underlying society and by the application of these laws resolve social confusion into order and harmony? Out of such speculation was born a new belief in human progress and the perfectibility of man.

In our own time we have grown far less confident of the ability of man to create a Golden Age by the sheer force of his intellect. The doctrine of natural rights and of the social compact, along with some other conceptions of the eighteenth-century philosophers, has long been discarded. But while we may speak of many of their ideas as naïve, it must not be forgotten that some of them are strong in our own traditions. They have been built into our institutions; they are of the very warp and woof of our civilization.

Character of the transition to bourgeois civilization.—Chronologically speaking, we have been marking time thus far, in our discussion of the Age of Revolution. In fact, the great body of the philosophy of revolt, which we have tried to explain in the preceding pages, belongs in point of time to the Old Order; but only in point of time, for its spirit was decidedly of another age, and radically destructive of the age that gave it birth. Its fundamental significance to the new society that was to be created during and after the Age of Revolution needs no further explanation.

We have characterized the second period in the development of modern civilization as a transition to the civilization of the Era of the Bourgeoisie. It would be futile to attempt, in one chapter, to describe European culture as it existed during this transitional period. Civilization presents a kaleidoscopic aspect: society was in a state of flux; institutions were changed almost overnight

everywhere in Western Europe the struggle went on between the forces of conservatism and reaction striving to salvage the old order of society, and the revolutionary forces of change inspired by the eighteenth-century philosophy laboring to create a new world which would accord with the teachings of that philosophy. Hence the Age of Revolution is a period of ferment and intermittent upheavals. When the struggle was over—in the third quarter of the nineteenth century—a culture fundamentally different from that of the Old Order had emerged. We call the new period the Bourgeois Era, because it was the bourgeoisie who had triumphed in the fight, who now occupied the seats of power, and who stamped the bourgeois pattern on the culture they proceeded to fashion.

The designation of the transitional period as the Age of Revolution is not meant to suggest that for nearly a century Europe was in a constant state of revolutionary upheaval. The designation is pertinent rather because the changes were fundamental in character, whether effected by revolutions or by reforms; in such a sense it is a "revolutionary" period. But the word also has significance in the ordinary meaning of the term. Down to the middle of the nineteenth century, this was an age when physical force was frankly accepted by the lower classes as an effective means for securing fundamental social and political changes. As we have already seen, a "right" of revolution was imbedded in the philosophy of the period. But back of the physical force there were ever present that eighteenth-century idealism and a faith in man's power to succor an unhappy and oppressed society and to build a Golden Age.

The turbulence of the period becomes impressive if we pass in review its procession of revolutionary disturbances. We have placed its beginning at the time of the collapse of the Old Order in France with the opening of the French Revolution in 1789. If we extend our observation to the New World, we might well push the beginning back to 1775, for it was the American Revolution that first put an end to the Old Order in one area of the world, so far as the colonies may be said to have reflected the Old Order of England. In Europe, the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte, a "son of the Revolution," kept society in turmoil for nearly a generation. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century the epidemic spread to Latin-American countries. During the twenties it flared up again in Spain and Italy; in 1830 it spread more widely

on the Continent. Two years later England was probably saved from a similar fate by the wisdom of her statesmanship, which pointed the way to a constitutional solution of fundamental problems by the Great Reform Bill of 1832 and later reforms. Sixteen years later almost the whole of Western Europe again flamed up in the Revolution of 1848.

The slender results of the widespread revolutions of 1848 brought disillusionment and reaction. Society seemed to have lost much of the optimism and idealism that had characterized the earlier period. Yet Cavour, the "realistic" statesman of Sardinia, included revolution as part of his plans in the unification of Italy in 1859. From 1866 to 1871, the unification of Germany involved "revolutionary" changes of startling character, although Otto von Bismarck himself, another realistic statesman and the architect of German unification, gave no place to revolutions in his political philosophy. The period of revolution may be said to have run its course with the final uprising in France, following her defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. During the seventies French society at last found greater social stability. With the establishment of the Third French Republic we have chosen to close the Age of Revolution.

Down to the middle of the nineteenth century these dramatic events of the Age of Revolution are landmarks in a series. They resulted from the same fundamental causes; they were fought on the same general basis of the political and social philosophy; they envisaged as a goal essentially the same kind of social order. Within the moving revolutionary tides we can discern two dominant currents—sometimes moving together, sometimes in violent opposition. These currents are liberalism and nationalism, both born of the French Revolution and the philosophy preceding it. Liberalism is a term rather loosely applied to movements directed toward the overthrow of absolutism and the establishment of constitutional governments as a guarantee of individual liberties and rights. In those lands where there was neither acceptable constitutional government nor political unity, nationalism emerged to supplement liberalism. In German lands and in the Italian peninsula, nationalism became a mighty force driving toward the building of nation-states. But in the Austrian Empire, composed of a medley of nationalities, nationalism tended rather to tear the empire apart. In the main, it was the power of these two movements, liberalism

and nationalism, that molded the characteristic political features of the culture that emerged in the seventies in Western Europe.

THE THIRD PERIOD OF MODERN CULTURE: THE BOURGEOIS ERA

The choice of the decade of the seventies to mark the close of the age of Revolution is far from arbitrary, for though in many respects the transition from the Old Order to the Bourgeois Era was incomplete, and nationalism and liberalism had not yet wholly fulfilled their mission, still their achievements were impressive. As we would expect, the influences of the revolutionary period had exerted themselves with varying degrees of force in different areas of Europe; everywhere remnants of the Old Order still persisted; but in few corners of Europe were they strong enough to give the characteristic tone to civilization. The period of storm and stress in its major manifestations appeared to have run its course, and Europe settled down to an interval of comparative peace and stability, which was not to be seriously upset until the catastrophe of 1914.

The achievements of nationalism and liberalism.—By the close of the seventies, nationalism had transformed the map of Europe. Central Europe and the Italian peninsula were no longer political checkerboards; in those areas two new states had appeared—the German Empire and the kingdom of Italy. The Belgians had risen against their Dutch masters and established the independent kingdom of Belgium. In the Balkans, nationalism had carved out of the Ottoman Empire the little states of Greece, Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro. Where nationalities still remained under alien authority, as in Austria-Hungary, the Turkish Empire, and elsewhere, nationalism continued as an ever-present source of disturbance and political instability. Thus the new period begins with an enlarged family of national states; and the map of Europe, with a few minor changes, was to remain fixed down to 1914.

The effects of liberalism upon the civilization of the Old Order were even more striking. Wherever the revolutionary forces had in some degree triumphed, there culture received the indelible stamp of eighteenth-century philosophy, for everywhere in Western Europe the aim of the victors was to realize the fruits of victory by translating theories and doctrines into laws and institutions. Almost everywhere in Europe absolutism and divine right passed into history, and some form of popular government became the accepted

type. Constitutions were drawn up to guard against the arbitrary exercise of power, and individual rights were to some degree established in law—the right to vote, to hold office, to speak and publish individual opinion, to assemble for discussion of grievances, to petition for their redress, to exercise choice in religious belief. Apparently the rule of law had become a reality—law before which (theoretically, at least) all stood equal. That these rights were often abridged and violated may be taken for granted; nevertheless, the rights of the individual as dreamed of by the philosophers had greatly increased beyond those he possessed under the Old Order. New institutions gave to society a political stability which it had not enjoyed since the French Revolution, and the constitutions then in force continued, with minor alterations, down to the World War.

By the seventies, the economic world of the Old Order had been transformed beyond recognition. Between the force of a theory—laissez-faire—and the greater force of a revolution in industry, the old economic order had been overthrown in most parts of Europe. Serfdom had practically everywhere disappeared—even in backward Russia—and with it had largely disappeared the medieval methods of agriculture. In industry the machine was fast displacing the handicraft system; factories were springing up, the ancient guilds were gone; modern trade unions were on the march. With the expansion of industry went the growth of trade, until there was hardly a corner of the globe that did not feel its influence. How much of this economic advance can be attributed to the adoption of the laissez-faire policy it is impossible to say; at any rate the advance was accompanied by the retreat of government from the economic life of the people. As a system mercantilism was dead, for the time being. Freedom of enterprise and freedom of trade had become a reality practically complete in Great Britain; the Continent did not make so clean a sweep, but it went far in imitating the British example.

Hardly less striking was the altered face of society. The social pyramid of the Old Order, with its noble and privileged minority at the apex and its unprivileged masses at the base, was seriously cracked if not demolished. Though the nobility had not actually disappeared from society they had been stripped of their prerogatives, if we ignore the power and privilege that continued to lodge in their social prestige. There were exceptions: in Russia, for ex-

ple, where the nobleman maintained his dominance in society; and in England, where the peer still enjoyed political privilege in the House of Lords. But speaking generally, industrial progress was shifting the emphasis from agriculture to industry, and political power from an aristocracy of land to an "aristocracy of stocks and bonds," the so-called capitalist class. In the lower orders of society a corresponding shift in the balance was taking place, from the idlers on the land to the toilers in factory, mine, and shop. Thus to the new society had come two dominant influences: that of the triumphant bourgeois business man, and that of the mass of landless workers, the proletariat. Each was to impress its character on the culture of the new era.

The bourgeois stamp on civilization.—During the period since 1770 the bourgeoisie have placed their stamp so indelibly upon modern civilization in many of its characteristic aspects that the new age has been called the Bourgeois Era. Used as a term to designate the age, the word "bourgeoisie" refers to the business class, and more or less by the men of great urban wealth, who fought their way into the seats of power in the course of the struggle with princes and aristocracy. Popular writers have called the civilization of the period a "business man's civilization," because the business men in all phases of economic activity, and their allies in the professions, seem to dominate what is typical in the life of the period. Where the bourgeoisie had captured the government, they naturally proceeded to use it as an instrument for the promotion of bourgeois interests, just as the princes and the aristocracy had used government in their day to safeguard theirs, and just as the Russian Soviet was seeking to promote the workers' interests under a "dictatorship of the proletariat."

The individual liberties preached by the eighteenth-century philosophers the bourgeoisie appropriated to themselves in full measure whenever they held the reins of government; less freely they bestowed them upon the masses at the base of the social pyramid. Political, economic, and religious liberty were principles generally accepted by the bourgeoisie; but what is important, in the field of visible accomplishments, is that the newly won liberty cleared the way for the conquest of the material world by a utilitarian, industrial society. The new princes of industry and finance produced fabulous wealth. They coveted profits for themselves, and they set the gauge for a profit-seeking society. Some of them

amassed great fortunes; they built palatial houses in town and country, rivaling those of the old aristocracy; they patronized science, art, and education. The old aristocracy itself succumbed to the spell of the hour, seeking to rehabilitate shrinking revenue from the land by speculations and investments in stocks and bonds. Nevertheless, they did represent a tradition that offered some resistance to the scale of values which the materialistic age had set up for acceptance by society.

The impress of the industrial workers.—The masses shared in the immense increase of wealth produced by their hands under the directing minds of their capitalist commanders. The general level of material well-being was rising; standards of living were advancing. Yet there was growing discontent among the laboring classes, particularly the great armies of industrial workers in the towns and cities. Material gains were often offset and sometimes completely destroyed by recurring periods of business depression that threw hundreds of thousands of workers out of employment and depressed the wages of those who continued in their jobs. The skill of the workers' hands and their willingness to work were all the capital they possessed to maintain themselves and their families. When the opportunity to work was denied, they were helpless. This insecurity of their lives fed their uneasiness and discontent. Moreover, even when times were good, working hours were long; conditions in factories and mines were often wretched; and wages, they felt, were all too low, measured in terms of the wealth they produced for their employers. If they were maimed or incapacitated by industrial accidents, the laws made compensation difficult to obtain and inadequate when it was obtained; in time of sickness income ceased, and there was little or no emergency fund to fall back upon when years of unrelenting labor had earned a rest in old age, there was little or nothing to retire to; and when death claimed the worker there was all too often misery awaiting his dependents.

The capacity of society to produce wealth had been several times multiplied by science and the machine. No one could deny that yet large sections of society felt no economic security. Critics who looked beneath the glamour of a spotted prosperity began to point to the lights and shadows in the distribution of the new wealth to the poverty and misery of the slum areas in the industrial centers contrasted with the lavish display of riches among the few. Evidently, individual freedom was not bringing the Golden Age. Th

time was ripe for a new revolt; this time, not against absolute princes and an ancient nobility, but against certain phases of the very philosophy which, less than a hundred years earlier, had been proclaimed as the salvation of mankind, and against the class which appeared to be the chief beneficiary of that philosophy—the bourgeoisie. Out of this situation, new currents of thought and action emerged destined to have a powerful influence upon contemporary civilization—a dynamic humanitarianism, and a new economic philosophy called socialism.

Humanitarianism and socialism.—The humanitarian movement centered its fire largely upon the social results of the laissez-faire policy. Long before 1870, certain English humanitarians were protesting in parliament against the situation in factories, mills, and mines. Employers, they asserted, were capitalizing their newly acquired freedom by exploiting men, women, and children. Slowly the sentiment gained ground in political circles that non-intervention by the state in the economic affairs of a nation was no longer, in all situations, a tenable policy. It was pointed out that the time had come to shift the emphasis from individual rights to the paramount welfare of society, to curtail individual liberty where its exercise threatened the good of the many. In England the doctrine came to be called collectivism. Not only in England, but in the industrial countries of the western world generally, the collectivist idea began to permeate political thought and government policy. The reason is not far to seek. Where the bourgeoisie did not catch the humanitarian spirit of the time, they at least understood the political expediency of making concessions for workingmen's votes; and, above all, they came to understand the importance of guarding against the dangerous threat of socialism to bourgeois supremacy. The result was a rising tide of social legislation during the latter part of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, designed largely to improve the lot of the industrial workers. These responses of the ruling middle class to the attacks upon laissez-faire did not destroy individualism; they merely sought to mitigate its evils.

The workers accepted these concessions more or less gratefully but not as a satisfactory solution of their problems, which were hardly touched during most of the nineteenth century. The majority believed that collective bargaining with employers through the direct pressure of trade unions was the most effective instrument

to improve the lot of the workers. The trades-union movement thus came to occupy a place of considerable importance in industrial society. But more daring and radical leaders pressed the attack upon individualism much further. These were the apostles of a new social philosophy—the socialists. They accepted social legislation as better than nothing; but to them it was merely a salve applied to the superficial symptoms of deep-seated social disease. The capitalist system, based on individualism, was fundamentally bad and would have to be destroyed before a cure could be effected. Like the collectivists, they stressed the superior claims of society against the claims of the individual; unlike the collectivists, they maintained that government regulation was feeble and inadequate, since it preserved the competitive system dominated by the individual profit-seeking motive, and did nothing to loosen the stranglehold the capitalist maintained on society by reason of his control of the instruments of production. Only by the destruction of these features of the existing order could a sick society be healed. Consequently, the socialists urged that society take over the instruments of production in the major economic activities of the people, to be controlled and administered not in the interests of an individual or of a class, but in the interest of the whole community.

This new philosophy of revolt had its beginning in the humanitarianism of the early revolutionary period. One of its earliest exponents was a French nobleman, the Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), who spent his fortune to propagate his ideas. In the history of socialism, Saint-Simon and his followers are known as the Utopians. They exerted slight influence upon the working classes of their day. It was Karl Marx (1818-1883) who made socialism a militant, revolutionary force in contemporary civilization. After years of labor under the greatest privation, Marx produced a book on economics, *Das Kapital*—in its influence on the modern world probably the most significant book of the nineteenth century. *Das Kapital*, together with a little work called the *Communist Manifesto* written by Marx and Friedrich Engels, became the Bible of the socialist movement.

With the work of Marx, the issues became squarely joined between capitalism and labor. The issues involved a conflict of interests between the ruling middle-class group on the one side, and a militant proletariat on the other. Underneath the conflict of interests lay a conflict of philosophies as to how human well-being might be best

chieved—a conflict between individualism and socialism. The one envisaged a society of individuals possessing well-defined rights, and competing one with another in the race for individual satisfaction and achievement; the other contemplated a society in which the individual was supposed to enjoy a richer participation in the social inheritance by his more complete subordination to community interests and coöperation with his fellows. The individualistic capitalist class sought to retain, through its control of the instruments of production, a supremacy based on the economic power of the group; the socialist sought to destroy this supremacy by taking the major instruments of production from it and placing them in the hands of society. The competitive spirit of capitalism was extended into the arena of international relations; that is to say, capitalism was militantly nationalistic. In contrast, the coöperative spirit of socialism projected into the world community made the socialist movement international. The irreconcilable nature of capitalism and socialism has made inevitable an unceasing contest for supremacy. That conflict is a major and portentous fact of the world today.

How the Industrial Revolution divided society.—This division of modern society into two major groups in potential or actual conflict with each other cannot be explained by the influences set in motion by revolutionary France. While the great social upheaval was in progress in France, another change, or series of changes, was taking place elsewhere, a change as profound in its influence upon contemporary civilization as the French Revolution itself. This was a fundamental change in methods of production, which began in England in the eighteenth century and during the nineteenth spread over nearly all the Western world. The change is now known as the Industrial Revolution.¹ The Revolution was, in part, the first prodigious effect of the application of modern science to the conquest of the material world. It is called a “revolution” because, in a remarkably short period, it swept away a handicraft system of production in use since the dawn of history, and drew in its wake numerous social changes of revolutionary character. It is to the Industrial Revolution that we must look to find an explanation of many of the characteristic features of modern civilization during what we have called its third period.

¹See Chapter XX.

The revolt against the Old Order in France was attributed part to the rise of the bourgeoisie to a position of importance. French society through the expansion of industry and commerce. That phase of economic development was not the result of an important change in the technique of production but of an enlargement under the old methods. Hence it was not science and machinery that gave the initial push to the rising fortunes of the French bourgeoisie during the early revolutionary period; but the introduction of machinery into France toward the middle of the nineteenth century does explain, in large measure, the final victory of the bourgeois republicans over the monarchists during the seventies and the establishment of the French Third Republic of today. In other words, the power which swept them on to political supremacy was largely a power based on wealth resulting from machinery and industry. As we survey the political scene of the Western world during the nineteenth century, we find it generally true that when the Industrial Revolution had established itself, there the capitalist middle class had acquired a dominant political position.

The Industrial Revolution also explains the contrasting social phenomenon—the emergence of the proletariat, the army of industrial wage laborers. It was around the machines that the large industrial towns and cities were built. There tens of thousands of workers were brought together, elbow to elbow, in the factory and slum districts, where the conditions of life bred a spirit of discontent that finally became vocal. It was those conditions that stirred the humanitarians to action, as we have seen, and led to the inauguration of wide programs of social legislation. And, finally, it was the close association of large aggregates of workers, moved by common grievances, that fostered a working-class consciousness and solidarity. Here, in brief, the stage was set for the revolt against the middle-class masters and the social order that had grown up about them; out of the revolt came the trades-union movement and socialism.

The advance of science and technology.—The spectacular march of the machine is bound up with the advance of science. If the inconceivable had happened, if there had been no extension of scientific knowledge after the eighteenth century, twentieth-century culture would be quite different from what it is. The obvious fact is that science has fed on its successive discoveries and has grown prodigiously. Each new discovery has illuminated the way for

Further discoveries, until enthusiasts have begun to wonder if there any peak that science may not some day attain.

Despite the popular acclaim of science in the eighteenth century, was a suitor knocking for recognition at the doors of the universities, a suitor held in suspicion and distrust by many churchmen and classical academicians. By the middle of the nineteenth century had achieved a recognized place in institutions of higher learning; the beginning of the twentieth it had become a kind of god to be worshipped. Men no longer commonly appeal to the Scriptures for guidance, as in the seventeenth century, or to the sayings of the classical thinkers, as in the eighteenth; they commonly quote science and statistics. Not only has science gained a preëminent place in the schools, but money has been poured out lavishly for its advancement. Scientific foundations backed by rich endowments have been established; laboratories have sprung up in connection with great industrial plants and distributing agencies; governments subsidize work; scientific books and periodicals pour from the press. All these are some of the more obvious indications of the dominating place of science in contemporary society.

The most impressive and the most characteristic achievement of contemporary society is material progress. We speak of the Industrial Revolution in England as an event of the eighteenth century; more accurately, we may think of the eighteenth century as marking the beginning of a change that has continued with increasing momentum to the present. As in the case of science, one mechanical invention has paved the way for further technical improvement, or for what we call new inventions, which are usually the result of modifications, or improvements, or new applications of old inventions. In this advance of the machine, science has been the handmaiden of invention, for in our day science remains "pure" only so long as the ingenuity of man fails to discover how to put it to work. In the eighteenth century popular interest in science lay mainly in its ideology as an instrument of attack upon the Old Order. Popular interest in science today is basically an interest in technology, in the marvelous power of machines to conquer the physical world and to create material wealth. If the common man worships science today, he worships it in the image of the machines that it has produced.

The accomplishments of the machine age and its problems. Applied science has transformed the physical world. It has made

possible the support of a phenomenal increase of population since the beginning of the industrial revolution. The dense population of today could not have existed in Europe under the medieval handicraft and manorial systems; and we are told that populations are still far below the maximums that science and machinery can support. Science is steadily lengthening human life and, as applied sanitary engineering, is making the world a cleaner one to live in. Particularly in the field of chemistry, science is revealing improved methods of production, creating new products, and competing with nature in the making of things for which man until recently depended upon nature's workshop. Technical invention has largely kept pace with scientific discovery, devising machines to supplant human labor in ways hardly dreamed of a few generations ago, and multiplying wealth at a dizzy rate. New sources of power have been discovered and utilized. The electric motor and the gas engine have displaced or supplemented steam power and have made possible swift locomotion in the air and new automotive contrivances on land and water. With telephones, cables, and wireless, communication has become almost instantaneous over wide distances. The changes in locomotion and communication have made neighbors of people in widely separated areas and have caused our planet to shrink as by a miracle.

The results of science have not proved to be unmingled blessings. Scientists frequently remind us that the knowledge which they have put at the disposal of society is not harmful in itself; it is the use to which science is put by individuals and society that sometimes bring injurious results. Populations, massing about the machines, have become increasingly urban. The urbanizing of society has produced conspicuous changes in social life and created many perplexing problems. Great wealth has also centered in the machines, largely concentrated in the hands of a minority; and, as we have seen, this unequal distribution, together with its social consequences, has emphasized divisions in society and has awakened deep-seated, disruptive forces. Nor must we forget that science has been permitted to release forces productive of great social misery and destruction. In its potentialities for harm to humanity, scientific, mechanized war is as far advanced over the technique of the past as the aeroplane is over the horse-drawn carriage of a generation ago.

Problems have multiplied so fast during the machine age that

me observers have concluded that society has become the helpless victim of the machines that it has created to serve it. If so, the fault lies partially in the fact that we have been measuring the value of science too much in terms of individual profits and material progress and too little in terms of social welfare. But another factor, perhaps more important, has been the speed with which social changes have taken place during the machine age. Society has subject to greater changes during the nineteenth century than during the whole of the Christian era preceding. And yet if we could transport a child of ten now living in the United States to the American world of half a century ago, he would rub his eyes in amazement, so unfamiliar would it appear to him. Thus change is a law of social life has become an impressive fact. New problems of social adjustment, often baffling in their complexity, have presented themselves in such quick succession that man's experience has failed to keep pace; and when old formulas have proved futile, the intelligence of those in command has frequently lacked the flexibility, imagination, and boldness to cope with the situation. Such appears to be the bewildered state of society today.

The influence of contemporary science on religious thought.

From their very nature, religious beliefs have felt the impact of science. Astronomy has had an influence. It will be recalled that medieval society accepted the geocentric theory of the universe. Not only was the earth accorded the central position, but it was regarded as divinely created as the special dwelling place of man. In the near heavens above the earth was the throne of God, and the earth was his footstool. The whole conception tended to nurture in man a complacent acceptance of the unique and supreme position of his own planet, and of his own importance in the divine scheme of things. The work of Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton made it necessary for man to orient his thinking to an entirely new conception of the position of man, his earth, and his heaven; and the necessity has been greatly emphasized in the recent past by successive discoveries of giant heavenly bodies of whose existence Galileo did not dream. One example will suffice to illustrate. A few years ago a new star, Antares, was discovered whose diameter measures 400,000,000 miles. This giant among giants lies some 2,500,000 times as far from the earth as our own sun. The advance of astronomy has made men pause to wonder at the limitless expanse of the universe, and to contemplate the shrinking impor-

tance of our relatively insignificant solar system and our dwarf planet, the earth.

The progress of geology has affected men's religious beliefs. During the early decades of the nineteenth century Sir Charles Lyell, an English geologist, spent years gathering data based on study of the stratification of the earth's crust; the rising and falling of land surfaces; their disintegration by moving water, frost, and other agencies; the action of earthquakes and volcanoes. From these data he concluded that the history of the earth could be explained by the action of these forces operating over unnumbered ages of time. The results of his researches not only contradicted the Biblical version of the origin and history of the earth, but pushed back the origin of man thousands of years beyond the date, 4000 B. C., set by Biblical chronology. Since Lyell's time a considerable part of the earth's surface has been explored and geological data have been greatly increased, all tending to confirm Lyell's general conclusions concerning the great antiquity of the earth and of man.

In the field of biology still more revolutionary pronouncements were at hand. The publication of Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859 and his *Descent of Man* in 1871 constitutes a landmark in the history of science comparable, some think, to the contribution of Sir Isaac Newton. The nature of Darwin's work has already been considered. Here we are interested in its effect on religious attitudes. The evolutionary doctrine as applied to man inevitably tended to undermine the Scriptural account of his creation. But more destructive than Darwin's works themselves were the militant efforts of such men as Herbert Spencer and Thomas Huxley, who was called "Darwin's bulldog." They and less notable champions originated the public controversy that became a long drawn-out and bitter argument between the supporters of science and the orthodox defenders of theology.

Herbert Spencer, belonging to a line of middle-class nonconformists, had, before the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, thought out a complete system of philosophy in which he applied the evolutionary principle to the whole world of organic and inorganic matter. In his *First Principles* of this extended work on *Synthetic Philosophy*, he attempted a "reconciliation" of science and religion, but ended by concluding that the "power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable," and that the weakness of religion therefore lay in the claim that it had a knowledge about

power called God, which must remain unknowable. Spencer's application of the evolutionary idea to the whole universe not only made his work the accepted "gospel of progress," but laid the basis for the acceptance of the mechanistic theory that the phenomena of nature are the products solely of mechanical forces which lie wholly outside man's control.

Thomas Huxley, a distinguished English biologist, was the outstanding popularizer of Darwinism. With a zest for intellectual battle he threw himself into the fray, writing numerous articles for periodicals, and more extended books, and taking the platform in public debate against churchmen and all other foes of the new doctrine. He carried his side of the controversy from a mere defense to a determined attack upon the foundations of revealed religion, and rejected Christianity as being no longer worthy of emulation and support, even in its system of moral values.

To the influence of astronomy, geology, and biology in the breaking down of earlier religious attitudes should be added, if space would permit, the influences that flowed from a "scientific" criticism of the Scriptures by distinguished scholars, themselves of deep religious faith, whose researches tended to undermine rather than to strengthen religious foundations. Most notable among these were the German historians Niebuhr (1776-1831) and Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886). Similar was the result of the work of Ernest Renan (1823-1892), a French orientalist of distinction, whose *Life of Jesus*, in the opinion of many, stripped the great founder of Christianity of both mystery and divinity in the traditional sense and gradually produced a reinterpretation of religious values.

These currents of thought help to explain why we find the old attitudes toward revealed religion progressively breaking down as we approach the twentieth century. Man has become skeptical of supernatural forces as factors determining his fate; more and more he has turned to science for an explanation of what appears mysterious. It is hardly necessary to add that this change is by no means universal; religious attitudes essentially medieval still dominate millions in contemporary society. The trend is shown rather in the widespread growth of agnosticism and indifference to the Church, and in the sharpening of divisions in religious ranks themselves along the general lines of liberalism and fundamentalism. Altogether, trends in the twentieth century appear to many to point to the passing of the old age of faith. Yet, it should be clear, science has

not proved religion itself to be a myth, though it has stripped it of many beliefs traditionally associated with religion. In the light of history, science is not a consummation of knowledge, nor is it infallible; no one can foresee what the next age may bring forth.

DOMINATING CURRENTS IN MODERN LITERATURE

For present purposes, literature may be regarded as a "reflection of life—a many-sided mirror which catches and holds for us pictures of the changing interests, activities, and ideals of man through the generations." Thus the literature of the modern world is responsive to the changing moods and ideals of the time, as we pass from the early modern to the revolutionary period and thence into the bourgeois age.

The early modern writers carried the spirit of the Renaissance into the seventeenth century. As we have seen, the literature of the Renaissance reveals the shifting of emphasis from the otherworldliness of the Middle Ages to man and his achievements on earth. Convinced of the intrinsic importance of his present life, irrespective of the possible future life of the soul, man sought the means by which he might develop, enrich, and adorn his present life. In the quest he turned back to the great literatures of Greece and Rome as the fullest sources of the new ideals. Thus he introduced into modern literature the classical influence. Ben Jonson set the goal for the literary world when he said, "I know nothing can conduce more to letters than to examine the writings of the ancients, and not to rest in their sole authority or take all on trust from them.—It is true they opened the gates, and made the way that went before us: but as guides, not commanders." As guides "they furnished much, not only of substance, but also of form—such as the style and structure of the epic, of drama, of satirical poetry—which was mingled variously with elements inherited from the Middle Ages to form distinctively new and modern literature whose permanent significance is incontestable, and such as to place them securely amongst the highest achievements of the human race."

Early in the seventeenth century the great creative period of the Renaissance drew to a close. The classical influence continued, but literature fell under the domination of a formal and narrow rationalism which lasted down to the eve of the French Revolution. Rationalism exalted man's reason as the key to enlightenment and

man progress, and decried all expression of human emotions as misleading sentimentality. Writers sought to banish mystery from the and distrusted beliefs based upon divine revelation unless they could stand the test of reason. We have already noted this critical spirit in the writings of the eighteenth-century philosophers. Rationalism established an authority comparable in some respects to that exercised by the Church in the Middle Ages. By the last quarter of the eighteenth century the restrictive formalism which rationalism had imposed upon literature had led to a new revolt, known as the Romantic Movement. In point of time it corresponds roughly to what we have called the Age of Revolution, the characteristics of which are clearly reflected in much of the literature of the period.

We shall not go here into the various characteristics of the Romantic Movement—emotional, imaginative, and volitional. Most important historically was the emergence, further intensified, of the individualism dominant during the Renaissance. The restraining standards which rationalism had imposed upon writers were ignored; and literature, feeling the impulse of a new freedom, entered upon a period of remarkable activity. The emphasis laid upon the importance of the individual and his freedom led—in one direction—to a sentimentality which asserted that man was by nature good and well-disposed, but that his good impulses had been corrupted by the artificial restraints laid upon him by civilization; that once freed of the shackles of political and ecclesiastical authority his good impulses would reassert themselves in wise and benevolent behavior. In the Romantic literature of this type, it is to be observed, we have another expression of the conviction, prevalent during the revolutionary period, that the supreme need of society was individual freedom as the key to human happiness.

The close of the Romantic Movement, about midway of the nineteenth century, corresponds roughly with the turning point, already indicated in political thought, from the idealism of the revolutionary movement to what has been termed realistic statesmanship. The advance of machine industry, the growing influence of commercialism, the spread of mechanistic or deterministic doctrines induced by scientific discoveries combined to drive men's minds counter to the spirit of Romanticism.

As the nineteenth century advanced, the prevailing tone of the so-called bourgeois age stamped itself upon literature. Writers

affected by the impact of a commercial, comfort-loving society became motivated by a materialistic point of view. Resorting largely to prose fiction, they regarded themselves as realistic novelists. In conscious or unconscious emulation of the scientist, they cultivated an objective attitude and mechanical accuracy in describing the life about them. They became reporters of fact rather than "imaginative creators," giving, as some of them thought, the character and value of science to their portrayals. In subject matter they were disposed to emphasize the "uglier aspects of life and those traits of human nature which link man most closely with the lower animals." Other writers, responding to the humanitarian impulse of the period, wrote novels and plays designed to promote various causes such as socialism, movements for improving the living and working conditions of the industrial classes, the single standard of morality, and the like. In general terms "it may be said that this dominant and characteristic literature of the last sixty or seventy years, including certain very recent developments out of realism, represents the combined influence of science and commerce in materializing, externalizing, and standardizing the lives of modern men and women, while leaving their inner selves a chaos of undirected, conflicting, and vague emotions."

THE SPREAD OF WESTERN CULTURE

The dissemination of Western culture has been impressive in its scope. Making its appearance in a small corner of Europe, it spread through the agency of the Greeks and Romans until it covered the whole Mediterranean area. This was its limit at the beginning of the Middle Ages. In fact, as the medieval period wore on, the boundaries of Western culture were driven in, and it lost ground in the Near East and in North Africa. To compensate for these losses, however, the Church had established vitalizing contacts between the Mediterranean area and every corner of Europe. By the close of the Middle Ages Western civilization had become essentially European.

With the opening of the modern period a new chapter began in the spread of Western culture. It crossed the seas and penetrated every continent. From the sixteenth century down to the present, European civilization has never ceased to spread, for always there has been a stimulus to excite the impulse to expand. The zealous

sh to spread Christianity, the desire for wealth, the need to relieve the overcrowded condition in certain parts of Europe, the Industrial revolution with its accompanying demands for raw materials and new markets, the triumph of the bourgeoisie lured by a passion for commercial gain, the development of self-centered national states dependent upon economic and political security—each has had its influence. However selfish the motive back of the movement, European culture—Western culture—has spread. Today the oriental peoples are slowly coming to terms with science and the machine, and with the passing of time the lines of cultural differentiation between East and West are growing less sharp; even the backward peoples in Africa are being subjected to the relentless pressure of imperialism. Is Western civilization ultimately to become a world civilization?

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CHAPTER XVI

THE NATURE OF INSTITUTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION

WE HAVE completed a long excursion into the past, following the path of man from the time of his emergence as a human being to the present. We have observed something of how he began to build and accumulate a culture, how he climbed painfully through the levels of the Stone Age, how he finally stepped out of the mists of prehistory and became the architect of the more elaborate cultures, first of the Near East, then of the Greeks, still later of the Romans; how he suffered a partial eclipse of his civilization with the coming of the barbarian hordes out of the North, and how he gradually recovered many of the elements of the culture of antiquity and used them as the basis for the development of our modern civilization. We have seen how in the course of his development man has accumulated a more and more complex culture, retaining innumerable unwritten traditions from the past, transmitting in written records his own beliefs and activities to coming generations, multiplying inventions, developing hundreds of new and specialized arts, forming new types of social groupings and developing new institutions to meet the demands of his increasingly complex social situation.

Our survey of this changing panorama of a growing, increasingly complex society contains little more than the broad characteristics of human development. No more has been said of the organization of social life than was necessary to hold the picture together. But now that our study has brought us into the realm of the modern world, our approach changes. We wish to bring our Western civilization under closer examination, to study more intensively some of the important features of our social life, particularly those features called institutions.

How institutions come about in society.—From the functional point of view social life may be regarded as a means by which men attempt to satisfy their desires more effectively. Through coöperation with their fellows, they can provide for themselves more food

and better shelter and clothing than by working alone. Through coöperation they can bring about the union of forces necessary to safeguard the foundations of their material and social life. When we examine our civilization from this point of view, we find numerous nuclei of group life serving as centers of organization for the satisfaction of man's desires and needs. These nuclei contain the major elements of social life—tools, machines, traditions, customs, sentiments, beliefs, codes, rituals, institutions, and so on, but for our purposes their most significant characteristics are their institutions.

The way in which an institution develops and becomes an important factor in the life of the group has been outlined by W. G. Sumner in a classical volume entitled *Folkways*. In brief it is as follows: Human beings strive to satisfy their desires with as little inconvenience as possible. When they are confronted with a new problem of adjustment to their environment, each one may attempt to solve it in his own way. The result is that some are more successful than others. But since men live in groups, and are in constant communication with one another, the less successful copy the actions of those who have hit upon a more efficient procedure. Gradually all the members of the group begin to practice the method which proves best, and come to feel that this accepted way of acting promotes the welfare of the group and should be followed to the exclusion of every other. They transmit the custom with the sanction of the group to the succeeding generation, whose members uncritically accept it as valid and are thus relieved from working out their own adjustment to the situation. Succeeding generations are in this way able to profit by the experience of their ancestors, to take a short cut to knowledge, or, as one authority strikingly puts it, "to stand upon the shoulders of the preceding generation."

Sometimes, however, one of these tested group standards is challenged by a variant member. It is then that the group rallies to its defense, explicitly formulates the challenged rule of conduct for the guidance of its members and, if the standard is of sufficient importance, inaugurates some more or less formal means for preserving and perpetuating it. This is the final step in the creation of an institution.

It is apparent from Sumner's statement that what we call institutions are relatively permanent social phenomena. They are forms of association which typically have originated in the past, which

ningly have proved useful in the struggle for existence, and which have been transmitted with approval to the succeeding generation. It is recognized that all things are relative and that nothing in our social life is absolutely permanent, but institutions among the relatively permanent forms of social relationships. Meeting groups such as one encounters on a street corner, in a play, or in a place of amusement, can never become institutionalized. The relative permanence of the institution is made clearer by the realization of the fact that the break-up of one or more concrete embodiments of it does not signify the disappearance of the institutional form. For example, the break-up of the family of John Jones does not signify the disappearance of the family as an institution. The family as an institutional form does not disappear until the parent-child relationship, which is its essence, has ceased to be sanctioned as desirable. Viewed in this light, the most important of our social institutions are seen to have persisted throughout the period of written history, and perhaps much longer.

Institutions are of course continually changing in some degree, and there are periods when the change is so rapid as to be revolutionary. But this is the exception. Organization and regularized behavior, which are component elements of every institution, imply a high degree of stability. One may escape bewilderment in his study of the multitudinous confusing variations and fluctuations of social life by keeping his eyes centered on the basic core of institutional forms.

Distinguishing attributes of institutions.—Since there are many forms of association that are not institutions, it becomes desirable to know the specific earmarks of institutionalized life. A person of ordinary intelligence would hesitate to name common examples of institutions—the church, the family, the school. Thus he is quite clear and sure of himself; but if he is asked to define an institution, he is likely to exhibit considerable confusion of mind. The reason is, mainly, that he has never placed himself outside of social institutions so as to acquire an objective point of view. They are so familiar to him; he has lived so close to them, in fact within them; and he has taken them so much for granted, that he has not observed them as objects which can be investigated as one would study a frog in the laboratory or inspect a house which one wished to purchase. If perchance he has come into conflict with one particular form of institutional organization—family,

church, or state—the chances are that he has either rebelled against it, escaped from it, or submitted to it without ever having acquired a clear understanding of just what a social institution is or in what way it is significant for him individually or in relation to his fellow men.

What are the essential attributes of an institution? Their relative permanence and stability have already been pointed out as characteristic. To these we add certain other qualities already briefly discussed in the chapter on *The Nature of Man's Culture*. There it was pointed out that culture, including institutions, is a social product, uniquely human. But to say that institutions are relatively permanent and relatively stable, that they are a product of human association, and that they are uniquely human is not sufficient to distinguish them from some other forms of association in social life. What are the additional attributes which more sharply set off and define institutions? We may speak of them as the minimum components of an institution.

1. **The basic idea.**—The central, fundamental element of every institution is the basic idea around which the other components are organized and by means of which the basic idea or purpose is realized. This basic idea or concept contains the recognition that a given form of social relationship is highly desirable and that it fulfills an important social purpose or function. Thus the basic idea underlying the family is the confirmed conviction that a relatively close and enduring relationship between parents and children affords the most satisfactory method of rearing and socializing the immature offspring. The other components, which will be discussed in paragraphs following, are merely the means or machinery through which the purpose implied in the basic concept is made effective in social life.

2. **Regularized behavior.**—Regularized forms of social behavior constitute another attribute of institutions. Every institution has as an important part of its composition some regularized way of acting determining the relation of one member to another.

Folkways and mores.—The most usual forms which these regularized patterns of behavior take are those of the folkways and mores. Folkways are those customs (group habits) which are performed more or less spontaneously and uncritically, and which have not been defined as possessing moral value. They are illustrated by the customs which we label as “good form”—such as eating with the

per utensils, dressing within the limits of good taste, using the accepted forms of greeting one's friends, and the like. Mores are these customs to which a moral sanction has been attached—such standards of honesty, and sex conduct. *Taboos* are negative ones. It is characteristic of the mores that they are accepted and formed uncritically and are not open to rational discussion within a group where they are in force. The taboo of cannibalism, for example, which is in the mores of every civilized community, could hardly be made the subject for serious debate outside a madhouse. On the other hand, in communities where cannibalism is practiced it has been given unquestioned moral or religious sanction. It is this unquestioning certainty that given practices or standards are morally right that distinguishes the mores of a group.

Formal laws.—Instead of being crystalized in the form of mores, regularized behavior patterns may be fixed in formal laws. Such are the constitutions and other fundamental laws of states, the codes of ancient societies, the charters of corporations. The law is set forth objectively and concisely as a rule of behavior which has consciously been formulated and made enforceable through the power of a governing authority.

It is possible, but not essential, for other types of regularized behavior to be found within an institution. They may occur in various combinations. They may under some conditions take the form of a ritual or be organized into a code. Formal machinery for the administration, protection, or promotion of the institution may be developed, such as the elaborate machinery which is necessary for the operation of a complex political institution like the modern state. But no one of these developments—code, ritual, ceremony, or legal machinery—is an indispensable element of an institution. Regularized patterns of behavior of some sort are, however, essential to institutional organization.

3. **Enveloping sentiments.**—Accompanying and supporting the basic concept of the institution and its behavior patterns are a number of sentiments, beliefs, ideas, and rationalizations. Some one of these or some combination of them is an inevitable component of institutional organization. These it is that furnish the emotional appeal of an institution to its devotees and the driving force which draws them into vigorous defense when the institution appears to be threatened. Thus patriotism, compounded of sentiments and beliefs, is constantly appealed to in defense of national institutions

when they are confronted by danger, either fanciful or real. Such too are the religious sentiments and beliefs that express themselves in devotion to the Church, sometimes to the extent of fanaticism and the acceptance of martyrdom.

4. **Organization for perpetuation.**—Finally, we come to the component of institutions which is perhaps their most distinctive mark; that is, their organization for perpetuation. This more than any other single feature serves to differentiate institutions from other forms of social organization; without it no social organization can be accurately defined as an institution. The organization which purposes the preservation of the institution may be the institution group itself, as is the case of the Roman Catholic Church; or it may be some larger, more inclusive social organization of which the institution in question is merely a part. This latter type is more common, the political state being the outstanding example of perpetuating machinery. In a sense, the state as an all-inclusive organization serves to perpetuate and protect all the other recognized institutions of the state society. The state guarantees the rights of certain recognized groups to continue their association without interference—the right for example, of religious groups to worship as they please; it lays down laws designed to promote, develop, and continue domestic, economic and educational institutions. Small units of our social organization may in similar fashion become the protectors of still smaller sub-units, as for example, a national fraternal organization which attempts to perpetuate and protect its local chapters.

The preceding detailed characterization of an institution will be clearer in summary form. These attributes, be it remembered, are characteristic of every institution regardless of its form. An institution is a product of social life. It is peculiarly typical of human beings and is not found among any other representatives of the animal world. It is a sanctioned, relatively permanent, and stable organization of behavior by means of which men attempt to satisfy their desires and needs. It possesses as essential components (1) a basic concept or idea, (2) an organized system of behavior patterns by which this idea is realized, (3) a number of sentiments, ideas, and beliefs which accompany and support these behavior patterns, and (4) some sort of provision for its protection and perpetuation. The feature which serves to differentiate the institutional organization from all the other forms of social life is the

combination of the basic concept or idea, backed by a conscious, more or less formal organization for its perpetuation.

How institutions originate and how they change.—The problem of origins and of change as applied to culture has already been discussed¹. These problems of origin and change of culture in general are likewise problems of origin and change of institutions, for the obvious reason that institutions are a very important component of culture. It is not necessary to repeat what has been said, but it may be desirable to review concisely a few principles that have particular application to institutions.

(1) It is especially true of institutions that knowledge of their original forms is lost in antiquity. In their early stages they left no material or fossil records by which their characteristics might be reconstructed, as did tools and art. It is useless, therefore, to speculate concerning the original, primary form of any institution.

(2) Institutions, like other phases of culture, change primarily because of those contacts between peoples which result in the diffusion of culture elements. But institutions also may change as a result of inventions and discoveries. These inventions which cause changes may arise within the institutional field itself—for example, in the case of a business corporation, an economic invention which has caused changes in economic structure; or they may arise outside the institutional field as in the case of the invention of new tools of production which have resulted in changes in domestic institutional organization. We shall study some of these changes in detail in later chapters.

(3) Because of its past importance in the life of the group, and because of the formal nature of machinery which may be set up to make it effective and to perpetuate it, a given form of institution is more likely to outlive its usefulness than are other features of social life. The form itself may assume in the eyes of its devotees the character of something intrinsically valuable, something almost sacred, demanding perpetuation for its own sake. The institution thus crystallized usually fails to change as rapidly as the rest of the social order. It lags behind the times and frequently becomes a serious source of social maladjustment. The ossification of institutions is, as has already been indicated, a prolific source of social evolution.

¹See Chapter IV.

The major forms of social institutions.—Social institutions may be classified in many ways, depending upon the point of view of the person making the classification. In this study we are primarily concerned with institutions as tools by which associated human beings attempt to satisfy their needs. The most valuable classification from this point of view is the functional one. The major institutional fields, classified from the functional point of view, are the domestic, the economic, the political, the religious, and the educational. Many other specific institutions having peculiar functions of their own might be listed, but they will not be considered here.

Institutional fields are seldom simple; a particular institutional activity is usually compounded of several institutions usually related and sometimes more or less interdependent. The economic field, for example, includes those institutions which extract the raw materials from the soil or water through agriculture, mining, and fishing; those which convert the raw materials into useable products; those which transport materials from place to place; those which distribute the commodities through commercial activity; and those which aid in financing any of these operations. The political field includes such institutions as the state, government, and international machinery; the domestic field includes the family and marriage; and so on.

Nor does any one institutional field stand alone as it actually works in society. All are to some degree interrelated; and each tends to overlap the other. It is difficult to find any organized group having exclusively political, domestic, economic, or religious functions. An economic institution, like an industrial plant, may introduce methods of educating its employees, either in the technical fields of their work—as in the case of the department store classes for salesladies,—or in more basic cultural subjects—as in the case of the elaborate educational program of the Columbia Conservation Company of Indianapolis. A family group may have religious services, educational programs, and economic production carried on in its own body. The state unquestionably depends upon economic resources for its support. In some cases the political unit enters directly into the economic field—as it does in Soviet Russia, and in cities which own and operate public utilities; or it enters into the educational field through public educational systems, such as are common in all civilized countries.

To avoid this confusing complexity of the phenomena of real life, students of social activity have studied institutions from the point of view of particular functions. One group has fixed its attention upon the problems of getting a living. We call the members of this group political economists, or economists. These are interested in the ways in which objects having an exchange value are produced and distributed. They center their attention upon the problem of economic value and study all things merely as they affect this problem. The economist is interested in the state not as a governing body per se but as an organization which regulates the production and distribution of wealth and which requires wealth for its operation. Another group of theorists have centered their attention upon the problem of government and law. These are the political scientists. They are interested in the ways in which men are governed, and they neglect all factors which do not help them to understand this phenomenon. They are interested in industry only so far as it must be regulated by a governing body and as it furnishes the wealth for the support of political institutions. Similarly, still other students have been interested in examining the functions of the family through which physical care and basic socialization are given to immature offspring. This field has by historical accident fallen to the lot of the sociologists.

This method of isolating a certain phase of reality as the center of interest offers, perhaps, the best approach to the identification of institutions in real life. An institution is economic in the degree to which it performs an economic function, political in the degree to which it performs a political function, religious in the degree to which it performs a religious function, and so on. If this point of view is kept in mind, no confusion should result when one finds a concrete institutional group performing a variety of functions.

The continuity of institutional development.—The succeeding studies exhibit only a subordinate interest in the character of institutions as isolated static entities in society. The more significant problems center in the discovery of lines of institutional descent having their beginnings in the remote past, and their conclusion, so far as we living today are concerned, in the institutions now existing and influencing our lives. These lines of institutional descent are currents in the broad stream of cultural history. The continuity of history has been abundantly illustrated, it is hoped, in the preceding brief descriptions of the cultures that have successively appeared in

Europe. The discerning student will discover that the continuity of history, as there outlined, has been largely an expression of the continuity of institutional development. The story of the continual remaking of institutions in the course of social life now demands attention. It is a very complicated story at best. In the chapters ahead, as already suggested, the attempt will be made to isolate the currents of institutional development in separate studies of each of five basic institutional fields.

In the case of each, our culminating interest is in contemporary institutions. What is their character and significance? To answer that question intelligently we must ask another: How did they come to be what they are? To answer that question we must again journey into the past and follow on down the lines of institutional descent, discovering what element or feature we have inherited here and what there. The cultures we have studied should furnish the background and the total cultural setting into which we fit the separate accounts of institutional development, like episodes fitted into the plot of history.

Finally, in our study of institutional development we shall need to remind ourselves frequently that institutions are man-made instruments fashioned by mortals to satisfy the basic needs of society. As such they reveal the imperfections resulting from human weaknesses and the limitations of human wisdom. When these imperfections become so serious as to vitiate the usefulness of an institution as a social instrument, society becomes sick; and its illness is revealed in the emergence of serious social problems. Then persons and groups line up, some to defend the institutions as they are; some to modify or "reform" them; some to destroy them. Each group devises its philosophy, a philosophy of defense, of modification, or of destruction. Thus the story of the remaking of institutions is shot through with the drama of opposing ideas, theories, and philosophies, and of physical struggles to realize them. All of these we shall need to take note of and understand as a intelligent approach to the social problems of our contemporary world.

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PART IV

THE DESCENT OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

- XVII. The Basic Forms of Economic Life
- XVIII. Medieval Economy
- XIX. The Decay of Medieval Economy
- XX. The Establishment of Modern Economy
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GEORGE A. HEDGER

CHAPTER XVII

THE BASIC FORMS OF ECONOMIC LIFE

THERE is no more insistent demand on man than that of maintaining physical life. The needs of primitive man emphasized the importance of food; the material wants of modern man are more extensive and elaborate, but they are no less insistent. The life of primitive man was a struggle, a struggle for food; the life of contemporary man is similarly a struggle, a struggle to maintain a standard of existence in keeping with the demands of the complex society in which he lives. Thus from the very nature of things, the satisfaction of material needs is and always has been a cardinal problem of human society. An exceedingly large part of human activity, for the great majority of men and for all major social institutions, is found, when accurately appraised, to be in some degree related, directly or indirectly, to the accomplishment of this paramount task. Those activities and institutions which primarily and directly contribute to its accomplishment are termed economic. It is the development of economic life from its beginnings to the present that now calls for consideration, our ultimate aim being to understand and evaluate modern economic life by contrasting it with what has gone before and by observing those currents out of the past that continue to influence our world today.

The complexity of modern economic life.—Economics has been defined as that social science which examines the processes involved in meeting the wants of men for food, clothing, shelter, and luxuries. On the one hand are almost unlimited human desires; on the other are the means of partially meeting those desires; that is to say, the agents of production—land, labor, and capital. In a broad and fundamental sense, economic activity consists in utilizing these agents of production in such a fashion as to satisfy the variety of human needs. Thus the end of the economic process is consumption; we produce to consume.

In a primitive economic society there is little gap between the production and consumption processes; one gathers the fruit of the

land and eats. But in our own advanced economic life the productive processes are long and involved. Consider the history of a package of cigarettes. It is obtained from a retailer, who devotes his time to dispensing the product to the final consumer. Probably the retailer got the cigarettes from a wholesale distributor, who in turn obtained them from the manufacturer. These transactions seem simple enough; but in fact the process of turnover is a complicated one involving capital, labor, land, and management. As we move backward the process grows still more complicated; the manufacturer had to engage large numbers of laborers, considerable machinery, and land area to make the cigarettes. Nor does the process end here. The manufacturer is not the ultimate source of the commodity; he obtained the tobacco from dealers who, in turn, had obtained it from tobacco planters. The planters who raised the tobacco started their crop months before it reached the manufacturer, and before they could engage in tobacco cultivation they had to make an investment in land, in machinery, and in seed. Moreover, there had to be an investment to make the implements which the tobacco planter needed. It is easy to see how complex is the process involved in supplying just one of our modern demands. In this long chain of activity no one laborer or agent employed is producing goods for his own immediate consumption. The gap between producer and consumer has been indefinitely widened.

So far, we have been talking in terms of specific products of industry—tobacco, machinery, cigarettes; but economics is concerned with more than these. The services of laborers give rise to labor problems. The transportation of goods brings up the railroad and public utility question. The profits of the manufacturer, when they are excessive, give rise to problems touching the unequal distribution of wealth. Again, the government usually insists on a share of the proceeds of business; here emerges the question of taxation. The use of mediums of exchange—money and credit—necessitates a banking system. The sale of goods abroad creates problems of international trade. But these wide ramifications of the field of economics, requiring a complicated social machinery, belong only to an advanced society; the economic life of the men of the Stone Age was extremely simple, and the necessary social machinery correspondingly so.

Modern economic life a stage in an endless development.—Our economic customs, organizations, and institutions are, like all

other aspects of human culture, a product of historical development; they have grown through the ages into what they are now. It is easy, however, for us to take them for granted—to forget that our present economic arrangements—private ownership of property, freedom of enterprise, machine technique, money and credit, freedom of choice of occupation, specialization—did not always exist, and even to assume that because they are now they always will be. But one of the great lessons of economic history is that industrial relations and institutions have undergone constant change. We have no sufficient reason to believe that they will not undergo fundamental modifications in the future. There is really nothing necessarily fixed or permanent in the present economic order. Perhaps the most effective way to impress this fact is to examine the character of economic development during the whole historical period.

We may approach such an examination through two avenues. One leads to an analysis of the basic forms of economic life characterizing the various stages through which society has passed in the course of history. These basic forms we have designated as types of economy. The second avenue leads to a more detailed study of the historical development of economic practices and specific organizations or institutions within these types of economy—in a word, to a study of economic history. We shall use both of these avenues of approach. In the present chapter we shall deal with types of economy; in succeeding chapters we shall examine the historical descent of economic institutions in some of their salient features.

The history of culture reveals six rather distinct and basic types of economy: (1) the collectional economy, (2) the nomadic economy, (3) the village economy, (4) the town economy, (5) the national economy, and (6) the world economy.¹ The justification for this rather arbitrary division is the fact that each form presents special characteristics that distinguish it from other forms, though it is also true that there is much that is common to all of them. The purpose here is not to give a detailed picture of each form, but rather to mention those attributes that distinguish one from another. For the sake of convenience we shall speak of the types of economy as stages

¹In discussing the first four topics of this classification the author has followed essentially the line of thought presented in Professor N. S. B. Gras's excellent little work, *An Introduction to Economic History*, Harper and Brothers, 1922. The discussion of the last two topics follows the more conventional view.

in economic development; but it is to be understood that we have no adequate evidence for the assumption that every community, during its historical advance to existing economic forms, has necessarily passed through these "stages" in the order named, or that any given community has necessarily passed through all of them in the course of its history. What we do know is that history discloses abundant examples of each of these types of economy, except the last—world economy—which belongs only to modern times. With this caution in mind we may proceed to a consideration of the first stage.

THE COLLECTIONAL ECONOMY

The simplest and most primitive form of economic life is that in which man is essentially a non-producer of economic wealth. Lacking a social heritage, he relies wholly on the generosity of nature for subsistence. What nature gratuitously provides he more or less passively takes for himself. If foods are available, he eats; if not available, he starves. As yet it has not dawned on him to make careful provisions for the future—to save enough of the surplus for the next day or the next year. Nor has he the technical knowledge necessary to do so. If one collects enough berries to satiate his present hunger, he is wealthy; but in a few hours he is once more in poverty should the available supply have been exhausted. Under such an existence it is the present that is vital, not the future.

Collectional economy among backward peoples.—Chronologically, this stage appears before the dawn of recorded time; in all probability, the men of the early Stone Age lived under a collectional economy. But it still exists among some of the so-called primitive peoples who have thus far developed no mechanical ingenuity. The Tasmanians, now extinct—the last dying in 1876—depended for a livelihood on hunting and collecting. Their only weapon was a pointed spear made of hard wood. The only clothes they knew were opossum skin cloaks. Most of their time was spent searching for food. While the women and children dug for roots and searched for berries, the men were chasing the kangaroo or climbing trees for opossums. Every form of animal food was eaten, even frogs, snakes, lizards, and snails went into the pot.

Before their contact with the White man the Bushmen of South Africa lived under a collectional economy. They were nomadic hunters, knowing nothing of the domestication of animals or of

agriculture. They caught small animals, grasshoppers, snakes, insects, larvae, and fish for food. They also gathered wild melons, grass seed, berries, and other fruits. They liked honey and obtained it by smoking the bees from their hives. The Bushmen often killed the cattle of their Hottentot, Bantu, and White neighbors. They took little thought to plan for the morrow. They would make a kill, devour the food on the spot, settle down to sleep off the effects, survive for a few days, and set off again in search of game.

Some of the Eskimos exhibit certain characteristics of collectional economy. They depend largely upon seafoods, such as seal and fish, for their winter larder, and upon the meat of the caribou for their summer diet. They are wanderers, moving from place to place and building temporary habitations. In the winter they often suffer famine. In such cases, they eat their dogs, their leather clothes, and their dog harness. Cases of cannibalism under such circumstances have been reported. On the other hand, many of the Eskimos have developed traits which carry them far beyond a typical collectional economy. In fact, when they utilize the seal and reindeer not only for food but for oil, skins, canoes, and nets, they show the beginning traces of the present characteristics of industry—the roundabout process by which man utilizes his available resources, not merely for the satisfaction of direct wants but for the creation of tools and equipment which, while not directly consumable, will ultimately yield him a return great enough to compensate for his temporary sacrifice.

The limitations of collectional economy.—The limitations of a collectional economy become apparent when we analyze it in terms of later developments in economic life. There was little social stability under a collectional economy. Most of the time man was in the move in the perpetual quest for food. Whenever climatic conditions or serious weather changes reduced the natural food supply, or food in a given area became scarce by reason of the demands upon it, there was nothing for man to do but move on. There was no need of conserving land space, for the population was sparse in early periods while land areas were practically unlimited. Until man should learn to supplement the wild products of nature by the cultivation of the land his subsistence would have to be gathered over wide areas and a permanent, settled life would be impossible. The absence of agriculture, then, is an indication of the primitive character of life under a collectional economy.

Another characteristic feature of collectional economy is the absence of the institution of private property.¹ Private property presupposes, for its perpetuation, an orderly settled society. It presupposes a civilization in which shrewd and energetic man, contemplating the future, makes provision for it by accumulating wealth—wealth which eventually belongs to him, in the sense that social sanction defends his claim to it. But under the collectional economy, in which the future is hardly a serious concern and in which the available wealth is viewed as the means of meeting the moment's need, private property is not likely to be a part of the general philosophy. Here a digression may not be out of order: We who are born into a world already accepting private property are apt to suppose it is something natural, something inseparable from the proper order of things. But properly viewed it is a concept which has developed to meet the conditions of a dynamic world, and as these conditions continue to be altered the concept may, in the future, be likewise altered.

Despite the rudeness of life under a collectional economy, it is to be noted that the practice of division of labor has already begun. It is illustrated by a very simple division under which men hunt and fish while women collect berries and dig yams or roots. The men do the fighting while the women care for the young. It is a division of employment in which each sex assumes, more or less, the responsibilities for which it is especially suited. In some of the more advanced groups there is actually a division of labor among members of the same sex; one man makes arrows and another medicine. Further, some groups specialize in the collection of one commodity, which is exchanged for the commodity of another group; thus fish might be exchanged for skins and game. This characteristic of a simple division of labor is pointed out as indicative of the fact that no one stage is absolutely and completely different from a succeeding one. What exists today has its roots in the past, even though the primitive traces seem so far removed as to bear apparently not even a superficial resemblance to our present complex manner of living.

¹By "private property" we do not mean wealth; we mean the recognition by the community that a certain item of wealth belongs to a particular individual for his private utilization as he may see fit. Suppose, to be specific, a primitive man settles on a piece of land which, because of its fertility, seems especially desirable to him. The land is undoubtedly wealth, but not until the community acknowledges the land to be his in a special and private sense, rather than a general possession for general use, does private property exist.

In passing from the collectional economy to the nomadic, we should remember that in modern life we still depend for the gratifications of many wants on the process of collecting or appropriating the gifts of nature. This is evidenced by such occupations as mining, lumbering, and fishing. But while these occupations depend fundamentally on what nature has stored up over the years, we are able, with our fund of knowledge and the use of the machine processes, to avail ourselves of these goods in greater quantities and with more certainty than were the peoples of earlier days.

THE NOMADIC ECONOMY

Distinguishing characteristics.—Specifically, what marks off the nomadic stage from the collectional is the cultivation of plants, the domestication of animals, and the use of tools. Man has become painfully conscious of the vagaries of nature. The demand for food, clothing, and shelter is constant, but the uncontrolled environment is not to be depended on for the gratification of these wants. It becomes necessary to control the external forces—a control which becomes increasingly more possible only as knowledge increases and tools and equipment are acquired. In the nomadic economy man learns to think of more than his immediate needs; the future takes on greater meaning; economic activities, while they become more indirect, have a more certain promise of meeting a greater number and variety of wants. The time and effort spent in the cultivation of plants and animals yield no immediate returns, but ultimately they make possible a greater output in return for the deferred satisfaction of the present—a fact of primary importance, as will be explained presently.

We can appreciate the advance of the nomadic over the collectional stage as an instrument for more effectively meeting man's needs. But although men under the nomadic economy cultivate plants and animals, though they use tools, it must not be supposed that the habits and methods of the collectional stage are altogether abandoned. More accurately, cultivation supplements the methods of the preceding existence. Life still depends largely on the direct gifts of nature. Except for cultivation—which is a difference of kind, the nomadic stage differs from the collectional in degree. Men still continue to wander (though less than before) either from necessity—since they have not yet altogether learned to secure from any

given area a year-in-year-out supply of food; or from fear—when their habitation is threatened by invasion from a neighboring group; or conceivably, from sheer restlessness and desire for exploration. The concept of property, the traces of which we have already seen, takes on a more developed consciousness in the second stage because of the greater fund of wealth. Division of labor becomes more complicated; women and boys cultivate; men engage in simple manufacture, warfare, and hunting. The division of labor becomes further complicated by the introduction of slavery through conquests of other nomads. Women and children are the main reliance for continued and sustained labor, while men become the overlords with a sense of their dignity and importance. This makes routine work the lot of the menial and inferior.

Evidence of social advance under nomadic economy.—As already indicated, what most distinguishes the nomadic economy from the collectional is that by the introduction of tools, the cultivation of plants, and the domestication of animals man is enabled to make provision for the future. The importance of making provision for the future is to some extent recognized in the collectional economy where food may be held over for later consumption. But this process does not increase the wealth of the community in the future, except by the amount of consumable products which has been held over for the next period. Under the nomadic economy this process of saving takes on a new social significance. With the cultivation of land and the use of domestic animals another type of saving is practiced, a saving which takes on the form of what is called producer's capital. The importance of this change cannot be overestimated, for it is the basis of our modern economic system. It means that men utilize their available labor and land for the creation of producers' rather than consumers' goods, with the realization that these producers' goods, which yield no immediate satisfaction, will ultimately help produce a surplus of consumers' goods. Thus men devote their energies to the creation of tools with an eye to their future uses in production.

A tool represents something saved; its existence shows that consumption has been deferred. This is so since, with the same effort, man might have obtained something consumable—food, let us say. Instead, his efforts have gone into the creation of a product not available for the immediate gratification of wants, and this postponement of consumption represents the saving process. Man is

will to defer the satisfaction of his immediate wants with the hope that the saved commodity (producers' goods) will yield a return above the sacrifice or abstinence involved in their creation. This is also what we mean by the roundabout method—the indirect application of labor to land, creating thereby instrumental capital or unfinished goods which will not yield immediate gratification. This process of saving instrumental capital is important because it makes possible an output of wealth inconceivable under more primitive conditions where man works without tools and machinery. It makes the economic system more complex and roundabout, in that man no longer directs his energy to providing food for the next meal; instead he now creates instruments that will help furnish food for the next few years.

These gains represent some of the advantages of nomadic economy over the collectional stage. Under a nomadic economy man finds life less precarious; his next meal is less of a gamble. But he still has much to fear, for he has not yet learned how to get from a given area an assured and continuous production. So long as he remains in a nomadic state he is subject to serious limitations on his cultural progress. He is compelled to give considerable time and effort to the periodic moving of his habitation; nothing more than the most superficial agricultural development is possible. Hence, when man learns how to settle down permanently on one spot he enters a more advanced stage of economic life, namely, that designated as village economy.

THE VILLAGE ECONOMY

As we shall use the term here, "village" does not mean a collection of houses; we use the word to designate a social unit with a definite territorial area whose primary purpose is economic production, and whose outstanding characteristic is self-sufficiency. For present purposes we should think of a village as a group of people in conjunction with a definite territorial area, who depend for their subsistence not on articles of trade but on the things which they themselves produce. These then are the three tests of a village economy: (1) a social unit, (2) a definite territorial area, (3) self-sufficiency.

Probably the first villages of this kind appeared in Egypt and Babylonia. Over the contemporary world permanent settlement is

an obvious fact, though in parts of Asia and Africa it is still in the process of accomplishment. The classic example of a people in transition is the Arabs who are now abandoning their tents for houses. The process of settlement is a slow one and may be the consequence of innumerable causes. The development of a technology which enables a community to obtain subsistence from a limited area is the fundamental explanation for this settled, permanent kind of life. The villages thus established may differ in type, one from another. With the ascendancy of a group or an individual, one village may be subservient to a priest or a nobleman while another remains free from external control. In some villages homesteads are scattered, in others nucleated. The exact type varies in different periods of history.

Advantages under the village economy.—The social significance of the development of village economy is apparent. Man is more efficient in production. Agriculture becomes of major importance; previously the work of women and menials, tillage now takes on a greater dignity and becomes the work of men. Cultivation is still extensive, but it is extensive over a given area; and in comparison with that of the nomadic stage it might be described as intensive, for extensive and intensive are relative terms. Less stress is put on the raising of domestic animals and more on plant cultivation, now that a given area is a permanent home. It becomes clear that the soil must be cared for, since its exhaustion presages extermination for the village group. So we find that lands are either carefully irrigated or permitted to lie fallow to renew their original fertility. With these developments it becomes possible for population to increase, since the available food supply can now make provision for greater numbers. Storage of food is more frequent than with the nomads, since it is possible to build permanent granaries in the villages. And of course more time is devoted to the creation of tools and equipment—essentially a process of saving, as was already indicated. Manufacturing is more important than previously; man can now enjoy a greater quantity and variety of commodities. Division of labor is more detailed; now there are carpenters, blacksmiths, potters, and astrologers. All in all, society assumes an aspect of stability and permanence not present during the earlier stages of economic development.

From the beginnings of history down into modern times, the village economy has existed more or less extensively. It will be re-

lled that the art of agriculture appeared as early as the Neolithic period. Whether or not Neolithic agriculture developed to the extent of creating a village economy cannot be known for certain. Over wide areas of the ancient world, however, the village economy was common. For several centuries during the Middle Ages it was almost the sole form of economic organization—known on the European continent as the manorial system. The wide extent of its spread and its persistence over a long period suggest that the village economy must have served society well in ministering to its wants. That is true in a number of particulars, yet from the modern point of view the village economy has numerous shortcomings as a social organization for the satisfaction of economic needs.¹ Some of its disadvantages will appear as we advance into the discussion of the next stage in economic development.

THE TOWN ECONOMY

Under the types of economy thus far described, a dominant characteristic of life has been self-sufficiency or independence from other groups for the essential needs of subsistence. Trade existed, but it was incidental to the main activities. Specialization was limited and exchange between different units took place only to a minor degree. Where trade was sufficient to make it necessary, the village had a market-place. Exchange was simple and took place largely among members of the same community. When we speak of the next stage, the town economy, we have in mind an existence in which trading itself is a major occupation, where men do not merely produce in the physical sense but act as exchangers—buy and sell at a profit. Thus, the characteristic of the town, in the present sense, is trade outside its own limits.

In a town economy the town commonly becomes the center of a web of commercial activity "with a radius of ten or twenty miles." Within the circle the outlying villages are dominated by the town, the villages supplementing the economic life of the town, the town supplementing the economic life of the villages. A specialized group of traders or some of the villagers themselves carry the produce of the land or other raw materials to the town, while the surplus of the manufactured goods of the town finds markets in the villages. Thus the economic life over a considerable territorial area becomes in-

¹For an analysis of the defects of the village economy see p. 343 f.

tegrated; town and villages become to a degree interdependent and a new economic unit emerges—a town economy. When towns are advantageously situated on the sea or on important rivers trade becomes more extensive and varied, and the town comes to dominate the lesser towns as well as the villages within its radius of influence.

Town economy an indication of social advance.—The development of a town economy marks a social advance in several particulars. The advance of commerce to a position of major importance means the exchange of goods over an increasing area, with the result that the advantages of geographic specialization are afforded. The division of labor is carried a step further. Men devoted exclusively to trade come into prominence. The farmer is an expert in the agricultural processes; he has neither time nor the ability to devote to the problems of storage and marketing. By the entry of a specialized group of traders into the productive process the efficiency of the economic system is further increased, and consequently production increases. A town economy also affects the growth of population. A given area constituting a town can support a considerably larger population than a village. In the first place, trade, by its very nature, does not require extensive land holdings; and secondly, trade results in such an increase in production that a given area can now economically support more people. Suppose that today every town should cease to have economic relations with the rest of the world, producing only for its own needs. If such retrogression should occur many communities would probably cease to exist entirely, while in others the output of goods would be so diminished as to lower materially the standard of living for all, since to become self-sufficient is to surrender the advantages of specialization. Each community in such a case must feed, clothe, and house itself. It would import nothing, export nothing. It could not enter into any large-scale enterprise, since obviously such major undertakings are not meant to satisfy local wants alone. Trade is merely the process of surrendering what we want less for what we want more, thereby benefiting both traders. The exchange results in increased production, and the increased production makes possible the support of a larger population.

With town economy there comes another important feature of economic life; that is, the extensive use of money. As production increases, as more wealth accumulates, private property becomes a more important institution. Private property hitherto has been

mainly in land; now articles of trade also constitute private property. And since trade is complicated, it becomes necessary to have a medium of exchange, namely money, to carry it on. In the town economy money assumes great importance, whereas prior to this time it was only an occasional manifestation. The change gradually produces a demand for greater facilities in the financing of business enterprises and trade. The result is the gradual development of banking as one of the indispensable institutions in the economic world. In general the shifting emphasis from land to money has its social consequences in another sense; a man's social status comes to be measured largely in terms of industrial wealth, just as in the agricultural communities it had been measured in land; the "moneyed class" tends to displace the "landed class."

Since trade must necessarily be carried on for profit, and since the acquisition of profit requires great ingenuity, the old traditional procedure of the village must give way. The exercise of individual judgment and the discovery of new methods are more important than a thoughtless imitation of the past. In the self-sufficient community, men live by merely repeating the age-worn methods of cultivation; but in the towns, business judgment is required to insure that goods be sold at a price higher than their cost. Individuality, therefore, plays a more important part in town economy.

Disadvantages of the town economy.—The town economy appears to furnish the elements essential to man's material well-being; agriculture, industry, and commerce are combined to enrich his economic life. No longer confined to the narrow limits of his immediate surroundings, he draws his subsistence from a variety of sources; existence is no longer scant and naked but rich and luxurious—at least for the fortunate. Nevertheless, the town economy has serious limitations. It is to be remembered that historically town economy went hand in hand with the political autonomy or independence of the town; that is, the town functioned as a political as well as the central part of an economic unit. Hence its economic life was organized on the basis of local needs and interests. For purposes of trade, territory beyond the jurisdiction of the towns was viewed as "foreign" territory; and each town accordingly walled itself in behind customs barriers, much as nations today wall themselves off from one another. Obviously, such a situation was harmful to commerce. Moreover, town economy implied the absence of centralized authority; hence there existed hazards both to property

and life beyond the jurisdiction of town authority, where robbers on land and pirates at sea commonly preyed upon commerce.

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND WORLD ECONOMY

Wherever society is divided into small, independent political units a corresponding division into economic units is to be expected, and such disadvantages to general trade and commerce as just indicated will be the result. Nevertheless, so long as political localism is the dominant fact, economic localism with all its disadvantages will not only be tolerated but vigorously defended by the independent communities themselves, as the only kind of economic order possible under the circumstances. On the other hand, if in the course of history society comes to be organized politically into broader and more inclusive units, then within those units the disadvantages of the town economy become intolerable and indefensible. The emergence of national states signified that European society had in fact become organized into broader and more comprehensive political units.

The change foredoomed the town economy. The organization of peoples politically on a national basis requires their economic organization on a national basis, as a means of laying the material foundations necessary for national welfare. That is to say, a national economy becomes the next logical and inevitable step; local control as represented by village or town finally gives way to a more comprehensive economic organization based on the needs of the national community. In the course of time each town acknowledges its obedience to some national authority. It comes ultimately to discern an identity of interests with its neighbors and chooses some degree of coöperation with them by the acknowledgment of a common leadership—that of a national government. The establishment of a national authority means greater security for life and property both on land and on sea, inasmuch as the national state is in a position to enforce greater respect for law and order within the whole national realm and to use its greater naval power to protect shipping at sea.

We shall not detail the characteristics of the national economy since the subject is discussed in a later chapter. Suffice it to say here that the national states followed the general model set before them by the town economy. The national governments sought to

make the nation self-sufficing by promoting all possible forms of production within the nation and by protecting home industries and foreign trade through a national system of protective tariffs.

The transition to world economy.—A culminating point was reached in economic development with the emergence of a world economy. National economy sufficed as long as each nation lived a comparatively isolated existence.¹ As long as distances over the globe remained forbiddingly great and slow means of transportation and communication made international commerce uncertain and irregular, the economic unit remained the nation. But once the barriers to international trade were removed and it became possible for the rich and abundant variety of the world's products to be brought to the doors of every nation, a national economy became an anomaly; it was no longer necessary for a nation to live unto itself. The enrichment of the nation's economic life to be gained when all share equally in the fruits of the earth became the sensible goal for all.

Science and machinery, as we have seen, actually did much to bring about such a transformation during the nineteenth century. With the introduction in the eighteenth century, of machine production in place of the old handcraft system, the piling-up of surpluses made foreign outlets indispensable; international commerce quickly expanded to tremendous proportions. Shortly after the machine made it possible to produce far more than the producing nation could consume, mechanical invention transformed communication and land and water transportation. The effect of these forces working together has been to produce a striking shrinkage of the world in which we live and to make nations economically interdependent. The whole world has become the market of every nation. Russian agricultural output affects, for better or for worse, our American wheat farming. The price of British Colonial rubber is a factor in the American cost of living. When Great Britain goes off the gold standard, the financial situation in the United States is significantly affected. Germany's internal prosperity affects her capacity to pay war reparations, and is therefore of importance to the allied nations. Figuratively speaking, every nation has become nervously sensitive to its economic life to conditions in other countries. All of this is true because we are now living in a world economy.

¹It is to be observed, however, that during the period from the sixteenth to the close of the eighteenth century, dynastic governments recognized the need of supplementing the national resources by securing the products of colonial possessions.

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CHAPTER XVIII

MEDIEVAL ECONOMY

THE second task which we set for ourselves in the preceding chapter is before us. That is the task of examining the characteristic organizations and practices that grew up under the types of economy first described. These we shall want to follow in their historical development down to our own time. We shall not, however, attempt to add to what has already been said of the economic life of prehistoric peoples; for, granting that our economic foundations were laid by men of the Stone Age and those immediately following—the plow and the wheel, for instance, and the art of smelting metals—until it may be said that our present institutions are the result of a development that, in its essentials, had its beginnings in the medieval period. Nor does the ancient world of historical times throw much light upon contemporary economic organization and practice; we shall, therefore, give it but a passing glance.

Economic aspects of Greek and Roman life.—Early Greek life had its roots in agriculture; and since the Greeks never developed machine technique in agriculture, a large proportion of the people continued throughout Greek history to devote themselves to the soil. At first Hellas was a land dotted by numerous self-contained villages of free, independent farmers who produced for their own consumption; other needs were so simple that they required neither extensive nor specialized industry. With the development of the city-states, however, and the expansion of Hellas to the north and the west, Greece underwent an economic revolution. This came about when, and largely because, population had grown to a point where new means of livelihood were found necessary. Manufacture, carried on in small shops by master workmen—partly free and partly slave—came in to supplement agriculture. Moreover, agriculture itself was affected, particularly by the colonial expansion. Many farmers in Greece ceased to compete with fertile colonial lands in the raising of grain and turned to the production of vines and olives. Thus a situation was created favorable to commerce. Foodstuffs were

brought from the colonies; manufactured goods and products of the vineyards and olive groves were exported. Economic life in Greece had become diversified—agriculture, manufacture, and commerce all contributing to her wealth.

While the general ideal of the Greek city-states was to make themselves self-sufficient, and although at times imperial states like Athens regulated trade, prohibitive tariffs were unknown. No colonies were so closely bound to their mother cities as to prevent their dealing with other states. This free competitive system permitted the Greek communities to enrich their economic life by drawing on the varied products of a wide geographical area.

As in Greece so in Rome the foundation of economic life was agriculture; and to the end of Roman times, so far as the Romans themselves were concerned, the possession of land continued to be the badge of one's social status. The early Latin village communities like the Greek, consisted largely of free men who owned the soil and cultivated it to meet their own needs; but for reasons already explained,¹ social changes, set in motion by Roman imperialism, led to the absorption of the small holdings of individual farmers into great estates worked largely by slaves and held by a class of wealthy proprietors. Throughout the republican period Rome remained an agricultural state, largely because her conquests in Italy provided new lands for her expanding population—in much the same way as the American frontier served the older settled communities of the Atlantic seaboard.

This opportunity of Rome to draw off surplus population also accounts in part for a characteristic freedom of economic activity throughout the Roman Empire. Rome did not find it necessary to develop industry intensively. She had no trade or industries of her own except those which ministered to the local needs of the metropolises. Hence she did not interfere with the operation of economic laws within the Empire; trade and industry were permitted to develop freely and naturally to meet the needs of widespread communities. Nevertheless, despite the absence of artificial monopolies and other restraints upon the free exchange of goods and products, particularly favored districts here and there built up relatively large-scale production with markets in far-distant parts of the Empire. The essential difference between economic conditions in Hellas and those in the Roman Empire at its prime was the result

¹See p. 201 above.

of the westward expansion of civilization through Roman conquests and the political union that Rome gave to the ancient world. For the most part, the Roman Empire was a union of city-states now no longer hampered in their economic life by constant warfare and innumerable frontiers.

Later, however, when Rome began to decline, conditions changed. Commerce became more and more restricted, and the government, in a vain attempt to secure for itself a sufficient income, interfered with economic laws. It attempted to fix prices, to regulate the guilds of craftsmen, to exact corvees from the peasants, and to restrict the free movement of labor. In this fashion, as slavery tended to disappear, a type of serfdom was created in many ways analogous to that of the Middle Ages.

As we shall presently see, the economic life of the Middle Ages presents some characteristics similar to those of ancient Greek and Roman life, and others that are striking in their contrasts.

THE DOMINANCE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE MIDDLE AGES

To get a general picture of economic life in the earlier centuries of the Middle Ages, let us imagine ourselves back in the European world of the ninth century. As we travel over Europe we are impressed by the sparsity of population; wide areas are uncultivated; forest and swamp lands abound. We are impressed, too, by the lack of highways and bridges, and the difficulties of travel generally once we leave the seas and the rivers behind us. As we proceed, we come upon village after village, but practically never a town; the impressive fact is agriculture; there seems to be no other sort of economic activity. Everywhere, too, the villages look much the same; a church, possibly a monastery, a castle or a less imposing baronial hall, stand out sharply. Grouped about them or near them stand the miserable huts of the tillers of the soil, huts huddled together with hardly more than a garden patch to separate them. Farther out lie the farm lands, not enclosed by fences, but "open fields" curiously laid out in long, narrow strips, separated by rows of stones or by unplowed ridges of earth that furnish a narrow footpath between the strips. Here and there are patches of woodland or meadow or waste. We look in vain for labor-saving implements of the modern type; we see only those rudely constructed implements of a primitive age which demand of laborers a maximum of toil.

Such were the physical aspects of the typical agricultural villages that stretched over almost all of Europe. Town life was so rare a thing, that we might say that there was none before the tenth century. Only here and there where the bishops of the Church had preserved the town as an administrative center, or where exceptional opportunities for trade had created some semblance of a town community, was there any deviation from the village type; and even in these cases towns were hardly more than overgrown villages. By and large, this was the period when European society was thrust back from the rich urban life that characterized Roman civilization to a state in which the village economy dominated society. The high churchmen and the noble or knight who ruled and fought were almost the only ones who did not actually till the soil to feed the mouths of the population. The village, which so universally marked the European landscape, was the economic unit of medieval society. In Europe it was known as the manor or the *ville*, but the term "manorial system" is used generally to designate the peculiar economic organization which characterized the period.

The manorial system.—The complete historical development of the manorial system does not lie within the medieval period. In its main outlines it was a heritage from the Romans, who in turn had taken the idea from the Near East. It will be remembered that the controlling center of the Roman estates was the villa, where the Roman master of the land resided; that the land was tilled by slaves subject to the control of the master, who was held responsible for their good behavior to the Roman government; and that the estate was organized as an economic unit for the support of all who lived under the master's authority. In these several particulars the medieval manor resembled the Roman estate.

First and always the medieval village or manor was organized essentially as a self-contained community; that is, it was able to furnish within itself all that was necessary for the subsistence of the group with a minimum of aid from outside. It was compelled to be self-sufficient. Cut off in large measure from the outside world the community had no choice; it had to maintain its own physical existence or perish. It produced not for profits, but that it might eat and live; and consequently it usually produced no more, and could produce no more, than sufficed to support life. Such being the object, it organized its community life, the best it knew how to achieve that end. Trade was not non-existent, however; slight

as it was it served to introduce a limited use of money into medieval village economy.

An ordinary American or European village of the present time offers a striking contrast in its economic organization. Modern methods of communication and transportation make it unnecessary for it to be self-sufficing. It is not an economic unit; it does depend on the outside world; it can draw on the farthest ends of the earth to supply its wants. To supply those wants it must have commodities to exchange, and it obtains such commodities by producing a surplus which it sells for money to purchase what it needs from the outside world. Thus the modern farmer produces for a profit and not merely for direct consumption.

The agricultural laborers.—The status of the medieval cultivator was likewise strikingly different. He was in most cases a serf. At the head of the manor or ville stood a lord, lay or ecclesiastical, or a simple knight. Since a lord usually possessed many manors, his representative or agent frequently occupied the position of authority. But to some authority, whether that of a great noble occupying a castle or one of lesser importance occupying a manor house, the serf owed obedience. It was of this authority that the serf held his land; and he held it for use; he did not own it in the modern sense. He was attached to the land; when it was transferred to another lord, he went with the land like a tree or a building. He might not leave his holding if he desired; if he ran away he could be brought back and punished. The food which he produced belonged to him only in part; part of it he must give to the lord. Nor did his labor belong wholly to himself; part of it, usually about three days in the week, he must give to the cultivating of the master's lands—the demesne; and in times of need, as in harvest time, even more of his labor might be exacted. He might also be called upon to build roads or bridges, or to perform other services. He used the lord's mill to grind his grain, the lord's oven to bake his bread, the lord's wine-press to make his wine; and for all these services he must pay a fee. On certain occasions he was compelled to make still other payments to the lord, sometimes in kind, sometimes in money. For his contributions and services he received the land on which he subsisted and, theoretically at least, protection.

All this looks much like slavery, but a serf was not a slave. There were limits to what a lord might demand or do, limits fixed by the customs of the manor. He was not permitted to buy or sell a serf.

He might not dispossess the serf of his lands except for a recognized cause. Servile obligations were numerous, but they could not be arbitrarily imposed by the lord or increased or made more severe; they were controlled by custom, though complaints are numerous indicating that custom was sometimes overridden. And, finally, the serf possessed a legal status, which slaves ordinarily do not; he had resort to the manorial courts in the case of certain grievances.

Agricultural methods.—The compelling power of custom exhibited itself in numerous other ways. The serf was not an individual cultivator; as we have seen, there was little play for individualism in medieval society. The conception of the manorial group was communal; each member was an integral part of the whole. The community was a closely integrated, coöperative unit, in which each member was consigned to a status which carried with it certain customary obligations; a status to which each was born and from which there were very few avenues of escape. Thus the serf's activity was ordered in advance. What he should plant, when, and how; when he should harvest and how; the amount of wood which he might take from the common woodland; the number of animals he might put on the common pasture—all these were matters determined by the customs of the manor.

The distribution of the land and its use were in keeping with the communal conception; individual farming would have been out of the question. The distribution scheme is designated as the "open field" system and the "two field" or "three field" system. A description of the three-field system will serve to make the typical arrangement clear. Under this system, the tillable land was divided into three great, irregularly-shaped fields. As a rude means of preserving the fertility of the soil, each of the three was permitted to lie fallow one year and was cultivated two successive years. Of the two fields cultivated in a given year, one was sown in the spring commonly with oats, barley and peas, to be harvested in the autumn; while the second was planted to rye and wheat to be harvested the following summer. Judged by modern standards, the variety of crops was exceedingly small and the yield light. Each of the great fields was divided into long narrow strips that stretched like ribbons over the land. Each serf was allotted a definite amount of land; but each holding was made up of a certain number of "open" or unenclosed strips in each of the three great fields, with the result that the serf's "farm" was widely scattered over the manor.

this odd method of distribution apparently effected a fairly equitable apportionment among areas of the good, the less fruitful, and the poor land. At the same time, the wide scattering and the intermingling of strips made it necessary and practical to farm coöperatively; services were exchanged, and the few existing farm implements were used more or less in common. A conception of farming as a scientific and individual enterprise requiring experimentation and careful calculation for the future, was unknown.

Disadvantages of the manorial system.—Viewed through modern eyes this picture reveals some of the sources of stagnation in a medieval society. Man was, more or less, a creature of a fixed routine. The result was the perpetuation of wasteful methods, and consequent poverty. Moreover, self-sufficiency, by its very nature, is not conducive to material prosperity. Manorial life was exceedingly simple; it lacked the complexity of our present elaborate arrangements for producing and distributing goods. But, obviously, this simplicity was the very reason for its poverty. If in the present day we were to revert to the simple rural life, abandon our specialization, produce only for direct wants—in other words, become an assemblage of self-sufficient communities instead of interdependent units, we should thereby reduce ourselves to comparative poverty. The self-sufficient community is, from the economic standpoint, highly inefficient; by all their laborious efforts and endless toil the serfs could barely provide the most meager subsistence. So far did the lack of adequate transport facilities bind their economic fortunes to a limited locality that in times of local distress due to failure of crops they were often in no position to draw upon the surplus of more favored regions.

Added to the disadvantages of the system was the incubus of war. Among the medieval nobles, never held adequately in check by any higher authority, war was a chronic condition. Thus society was constantly still further impoverishing itself, constantly using up the resources of the land to ward off the enemy. What might have been economically utilized to provide necessities, and perhaps the comforts of life, was directed to the prosecution of war.

This type of existence—one characterized by war, poverty, wasteful farming methods, the lack of machinery, and the absence of freedom of enterprise—was widespread over Europe for centuries. With all its limitations—from the modern point of view—it endured so long because it was peculiarly adapted to meet the needs of

society under the conditions then existing. The world has changed considerably since then. Methods of farming have become less traditional: the present attitude is not to repeat past customs, but to find newer and more efficient methods of land utilization; farming has become scientific. Efficiency in farm production makes it possible for a relatively small part of the world's population to feed the rest of the world adequately. Those thus released from agriculture manufacture products which are exchanged for the surplus food supplies of the farmers. When superior opportunity is in the city as against the country appears, or when one city offers an opportunity superior to that of another, we see a movement from the less to the more desirable locality. This mobility of population which is essential to freedom of enterprise, was never a characteristic of the Middle Ages. Wars and poverty we still have with us, but the manifestations of poverty are less and less severe, and wars occur less frequently than formerly.

INDUSTRY IN THE MIDDLE AGES

As already stated, town life, which is in part distinguished by its devotion to industry and trade as contrasted with agriculture, was a rare occurrence until the tenth or eleventh century. The great bulk of manufacturing, therefore, was, in the earlier centuries of the Middle Ages, carried on in the village or manor. And so simple and meager were the needs of the agricultural worker and his family that it required no great skill to supply most of them within the home. Spinning, weaving, and needlework were common occupations of the housewife and her daughters—in addition to many other tasks incidental to rural life—and even noble ladies busied themselves with fine needle work. To furnish those articles of finer manufacture which could not be produced on the manor there appeared occasionally an itinerant peddler. Otherwise, economic contact with the outside world was narrowly limited.

It is evident, then, that the industrial arts were incidental in this period. The manorial dweller was first and last a tiller of the soil; what else he did to meet his physical wants was incidental and subordinate. Yet there were a few specialists on the manor. A certain amount of ironwork, for example, was a necessity; someone must acquire the skill to use the forge and the mechanic's tools. The village miller was likewise indispensable. But, on the whole

specialization was not a characteristic of manorial economy. It is hardly necessary to add that the limited amount of industry that went on in the village was executed entirely with hand tools; that is to say, it was a handicraft industry. The emergence of town life in the eleventh century signalized the beginning of a new phase in the development of medieval industry and trade.

Medieval towns.—The origin of the towns is still shrouded in considerable mystery. Those who left records of medieval life gave little or no attention to the rise of the burgher class as an important social phenomenon, perhaps because of the failure to appreciate its significance, or from sheer indifference or contempt in a world in which the holding of land was the mark of social distinction and trade was the occupation of a despised, ignoble class. Not until the records kept by the towns themselves does the historian have much evidence upon which to base a knowledge of town life, and these records are rare before the eleventh century. Consequently, we cannot speak with great assurance of the origin of the towns. Very few of them seem to have had a continuous history from the time of the Roman Empire; even the sites of many of those ancient centers are still unknown. Some towns appear to have grown from villages by reason of possessing advantages for trade; others by reason of their situation at an important ferry-point on a river or in the neighborhood of a great monastery; still others by virtue of grants to hold markets and fairs. A number of towns had descent from Roman military and administrative centers.

For the most part medieval towns bore little resemblance to our modern towns and cities. So far as size is concerned, we should still call most of them villages. For purposes of protection they were surrounded by walls. As they grew, available space became limited and buildings became crowded; the streets were little more than crooked lanes which usually became filthy with decaying matter, since sanitary facilities were almost non-existent. With growing wealth came the addition of many quaint and picturesque features—more stately churches, town halls, guild houses, towers, gateways, public squares utilized as market places—all of which lent some justification for the pride that the burghers felt for their towns, often described by them as “beautiful.”

For a time their position in medieval society was not much different from that of the villages. Like the villages they were under the authority of some king, nobleman, bishop, or abbot who exacted

certain dues or tolls from the inhabitants. As industry and trade developed, the economic interests of the town dwellers diverged ever more widely from those of the agricultural communities about them. With the change the desire grew to limit or throw off the authority of the manorial lords. This movement for town liberties opened a long and interesting struggle from which the more important towns emerged with exemptions and privileges in varying degrees set down in successive charters granted by the kings, noblemen, or ecclesiastics upon whose territory the towns happened to be. The development is important in economic history, for it led ultimately to the complete political independence of some towns and a large measure of autonomy in others. It was this special authority to manage their own affairs that set the towns off politically from the rural communities and gave them either complete or extensive control in the ordering of their economic life.

The life of the towns was richer and more varied by far than that which had characterized the medieval manor. Trade and industry became specialized; production increased, and skilled crafts multiplied. The towns became the center of a more advanced type of economic organization, in which neighboring villages and smaller towns were drawn into new relationships. The town became at once a market for the products of the surrounding rural communities and a means of supplying manufactured goods of a kind that could not be produced on the manors. In addition, a limited trade sprang up between towns, but, for the most part, the great bulk of manufactured goods was for local consumption. Far more extensive, however, was the trade of the great towns and cities of Italy and the Netherlands and of the more important towns of some other areas. In the case of the Italian cities, particularly of Venice, a profitable trade in the products of the East became a practical monopoly and was pursued on a scale, for those times, of imposing proportions.

Medieval guilds.—This more complicated pattern of economic life presupposes new economic and social interests, new economic practices, and new forms of economic organization. The townsmen turned characteristically to a familiar form of social organization—the corporation, in this case called a guild. Guilds performed a number of social purposes in the Middle Ages. Our interest is confined to those that were devoted essentially to economic ends—the merchant guilds and the craft guilds.

The merchant guilds had reached a position of importance as early as the eleventh century. Every town of any importance had its merchant guild. It included all townsmen who were engaged in the selling of goods. Not all these were "merchants" in the present-day sense. With the exception of a limited number who confined their activity to the buying and selling of raw materials, most of the guild members were manufacturers who sold the goods they made. These commercial activities entered so extensively into the life of the town that the great majority of the townsmen became members of the guild; it was almost an all-inclusive organization.

Its functions were numerous. In general it sought to maintain the privileges and liberties of the townsmen; it furnished direction and organized power to the town in its struggles to free itself from the manorial obligations to its lord and to combat the oppressions of the feudal nobility. It sought to promote and protect the commercial interests of the town and of guild members in various ways. It largely reserved the town market for its own merchants by laying severe restrictions upon the sale of goods by "strangers," that is, merchants from other towns; or by levying taxes upon goods brought in from outside. It reserved for the townsmen the first opportunity to buy town merchandise against the right of purchase by a stranger." It aimed also to protect members of the guild against other members, should they engage in any unfair or "unbrotherly" practices, such as the use of false weights and measures, the "cornering" of the market by obtaining a controlling share of some commodity ("engrossing"), the selling of goods above the market price ("regrating"), the gaining of some unfair advantage by purchasing goods before they reached the market ("forestalling"). To the extent of its power the merchant guild extended its protection beyond municipal limits to members journeying abroad at a time when travel was beset by numerous hazards—hazards to the goods, liberty, and life of the traveler.

By the thirteenth century the merchant guilds were rapidly slipping from their commanding position. With oligarchical tendencies within the organization and the crystallizing of industrial technique, the merchant guild was unable to keep pace with a more rapidly expanding commercial life. More vigorous and more democratically organized bodies had appeared during the twelfth century and were soon crowding the merchant guilds into a subordinate position, although these continued to function for a long time to come in certain

parts of Europe by confining their activity to special, narrow fields. The new bodies to which industrial control now passed were the craft guilds.

The craft guilds reflect the growing influence of specialization by their recognition of an increasing differentiation of interests among industrial occupations. One inclusive organization no longer served the special needs of each craft. Instead of one guild there were now in each town as many craft guilds as there were important industries. The weavers, the dyers, the tailors, the armorers, the drapers, and so on, had each a separate guild. In many ways their functions were similar to the functions of the merchant guilds. They used their power largely to reserve for their own members the economic opportunities of their town both by regulating severely the participation of "strangers" and by prohibiting the making of goods for sale by townsmen who were not members of the proper guild. As co-operative rather than individualist bodies they established minute regulations governing the activity of members. Some of the regulations were to protect one or more members against unfair tactics of other members. Others were partly for the protection of guildsmen and partly for the protection of the consumer against inferior materials or craftsmanship, against the excessive use of apprentices in shops, against night work, and against charges above what was considered a "fair price." These rules and regulations were enforced by officially appointed guild authorities, who had the power to punish serious offenders by fine or imprisonment or expulsion from the guild.

The guild process was further standardized by the definite fixing of the routine preparation which one must pass through in order to qualify for the practice of his craft. Aspiring to the occupation of carpenter, a young man had first to start as an apprentice. The apprenticeship was that phase of his vocational education during which he lived in the house of his master workman, learning by imitation the secrets of the trade. Upon the successful completion of this phase of his education, he then became a journeyman, receiving remuneration for his labor. Neither an apprentice nor a journeyman, however, might perform work directly for the public, but only for and at the direction of his master. In time the journeyman became a master workman, conditional on his acquisition of the necessary skill and the possession of sufficient wealth to set up business. To learn a trade took from three to seven years. On

learned to do as had been done. So many apprentices could be employed each year, so many hours were to be spent on the work each day, and only so much work of prearranged quality was to be turned out.

An evaluation of the guild system.—Judged by modern standards the guild system in industry, like the manorial system in agriculture, was wasteful, unprogressive, and inefficient. It would prove utterly inadequate to meet the demands of present-day society, with respect not only to the rich variety of present needs but to quantity of goods as well. But after this is admitted, it can be said that the guild system met the needs of the comparatively stagnant and sparse population of that time, with its much simpler standards of living, as well as our own economic system meets the needs of present-day society, particularly if one considers the needs of all classes rather than those of the well-to-do minorities. The guild system provided a social mechanism which fitted the individual into his appointed niche, where he found opportunity to contribute his share to the well-being of the community and to maintain himself and family. In this last respect it furnished more than a supporting stage; it provided for some of its members a kind of insurance against sickness, death, and other calamities; and it was a center for social enjoyment. It established a comprehensive system of training and regulation which tended to insure a standard of workmanship and quality of output measured to the demands of the community, and at a price accepted as "fair." (This statement contains substantial truth despite the frequent evidence of fraudulent practices and defective workmanship.) The guild system possessed, too, the advantage of greater stability of employment—that is, a comparative freedom from economic crises of the sort that shake society in our own world and produce widespread misery and want. This advantage it enjoyed by reason of its dependence essentially upon local consumption which varied little from year to year, rather than upon the vagaries of distant markets. This was particularly true of the guild in its earlier history.

There was another side of the picture. The guild system devoted itself to tradition and custom to a degree that made it unprogressive from our point of view. Methods were stereotyped, and individual initiative and ingenuity had little opportunity to function. The introduction of improved methods or new industries could be effected only with great effort, if at all. The fundamental spirit of monopoly

stifled the stimulating effects of competition. Those whose enterprise led them to attempt to set up as manufacturers outside the authority of the guilds were crushed; if necessary, by military measures. But it is to be remembered that only in the later stages of guild history did the organizations close the door to newcomers: first, young men who desired to prepare themselves for a craft were freely admitted, and the organization of the guild was fairly democratic; but as the institution became crystallized, entrance of new apprentices was made difficult, and the administration came to center in the hands of the wealthy masters, who played favorites among relatives and friends in the matter of advancement, and grew more intolerant of innovations of all kinds. It is to be noted that this growing conservatism and rigidity were among the first signs of the decline of the social usefulness of the guild system and the signal for its decadence and ultimate destruction.

COMMERCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES

Before town life became a significant feature of medieval society commerce was narrowly limited. Villages, as we have seen, produced much the same thing, and generally only enough for local needs. But the rise of towns signified the rise of commerce, commerce between the towns of one country, and between towns in different countries, and between European towns and the East, the last growing to important proportions from the tenth century on. There were two outstanding theaters of trade—the Baltic area and the Mediterranean. In the former, many of the towns in German and Russian lands organized the famous Hanseatic League, as a means of protecting and promoting the exchange of the commodities of the Baltic area and those of the countries southward, a trade mostly in raw materials or foodstuffs, such as grain and fish. The Mediterranean was the great highway for trade with the East. To ports on its eastern littoral and on the Black Sea Mohammedan Turks and Arabians brought the products of the East—spices, jewels, and other luxuries. It was this lucrative trade, it will be recalled, that provided the economic foundations in Italy for the Renaissance.

Handicaps of medieval commerce.—Even at its height commerce was relatively far less important in the Middle Ages than in the modern period. That it should be insignificant in amount as compared with modern trade is easily understandable. The

population of the Western world was infinitely smaller than now, and the productive capacity of the handicraft system was incomparably lower than that of modern machine technique. But there were limiting factors of another sort. There were few good highways—some of the best being the ancient Roman roads, just as some of the remaining Roman bridges were about the only ones of importance available to traders. The ordinary instruments of transportation and communication were clumsy and slow. Then, it must not be forgotten that medieval commerce was municipal commerce; the jurisdiction of the towns was limited and their power was insufficient to maintain order over wide areas. Roads were infested with robbers, and the seas were infested with pirates. The resulting insecurity naturally was a great obstacle to trade. More serious still was the handicap of local customs barriers. Every independent town and principality of a feudal lord erected its customs wall. If every state in the American union raised tariff walls against interstate trade, the situation would be comparable to that which existed in medieval Europe, but not nearly so complicated. To the degree that such a practice hampers trade in any age, the advantages of geographic specialization are lost.

There were in force other economic practices and conceptions to hamper medieval trade. For example, there was prevalent the notion that goods should be exchanged at a price fixed by custom, at "fair" or "just" price. To sell for less or for more than that price was considered unethical. We know today that the price of a commodity necessarily must change as the difficulty or ease of its production changes. Modern governments recognize the fact that the determination of price is, or should be, a matter of unimpeded competitive forces, and under normal circumstances do not attempt to fix prices.

Another hindrance was the medieval conception of interest. The making of interest was then considered highly unethical. To take money for the use of money was regarded as an unfair practice, since money itself was thought to be sterile and unproductive. Could it be just to force borrowers to return more than they borrowed? During an age when loans were made principally by kings and nobles to finance their wars, the medieval attitude toward interest was more defensible than now, even on economic grounds, for war is a destructive, not a productive process. The conception of interest as usury broke down as industry and trade developed and it became evident

that borrowed money became a factor in the production of more wealth, and as such was deserving of remuneration, as was labor itself.

Within the limits of their experience and powers, medieval merchants did what they could to overcome the obstacles to commercial expansion. We have already mentioned the Hanseatic League as a coöperative enterprise to promote trade and furnish the protection which towns acting alone could not provide. The guilds, too, though necessarily in a more limited way, afforded protection to merchants traveling from town to town, and made provision for the families of those who lost their lives on business journeys. The leading Italian towns established municipal navies to ward off injury both from competitors and from pirates in the Mediterranean. To facilitate trade in a more positive manner there were the medieval markets or "fairs," as they were called, which usually grew up outside the jurisdiction of the guilds.

By the eleventh century fairs had become an important adjunct to the exchange of products and manufactures. Local fairs, drawing together merchants and other buyers over a limited area about the town, were at first held on religious holidays, usually in the market place before the church. These soon established themselves in the economic life of the time and came at frequent intervals, in some places once a week, in others, monthly. More important so far as foreign trade was concerned, and more picturesque, were the great fairs established in a limited number of important towns—fairs coming at wider intervals, and sometimes continuing for weeks. These drew merchants from every important commercial area of Europe. All necessary facilities to stimulate and promote exchange were provided—facilities for the equating of the medley of money values, courts to validate special agreements among the merchants, arrangements for giving foreigners necessary protection. All these practices and devices contributed to the expansion of commerce. By the close of the Middle Ages it had reached important proportions and had become a decisive factor in the enrichment of European economic life.

From municipal to national commerce.—Viewed in perspective, however, medieval commerce represents the infant stage in the development of European trade. So long as commerce remained a municipal undertaking, the handicaps mentioned above would continue to block any wide commercial expansion. Two powerful

influences were operating at the opening of the modern period to open the way for a transformation in commercial practices and for a wide extension of the theater in which they were to operate. The first was the influence of the great discoveries of the closing decade of the fifteenth century, which were ultimately to extend European commerce over the entire globe. The second influence was the rise of absolute governments as centers of control. With these changes commerce quickly entered an era of great expansion both in bulk and in the variety of commodities exchanged; at the same time commercial technique was transformed. It is these changes in the economic life of Europe that we shall next examine.

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CHAPTER XIX

THE DECAY OF MEDIEVAL ECONOMY

THE closing centuries of the Middle Ages and the early modern period witnessed the decay and partial disappearance of many features of medieval economy, particularly in England. The process of disintegration continued into the eighteenth century, when the Industrial Revolution, together with attendant forces, administered what proved ultimately to be the final blow to most of what was left of the old economic structure. It is these changes prior to the Industrial Revolution that we now wish to examine. It is hazardous to generalize about them, because of the irregular way in which they came about. Some conclusions that hold true for such advanced countries as England, France, and Holland are not true of Eastern and Central Europe, where political and economic development came more slowly.

A few facts will indicate the wide variations in the chronology of the events. Serfdom had passed away completely in England before the close of the sixteenth century, but it persisted in central Europe until the beginning of the nineteenth, and in certain parts of that area to even later times. In Russia it lasted until the sixties of the nineteenth century. Even in England, down to the middle of the eighteenth century approximately half the farm lands were still divided into strips after the medieval fashion, and the old methods of cultivation were still widely followed. In France much of the old manorial structure was still standing until the French Revolution destroyed it. While in England the guild system had given way completely by the close of the sixteenth century, in France it was preserved until the Revolution. It is clear, then, that the whole process was halting and irregular. European communities continued to hold on to medieval practices until it became evident that they no longer met the needs of society. In general, however, it may be said that the trend was decidedly away from the localism which had characterized medieval economy toward a broader economic organization suitable to the needs of the newly

established national states; that is to say, toward a national economy.

THE DECAY OF THE MANORIAL SYSTEM

Judged in its own social setting, the manorial system was well adapted to meet the needs of society. A sparse population, relatively static and grouped into small, more or less isolated communities, is a characteristic feature of the background against which manorial practices must be judged. So long as the social setting remained unchanged, these practices would probably remain unchallenged; in certain parts of Europe, however, they were beginning to be challenged, as the modern age approached, because social changes were in progress that threw manorial practices out of adjustment. Here and there communities were slowly being made aware of the need of new social instruments to solve a new set of economic problems. In no other country was this change in the economic situation quite so evident as it was in England; this country, therefore, offers the best opportunity for observing those social forces which, manifesting themselves first in the closing centuries of the Middle Ages, continued to operate until much of the manorial structure had been destroyed.

The breaking down of villeinage.—One of the earliest signs of the breaking down of villeinage, or serfdom, in England was the emergence of a new practice called the *commutation of services*. Modification in economic life had made it mutually desirable to lord and villein to acknowledge a new relationship. With the progress of the change, it became more and more the customary procedure for villeins to meet their obligations to their lords in money instead of labor, and for the lords to hire labor for wages or to let out their land to leaseholders. Thus, the villeins gradually obtained release from their traditional obligations of actual work, by making money payments. Slowly but surely, the lord was assuming the rôle of landlord; the villein, that of tenant.

One factor leading to the commutation of services was the expansion of English commerce, in which wool figured prominently. English wool was sent mainly to the Netherlands, the English receiving manufactured cloth or silver in return. The silver was coined into money and thus got into circulation. The expansion of commerce stimulated the development of towns with an ever-increasing population devoted to industry and commerce. The result was a

growing pressure upon agriculture to increase production. But in the main the villeins had produced for their own consumption, and ordinarily the manorial lords likewise had been interested in agriculture for direct consumption. Servile labor, shackled by tradition, could hardly be expected to produce more than a meager subsistence. Thus the growth of towns produced a problem. If the greater demand for agricultural products was to be met, more efficient methods in agriculture must be adopted. Moreover, there was the stimulus of profit, provided surpluses of food could be produced. It became apparent that servile labor, sluggish and unimaginative, was not good economy. The economic development that emerged to meet this new economic situation was, as we have indicated, commutation of services.

The change was revealed in new forms of cultivation and land tenure. In some areas the former manorial lord turned to what is called *demesne farming*. He consolidated the strips of his *demesne*—that is, his own personal holdings—and commonly let out the land to leaseholders who paid him rent; in some cases, he hired agricultural laborers who tilled a part of the *demesne* for him in return for wages. Some of the liberated villeins proceeded in a similar fashion. They exchanged strips with one another and consolidated their own holdings. They then tilled the farms thus created as tenants, paying rent to their former lords. Thus in those parts of England where these changes had taken place manorial lords became landlords, and the liberated villeins became leaseholders on the *demesne* of a landlord or agricultural laborers working for wages on the *demesne* or, in some cases, on the holding of other liberated villeins.

The Black Death.—In the fourteenth century a terrible plague swept over Europe. In England this “Black Death” wiped out approximately one-third of the inhabitants. So great a reduction of the population was bound to have important social consequences. One result was a further disturbance of traditional practices.

The decline in population placed the remaining English laborers in a strategic position. We know that as the supply of any agent of production decreases, its relative importance increases. Fewer laborers meant greater importance per laborer, just as fewer farmers today would mean greater importance per farmer. It is scarcity of an agent of production, either land, labor, or capital, that makes it comparatively more significant. In this case it was the laborers

who became relatively scarce as compared with other agents. In this situation the Black Death generated forces which acted in two opposite directions so far as its effect upon villeinage was concerned. On those manors where the villeins were largely or wholly destroyed by the plague the manorial lords were compelled to go into the labor market and bid for agricultural workers. Under the circumstances existing it was not likely that men would consent to accept the old servile status. The result was a further undermining of serfdom. On the other hand, where the manorial population had largely escaped the effects of the plague the tendency of the manorial lords appears to have been to hold more tenaciously than ever to the customary services of their villeins. This twofold effect of the Black Death makes it difficult to measure its contribution to the disappearance of serfdom in England.

Another interesting consequence of the plague has no direct bearing upon the disappearance of villeinage. This was its effect upon wages. Since it had become customary to hire free laborers for money, and since the supply had been so greatly diminished, laborers could ask for higher wages from their lords. The rise in wages was inevitable, but it was also contrary to tradition. Certain wages and rents had become habitual; a departure from them was therefore resisted by the owners of land, who were clearly the losers by the transformation. The lords argued that the customary payments were just, and that the higher demands of the laborers were manifestly wrong. In the emergency the lords appealed to the government for aid. Laws were passed known as the Statutes of Laborers, designed to prohibit laborers from demanding more than the customary wages and to force them to accept employment at rates in effect before the great plague. Those failing to comply were subject to imprisonment. The statutes were frequently reissued; but in spite of all legal insistence wages continued to rise. The Black Death, with its attendant depopulation, was raising the economic status of the free laborers.

The enclosure movement.—The emancipation of villeins and the disappearance of the manorial system in general were still further hastened by the enclosure of lands for sheep raising. Up to the Hundred Years' War between England and France (1337–1453) the raising of wool had been an important industry in England. Wool was exchanged for manufactured cloth from Flanders; but as the war continued, this trade was hampered and the English were driven

to a much more extensive manufacture of cloth at home to meet the domestic demand. Thus began an enterprise which was to become of first importance in the economic history of England. Landlords, scenting the opportunities for profit in the growing demand for wool, began to turn more and more from the production of grain to the raising of sheep. They had found that they could thus reduce the expense for labor, for a given amount of land utilized for sheep raising required far fewer laborers than if used for agriculture. But the old system of land tenure under which villeins or tenants held adjoining strips of land was an obstacle to sheep raising, which necessitated a broad enclosed acreage under one control. The prospective sheep-raiser, therefore, proceeded to evict the former grain-raising villeins or tenants and thus to get possession of many adjoining strips, which he hedged or fenced in.

The enclosure movement was the most powerful force making for the disappearance of villeinage in England. Land devoted to sheep raising, since it was now definitely marked off from other holdings, took on more clearly the characteristics of private property, as we use the term today. The change was inevitable and of fundamental economic importance, but like all rapid changes, both good and bad, it meant great suffering to that class which because of its fairly fixed habits was unable to adjust itself to the new order. The case is somewhat analogous to what happens now when a new invention that contributes largely to social progress does so only at the expense of those unfortunates whom it robs of their means of livelihood. So in England, as the enclosures continued on into the sixteenth century thousands of men were set adrift from their medieval moorings to wander in search of new employment. Opposition to the change was naturally very great, and contemporary literature cried out against the cruelty of enclosures. Time after time the government sought to check the movement, but, as usually happens, found its efforts ineffectual against the force of economic changes.

The events briefly indicated here mark the beginnings of a fundamental change in rural economy. The enclosure movement, first motivated by an interest in sheep culture and later by increased demands for grains and other foodstuffs, continued in England down into the nineteenth century. From the fourteenth century on the number of free laborers and tenants was constantly increasing through a diminution in the ranks of the villeins. In one way or another those remaining were obtaining freedom from their lords.

Some merely ran away, others were voluntarily granted their freedom. Basically, the medieval relation of lord and serfs based on customary services was becoming economically obsolete. By the middle of the fifteenth century, though the legal form of villeinage remained, most of the English rural population were freemen, and in the sixteenth century the process was practically completed. But the disappearance of serfdom did not carry with it the widespread abandonment of medieval methods of cultivation. The change in that direction came more or less haltingly until we reach the eighteenth century when the process is so quickened that some have referred to it as an agricultural revolution.

Before this even, however, the pattern of modern agriculture had been set. The trend of events pointed inevitably to a definite change from the conception of landholding for use to private ownership; from subsistence farming to commercial farming; from customary services to labor for wages; from coöperative activity to individual competitive activity. As these changes proceeded, the physical aspect of the English rural areas was slowly undergoing a striking modification. Now, in place of a land divided into innumerable strips, there appeared in some districts large consolidated estates of yeomen, country gentlemen, or nobles. Truly, rural society was beginning to take on a more modern appearance. But again it must be emphasized that the transformation came slowly in some of its aspects, and at first only in favored localities. One must wait until the nineteenth century to find the process complete.

THE DECAY OF THE GUILDS

The guilds did not suddenly lose their control over industry. The decline of the system was gradual and its final disappearance in different parts of Europe came at widely separated periods. It declined first in England, and it is in this country that the causes of its loss of power can best be observed. On the continent, under somewhat similar conditions, the guilds declined from the opening of the sixteenth century on, but there they continued as an important feature of industrial life long after they had ceased to function in England.

The emergence of the domestic system.—From the fourteenth century on there are increasing signs of the declining power of the English craft guilds. Internal conditions similar to those which had

earlier weakened the merchant guilds now appeared in the craft guilds—the concentration of control in the hands of wealthy masters, and the restriction of full membership by the imposition of heavy payments. These monopolistic tendencies caused dissatisfaction and led to the organization of journeymen guilds outside the parent bodies but subordinate to them. With the development of the cloth-making industry a more powerful movement emerged affecting the position of the guild system. This movement resulted in what came to be called the “domestic system.”

The manufacturing of wool offered good profits. A class of enterprising merchants arose who attracted numbers of dissatisfied craftsmen to set up establishments in villages and towns outside the jurisdiction of the guilds and the industrial centers. The merchant bought the raw materials and supplied the craftsmen who worked for him for wages. In some cases he might even supply the necessary tools. The finished product belonged to the merchant, who disposed of it in local or other markets. It was to this type of productive enterprise that the term “domestic system” was applied. It carried with it important deviations from the guild system. In effect it was a defiance of the earlier control which the craft guilds had exercised over industry. To a considerable extent it drew industry out of the old established centers and spread manufacturing through a large part of rural England. It resembled our present-day organization in some respects in that the workers owned neither the raw materials nor the finished product, nor, in some cases, the tools with which they worked. The domestic system, therefore, marked something new in industry; it signified a separation between work and ownership. It also signified the growing power of the merchant class and a corresponding decrease in the power of the guilds. What happened in cloth-making also occurred, in lesser degree, in a number of other industries.

The influence of the national monarchies.—A second force tending to break down the guild system was the development of the national states under absolute kings. To establish themselves in complete power, monarchs deemed it necessary to destroy the political localism of the medieval nobility, the power of the Roman Church in temporal matters—and to a degree in religious matters—and the local power of the towns in industrial and commercial affairs. There was gradually adopted a systematic program of intervention in the activities of the people. Economically this meant the

diminution of the controlling authority of the guilds. Hitherto the craft guilds had been all-important in the regulation of economic life in the towns; they had also exercised a powerful political influence in town government, enjoying for themselves almost complete political independence. But now the government took over the many-sided task of promoting national economic development. It controlled money by securing for itself a monopoly of coinage, thus establishing uniformity and preventing counterfeiting; it created a national system of taxation; it instituted a system of courts for the enforcement of its law. The granting of special privileges to towns was discontinued, and monopolies were reserved for companies of national scope. By the Statute of Apprentices, passed in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, an attempt was made to fix wages, hours, years of apprenticeship, and innumerable other details.

The confiscation of guild property.—What might be termed the final decisive blow in the extinction of the guild system of production came toward the middle of the sixteenth century as an incident in the English Reformation. During the reign of Edward VI, a radical religious movement swept over the country. In its zeal to erase all "superstitions" of Roman derivation and—it must be said—to reap further material rewards, the government, then under control of the reform party, enacted laws under which all property of the guilds utilized for religious purposes was confiscated. Such property comprised a considerable part of the wealth of the guilds, for during preceding centuries many bequests had been made by departed brothers on condition that the guild concerned should perform certain stipulated religious duties. The government's action not only struck at the economic foundations of the guilds but it went far to destroy the religious bonds which had contributed to hold the members together. These religious bonds were still further weakened when the religious dramas—the miracle plays, which had long been presented by the craft guilds—were taken over during the sixteenth century by professional players or displaced by other forms of the drama.

By the opening years of the seventeenth century the craft guilds had run their course. As the central government developed its power, the hitherto independent towns became subsidiary units in a bigger political and economic organization, and the guilds steadily lost power and influence. A sentimental attachment to a long tradition was effective in preserving some of the great English guilds

well into the modern period, but only as social organizations devoted to the retention of some of the colorful ceremonials of a cherished but outgrown past. As economic institutions vital to the life of English society, the guilds had ceased to function. The control of economic life henceforth centered in the state.

THE REVOLUTION IN COMMERCE

In medieval times commerce was small in volume, narrowly confined geographically, and rigidly controlled by the towns through guild and municipal enactments. It was inter-municipal and almost entirely intra-European. There is one conspicuous exception to this statement—the trade with the East; but this was monopolized by the Italian cities, particularly by Venice. The Orient, which had almost faded from man's ken after the collapse of the Roman empire, was rediscovered during the Crusades and presently became the Eldorado of the Middle Ages. Whoever had control of the highways to the East seemed to hold the keys to wealth, prestige, and power; and the Italian cities had this control. Countries like Portugal, Spain, France, the Netherlands, and England stood at the back door, and shared only indirectly in the profits of the oriental trade.

The great discoveries and their significance.—With the development of powerful national monarchies under ambitious kings the monopoly enjoyed by the Italian cities in trade with the East was challenged. It became evident, as knowledge of the Orient increased, that the discovery of a direct route to the sources of supply would greatly enhance profits by cutting out the toll paid the Mohammedan middlemen for carriage of goods, and at the same time break the monopoly of the Italian cities. There was also a religious impulse to be considered, the passionate desire of many Catholics to carry Christianity beyond the boundaries of Europe; for the crusading spirit still lived in Catholic countries. Thus the lure of gold, combined with a missionary zeal, stimulated the desire to venture into unknown lands. Such were the guiding considerations which led Prince Henry of Portugal to seek to tap the East by an all-sea route around Africa. The final accomplishment of that project by Vasco da Gama in the closing years of the fifteenth century, and the discovery of the New World by Columbus, likewise bent upon finding a water route to India for Spain, were the immediate causes of a momentous change in the

character of European commerce, a change so rapid and so profound to be called a commercial revolution. What was the character of the revolution, and what did it signify in the economic history of Europe?

Europe rapidly faced about commercially; not only did the New World lie westward, but even the approach to the much-coveted trade with the East lay through western waters. The preëminence of the Mediterranean as a theater of commerce, together with that of the Italian cities, was lost, never to be wholly regained—though there was a partial restoration when the Suez Canal was cut in the nineteenth century. The Atlantic seaboard succeeded to the position in commerce formerly held by the Mediterranean. Commerce increased in magnitude, in the variety of goods exchanged, and in geographical extent, until European sails dotted the whole wide expanse of ocean. The desire to know the world and to appropriate its wealth to the use of Europe became insatiable; an imperialist impulse took possession of the dynastic houses, and there began that odious expansionist movement which has never ceased even down to our own day, a movement which has carried the elements of European culture like seeds to every corner of the globe. The extension of commerce meant the expansion of industry, the growth of town life, and the rising importance of the burgher class; the bourgeoisie, despised and unprivileged during most of the medieval period, were now launched on a forward movement that ended in the economic conquest of the earth and the enjoyment of its richest fruits.

The mercantile system.—In the course of the change from local to national economy, a theory that earlier had been applied by the commercial towns and city states was adopted by the European princes and elaborated to fit the economic needs of the nation. The theory is called mercantilism, and the organization of industry and trade which was built upon it is called the mercantile system. It was another expression of a growing national consciousness, and of the determination of kings to bring the whole life of their realms under the directing and organizing authority of the monarchist state. In execution it aimed at such regulation of industry and commerce as would, presumably, strengthen and enrich the national state, which, on the Continent at least, was essentially the royal estate. The dynastic houses of Europe viewed their realms much in the light of vast royal estates to be managed from above in the

interest of the dynasty. They knew that political power rested upon economic power; economic power rested upon national wealth and national wealth, so they calculated, was measured in money, gold and silver. With an abundance of money the kings could support the grandeur of their realms and could carry on dynastic wars successfully as a means of enhancing their position. Therefore, the great question was how to get money.

Mercantilism furnished the answer. Trade must be so regulated that goods of high value would be exported and goods of low value imported. There would thus be a constant increase in the amount of money coming into the country, and the country would be prosperous, for the mercantilist preached that the nation with the largest amount of the precious metals was the richest nation. Hence there followed a careful regulation of commerce, designed to encourage the exportation of manufactured goods—that is, goods of high value and the importation of raw materials—that is, goods of low value.

Now it appeared logical that if the objective of the state was to be more than it bought, that state would be best off which came nearest to making itself economically self-sustaining, for then the need for buying from rival states would be least. The self-sufficient state became the economic ideal. The king and his ministers sought therefore, to make their country independent of other countries for things that could be produced at home. Every resource of the nation was to be utilized. The export of gold was forbidden. New industries were encouraged through the granting of bounties, subsidies, or monopolies; and once the industries were created, their prosperity was promoted by various governmental policies. They were provided with the necessary technical skill by government regulation of labor and by laws forbidding the trained worker to leave the country. They were shielded from foreign competition by tariffs; the exportation of their surplus manufactures was promoted by a number of devices; they were favored by the free importation of necessary raw materials, while the export of domestic raw products was discouraged. To prevent the drain of money from the nation through payment of transportation charges on foreign carriers, laws were passed to stimulate shipbuilding and the training of sailors, and to prohibit the carriage of goods in foreign vessels or vessels manned by foreign sailors. In England such laws are known as Navigation Acts.

Mercantilist thought affected the policy of the absolutist govern-

ents in still another way. It was evident that limitations of climate made it impossible for European countries to produce all the essentials of life—such products, for example, as cotton, sugar, tobacco, certain dyes, and spices. It appeared, therefore, that if the state was to be self-sufficient it must acquire possessions in other regions of the world, which could supply the products needed to supplement those of the nation. The logic of this reasoning contributed to the urge driving the European states toward colonization, and once colonies had been acquired, the same logic drove the mother country to such tariff regulations as would give her a monopoly of the products of her colonies, especially those which were not found in the home land. The consequence, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was a fierce rivalry among the nations for the coveted colonial areas. Armaments were built up, and the nations entered upon a long series of commercial conflicts. The result of the whole process was the establishment of great colonial empires. In so far as mercantilism led to increased production by stimulating new industries and promoting a fuller development of the natural resources of the nation, it was fundamentally sound. Moreover, by giving a stronger impulse to the shift from a local to a national economy, it doubtless helped much to lay the foundations for a richer national life. Nevertheless, the economist of today discovers some serious fallacies in the mercantilist theory, particularly in the idea that growth in national wealth demands that the nation shall sell more than it buys. If a country continues indefinitely to export goods of higher value than it imports, it is only succeeding in impoverishing itself. True welfare can be achieved only by the importation of goods of as high value as the exports. International trade is only barter; no country can go on indefinitely giving up more goods than it receives, taking the difference in money. We feed, clothe, and shelter ourselves, as a nation, not with money, but with goods. The growing prosperity of the western countries of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is not to be explained by the accumulation of "treasure"—that is, of gold and silver—at the expense of the production of consumable goods; economic improvement came, in spite of the mercantilist's fallacious theory of wealth, as a result of the enlargement and better coördination of the agents of production under national economy.

Changes in business practices.—Numerous changes in business concepts and business practices were found necessary to meet the

demands of an enlarged and more complicated economic life. Important among these was an altered attitude toward the charging of interest. In the preceding chapter, we mentioned the prevalent view during the Middle Ages that the charging of interest for the loan of money was unethical in that the lender was taking an unfair advantage when he exacted from the borrower more than he had lent him. As trade developed, however, it became apparent that the payment of interest was no injustice imposed on the borrower since with his acquired funds he was enabled to obtain capital goods which, when put to productive uses, earned enough to make payment of the interest possible. This realization of the economic justification for charging interest resulted in a modification of the laws; about the middle of the sixteenth century it became legal to charge for the use of money.

In the development of the practice of borrowing funds we see the inception of another important change, the introduction of the banking system. The expansion of commerce and the financial needs of governments, particularly for the carrying on of war, created a growing demand for money and credit. Before the close of the thirteenth century banks had appeared in Italy, and by the sixteenth century there were banking houses established in Germany and Holland. In this development England lagged far behind the Continent. During the seventeenth century England's chief "bankers" were the goldsmiths until the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694. It had become customary to leave supplies of gold in the care of the goldsmith—subject, of course, to withdrawal. Since the goldsmith acted as custodian, he might exact a charge for his services. In time the goldsmiths discovered that funds left with them would not all be withdrawn at the same time, and that they therefore, could safely make loans at interest. They had discovered the basic principle of banking put into practice by banks today when they keep only a small reserve (about ten per cent) against deposits and make profitable use of the remainder of their customers' funds.

Another development in trade and commerce is worthy of mention. As business adventure grew and a need for increased capitalization arose, individual enterprises gave way to partnership concerns, and these in turn to corporations. The corporation made possible large-scale production, and, generally, a lower cost of production per unit. The investor—that is, the man who had bought stock in the corporation—had this advantage, that whereas formerly

as a private producer or as a member of a partnership he had been personally responsible for all debts incurred, now as a stockholder in a corporation he could not be held liable for the debts of the corporation in case of failure. All he could lose was the amount he had invested in stock. This growth in size of business enterprises made necessary a more elaborate system of accounting. Such a system came to England from Italy.

ECONOMIC SOCIETY ON THE EVE OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

By the eighteenth century, so far as England was concerned, much of the structure of medieval economy had been considerably altered, where it had not actually been destroyed. In France, most of what was still standing was destroyed at the close of the century by the French Revolution. Elsewhere on the Continent, with the possible exception of the Dutch Netherlands, medieval traditions lasted longer and exerted a much greater influence. But in practically every country the mercantilist theory had contributed to the transfer of the control of economic life from the earlier local units to the royal government; and in such countries as England, France, Spain, Portugal, and Holland, mercantilism had been a very important factor in determining the trend of their economic history. Each of these states had built up an extensive trade; each had established a colonial empire of vastly greater extent than the mother country itself, and was seeking to monopolize its wealth and trade. Yet with all these changes and all the turmoil, the economic world that we know was not yet born: international commerce, relatively, was still in an infant stage, and industry was still handicraft industry. The supreme influence which was to change all this and usher in contemporary economic society was the Industrial Revolution.

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CHAPTER XX

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MODERN ECONOMY

THE period of change described in the preceding chapter presents a picture of English society remodeling the economic structure inherited from the Middle Ages to adapt it to a changing social setting. Opposed to preserve as much of the old as possible, the English proceeded to make alterations and build lean-tos rather than tear down the old structure to make place for something entirely new. In the eighteenth century this old structure, patched and repaired, began to fall rapidly into practically complete ruin, and the English cleared the ground for a structure designed on lines entirely new. With the completing of that process, modern economy emerged. The transformation involved a fundamental change in all the major sectors of economic life; in agriculture, in industry, and in commerce. An examination of that transformation is the subject of this discussion.

THE TRANSFORMATION IN AGRICULTURE

As we have seen, changes in the manorial system of agriculture were well under way during the early modern period, but, aside from the disappearance of serfdom, agricultural changes had affected only favorably situated areas in rural England. By the beginning of the eighteenth century approximately half of the land was still managed according to the medieval two- or three-field system. Open fields divided into long, narrow strips, and cultivated by essentially medieval methods were still a feature of the rural scene. In these backward areas the small tillers of the soil commonly lived by combining agriculture with domestic industry, dividing their time between labor on the soil and work at the loom or the spinning wheel, or at some other handicraft that lent itself to the domestic system of production.

But in the eighteenth century there was a new movement toward the enclosing of lands which, until that time, had remained unen-

closed. Before the sixteenth century enclosure had been largely means of facilitating sheep culture. Thereafter, particularly during the period of Elizabeth (1558-1603), it was utilized to promote the production of foodstuffs. In the eighteenth century enclosure was revived on a wider scale than ever before. The process did not cease until well into the nineteenth century. During the century and half from 1700 to 1850 more than seven and a half million acres of land were enclosed. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, medieval agriculture had practically passed out of existence so far as England was concerned.

Factors in the change.—This revolutionary change was fundamentally a response to a growing demand for a greater production of foodstuffs, a demand which could not be satisfied under the wasteful and inefficient methods of the old agricultural system. This increased demand for foodstuffs was mainly the result of the great growth of population in the eighteenth century. Toward the close of the eleventh century there were fewer than two millions of people in England; by the beginning of the eighteenth—six centuries later—the population of England and Wales had increased to about five and a half millions, an increase of three and a half millions. During the next hundred years, 1700 to 1800, the increase was approximately the same, about three and a half millions; a single century had added as many to the population as had the preceding six centuries.

Another important factor was industrial expansion. The eighteenth century marks the beginning of a revolution in industry in England, a revolution which was to displace handicraft production by power-driven machines. With the growth of machine industry began the concentration of population in large towns. These towns constituted a market for agricultural products. As the towns grew and became more definitely industrial and commercial in nature, their dependence on the rural areas for agricultural products also grew, for it should be remarked, in passing, that the expansion of urban life presupposes the ability of the rural areas to provide adequate food supplies. By the close of the century these markets, so far further extended by the long wars with France (1793 to 1815), placed productive machinery both in agriculture and in industry under still greater pressure to supply the demand.

Lastly there was the influence of increasing capital and of a growing fund of scientific knowledge. English industrial and commercial

enterprise during the colonial period had, on the whole, brought rich turns. The application of capital to agriculture promised a profitable investment, which certain of the new capitalist class in industry and of the nobility and country gentlemen were quick to see. With capital to finance the enclosure of land and to utilize the new scientific knowledge of agriculture now becoming available, these groups turned to farming and stock breeding. These enterprises were carried on generally in a scientific manner as large-scale, individualist business ventures.

Economic significance of the agricultural transformation.—The change here described was a fundamental one, signifying the passing of the last important vestiges of manorial agriculture. Great landed estates, the creation of which had been initiated on a small scale centuries before, now became a dominant feature of British rural life. On these great estates the actual cultivators were either tenants who paid rent to the landlord or agricultural laborers who worked out for a wage. In the enclosing process the small landholder had been crowded out; only those with large capital could hope to survive in competition with the new agricultural landlords. Land in England had virtually become a monopoly enjoyed by a landed aristocracy, whose prestige and power were to impress English social and political life during the nineteenth century.

Another result economically important was that the production of foodstuffs was so greatly increased that it became possible for English agriculture to continue to feed the growing population without the resort to outside sources. It is true that the feat was accomplished at the sacrifice of the masses of the poor, for it was found necessary to protect English agriculture by protective tariffs—the Corn Laws—which kept the prices of grain high. Even after protection was removed in the forties, agriculture in England continued to be relatively profitable. Down to 1874 four-fifths of the grain, meat, dairy products, and wool consumed in the British Isles was produced at home. From that year on, however, competition from the United States and other food-producing countries has undermined British agriculture.

The change was significant in still another way—one that relates the agricultural transformation directly to the revolution in industry. The enclosure movement set adrift thousands of small freeholders, tenants, agricultural laborers, and squatters, who flocked to the towns in search of work. Some of the more enterprising of

them became factory owners themselves; others in great number furnished an abundant labor market to be drawn on by the new machine industry.

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

More fundamental and far-reaching in its ultimate effect than the transformation in agriculture was the economic change known as the Industrial Revolution. It is not easy to give the Industrial Revolution a comprehensive definition; what it was is revealed in its manifestations. The revolution was industrial only in its origin and its primary manifestations: it began with inventions that transformed production by substituting in large measure machines for the craftsman's tools, machine labor for human labor, water power and steam power for human muscular power. As the revolution progressed, it affected political and social as well as economic life. Our present interest, however, centers in the changes in economic practices and institutions; other aspects, social and political, will be treated in later chapters.

The revolutionary character of the change.—We are inclined to associate the word "revolution" with changes attending the violent overthrow of governments. The term has, however, a broader application in the study of social phenomena; it may be properly applied to any comparatively rapid and at the same time profound change in social practices or institutions, as contrasted with the normally slower change which is sometimes described as "evolution." It was such a change that came over economic processes and institutions in the later decades of the eighteenth and the early decades of the nineteenth century. It was not recognized as a "revolution" by contemporary observers; it was not until considerably after the close of the period usually assigned to the phenomenon that the term "Industrial Revolution" was applied to it by Arnold Toynbee, an English economist. Seen in historical perspective, the designation is defensible. The years 1760 to 1830 are commonly assigned to the Industrial Revolution in England, the country in which it first occurred. Compared to a political revolution which may bring about volcanic changes in a year or less, changes over a period of seventy years assume the aspect of ordinary historical developments. Yet, when we consider that down to 1760 modifications in the economic life of Western society were of relatively minor importance, and that the following two generations fundamentally altered the fabric of En-

h society, we begin to understand the revolutionary nature of the change.

The dates 1760 to 1830 must be accepted as somewhat arbitrary, though they are not to be misleading. The first inventions which, in their later development, contributed to the change came fairly early in the eighteenth century, so that some writers have spoken in general terms of the whole of that century as a period of experimentation, invention, and trial; and of the nineteenth century as the period of realization. The date 1830 is chosen to mark the close of the Revolution simply because by that time the results were so decisive as to make it apparent that the machine age was well established in England. But the change did not end in 1830; in fact, it has continued ever since to affect society. At frequent intervals in the recent past new inventions have displaced hundreds, and even thousands, of skilled workmen; electricity is displacing steam in certain branches of industry and transportation; revolutionary changes in management and organization, the massing of capital for productive purposes, the extension of giant power—these and other like phenomena furnish evidence of the march of the Industrial Revolution in our own day. The forces which it unharnessed are cumulative, and are increasingly vital in our own generation.

Why the change came first in England.—Just why the revolution in industry took place in England many years earlier than elsewhere is an interesting question which cannot be wholly answered. A number of reasons, however, can be advanced as a partial explanation. In the first place, the growing population, here as on the continent, increased the demand for manufactured goods as it had for foodstuffs. The demand was further stimulated by the growing mobility of the population resulting from the building of highways and canals during the eighteenth century. A greater number of people were thus introduced to new articles of consumption and to new markets where they could be obtained. The change intensified the desire for a higher standard of living. Gradually the old slow processes of manufacture by hand became more and more inadequate to meet the growing demand. In the second place, England had natural advantages in its climate, its water power, and its great resources of coal and iron. She also had an abundance of capital,—the result of two centuries of industrial activity—and a labor supply greatly augmented by the process of enclosures. In the third place, the paternalism inherent in the mercantile

theory had never obtained so firm a grip in England as it had elsewhere, and there was, consequently, greater opportunity for individual initiative in industry. This free play of initiative was favored also by the breaking-down of the restrictive influence of the guilds. Finally, though the spread of scientific knowledge had not been confined to England—in fact, much progress in science had been made in France, and even improvements in methods of manufacture—still it was in England that men most readily turned their knowledge of science to practical account. Hence it was in England that the inventions that transformed industry began to appear in great numbers.

We shall not attempt here to describe the many inventions of this period that can be ascribed to English mechanical ingenuity. A few examples will suffice to indicate the mechanical aspects of the revolution. First in the order of importance was James Watt's invention of an improved type of the steam engine, 1769 and 1782, first used in iron foundries and coal mines, and later in cotton mills. Even earlier than the appearance of Watt's invention the hand process in spinning and weaving began to give way before a succession of inventions. By 1874 James Hargreaves had created an ingenious multiple spinning jenny, as it was called. Further improvements in spinning were made by Richard Arkwright and Samuel Crompton, by which spinning was finally put on a power basis. The resulting increased production of thread stimulated further improvements in weaving machinery, due mainly to the achievement of Edmund Cartwright. One device led to another. By 1800 water and steam power had replaced hand and foot power in some branches of manufacturing. A little later power machinery was extended to transportation when George Stephenson gave the first trial to his locomotive in 1814. Once started, the mechanical revolution progressively gathered momentum as the nineteenth century wore on.

FROM MERCANTILISM TO INDIVIDUALISM

The passing of mercantilism.—The displacement of state regulation by an individualist, competitive system was one of the major changes in economic life following the Industrial Revolution. It will be recalled that the eighteenth century philosophers began a determined attack upon mercantilism. But it was not theories that

destroyed mercantilism in England; it was rather the new conditions of life introduced by the mechanical revolution, conditions that led men of action to support the theorists in a successful movement against state regulation. With the development of the new industrial life mercantilism, which had once been regarded as a blessing, now appeared to the aggressive members of society as an unnecessary restriction. "Just as the guild system had originally been a boon to industry, but had ultimately become a drag on it, so the mercantile system of regulation changed from a boon to a drawback."¹ The regulations suitable to one economic period had become obsolete in the light of new conditions. Adam Smith reasoned that welfare was conditioned on complete freedom in internal industry and external trade. Under mercantilism, it was contended, government had regulated the economic life of society in the interest of a small minority. What the new business class desired was equality of opportunity. The machine had put instruments in their hands to gain untold wealth, but they must be free to exploit the machine. Regulation under the mercantilist system stifled individual initiative, shackled enterprise, and discouraged the utilization of man's energy and ingenuity in the production of wealth. Economic freedom was the supreme need of the times.

How seriously mercantilism was opposed to the interests of the new industrialists becomes apparent when we consider their needs. The new machine industry demanded a free and ample labor market in which the competition for jobs would keep down employment costs in the factory; but the old Statute of Apprentices came into conflict with the demand by reason of its requirement of a long period of training not needed by workers in a factory. Again, in the interest of keeping down cost of production it was desirable that the price of food for the workers be low; but mercantilism had created the Corn Laws as a means of keeping up the price of home-grown grain, thus placing a high, monopoly price upon bread. In like fashion, the import duties increased the cost of raw materials indispensable in the manufacture of goods. And finally, machine production created surpluses of manufactured goods far in excess of the consuming power of the home market. Foreign markets were a necessity, but mercantilism hindered international commerce throughout the Western world. It was quite evident that industrial

¹E. R. A. Seligman, *Principles of Economics*, Longmans Green & Co. 6th edition, 1914, p. 119.

society was confronted by vital facts not contemplated by the old order.

To meet the new situation there was at hand the arsenal of ideas created by Adam Smith and other eighteenth century thinkers. In the laissez-faire doctrine was found not only a basis for the onslaught on state regulation, but also a theoretical approach to the building of a new economic order. Laissez-faire assumes that the maximum of social welfare is to be derived from a minimum of governmental interference, and that each individual understands best his own wishes and will come nearer to their realization through his own initiative than through the agency of collective action. Adam Smith stated the case for laissez-faire in his epochal work *The Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776, in words which since have become the classic expression of that philosophy:

All systems, either of preference or restraint . . . being taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own way and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man or order of men. . . . According to the system of natural liberty the sovereign has only three duties to attend to . . . first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice and oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the advantage of any individual or small number of individuals to erect and maintain because the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society.

Establishment of the individualist system.—The revolutionary ideas of Adam Smith did not immediately capture the imagination of the public. It required years of argument in pamphlets and on the platform before conservative Englishmen were ready to accept them. But the battle was won by the middle of the nineteenth century. Under the leadership of Sir Robert Peel, the supporters of free trade in Parliament were able to put through a succession of free trade budgets which wiped off the statute books the hundred of regulations and tariffs which had accumulated over past cen-

tries. Mercantilism was dead, and laissez-faire and free trade had become a fact in English life. The far-reaching character of the change is indicated in the words of Professor Seligman:

The demand for freedom of industry no longer meant freedom from the action of local government, but freedom from the action of national government as well; the demand for freedom of trade no longer meant liberty of export, but liberty of import as well. Just as it was recognized that the various provinces of the nation benefited from freedom of exchange among one another, so it was claimed the various nations of the world would equally benefit. Instead of a national exclusiveness, economists demanded cosmopolitan freedom.¹

The economic order which emerged after the downfall of mercantilism, first in England and later in modified form in most of the western world, has persisted in its central feature to our own day. Down to the third quarter of the nineteenth century the economic system continued to rest almost universally upon an individualist and competitive basis; and even now, in spite of considerable inroads upon the early English conception, individualism and competition remain as the working hypothesis in the economic life of almost all modern societies. The statement will become concrete as we examine the characteristics of the industrial system introduced by the Industrial Revolution.

FROM THE DOMESTIC SYSTEM TO MODERN INDUSTRY

The introduction of machine production spelled the ruin of the domestic system. The change did not come overnight. Statistics tell the tragic tale of how the hand weavers struggled year after year in forlorn competition with machines, only to be forced out as the latter relentlessly drove down the price of fabrics. In some other kinds of industry hand work stood a much better chance, particularly where individuality was a consideration, as in tailoring, skilled lace work, and the like. Some of these, in fact, held their own in small shops down to the World War. But the victory of machine production, in all but a few lines, was inevitable.

The expansion of productive power.—The unit of production under the new industrial system was the factory—an organized group of wage-workers controlling power-driven machines under the direction, at first, of the factory owner and his aids, but later of

¹*Op. cit.*, page 119.

salaried officials, technical experts, and foremen organized into highly specialized managerial and administrative departments. With the progress of time the factory has developed into an instrument of giant power for the production of goods, and large-scale production has become a characteristic of the industrial system. In earlier times even a wage-earner could hope, by frugal living, to save enough to go into business for himself, at least on a small scale. But now he realizes the hopelessness of trying to compete with the large business corporations whose very size places the would-be small producer at a disadvantage. And so today the small business establishments that were prevalent in the earlier development of the Industrial Revolution are seldom found; they were forced either to suspend or to be absorbed into larger units. Our economic processes have become more and more capitalistic—that is, they involve larger and larger amounts of instrumental capital.

Large-scale production under the corporate form of organization affords a number of advantages which need not be discussed here. For present purposes the economic fact to be emphasized is that in manufacture the larger the output becomes under one management, the lower goes the cost of production per unit. Consequently the large-scale producer possesses a vital advantage over his small-scale competitor in the scramble for markets. We may have sympathy for the little man who must give up his business, but we buy where we see advantage to ourselves; our own interest has helped to foster the gigantic corporations.

The development of large-scale productive units has meant a tremendous increase in the total productive capacity of society. How great this increase may be is concretely illustrated by Slichter:

Perhaps the most obvious result of machine industry is the extraordinary increase in output for which the new machine technique is largely responsible. A hundred years ago, a skilled workman could make about thirty needles in a day. Now a semi-skilled girl with the aid of a machine makes 500,000 in the same time. On the Great Lakes, ore vessels are loaded with 10,000 tons of ore in twenty minutes and unloaded in a little more than three hours. One can conjecture how long a gang of laborers would require to perform these operations by hand. It is estimated that the entire population of the world would be needed to produce by hand methods the amount of cotton cloth which is turned out by 1,500,000 workers using machinery.¹

¹Sumner H. Slichter, *Modern Economic Society*, Henry Holt & Co., 1931, p. 89.

The social significance of this increased power of society to produce goods is that our average standard of living is higher; for obviously the total production constitutes the income of society, and the greater the production, the more there is to go around. The standard of living is higher today than it was in medieval times only because it can be higher, and it can be higher because we have mastered the technique of creating goods in abundance. One needs only to observe a country like China where productive methods are still primitive. There the total annual output is so low that the Chinese masses are in poverty. And they will continue to live in poverty until machinery and knowledge supplement mere human physical effort.

Importance of capital, and the expansion of banking.—Instrumental capital has already been alluded to as one of the primary requisites of modern industry. It was a primary requisite in much of the economic activity that preceded the Industrial Revolution; but in modern industry the enormous sums required give to the word "capitalistic," as applied to modern economy, a significance which it did not hold in all preceding history. To meet the vital need of large amounts of capital, the institution of banking has come to occupy so important a place that it constitutes another characteristic feature of our economic life. In fact, it may be said that the great changes in our economic life that followed the Industrial Revolution could not have come to pass if there had not been a parallel change in banking processes. At first banking consisted principally in the safe keeping of money for depositors who had no immediate use for it.¹ Now banking performs a highly specialized social function—that of facilitating production. In our present industrial scheme banks are, in reality, instruments for bringing together the borrower and the lender of capital. The lender is the man who deposits money in the bank; the borrower is the one who secures a loan at the bank. The bank is the medium through which large number of small deposits—each ineffective in itself in this age of large-scale production—are translated, by the way of loans to producers, into large amounts of capital that can be utilized for the building of factories, for the purchase of raw material, and for the payment of wages. Thus the bank has become, not an end in itself, but a means—a means for increasing the instrumental capital of society. Since the Industrial Revolution there has been a constant

¹See page 366.

widening of the spread of time between the beginnings of production of a commodity and its sale to the final consumer. Thus credit has become a vital part of production; and with every increase in the demand for credit, there has been a corresponding increase in the function the bank plays in our economic scheme.

The competitive system and its consequences.—Large-scale production is a characteristic of the modern industrial system, whether we speak of a factory, a mill, a transportation corporation, or a public utility. Since each and all are products of individualist enterprise they comprise, in theory at least, a world of competing units; hence we speak of modern industry as competitive. Each producer is concerned not only with the problem of turning out goods, but with the more difficult one of selling them. The sale of his goods presupposes a price equal to, or lower than, that of his competitors; otherwise he fails to capture his share of the market. This eager, and even grasping, hunt for customers has both beneficial and evil effects. It is good in so far as it imposes on the business man the necessity for efficiency and the elimination of waste as a means of keeping the price of his goods within the range set by his competitors. Thus competition tends to insure to the buyers a price that is not far from the real cost of production. But it is an evil in so far as the everlasting pressure on the business man to keep his price low leads him to exact from his workers a working day so strenuous as to result in nervous strain and other ill effects to their health. This situation gives rise to an important social problem—the effect of modern industry upon the worker, a topic to be treated later.

The spread of modern industry.—Because the Industrial Revolution began in England, Great Britain became the first great industrial country in history. Despite early attempts to prevent British secrets of industrial processes from falling into the hands of other countries, they soon spread from one nation to another as each became ripe for industrialization. By the middle of the nineteenth century the technical revolution was well on its way in France, Belgium, and the United States. With the establishment of the German Empire (1871), the shift from handicrafts to machine industry began decisively in that country; and Italian unification (1859–1871) gave an impulse to the movement in Italy. Toward the close of the century, the imperial government of Russia devoted itself to the difficult task of introducing machinery into that agricul-

tural country—a task taken up again, after the Revolution of 1917, by the Communist government, and pursued with furious energy under the, at present, much-discussed Five-Year Plan.

THE REVOLUTION IN COMMERCE

Sixteenth-century changes in commerce were described as revolutionary. The nineteenth century witnessed a second revolution in commerce which may be treated as an aspect of the Industrial Revolution. Unlike that of the sixteenth century, the second commercial revolution was not attended by the discovery of new continents, or the finding of new oceans; but it was marked by the laying out of new ocean lanes leading to many new communities untouched, or all but untouched, in the centuries before the Industrial Revolution. It also introduced a technique of exchange as revolutionary in its departure from that which preceded it as is the modern ocean steamship from the ancient sailing vessel. With increased production of surplus goods, with new markets, with improvements in methods of exchange, the tonnage of ocean-going trade grew to almost unbelievable figures. In the beginning of the nineteenth century the total foreign commerce of the world amounted to \$1,400,000,000, while its per capita value was \$2.31. By 1850 it amounted to \$4,000,000,000, with a per capita value of \$3.76. In 1913 it amounted to \$40,000,000,000, with a per capita value of \$24.47.

The Industrial Revolution had made possible the surplus stocks which entered into the enormous trade between the countries of the world. But if applied science and mechanical ingenuity had not provided improved methods of transportation and communication, the surpluses of production would have been wasted, and the full fruits of the Industrial Revolution would never have been realized. It was necessary that a revolution in transportation should supplement the revolution in the technique of production. The United States offers a concrete example of this fact. Here in our western states the wide expanses of virgin soil and the invention of farming machinery before and after the Civil War provided conditions most favorable for agriculture on a large scale and for the production of a surplus of foodstuffs, but except for those communities on or near large rivers outside markets were not available until canals and railroads were built. When the American farmer finally could rely

on modern rail and water transportation, he found himself able in the seventies, to lay down his wheat in Liverpool at a lower price than the English farmer could meet. The result was the expansion of American grain production.

Thus the revolution in the means of production and the revolution in facilities of transportation and communication have worked together to produce a transformation in international commerce. Modern methods of production mean low-cost production, and modern methods of transportation mean low-cost transportation; the two acting together make international trade feasible and profitable on a large scale. The reciprocal nature of these forces suggests a certain sequence—first, greater production; second, the necessity for world markets in which to dispose of the products; third, the impetus consequently given to the development of transportation facilities; and fourth, the development of those transportation facilities made possible by the Industrial Revolution itself.

WORLD ECONOMY

The remarkable expansion of world commerce led to further progress in the economic integration of society. The comparative insignificance of commerce during the early Middle Ages was a sign and an explanation of the narrow and niggardly local economy of that period. The rise of national economy after the Commercial Revolution of the sixteenth century signified a great increase in international trade, or trade between the European nations and their colonial possessions. But it remained for the Industrial Revolution to open every corner of the globe to the exchange of commodities, so that every community that possessed the means was in a position to share in the rich economic heritage of the entire world. In other words, the Industrial Revolution has tended to make national economy obsolete, and to bind society into a world economy.

The economic interdependence of nations.—Today we are confronted with the impressive fact of the interdependence of nations. Economically speaking, practically the entire world community is bound together as a unit. No nation, if it would not impoverish the life of its people, can live unto itself. The economic interests of society have become so intertwined by our complicated commercial and financial systems that a serious hurt to the economic

the life of one nation materially affects the lives of people in other nations. One nation can never again afford to be indifferent to what is happening in other parts of the world society. Allusion was made above to extensive deliveries of American wheat in the markets of Liverpool in the seventies at prices so low that British farmers were unable to compete. Should England create new Corn Laws and thus raise the cost of food to the people, or should she permit the decline of English agriculture, now no longer able to compete in the world market? England chose not to lay a tax on food, and British agriculture did in fact decline. What was happening on the wheat farms of Minnesota and the Dakotas contributed to important changes in the economic life of the British Isles. As a highly industrialized and commercial nation, England chose to sacrifice her own agriculture and leave the feeding of her population in large measure to those countries that could produce lower-priced food. To a large extent England now depends on the outside world to feed her.

Numerous similar illustrations of the economic interdependence of nations could be cited. The cutting off of the supply of American cotton to England during the Civil War brought widespread distress to the thousands of workers in the cotton mills of Lancashire. Stagnation in the English cotton mills affects seriously the prosperity of our Southern planters. The present inability of Germany to consume English goods as she did before the World War contributes to industrial depression and unemployment in England. A failure of the Brazilian coffee crop may raise the price of a cup of coffee in the American home. The inability or unwillingness of the world to purchase German goods in large quantity makes it impossible for the German Republic to obtain a return in money with which to pay reparations; and her failure to pay reparations produces a critical situation in international finance that affects the whole world.

So we might continue; but enough has been said to indicate that, in an economic sense, the world has become like a living body in which the nations function somewhat as organic parts contributing to sustain the economic health of the whole. And within the body the numberless lines of commercial and financial contact are like nerves, communicating in some manner conditions of health or injury in one part to the health or injury of the whole body.

Of the many forces contributing to the economic interdependence of nations—to a world economy—one of the most potent is geo-

graphical specialization. The distribution of natural resources has given to one community or another an advantage over the rest of the world in some specialized line of economic activity. Here it is an abundance of coal and iron favoring the low cost of steel production; there an abundance of oil, or copper, or tin, or chromium, or potash, or platinum, or antimony, or nitrates, or manganese; in other areas a soil and climate peculiarly suited to the production of cotton, or tea, or coffee, or rubber, or olive oil, or hemp, or sugar. But in spite of these natural advantages possessed in different parts of the world, geographic specialization in production on a large scale would be impossible without world markets: Britain cannot begin to consume profitably all its steel, the United States its cotton, Chili its nitrates, Brazil its coffee. Moreover, geographic specialization depends on such improvements in the means of transportation as will so lower the cost of shipping that transportation charges do not offset the advantages inherent in a lower cost of production. When world markets do exist, and when the cost of shipping is reduced to a minimum, geographic specialization becomes a big factor in world commerce, with a consequent advantage, not merely to the local community, but to the world at large. For as markets are expanded the trend toward large-scale production becomes more pronounced; mass production permits the full utilization of machinery and a maximum degree of division of labor; this results in a lower cost of production per unit, and a consequent lowering of consumer's cost—which last, in its turn, encourages greater production—if other factors remain unchanged. Thus geographic specialization, world markets, and large-scale production act and react on one another, and when unobstructed result in economic gain to society.

Another factor in world interdependence is the mobility of capital. Capital tends to flow where it has the prospect of the most lucrative return. Elsewhere we have pointed out that the capital which made possible the industrial expansion of the United States after the Civil War was mainly borrowed from England. From the point of view of the individual English business man, he merely bought bonds of American corporations. From the international point of view capital flowed from England to the United States. This new country, with its abundance of natural resources, offered the opportunity for the profitable investment of capital; since the World War, we on the other hand, have found other countries which are, or seem to be, profitable fields for business ventures. These many enterprises

become international in character. Banks make international loans; German manufacturers set up factories in the United States for the making of rayon silk products; Henry Ford erects automobile plants in Canada and in Europe; British armament-makers introduce establishments in various parts of the world. The significance of this kind of international business enterprise for world interdependence is clear. When business crosses national frontiers in this fashion it creates economic ties with other countries and links up in some measure the interests of one with the interests of others.

World economy and modern imperialism.—The early English exponents of laissez-faire envisaged a thorough-going world economy. Their hope for the future was the creation of a free-trade world permitting the unobstructed movement of goods, raw materials, and capital in accordance with the "natural" laws of supply and demand. To that end they set to work to convert the world to the doctrine of free trade. Their efforts were not entirely unsuccessful. For a brief interval, international trade operated in a world comparatively free of tariff obstructions. For a time, so strong was their influence, the old colonial movement with its theories of a state-controlled trade and closed colonies fell into disfavor. But the situation did not last long. Whatever hope there may have been for the realization of a free-trade world was dashed during the last quarter of the nineteenth century by the rise of two powerful forces. One was the intensification of nationalism; the other was the economic demands of machine industry. When these forces combined, economic nationalism emerged with a driving power that progressively altered the international aspects of modern economy. The result was that the industrial nations, one after another, turned their backs upon free trade and returned to tariff walls and imperialism.

If it is asked, then, how modern imperialism has affected a world economy, the answer is not simple; the effect has been twofold, and in opposite directions. First we have seen the leading nations of the world seeking colonies which will absorb surplus manufactured goods and surplus capital, and at the same time supply the raw materials needed for manufacture in the mother country. Thus there is a furtherance of trade within the empire and a high degree of interdependence between its various parts. The world, however, is not one empire, but a number of empires; and with each prompted by self-interest that is not always intelligent, with each striving to be

self-sustaining and employing trade restrictions to insure to itself a monopoly in the production and sale of its favored commodities there arise, inevitably, serious obstructions to a full realization of the advantages inherent in an ideal world economy.

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CHAPTER XXI

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

ONE thing that is likely to strike the thoughtful reader who surveys the economic development of Europe is the general similarity of economic patterns running through the history of the different countries. There are minor contrasts, to be sure, but they are mainly due to variations in the rate at which economic changes developed. The manorial organization was common to all countries, likewise the organization of industry and commerce under the guild system; similar traditions affected economic life everywhere; and when the machine invaded the various countries it disturbed essentially the same kind of economic conditions and produced similar results. Economic development in the United States has been different, and for obvious reasons. Our history begins in the modern period, so that medieval methods, institutions, and traditions did not take root to the same degree. Our geographic and social environments were likewise different. It is not surprising, therefore, that our economic history should present some novel features.

FACTORS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

There have been periodic setbacks in the economic advance of the United States but they have been of short duration. The more impressive fact has been the almost uninterrupted march of our economic prosperity throughout our history, with a resultant standard of living higher, probably, than that of any other country in the world. The popular explanation given for this economic superiority is that the Americans have superior industrial ability, or that they possess higher intelligence, or that they have taken full advantage of protective tariffs, or that the Republican party or the Democratic party—as the case may be—is in power. But the less partisan and more impersonal view attributes our unquestionable economic success to a combination of forces—natural and social,

fortuitous and deliberate—which have drawn us on to remarkable material achievements. Of these we shall consider briefly some of the most outstanding.

Natural resources.—One of the major factors in American economic progress is our unparalleled supply of natural resources. No other single country has been favored with so varied and abundant a heritage. An attempt at anything like a complete enumeration would be futile. We shall confine mention to two of basic importance—minerals and land.

To a striking degree the material structure of contemporary civilization is built upon mineral wealth, and in the production and consumption of minerals the United States leads the world. "It is the only country in the world possessing adequate quantities of nearly all the principal industrial minerals and leads the world in the production of coal, oil, natural gas, iron, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum metal, phosphates, gypsum, and sulphur. It also leads in some of the minor minerals—arsenic, borax, cadmium, molybdenum, and talc."¹ As the population spread over the continent, these great mineral resources, together with others not enumerated here, were discovered and utilized in the building of American industry.

Abundant and rich land has played a unique part in the economic and social history of the United States. Made free, or almost free, to all comers by the liberal public land policy of our government, the great western areas of our country lay open to exploitation throughout most of our national history. For a century after the American Revolution there was no need to cultivate intensively the areas of the Atlantic states, no need to use a fixed area to feed an ever-increasing population. Instead, there was the possibility of spreading westward and ever farther westward to new free land. It was this free land that furnished a compelling attraction to the land-hungry emigrants from Europe who helped to populate the wide spaces of the West. It was our advancing frontier that drew off the surplus labor from the industrial centers of the Atlantic seaboard, thus easing the periodic strains of successive economic depressions. And it was the advancing frontier that periodically furnished new blood as a rejuvenating influence in our national life.

¹C. K. Leith, *World Minerals and World Politics*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1931, p. 48.

Population and labor supply.—In the development of a new country there are few demands more insistent than the demand for an power for the performance of the numerous and arduous tasks incidental to a pioneer existence. Absence of an adequate supply of labor retards economic development. To supply this need during colonial times indentured servants and slaves were brought to America. Far more important in meeting this basic need was the stream of immigrants from Europe. Our free institutions, a chance to possess land which was utterly denied to millions in Europe, the later growing needs of our industrial life—all these combined to make America look like a promised land to oppressed men seeking an opportunity to better their economic and social position, and drew to our shores a rising tide of immigrants—experienced farmers and skilled mechanics.

After the close of the Napoleonic wars immigration became a noticeable feature of our history. In 1830, coincident with the renewal of revolutionary disturbances in Europe, 23,000 Europeans, mostly Germans, found homes in the United States. From that year on the influx of foreign-born became an increasingly significant fact in our economic and social life. One year's quota of immigrants in 1907 added more than a million and a quarter to our population. It has been estimated that since 1820 not fewer than 35,000,000 aliens have entered the United States. In 1914 something like one-third of the inhabitants of the country were foreign-born or American born of alien parents. We are not concerned here with the social questions that have arisen out of this impressive influx of other nationalities, particularly since the eighties, when the incoming tide shifted from the areas of Central and Western Europe to the eastern and southern areas. For our economic development the important fact is that this immigrant stream poured inestimable wealth into the United States—the tangible wealth that the immigrant brought with him, and the far greater wealth represented by man power measured in muscular energy, in trained skill, in knowledge and experience.

Freedom of enterprise.—With a remarkable richness of natural resources at its disposal and an ever increasing labor supply as its economic needs developed, American society was most favorably circumstanced for a vast forward movement in its economic development. Another element requisite to such an achievement was supplied by the American society itself; this was freedom

of enterprise. Everything in the earlier history of the American community that conditioned its thought and action conspired to enshrine individual liberty as a shining goal of the new republic. The situation of a new society in a new and undeveloped country imposed self-help, self-reliance, ingenuity, resourcefulness, adaptability as the price of survival and successful achievement. The American emphasis on laissez-faire has been an outstanding force in our economic and social life. With freedom frequently restricted only by the economic order under which he lived, each man did very much as he pleased, going to this locality or that, engaging in farming or mining, and succeeding or failing quite independently of governmental aid or interference. Men therefore became habituated to freedom of enterprise, the freedom of choosing any occupation, limited only by ability or capital requirements. What we become habituated to, we eventually assume to be a "natural" right. Suggestions for government control and direction are to this day met with the most vigorous disapproval on the grounds that it constitutes an interference with the freedom of enterprise. This is a notion which the Americans possess to a much stronger degree than the Europeans, where the concept was never given so complete a range.

With freedom to act and the requisite materials at hand the American communities proceeded to erect the foundations of an economic structure which was to develop rapidly into a richly endowed and highly complex economic order. The remarkable speed with which the transformation was effected is something new in the history of the world. The economic transformations in Europe were comparatively slow; old institutions were gradually modified; new methods, after long contests with the old, finally won out as a result of long experimentation; and only finally a fund of knowledge and techniques arose. We are, in part at least, the product of Europe's testing ground; we built on the experience of Europe. The earlier evolution of European economic processes is not in evidence here. Instead, there was grafted on youthful America the maturity of Europe. Primitive life here could not be primitive long. As soon as the rougher and elementary demands of life were met, the culture of Europe was available to us, to be drawn upon according to our needs. It is true that peculiar American conditions have resulted in modifications of European methods and, in innumerable cases, in original contributions; but it remains

an important truth that, in a measure, we moved forward on the momentum the older world had started.

AGRICULTURE BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR

Down to the period of the Civil War agriculture held a dominant position in American economy. With land obtainable for little more than the asking and no heavy demand for capital to make a start, conditions invited men to the soil as a way of livelihood. For present uses it is not necessary to consider the colonial period. The real foundations of American agriculture were laid west of the Alleghanies, as the settlers advanced ever farther into the hinterland. There, during the early period, conditions were not conducive either to high proficiency in cultivation or to large-scale production.

Agriculture in the Old Northwest.—The early settlers of the West were compelled to enter into a grim struggle with their environment. They began with little more than the natural resources of the country and a determination to win a subsistence against all obstacles. The time which they could devote to tillage was limited by a multiplicity of demands upon their energy that do not exist in a community long established. Nor was there the necessity of carefully considered agricultural methods. The very abundance of land made the conservation of the soil unnecessary, for when the soil showed signs of exhaustion the Western farmer could usually acquire more virgin land for new cultivation. Agricultural methods were therefore likely to be slovenly and wasteful.

Isolation tended still further to foster careless agricultural methods. The great bulk of the scattered farms and villages had little or no market for their produce. The pioneer family ordinarily produced the necessities of life by its own labor; it was an economic unit. By 1825 there were some towns, usually along the more important rivers, to offer a market for produce, but farm areas within reach of these little urban centers were relatively few. In fact, in the United States as a whole, only about six per cent of the people lived in communities of 7,000 or more. Farming communities favorably situated could use the rivers to some extent to reach more remote markets, but freight rates were so high as to be almost prohibitive over wide distances. In the main, agriculture was subsistence agriculture. Not until 1840 when the construction of railroads and canals opened up more extensive markets for surplus

agricultural products did Western American agriculture become commercialized.

Agriculture in the South.—The Southern colonies along the Atlantic introduced and maintained the institution of slavery. They did so because the men of the South, like their countrymen of the North, pursued the primary object of maintaining their existence by exploiting their natural advantages. An abundance of highly productive soil combined with favorable climatic conditions made possible and profitable the supplying of a growing demand for certain highly valued commodities—tobacco, rice, cotton. During the colonial period an inadequate supply of white labor led the colonists to resort to slave labor, just as many other communities had done under similar circumstances. The present-day conclusion that there are serious disadvantages to slave labor, both on economic and moral grounds, is based upon an experience that the Southern slave owners did not possess, and so has no bearing on the case from the point of view of our present interest. Our present interest lies in observing how geographic conditions and the introduction of slavery produced an agricultural economy in the South quite different from that prevailing in the North.

When the Southern pioneers set their faces westward they carried the Southern type of economic life with them to the Mississippi and beyond; that is to say, they extended the slave system westward except in the case of the so-called "poor whites" who owned no slaves. As the nineteenth century wore on the slave system became intensified and was as vigorously defended in the Southwest as in the states of the Old South. The reason was a rising demand for cotton, accompanied by rising prices, following the Industrial Revolution in England, which produced an expansion of the textile industry there, and, to a much lesser degree, in the United States. The profitableness of cotton culture was still further increased by the invention of the cotton-gin in 1793. It was these changes that had enthroned King Cotton by the middle of the nineteenth century.

The growing importance in cotton made slavery the central feature of Southern economy before the Civil War. On slave labor the Southern plantation system was built. Hence the plantation rather than the family, as in the Northern frontier areas, became the economic unit. But the big plantations did not represent a form of subsistence farming to the same degree as did the farm

the Northwest. Plantation farming was of necessity commercial from the beginning. The emphasis was laid upon "one crop" rather than "mixed farming." The Southern planter produced his surplus of cotton or tobacco to be sold in return for money to buy the things which he did not produce on the plantation. In other particulars, however, Southern farming resembled Northern farming: it was generally careless and wasteful, the planter preferring clear new virgin soil for his needs rather than give the thoughtful man credit to his original acreage to prevent the exhaustion of the soil. The Southern agricultural system had its influences upon the industrial development of the South, as will be pointed out later.

THE RISE OF MACHINE INDUSTRY

The Industrial Revolution appeared later in this country than in England, but its growth here was more rapid. American industry was caught up with European achievements and—it is our boast, at least—has surpassed them. The reasons back of this rapid growth are found in what has already been said of the advantages America enjoyed: almost unlimited capacity in natural resources, including a vast area of agricultural land that was progressively able to support a growing urban industrial life; a rapidly expanding population capable of meeting increasing demands for man power; a laissez-faire attitude on the part of government; and the opportunity to draw, in the initial stages of her development, upon Europe's maturity. To these factors must be added still other powerful influences in our industrial progress: (1) the emergence of an extraordinary degree of versatility and inventive ability among the American people, (2) the development of a splendid system of canal and railroad transportation, and (3) the establishment of interstate free trade permitting business enterprise to enjoy a maximum benefit from our transportation facilities. In the early period, industrial enterprise was retarded by the lack of one important requisite—a sufficient supply of capital. The problem was met in large measure by borrowing abroad, but so rapid was her industrial growth and so fast did her own capital increase that by the outbreak of the World War the United States had been able to repay the capital she had borrowed abroad and had herself become a creditor nation, contributing from her surplus capital to the industrial development of other parts of the world.

The period of beginnings.—Machine production did not suddenly supplant handicraft production in the United States. The change at first came slowly; but one by one new influences began to operate in the economic life of the country—influences that increased the demand for manufactured goods and thereby gave impetus to the trend toward machine production. When, for example, the French and Napoleonic wars (1793–1815) seriously crippled American trade with Europe and necessary goods could no longer be imported, there was felt the need for increased manufacture at home, and small factories equipped with machinery began to appear. These beginnings came at a favorable time, since the deep absorption of Europe in the long conflict relieved our infant industries from serious competition from abroad and thus permitted them to strike their roots. Shortly after the close of the wars, governmental aid in the form of protective tariffs was sought and gained to perpetuate this domestic production, and to further its growth.

Early mechanical inventions.—The conspicuous place which mechanical ingenuity has taken in American civilization may perhaps be regarded as another expression of the extreme individualism and versatility that developed under frontier conditions and our free institutions. But whatever the explanation, inventive genius has had an eminent rôle in our industrial progress. At first our country depended largely on the technological knowledge of England: we borrowed from her the new devices in spinning and weaving, the steam engine, the locomotive. But American inventors also began to make important contributions of their own. Even before the opening of the nineteenth century Eli Whitney had invented (1793) the cotton-gin, by which the amount of cotton cleaned in one day by one man leaped from five or six pounds to one thousand pounds. In 1807 Robert Fulton introduced his steamboat, the *Clermont*, on the Hudson River. Before the middle of the nineteenth century McCormick had invented his reaper, which was to revolutionize agriculture, and Howe had applied for a patent on a sewing machine, which presently invaded almost every household and became the basis of a new industry in the preparation of shop- and factory-made clothing. Thus natural wealth, international events, governmental aid, and inventive ingenuity were all contributing to give America a start in industrial life.

Development of transportation.—Most of the inventions listed above were important because they increased man's power to

produce wealth. Two of them, the steamboat and the locomotive, suggest that inventive genius was also applying itself to the problem of transportation. The two processes—the increasing of production and the improving of means of transportation—go hand in hand. Increased production quickly reaches the limits of its usefulness if it depends on local markets. The development of systems of transportation connecting the diverse economic areas of the United States was indispensable to vigorous industrial growth. To an increasing degree the prosperity of the industrial and commercial East was dependent on its access to the food stuffs and raw materials of the West and South, while the West and South required the markets, the manufactured goods, and the capital that could be supplied by the East; each section, to a degree, supplemented the other in its economic activity. Hence the fundamental importance of communication and transportation in our economic growth.

For a considerable period after the American Revolution transportation facilities lagged behind other features of our national growth. Both economic progress and political unity were retarded as a result. So far as the interior was concerned it was not until the State and Federal governments initiated programs of extensive internal improvement that the problem of communication and transportation was finally solved. Beginning in the last decade of the eighteenth century, this activity continued throughout the period now being considered, the period before the Civil War. The aim was to link the country together by means of systems of turnpikes, canals, and railroads. The importance of early turnpike construction was largely limited to the region east of the Alleghenies. The construction of canals was in part stimulated by the invention of the steamboat. During the early decades of the nineteenth century rivers were linked together to serve limited areas. More important were such enterprises as the Ohio Canal, a State project, by which Lake Erie was joined at Cleveland with the Ohio River at Portsmouth. Most famous of all was the Erie Canal, completed in 1825, which linked the Hudson River with Lake Erie and thus opened the whole vast region of the Great Lakes to water traffic terminating at New York City. Canal construction was of great significance in American economic development, but its possibilities of supplying the needs of all sections of the West were obviously limited by the geographic distribution of rivers and lakes suitable

for navigation. Railroads came to fill the gaps. Beginning in 1830, railroad construction was at first confined to the Atlantic area, where a number of short, disconnected lines were soon completed. A little later lines were projected in the West, and by 1850, canal and railroad construction had linked the East and the West. When the Civil War opened, the railroads had become the most important feature of the American system of internal transportation.

These achievements carried with them consequences too numerous to detail here. Their general economic importance is clear. With transportation charges lowered and many new markets thrown open, foodstuffs, raw materials, manufactures, and capital began to move in accordance with the general needs of each section of the country, a movement facilitated by the freedom of our interstate trade. By the 1840's farming in the Northwest was changing from the subsistence to the commercial stage, and industrial life began to move with greater vigor into the West. Altogether transportation gave a tremendous impetus to our economic activity.

Free trade and protection.—During the colonial period it was the desire of England, the mother country, that her American possessions should remain primarily agricultural, and thus serve as a market for her manufactured commodities and as a source of raw products. This, it will be recalled, was an element in the theory of mercantilism. The restrictions England imposed on the colonies, however, were observed by the colonists only where observance did not mean their own economic loss. The natural resources of the colonies, to be sure, made agriculture and other extractive occupations the logical interests of the early Americans; but in some instances, equally fruitful opportunities for manufacturing existed—especially in the Northern colonies—and England found it impossible wholly to keep the colonists from developing these opportunities.

With American independence achieved, the new Republic was in a position to determine its own policies with respect to industry and trade. True to the economic teachings of the eighteenth-century philosophers, it at first ignored the theories of mercantilism and launched the Republic on a career of *laissez-faire*, in relation both to industrial enterprise and interstate trade. This freedom of trade within the federal union has been another prime factor in the nourishing of our industrial and commercial prosperity. Europe

offers nothing comparable to the opportunities afforded the United States by the steady extension of her frontiers westward. Here new communities were building up, decade by decade, and new markets were being created, not across seas, but within the confines of the country itself; markets accessible first by river routes, later by canals, and still later by railroad; but, most important, markets free to all by reason of our internal free-trade system.

In the light of this domestic policy we might expect a similar American attitude toward international trade. As a matter of fact there was, during the closing years of the War for Independence, considerable American free-trade sentiment. While the conflict was still in progress a number of attempts were made to conclude liberal commercial treaties with a number of European states, but in almost every case with little success. When the War was over the Americans sought to provide for liberal trade relations with Great Britain in the peace treaty of 1783, but again the result was negative. England proceeded to injure American trade in various ways, with the result that one of the first acts of Congress under the Constitution of 1789 was to pass a number of acts for the protection of American shipping and to raise revenue by the imposition of import duties. The international situation thus tended to drive the Republic to pursue a policy in foreign trade contrary to that established in interstate commerce. The divergence became more marked after the close of the Napoleonic Wars when the government moved toward positive protection for the industries that had been established in the United States during the period of European disturbance. From 1816 on the American government became increasingly devoted to the protectionist principle.

This changed attitude can be best understood in the light of the general economic situation. It will be remembered that despite the onslaught against mercantilism in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, those who advocated free trade were not yet in power, and mercantilist policies still prevailed. With the close of the wars with France England turned to recover some of her commercial losses by a vigorous pursuit of international trade. Her machine-made goods were thrown in great quantities on the American market, and some of our newly established industries did in fact succumb to British competition. Hence the demand for protection in 1816 and thereafter. It was further argued that war was more or less chronic in Europe and that the United States could not safely

depend on European manufacturers. Nor did it seem safe to assume that the country would escape involvement in European conflicts. Under this line of reasoning, the mercantilist conception of national prosperity and power based upon economic independence captured the imagination of the American government. So widely did this idea of national defense take possession of the people, despite dissident voices here and there, that the South, which was later to take a violent position against protective tariffs, joined in the chorus of approval.

By the 1830's the development of industry began to reveal sharply divergent sectional interests, and the portentous controversy between the industrial North and the agricultural South over the tariff issue steadily widened the breach that finally led to civil war. Despite all opposition the protectionists had their way, and a protective tariff became a tradition in our economic history. So strong, indeed, is the national bias in favor of protective tariffs that a large majority, perhaps, of our people have regarded this policy as the primary cause of our prosperity. It is true that, in general, students of the theory of economics discredit the policy and present logical proof to show that it caters to individual rather than to social gain. Nevertheless, our history has been one of increasing, rather than decreasing, tariff rates, which probably goes to show that economic science alone cannot enforce economic theories and proposals. Complications and failures in either our political or our economic structure must most frequently be relied on for a revolution in our practices.

The industrial lag in the South.—The retardation of industrial development in the South was a result of a combination of forces too numerous to be fully considered here. But it should be understood that the failure of the South to progress industrially before the Civil War was not due to the lack of natural resources—although the South is not so well endowed for industrial life as is the North—or to the inability of many thoughtful Southerners to understand the advantages and desirability of a more diversified economic life. The failure of Southern capital to go into industry lay largely in the fact that the unusual advantages afforded by a special kind of agriculture had early led the Southern planters to invest large sums of money in land and slaves. The plantation was a going concern. Its “machinery” consisted of great estates of valuable land and buildings and numerous slaves. This was the capital investment

of the planter. So long as the enterprise provided profits and supported a traditional social existence that appealed strongly to the ruling class, why should the members of that class abandon the realities of an established existence for the uncertainties of a venture in industry which was neither familiar nor attractive to them? Besides, the South had drawn to it few European immigrants, and the slaves were equipped neither by experience nor training to turn from agricultural work to meet the labor demands of the factory. Until a peculiar economic system built upon slave labor had disappeared from the South, it is illogical to expect that industry would strike vigorous roots there.

The triumph of industry.—It was in the North, then, that economic development was preparing American society for the irresistible sweep of the Industrial Revolution. By 1861 “. . . the capital invested in industries, railways, commerce, and city property exceeded in dollars and cents the value of all the farms and plantations between the Atlantic and the Pacific—a fact announcing at last the triumph of industry over agriculture.”¹ The opening of the Civil War period thus marks a turning point in the relative position of agriculture and of industry in the United States. The war itself was a titanic struggle between the agricultural aristocracy of the South and the industrial barons of the North, a struggle, so far as the South was concerned, to maintain the rule of King Cotton. It was the superior economic power of the North that finally bore down to defeat an agricultural system that had had its day. The superior economic power of the North represented overwhelming advantages which were largely a direct or indirect result of industrial development—advantages in facilities for transportation; natural products made available for military purposes by the possession of mechanical equipment and technical skill; a great superiority in man power, in part the result of throngs of immigrants attracted by the free labor system of the industrial North. Incidentally, it was largely these immigrants who kept up the necessary food supply from the Western farms when the demand for soldiers drew off the American farmers to fill the ranks of the Northern armies. It was in a very real sense, then, that industry tipped the scale against an agricultural South poorly equipped to

¹Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization*, The Macmillan Co., 1927, II, p. 365.

maintain the unequal struggle for the very reason that it was agricultural.

The demands of the struggle upon the productive powers of the North and the opportunities that it afforded for profitable investments combined to stimulate industrial expansion during the Civil War period. The great American meat-packing industry had its beginning during those years; and it was then that the manufacture of steel seriously began a career that was soon to make it one of the major factors in American economic life. Its expansion in the sixties was a result not only of the direct demands of the war but of the extension of railroads, for it was then that two transcontinental lines were started—the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific. Agriculture, too, experienced something of a revolution, which had begun earlier with the introduction of the McCormick reaper. Improvement in means of transportation enabled the great grain areas of the interior to put their product down at a profit in the European markets, particularly in 1863 when Europe suffered a serious shortage of crops. The more general use of the reaper and other farm machinery enabled the farmers to profit by these unusual opportunities. Economic forces were combining during this interval of conflict to make the decades following the Civil War notable in the industrial progress of the country.

ECONOMIC ADVANCE SINCE THE CIVIL WAR

Industrial progress.—So rapid has been our advance in industry since the Civil War that the United States is now the foremost manufacturing nation in the world. "It is estimated that the supply of productive capital has increased per wage-earner fully four fold since 1860, and in the same period the supply of non-human energy has increased nearly fivefold per wage earner. More mechanical equipment and more horsepower per worker have greatly increased the output per worker. These causes have increased the annual production of pig iron per worker from 267 to 709 tons. They have increased the production of gasoline per worker from 23,000 gallons to 71,000 gallons, and of automobile from one and one-half cars to four cars per worker. From 1860 to 1910 the mineral production per mining employee more than doubled, and since 1910 production has increased an additional 25 per cent in efficiency. A generation ago the bituminous coal

miner produced two and one-half tons per day, whereas today, by the use of superior machinery, he produces more than four tons per day. This multiplied efficiency of the worker means that production has increased much faster than population. In the twenty-two year period ending in 1920 the physical quantity of manufacture per capita of the population rose 39 per cent."¹

This increase in productive power is reflected in the output of industry, in the expansion of productive capital, and in the changing character of business organization. In 1860 the total output of American manufactured goods was less than two billion dollars; in 1919 it was more than sixty-two billions. In 1862 the capital invested in our industries was less than five billion dollars; in 1920 it was more than forty-four billions. This impressive advance in material results was paralleled by important changes in the organization of our productive units, indicating that the United States was becoming a country of large-scale industry. Our early manufacturing had been carried on in small shops and factories owned and managed by a single person or by partnerships. As the opportunities for large-scale production became more and more apparent, partnership enterprises gave way to corporations, which permitted the massing of great amounts of capital. By the eighties this process had gone on until the corporation had become the dominant factor in our industrial life. When these corporations expanded to mammoth size we had entered upon the age of trusts. It was this development, with its seeming purpose to narrow the fields of competition and in some cases to create monopolies, that finally resulted in such legislative action to curb the monopolistic trend of big business as—to give one example—the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.

The conspicuous multiplication of huge manufacturing corporations was accompanied by a growing tendency toward standardization which became a characteristic feature of American large-scale production. Standardization meant an emphasis upon general utility and low-cost production rather than upon considerations of individual taste and artistic appeal. Articles identical in appearance made up of interchangeable parts were produced in vast quantities to be sold at low prices. The earlier models of the Ford car offer a familiar example of standardized production. It is only of late years that the demands of individual taste are inducing competi-

¹L. D. Edie, *Economics: Principles and Problems*, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., p. 26.

ing manufacturers to consider esthetic as well as utilitarian qualities in their product. Again the automobile serves as an illustration of American progress in the creation of artistically beautiful things.

The advance in agriculture.—While technology was transforming American industrial life, agriculture was likewise undergoing revolutionary change. The signs of an awakening activity in the great farming districts during the period of the Civil War were but symptoms of profound changes still to come. In their work *The Rise of American Civilization*, Charles and Mary Beard present an illuminating picture of the development of modern agriculture in the United States. Between 1860 and 1910, they point out, the number of farms had increased from 2,000,000 to 7,000,000; and between the years 1860 and 1900, the export of wheat rose from 17,000,000 bushels to 200,000,000 bushels. In the material enrichment of American life, it is quite clear that the wealth of the soil was contributing its stream of capital to the wealth of industry. The expansion of agriculture was a necessary complement to the expansion of industry; for while the use of machinery resulted in an increase in the urban populations to be fed, the growing productivity of the farms furnished the necessary food.

The increased production in agriculture was not a result merely of the extension of farming areas, but also of the application of machinery and improved methods of cultivation. During the period following the close of the Civil War there appeared a remarkable array of agricultural implements and machines. With agriculture on a strictly commercial basis, the farmers soon found it necessary to invest in machinery if they would compete successfully in domestic and foreign markets. Moreover, with the disappearance of the American frontier in the eighties and the end of the opportunity to acquire good free land to which the farmers might migrate when, by unscientific methods, they had exhausted the fertility of the land they had been cultivating, the more intelligent among them realized that they must resort to improved methods of cultivating the land they already possessed. They were aided in the solution of their problems by the establishment of agricultural colleges and government bureaus and by the appearance of numerous farm newspapers, magazines, and agricultural bulletins. Thus the new agriculture became both a more strictly capitalistic enterprise, and at the same time a more scientific one. It still remains essential, if agriculture is to be a profitable enterprise, that the

farmer acquire a business knowledge; for once he has produced a surplus he is confronted with the complicated task of marketing that surplus.

The rapid change in the position of the American farmer between 1840, when farming became commercial, and 1880, when it emerged as a capitalistic enterprise, produced a formidable array of agrarian problems. The vanishing of the frontier raised the demand for cheap farm land. With mounting necessary expenditures for farm machinery, fertilizers, and the like, the farmer was confronted with the need of long-term loans at reasonable interest rates, a need which ordinary banking practice denied him. With the widening distances to profitable markets, he became seriously concerned about transportation facilities and low freight rates. And, finally, after 1920, the complex problem of marketing his products drove him more than ever to seek the aid of the federal government. Today, the combination of his problems has made the agrarian question one of major importance to the whole nation.

The expansion of commerce and its significance.—The advance in industry and the transformation of agriculture have had a marked effect on American commerce. Until the comparatively recent past, foreign markets were of relatively little importance to our manufacturers, inasmuch as practically our entire output could be absorbed at home. Our commercial prosperity depended mainly upon the trade within our own borders. Our export trade was indeed important, but it was mainly such raw materials as cotton and food stuffs that made it so; manufactured articles held an insignificant place. That statement no longer holds true for a number of important industries that have increased their capacity for production beyond domestic demand and have come to depend to a large extent upon external markets to absorb their surplus. At the present time 33 per cent of our lard, 28 per cent of our sewing machines, and from 21 to 40 per cent of our agricultural machinery, printing machinery, locomotives, typewriters, lubricating oils, and kerosene depend on foreign markets.¹ It is true that our foreign trade even now amounts to only about ten per cent of our total trade, foreign and domestic, and this fact has led some observers to conclude that the United States could get along very well without foreign markets; that we could even solve the problems presented by the present depression by economic isolation. That conclusion

¹New York Times, Apr. 16, 1933.

however, loses sight, first of the fact that the profit is in that ten per cent of sales; secondly, of the fact that both industry and agriculture are keyed up to a production scale beyond our own needs; and thirdly, of the fact that all our industries are so interwoven that loss in some—even a few—means loss to all.

We can comprehend our growing interest in the outside world still more clearly if we observe our foreign trade from another point of view. Until 1874 we were a debtor nation; that is, to hasten our internal growth we had borrowed huge amounts of capital from abroad. In other words, we regularly imported more than we exported. Note that what we imported was actual physical capital with which to build our roads, our railroads, and our factories. The returns on these internal developments were fruitful, however, and beginning in 1874 we were actually returning more than we were borrowing. In other words, by 1874 our exports had become greater than our imports. During the World War, we not only completed the process, begun in 1874, of paying off our indebtedness but proceeded to lend capital to the Allied nations. We thereby became a creditor nation; our exports continued to be greater than our imports, but now we exported, not to pay off old debts, but to make new loans. Our importance as a lending nation is impressively indicated by the fact that in 1929 the total indebtedness of other countries and other nationals to the United States was approximately \$25,000,000,000. Of that sum, \$12,000,000,000 consisted of loans made by the United States government to foreign governments during the World War and the years following it.

The growing importance of our foreign trade, and our position as the greatest creditor nation in the world, stand out as matters of unusual significance. They signify our growing economic integration with the rest of the world; we are now irrevocably a part of a world economy, a part of an interdependent economic order. We have become a world power. Here lies the primary explanation of a growing imperialist sentiment and interest, awakening at the close of the nineteenth century and carrying us into the twentieth-century imperialist maelstrom in the twentieth.

OUR MATERIAL ACHIEVEMENTS AND OUR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The preceding sketch of the economic progress of the United States during the last two generations, brief and incomplete as it

serve to indicate the gigantic proportions of the American achievement. Professor Seligman has characterized it in the following striking language:

Nowhere has man's victorious contest with the powers of nature been waged with such intelligence and such relentless vigor. Nowhere have the captains of industry prosecuted their quest for industrial supremacy with such alertness and ability. As a consequence, nowhere have the most advanced forms of a highly organized, fully differentiated, thoroughly complex industrial organism been evolved with such startling rapidity and such complete success. In the development of these new economic institutions America is leading the world and is showing other countries what stages they have still to traverse. While the movement toward combination of capital has even in Europe made only timid beginnings, it is revolutionizing American industry. In this sense America is old—far older than most of its industrial rivals.¹

The immediate result of the achievement has been the creation for the American people of a material prosperity far surpassing that of any other people. In ordinary times the income of the United States is about four times that of Great Britain and six times that of Germany. On a per capita basis this means that the average person in the United States has from 60 to 70 per cent more income than the Englishman, about three times that of the average German, and about six times that of the average Italian.² Unfortunately, these "averages" present a misleading picture of individual incomes in the United States, since of all the incomes figuring in the calculation a small proportion are excessively high and a large proportion are distressingly low. During the years covered by the foregoing statistics, three per cent of the population of our country received about 25 per cent. of the total income, and, according to the estimate of one writer, approximately 15 per cent exist on a poverty level even in prosperous years.

The effect of the present world-wide depression has been to reduce some sections of American society to poverty; that its general effect (1933) is catastrophic no one denies. What its general effect at some time to come will be no one can determine. There is no doubt, however, that we are confronted by a great economic and sociological problem. That economic distress can be a chronic

¹ R. A. Seligman, *Principles of Economics*, Longmans, Green & Co., 6th edition, 1908, p. 106.

² A. D. Durand, *American Industry and Commerce*, Ginn & Co., 1930, p. 6.

condition among millions in a land of surpassing wealth, and that acute distress can overtake many millions more in periods of depression, are facts that challenge the conscience and the intelligence of all men to an effort to create a mechanism which shall bring under control the destructive forces that appear to threaten the whole social order.

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CHAPTER XXII

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

A STUDY of the Industrial Revolution in terms only of mechanical inventions would cause us to lose sight of its social significance. All the countries that felt the impact of the Revolution found themselves face to face with a force deeply disturbing to the equilibrium of existing social organizations and institutions, within which both group and individual adjustments had been established by long usage. More than any other single development in history, the Industrial Revolution disturbed the lives of the great masses of people. It was, and is, at once the basis for great achievements and small failures. To its achievements and failures, especially where they have issued in serious social and economic problems, we now turn.

THE MACHINE AND THE MAN

The introduction of the factory system following the Industrial Revolution radically changed the life of the working classes. Prior to the Revolution, manufacturing had been carried on in the separate homes or in small shops; the workers owned their tools; the conditions of work were largely of their own making. Even under the domestic system, which, it is true, had separated worker from product, there was still room for individuality and the expression of personality. The worker in the home might engage in two or three occupations. He did, in fact, usually combine a certain amount of farming or gardening with the prosecution of his craft. But with the rise of the factory, conditions of work were completely altered. It brought into existence the capitalist, owner of the factory, owner of machinery, employer of labor; he it was who henceforth was to dictate the conditions of work. Both men and the machines they operated were agents of production; both were important from the standpoint of output; too often both were regarded impersonally in terms of future profits. In a sense, the machines were more

highly regarded, since their failure to operate efficiently meant a loss in capital, while the breakdown of a man meant nothing more than his discharge and the employment of another man. This impersonal relation between employer and employee that came to exist after the Industrial Revolution is one of the "dismal failures" of that Revolution. It has been the source and the cause of the innumerable disputes between capital and labor.

The extension of the factory system has meant the standardization of work as well as of products. The worker repeats endlessly a mechanical process which is easily learned and which hardly ever varies. Originality has become a lost quality in most work. The psychological effects of this extreme specialization are in many cases extremely harmful to the worker. The words of Adam Smith, written more than a century and a half ago, sound prophetic now: "The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple tasks . . . generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become." A man living under such conditions of work becomes something less than a human being; he is instead a cog in a machine, endlessly performing operations which in themselves have no meaning and in which he can ordinarily feel no pride. Yet this everlasting repetition of a simple task constitutes a major part of his life; his character and outlook on life are conditioned by the particular requirements of a machine; his psychological make-up tends to conform to it. Ideally, the problem should be solved by making the machine conform to the basic make-up of human beings, instead of the reverse. Obviously, since repetitive effort is bound to be dull and meaningless, and since the machine is here to stay, there is little possibility of making the factory hand's work interesting and vital. His burdens can perhaps be moderately lightened by conditions of sanitation, rest periods, vacations, and congenial working environment; but tasks, personally meaningless, will remain to be performed. Perhaps the most substantial solution lies in the direction of shorter hours—a possibility conditioned on increased efficiency in production. Here, indeed, is a most hopeful outlook. At the present time the production of the world is considerably less than it might be; that is, industry is still inefficient and wasteful. With the available machinery, land, labor, and knowledge of the arts, the world can possibly double its present production by scientific management and the smoothing out of the economic kinks in the system. And with future progress in labor

aving devices, with their resulting increases in production, it is reasonable to suppose that the present output of an eight- or nine-hour day and a six-day week can be maintained on the basis of a very short working day—perhaps four hours—and a short working week—perhaps four days. This decrease in the time spent in industry would permit a great cultural expansion in the working man's life. It is decidedly a possibility, the realization of which depends on a more capable organization of the industrial processes.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND INDUSTRIAL WARFARE

Another impressive fact arising out of the very nature of the capitalistic system of production in its present form is that, although there has been a great increase in total wealth and although the standard of living has improved, most men are propertyless. They depend for their existence on their jobs—their only source of income. But unemployment is widespread and recurrent, and in most cases it is impossible for the wage earner to save enough during a prosperous period to make provisions for the proverbial, and almost certain, rainy day. And because most jobs are repetitious, requiring merely energy and constancy of attention, young men and women are constantly replacing the older and more experienced workers. Many concerns do not hire men beyond forty years of age. For one reason or another, the retention of a job has become increasingly difficult. Fear is a constant element in our working class. Not without foundation is this anxiety so prevalent among the manual workers. In every country where the Industrial Revolution has made inroads, unemployment exists in periods of prosperity as well as in periods of depression.

Sources of the problem.—Unemployment is defined as involuntary idleness on the part of those physically and mentally able to work. Some of us carelessly suppose that unemployment is the fault of the worker, that anyone who wants a job can get one. This is an absurd idea. We must admit that unemployment is due not to individuals—employers or employees—but to some fault in the economic system. Whereas under medieval economy the economic relationships were direct, personal, self-sufficient, now there are impersonal contacts between employer and employee. Is business good? Then hire more men. Is it dull? Discharge some. An employee in a large factory is only a number. The

problem in hiring labor is merely a comparison between the wages of the laborer and the value of what he produces. This unfortunate situation is not a reflection on the humanity of the employer. It is probably true that the wages he pays and the employment policy he pursues are imposed by the competitive regime under which he conducts his business. He, like the employee, is caught in a system and necessarily follows the routine procedure. He must watch his cost of production—and labor is just one item in this cost—or fail to continue as a producer. He must make his investment earn dividends for himself and other stockholders.

The same relentless pressure of competition forces the employer to utilize such labor-saving devices as he can afford to install. The result is technological unemployment—that is, unemployment resulting from the displacing of men by improved machinery or changes in the organization of the plant. Such a disturbance is not always a major evil, since, in the long run, most of the workers so displaced find their way into other lines of employment. Moreover, new inventions create as well as undermine employment. The new machinery which may have displaced thousands, itself required workers to make it. And such additions to the technical world as radios and airplanes have provided thousands of men with new kinds of employment. Nevertheless, of late years labor-saving devices have been multiplying so fast that technological unemployment does add its quota to the army of jobless men. But whatever be the resulting ills to the workers, it is evident that so far as the employer is concerned he is simply trying to keep up with the procession in a competitive business world. That is his problem. Any serious lagging behind is likely to mean his elimination in the struggle. On the other side is the worker. He, too, has his problem. His problem is to get all he can to maintain his inadequate standard of living and, if possible, to raise it. With nothing but the rewards of his labor to depend upon, the wage scale and recurrent periods of unemployment become the major factors in his problem of existence.

In the very nature of the situation just described we find an explanation of the misunderstandings and strife between employer and worker. Who is to blame? Is either side fundamentally at fault? Probably not. Are the interests of employers and employees compatible and their disputes merely the results of misunderstandings? This brief survey forbids a completely demon-

strable answer to this question; but from what has been said about production and distribution, it can be seen that they are both compatible and incompatible. Both are, or should be, interested in increasing production; herein lies the compatibility. But on the question of the division of the production (income), the gain of one is the loss of the other; and here their interests are incompatible. Industrial disputes are, therefore, not mere superficial misunderstandings, but basic differences. Where economic survival is precarious, it is altogether improbable that conciliations can be reached without antagonisms and conflicts. And actual victory may be a matter of superior fighting power rather than of abstract justice.

Mass action as a labor defense.—The Industrial Revolution had not run far in its course before the workers began to realize that the superior fighting power lay on the side of the employers. The individualist philosophy dictated freedom of contract as the only acceptable basis for the relations of employer to employee, and the virtues of the practice were duly extolled. But as the worker came to view the matter, his right to sell his labor to the highest bidder and the freedom of the employer to buy labor in the cheapest market meant, in the last analysis, the right of the worker to accept the terms imposed upon him by the employer or starve. Under ordinary conditions, it was most unlikely that the two sides of the scale should be evenly weighted in a contractual relationship between a powerful employer on one side and a single workman, whose existence depended upon his getting a job, on the other. So long as he bargained as an individual he was hopeless.

Largely out of this situation the trades-union movement arose. In England, where this new type of problem emerged with the advance of the technical revolution, the workers initiated a movement at the beginning of the nineteenth century to organize crafts into labor unions for the purpose of collective bargaining with the employers. This assault upon the principle of freedom of contract met with vigorous opposition from the new industrial group. Both English common law and new statutes of Parliament were marshalled against such combinations of the workers. The result was a long struggle to legalize labor unions and to obtain the right to use them as instruments to increase wages, decrease hours, improve working conditions, and give the workers greater security in their jobs. In England the long-fought contest was not won until 1875. In every country where the Industrial Revolution has made itself

felt, trade unions have sprung up as if the phenomenon were inseparable from the industrial change.

Organization of the workers into labor unions promoted industrial strife, which latter, in its turn, enlarged the field of operations of the unions. Through the amalgamation of allied crafts into giant organizations, strikes have taken on the form of industrial warfare waged on wide fronts and involving tens and even hundreds of thousands of workers. Industrial warfare of this sort may be no less serious than military combats; it means great losses and suffering to employees, bankruptcy to employers, and discontinuation of services to the public. But although combinations of the workers have not eliminated industrial warfare, they have, in the opinion of many, decreased the number of such struggles; for the working class has learned that in many cases it is far more valuable to use their combined strength for bargaining in a spirit of compromise than to stake all on the problematical outcome of a strike. No one taking an unprejudiced view of industrial history can doubt the great benefits that have accrued to labor through an organization that has tended to equalize the fighting and bargaining power of employers and employees. In the United States the evils perpetrated by labor organizations have been numerous, but it is the belief of many economists that these evils are not an argument for the elimination of strong labor unions; rather they indicate the need of an improvement in their morale and of a deeper realization of social responsibility.

Industrial democracy a proposed remedy.—As a more effective means of harmonizing the interests of employer and employee, industrial democracy has been widely advocated. When the agitation for political democracy was at its height, it was conscientiously believed by many of its thoughtful advocates that the ballot in the hands of the depressed classes would prove to be the instrument by which they, through governmental action, would attain economic security. Experience has indicated, however, that political democracy under a capitalistic system may degenerate into little more than a formality. Legislation may represent powerful class interests rather than the conscience of the majority. The power of wealth may be utilized for selfish aggrandizement rather than for social well-being. A small but rich group of industrialists may combine to boost prices; or an employer may take advantage of the worker's everlasting dependence on the job, to depress his wages. For these

reasons the conviction has arisen among many critical observers that political democracy alone is not enough to protect the workers; it must be supplemented by economic or industrial democracy; that is, a system under which representatives of labor will be admitted to some share in the management of industry.

The organized workers have been demanding a voice in management as a recognition both of the indispensable part they play in industry and of their dignity as individuals. Arguments against this demand offered by capitalists run to the effect (1) that since the employer owns the business he alone has the right to run it; and (2) that a combined management of employer and employee—a dual control—is apt to result in inefficiency. Against these arguments the laborer says that since his very life is tied up with the fortunes of the business, since it cannot proceed without him, since his self-respect is impaired by being solely under the direction and whim of one who happens to own capital, and since the elimination of these evils would be conducive to higher morale and therefore greater rather than less efficiency, he should be permitted to participate in the control and direction of business.

At any rate, whether it is due to the insistent and increasingly potent demands of labor or a more general sense of social responsibility on the part of employers, there have been certain definite movements toward industrial democracy. In many of our largest industries labor, conceived as an indispensable part of the economic process, has been given a voice in management. Such large establishments as the International Harvester Company, the Bethlehem Steel Company, the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, the Dennison Manufacturing Company, have met the demands of laborers and frankly admitted that new philosophies of labor are necessary to meet new and changing conditions. The specific methods adopted by these companies to secure coöperation vary, but each has attempted to find a way to permit expression, if somewhat ineffectively, of the new ideology.

THE BUSINESS CYCLE

Cases of unemployment of the kind already discussed present a serious problem inherent in the capitalistic system. A factor more serious and widespread in its disturbing effects upon the stability of employment and on the general health of our whole

economic life is the so-called business cycle, one of the most exasperating characteristics of modern business, both in the United States and abroad.

Western contemporary society is vast in its wealth and productive capacity, a productive capacity which, if well coördinated, would produce a steady and abundant flow of income for all. Yet, about every five years, on the average, economic activities run a course from prosperity to crisis (or recession), and from depression to revival. The elaborate, complex, and individualistic system gets out of order, not occasionally and spasmodically but at more or less regular intervals. Thus we are faced with the paradoxical situation in which prosperity has in it the roots of a depression, and depression the roots of prosperity. It is as if good health were an indication of oncoming illness, and illness an indication of oncoming good health. Instead of a condition of regular and healthy business activity, where all the productive resources of the country are utilized in the most efficient manner, we proceed on a zig-zag course. Here is a problem absorbing the attention of the best minds—to attain economic processes so well-coördinated that business activity will be regular and continuous rather than fitful and disturbing.

It would be easy enough to understand a business depression as a result of a war, or a crop failure, or an epidemic of disease. But the "business cycle" is largely independent of these random factors and seems to be a fundamental characteristic of our competitive capitalistic system; that is, the very characteristics of the business economy—freedom of enterprise, specialization, and the roundabout method of production—generate the cycle. Wherever business is highly developed—in America, in Europe, or in Asia—the cycle occurs with regularity. Each cycle differs from all the others as a result of special temporary circumstances, but all of them have fundamental likenesses.

The importance of the problem is apparent to anyone with even the most casual knowledge of history. In the United States, the years 1818, 1825, 1837, 1847, 1873, 1884, 1893, 1907, 1910, 1913, 1929 are the years in which there was a major shift from prosperity to depression, and in other years there were depressions of less significance. The depression which began in 1929 is more severe than any other in the history of the world, and its special nature is probably the result of certain random factors, such as the World War, unusually rapid technological changes, and the agricultural

maladjustment. But the depression may well have occurred entirely apart from these random factors, though in less severe form. Alternations of prosperity and depression are apparently the result of forces inseparable from the workings of our present individualist economy, these forces more or less periodically giving rise to recurrent maladjustments.

The economic depressions that constitute one phase of the business cycle are at once the most baffling problem that an industrial society has to contend with and the most formidable obstacle to the maintenance of desirable standards of living. Long periods of unemployment mean incalculable losses in productive power, which are as truly a loss of wealth as would be the case if millions of tons of goods and products were dumped into the sea. Millions of men and women become dependent upon charity, a fact which destroys self-respect and saps the morale. Savings of a lifetime are swept away, ownership in homes and farms is lost. Banks collapse, business establishments of all sorts are driven into bankruptcy. What has happened, when men go in want of food and clothing while warehouses are filled with goods and foodstuffs? In the final analysis it means that large portions of society have become separated from the direct sources of supply—the land itself—by an intricate social machinery. When that machinery breaks down men are brought face to face with want. How to prevent these periodic collapses is a vital problem which challenges contemporary society.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME UNDER CAPITALISM

The Industrial Revolution should be judged not by its immediate effects but rather by the long-run changes in society which it stimulated. It is axiomatic in the study of economics that rapid industrial changes, though possibly desirable on the whole and in the long view, create in the transition process grave maladjustments. Thus, the introduction of a labor-saving device causes temporary unemployment, but ultimately is the means of increasing the income of society. Conversely, a great city fire is a blessing to those who are temporarily provided with the work of rebuilding, but obviously is an economic loss when considered in relation to society, since there has been actual destruction of wealth. Economics is replete with illustrations of events which in the main are desirable, but which are attended by evils to specific groups; and, conversely, of

events which are beneficial to specific groups, but prejudicial when considered broadly. So far as machine production is concerned, it is obvious that it has drawn in its wake a train both of blessings and of iniquities; as to which have predominated, opinion will probably differ.

Production has become roundabout or capitalistic. Because it is roundabout, it necessitates a longer period of time between the first processes of creating capital goods and the final consumption of the product needed. But it takes knowledge and the possession of machinery to make possible extensive utilization of the principle of roundabout production. The roundabout method involves a deferring of consumption, a saving in the form of tools and equipment. The foregoing of immediate gratifications in the form of consumable goods means the creation of instrumental capital; and this capital in the end makes possible a greater output of consumable goods. The Industrial Revolution, therefore, has resulted in a huge increase in production and a consequent rise in the general standard of living; for, it is to be noted, the production of society is the income of society, and it is this production or income which is distributed to the various claimants—landlords, laborers, managers, and capitalists.

But in spite of this rise in the standard of living, there have come about great inequalities in the incomes of individuals; so that poverty and riches exist side by side. There are slums and mansions often within close range of each other. Inequalities tend to perpetuate themselves; the children, by and large, assume the economic status of the parents. Nor does it follow from the fact of the existence of great wealth that its acquisition has resulted from great service to the community; this may be the case, but frequently there is little relation between large incomes and public service. Nor is it necessarily true that the receiver of a small income is not of very great service socially. It is safe to say that in many cases the financial standing of an individual is the result of accidental circumstances, of which equivalent contribution to public welfare may not be one; conceivably, if great incomes did represent great service there might be some justification for the present inequalities. But how to effect a more equal distribution in which the very low incomes shall be increased and the very high ones lowered is a practical question in applied economics which it is beyond our province to consider here.

As a matter of fact, even if an absolute equality of incomes could be achieved (incidentally, this would probably be impossible as well as unwise), it would not bring the standard of living for all to a very high point. The fault lies not merely in inadequate distribution; we must have more to distribute, more to divide. That is, we must increase our production. The two major economic problems are, therefore, to find ways to increase production, and to insure a more equitable distribution of what is produced.

Wide inequalities in the distribution of income have produced serious problems of poverty in all industrial countries. Poverty is a social problem not because it signifies wide inequalities in the distribution of earnings and wealth, but because it signifies squalid tenement areas and slums, where millions of men, women, and children are forced to carry on an unequal battle against physical and moral deterioration amid degrading surroundings that tend to destroy human dignity. And because poverty does signify such things, it means social unrest and instability. Poverty on so vast a scale, carrying with it consequences of profound social significance, has ceased to be a case for private charity and has become a matter of serious public concern.

Recognizing these facts and the political expediency of relief measures, some governments turned in the latter part of the nineteenth century to comprehensive schemes of social legislation. Working conditions were improved, hours of employment were limited, and minimum wages were in some cases fixed by law. Government insurance schemes were put into force to provide protection against sickness, accident, unemployment, old age, and death. Social legislation of this sort has become commonplace in the industrial countries of Europe and in the British dominions. In the United States, partly by reason of our traditional distrust of all departures from American individualism and partly by reason of a relatively high standard of living among American workmen that has until recent years made the need of governmental regulation less necessary, programs of social legislation have lagged far behind those of Europe. Nevertheless, federal and state ventures have already reached noticeable proportions. We now have the income and inheritance taxes, which lay the burden of governmental costs upon those most able to bear it. Various states have workmen's compensation laws, and laws prohibiting child labor; others have provided old age pensions and unemployment insurance. In the

opinion of many, more remedial action should be undertaken, but the division of authority between the states and the federal government has constituted a serious political obstacle to comprehensive schemes of this sort.

AGRARIAN PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES

Modern agriculture is intimately and delicately articulated with the industrial and financial activities of society; the three have become interdependent factors in our economic life. In consequence, agriculture has felt the disturbing effects of the World War no less than other forms of industry. Conqueror and conquered alike find that the comparatively normal routine of agriculture has been so roughly upset that readjustment is costing years of anxiety and human suffering. The Middle Ages were marked by almost perpetual war which impoverished medieval society; but when a local conflict was over, the customary economic life was quickly resumed. Now, war not only impoverishes the world but upsets it so profoundly that years are required to bring its complicated machinery of production and consumption back into satisfactory adjustment.

During the World War, Europe offered a larger market for American wheat and other foodstuffs than ever before, thus stimulating here an abnormally large production to meet the foreign demand. The farmers were able to sell their products at high prices, and there was a great expansion of farming enterprises. At the end of the conflict, the European demand fell off, with a resulting drop in prices for wheat and other agricultural produce to a ruinous level. There exists in the United States today a condition of over-expansion in some divisions of agriculture which makes it impossible for farmers to get a normal return on their investments. Should such a condition exist in the manufacture of a particular product, such as radios, the prevailing low prices would induce some business leaders to curtail output of that product, or even to discontinue the business and direct their resources into some other field. Thus the supply would be decreased and over-production checked. But the high degree of mobility in industry does not prevail in agriculture. Farmers tend to remain farmers, even though reduced to a starvation level; for, to the farmer, agriculture represents more than an occupation or a business in the ordinary sense—one from

which he may detach himself under economic pressure; his farm and his farming activities represent the core of his existence, to which he is bound by sentiments and ties matured through a lifetime.

When in 1921 prices of farm products fell faster than prices of other commodities, the farmers clamored for protective legislation. The McNary-Haugen Bill, passed by Congress but vetoed by the President, was an attempt at a solution of the problem. It proposed to export farm products, through a government export corporation, at any price that could be obtained abroad. It was claimed that the effect would be to decrease the supply here and raise prices considerably, but opponents of the bill insisted that it would afford no solution of the problem, inasmuch as it would not correct the basic evil—that of over-expansion. They said that it would amount to governmental interference to sustain high prices at the expense of the public and as a subsidy to farmers; that it was as fundamentally wrong in principle as the protective tariff, which amounts to a subsidy to industries.

The failure of the McNary-Haugen Bill to command necessary support did not end the efforts of the national government to find a solution of the farm problem. Other methods are being tried, and it is quite evident that the agricultural situation is now taken seriously by Congress as a matter so closely bound up with the material welfare of the country as to demand attention. In other words, a basic branch of our economic life hitherto left largely to shift for itself has been definitely drawn into the field of government intervention in a positive way. Much depends upon the success or failure of efforts to find a solution for the farmers' problem. A reasonably healthy state of agriculture is of fundamental importance to our economic life; its health cannot be restored so long as the farmer is compelled to sell his products below the actual cost of production. It is under such conditions that mortgages eat up the land, and independent owners of the soil become tenants of absentee owners. Such a condition also has its social repercussions; signs are already appearing of a growing schism between urban and rural populations. The agrarian population, usually a conservative, stabilizing influence in society, is beginning to stir ominously. In some of the European countries a growing agrarian solidarity is observable and new radical political alignments are emerging.

THE REACTION AGAINST THE INDIVIDUALIST SYSTEM

Material progress has been the watchword and the proud boast of contemporary society. In his alliance with science and machinery modern man has demonstrated a capacity to produce wealth beyond all comparison with that of any other period in history. Despite this impressive fact we have the spectacle of a society perplexed and harassed by wide areas of poverty and distress in practically every country. This condition, as already pointed out, is a chronic condition. It exists in good times and in bad times. Depressions greatly aggravate the condition, and bring it out into the open in so threatening an aspect that society is compelled to take notice and to resort to extraordinary means to keep the social order from collapsing; but the condition, in varying degrees of seriousness, is always present, depression or no depression. This anomalous situation lies at the root of the critical and questioning attitude taken during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries toward the individualist or so-called capitalist system.

Socialism versus individualism.—Plenty of evidence appears in these pages to indicate that, during the last hundred years, individuals, groups, and governments have been conscious of the unhappy results of some of the workings of capitalism. Labor organizations, proposals for introducing industrial democracy, a conspicuous movement toward social legislation of all sorts, taxes on incomes and inheritance—these are all evidence of efforts that have been and are being made to establish satisfactory checks on the injurious tendencies of individualism. It is to be observed however, that all these proposals, movements, and changes in policy have presupposed the continuance of the capitalist system. Their aim has been, not to overthrow it, but to find ways of eliminating what is bad without destroying what is regarded as unquestionably good. That these intentions have not been rewarded with a satisfactory degree of success is the primary explanation of the steady growth of a more radical movement bent, not on the preservation but the destruction of the capitalist system as the only effective means of solving our economic and social problems. The movement is socialism—devoted, in its moderate forms, to the idea that the change should come slowly through a process of education and by constitutional methods, and, in its extreme form, to the conviction

that capitalism can be destroyed only by revolution. Farthest to the left in this extreme group stands communism.

Socialism.—The basic conflict between socialism and capitalism has been indicated elsewhere.¹ Here we are interested in socialism, not as a political doctrine, but as a theory diametrically opposed to the existing individualist order in our economic life. In this respect socialism is not only pertinent but extremely important in our discussion of economic problems. The powerful group of capitalists who arose with the new industrialism were the strong supporters of the laissez-faire doctrine; consequently capitalism came to be identified with economic individualism. That doctrine, as we have seen, is founded on the conviction that the prosperity and general well-being of society can be attained best by giving the individual the maximum of liberty in the pursuit of economic interest. Socialists, on the other hand, hold that experience proves that such liberty means the freedom of a powerful minority—the capitalists—to exploit the majority—the workers—with resulting widespread poverty and degradation of the masses. The fundamental error, according to the socialists, lies in the controlling emphasis on the liberty of the individual rather than on the welfare of society as a whole.

Fundamentally, therefore, the socialists' attack is directed at the individualist system as it has worked out under capitalism. In its operation, individualism produces a society in which economic activity receives its impulse and direction from numberless centers; each center—individual, partnership, corporation—is intent upon its own business interests or profits. It sees its interests or profits largely in the light of its own narrowly circumscribed circle of operations. Under such a regime, the socialist argues, economic life becomes anarchic. There is no one controlling authority that has power to direct production and consumption along channels that minister to the wants of society as a whole. With the major interest centered on individual profits rather than in social needs, the greater part of the wealth produced under capitalism goes to the few who control production, and the buying power of the mass of workers is so reduced that they are unable to procure the goods they require. As a result the balance between production and consumption is destroyed, and society experiences what is termed "overproduction." When this kind of "overproduction" becomes

¹See pp. 293-295.

serious enough, the machinery of industry slows down and in many businesses stops altogether, and society enters a depression, in which men may starve and go ragged in the midst of plenty.

The foregoing statement, in over-simplified form, presents the root evil of the existing economic system, as the socialist views it. Thus the socialist defines the major factor in the inequitable distribution of income and in the periodic calamities incidental to the business cycle. What the socialist demands, therefore, is a comprehensive social control of the instruments of production, the elimination of private profits, and the substitution of social needs as the guiding motive in the directing of our economic life; he can see no lasting virtue in the kind of government regulation which attempts through social legislation to prop up a structure which he regards as fundamentally bad.

Economic planning.—The growing strength and hostility of the socialist opposition to the capitalist economic order has stimulated some of its defenders to attempt to find a way out. Obviously we cannot go back to the pre-industrial stage. To destroy our machinery would mean a reversion to elementary conditions of production—direct instead of indirect—with a tremendous diminishing of output. A complete reversion to hand labor would mean a sacrifice of the productive capacity of capital and a lowering of our standard of living. Shall we retain our machinery, but give up our present capitalistic system of private ownership and substitute for it the socialistic system? That would mean a fundamental change in the *status quo*, and raise the question as to whether we could produce as much and as efficiently under socialism as under capitalism. If it is assumed that we could, the question still remains: Can socialism really effect a more equal distribution of income once it is produced? These are the fundamental questions of socialism.

Confronted by the alarming results of the breakdown of the individualist system, 1929 to 1933, some of those whose interests are definitely bound up with capitalism, and others who believe strongly that it has demonstrated its worth and must be preserved, are seriously considering the possibilities of finding a compromise between socialism and individualism. It is thought that capitalism could be made to function more satisfactorily if some central planning committee, a government agency, were set up to direct all productive processes. Could this be done? Possibly. But it is

important to note that a government agency superseding private initiative is, in effect, an infringement on private property and freedom of enterprise, and therefore an abandonment of what we have called the capitalistic system. It is doubtful whether economic activity could be socially planned—aside from relatively small matters—except by a frank acceptance of the socialistic principle. And the acceptance of the socialistic principle involves so fundamental a change and so novel a departure that its results are at best problematical. For these reasons, any thoroughgoing system of planning will undoubtedly meet with strong resistance in capitalist countries.

If they will not submit to autocratic direction by governmental agencies, countries must probably face the alternative of attempting modifications within the existing economic order. Only by future experiments will it be possible to determine just how far economic planning of this variety can go without seriously injuring or destroying the individualist system which the planners seek to preserve, and to determine just how much value such planning possesses. Outside these more comprehensive proposals there remain such expedients as unemployment insurance and old age pensions, scientific management, elimination of waste in production, profit-sharing, control of the size of population, the control of the business cycle, elimination of protective tariffs, intensive application of the principle of inheritance, income, and land taxes, and countless other proposals. Certainly any proposal likely to succeed requires more than a mere wish to improve mankind. It must be based on technical understanding of the problem involved, and be subjected to the most painstaking scientific study.

THE GENERAL NATURE OF OUR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The economic world has developed from simplicity to complexity, from self-sufficiency to the roundabout method of production represented in its highest development under our existing economic system. The earlier economic societies possessed the advantages of stability and relative certainty; unless catastrophes like war and physical disturbances intervened, the soil yielded the means of subsistence; and since production and consumption were not far removed from each other, a livelihood was not problematical. There was no complicated social mechanism to get out of order.

In contrast, our complex economic order is one of instability and uncertainty. The production of goods nowadays is no guarantee that the producers will be fed; for now goods are produced for sale in anticipation of a demand that may not materialize, with the result that goods are either not sold or are sold at ruinously low prices. Unemployment is just one consequence of such disorder.

Shall we then condemn the Industrial Revolution which is the underlying explanation of this elaborate economic world? Before we answer the question we must remember that although the Revolution made insecurity a normal condition of our day, it has raised standards of living, shortened the working day, and made possible a cultural expansion resting on a surplus of wealth. With all its evils, the present complex system has vastly greater possibilities than the economy preceding it. Such, history shows, is the nature of fundamental economic changes; they are never altogether a blessing or altogether an evil. Certain groups may be affected favorably, others unfavorably. All that can be said of such changes is that they are not wholly good or wholly bad. It is in such a light that we must view the Industrial Revolution.

We shall be aided in evaluating its results if we reduce economic activity to its simplest terms. In the last analysis, all economic problems come down to two considerations: How much can we produce, and how adequately is the production distributed? Neither problem is, as yet, adequately solved. That production has been immensely increased over that of the pre-industrial period no one denies; but that we could produce immensely more by the elimination of avoidable waste, every careful observer admits. Since the world's income is the world's production, we can increase that income only by the continuous, smooth functioning of all the elements of the economic process. Idle labor or idle capital means economic loss and signifies that we are not producing as much as we might. But whatever the total production, it must somehow be distributed. Distributed it is, but in too uneven a fashion. Given a certain amount to go round, then more to one man means less to another. And, as was observed earlier in this discussion, inequalities in the distribution of income do not bear any necessary correlation to social contributions. High incomes frequently do not mean a return of social service correspondingly high, nor low incomes social services correspondingly low.

If modern economic productivity lags behind its possibilities and

the distribution of our production is open to serious criticism, is society helpless to correct existing defects? Rigid devotion to the *status quo* may be one of the most serious obstacles to desirable changes. What has been the regular and habitual procedure during our lifetime we tend to take for granted as the only possible way of doing things. Our activities are adjusted to certain institutions. But are not institutions man-made, and does not all history indicate that they are subject to change? Must we sanctify current procedure? Human beings may be unable to cope with certain adverse manifestations of nature, but we ought never to admit surrender to our own social creations—to institutions. In this latter case, what is done can be undone.

This simple statement of the problem does not mean that the solution is equally simple. The whole discussion in this chapter is a negation of such a conclusion. Important economic problems are complex and difficult because they are never single, isolated problems; they are aspects of broader questions. Essentially, the social sciences are concerned with human behavior; one aspect of that behavior is economic. The complete understanding of past or current behavior in any given instance requires explorations beyond the economic field into the political, sociological, historical, and psychological fields, and in some cases into those of the natural sciences. Reparations and war debts, for example, are more than technical economic subjects; to be intelligently understood as problems, they must be viewed in the light of political and historical complications, perhaps in the light of the psychological setting with which they have come to be associated. To conclude that they can be settled on the basis of the simple formula that they are honest debts and must be paid like all other honest debts is a mischievous delusion.

Finally, it must be emphasized that economics is a technical subject. In this section dealing with the descent of economic institutions, the attempt has been made to clarify the broad movements in the development of our economic life rather than to pass judgment on specific aspects of that development. Such a study should not be viewed as a handbook of rules of action. While it may have aided in the formulation of a general attitude or philosophy, it cannot determine for the reader just what action he as a citizen should take in judging a particular situation. For example, the brief discussion of the farm problem in the United States has, it is hoped, made clear certain maladjustments that complicate the situation.

But the exact technique of overcoming those maladjustments depends on a broad technical knowledge of the matter not only in its economic aspects but also in its wide social and political ramifications. A philosophy of the economic world is far from a rule of action.

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CHAPTER XXIII

MODERN IMPERIALISM

THE term "imperialism" has been employed loosely to describe a variety of activities involving the extension of the authority of one community beyond its allotted boundaries, over another community. Looked at in its simplest and most fundamental aspect, imperialism is a manifestation of the elemental desire of a community to obtain, to safeguard, and to extend or enrich the economic foundations of its life. Such an urge explains, in large measure, the extension of the political authority of the ancient kings of the Near East within the valleys of the two great rivers. It is the explanation of the pressure upon peoples from the desert areas of Arabia upon the Fertile Crescent, of the Greek colonial movement, of Roman imperialism, of the period of colonial expansion following the commercial revolution of the sixteenth century. It is likewise the fundamental explanation of the imperialism of the present day, which it is our present task to discuss.

The roots of imperialism.—Why do peoples often resort to imperialism as a means of enriching their economic life? The answer is to be found in the way human society is constituted, and in the haphazard way of nature in distributing products which are ought to be indispensable to man's life, comfort, and satisfaction. If our world society were essentially homogeneous in the matter of cultural advancement, if history had decreed that there should be a world-wide solidarity of peoples, then we might imagine a social order permitting every community to draw freely on the fruits of the earth, each according to its legitimate needs. But society is not thus constituted. There are wide variations in the degree of cultural advancement; and there is no world-wide solidarity of peoples. Peoples have developed a group solidarity. It may be a solidarity no wider than that of the Greek city-states, or it may be the solidarity of a national society, as in our day. But however small or however large, the same kind of force works within the community;

that is, it organizes its social life upon a local or territorial basis. The inevitable result is that frontiers or boundaries arise between communities. Within those frontiers each community is led to think of its vital interests in terms of the group or community—in terms of monopoly and more or less exclusive privilege. Beyond its frontiers other peoples are strangers, foreigners, rivals, and perhaps enemies. Hence each community seeks to keep what it has and to guard it against others—in advanced civilizations, commonly by resort to protective tariffs and the organization of military and naval forces.

If each community were content with the natural resources it possesses, and would build its social life upon them, there would be no need of international trade, and there would be no imperialism. But nature has distributed her material gifts very unevenly over the face of the earth, and human desires for material things tend ever to increase. The consequence is that today many a nation finds itself poor in natural resources, and no nation finds itself economically self-sufficient. Each nation wants many things produced by other nations; hence there is added to the desire each nation feels to guard its own possessions the further desire to acquire the wealth of other parts of the globe. Now it happens that many of the earth's valuable raw materials are found in regions whose people are able neither to utilize them fully nor to hold them against the aggressions of more powerful nations. The result is that the strong extend their economic or political power over the weak and, once possession is acquired, usually proceed to adopt such measures as will secure to themselves exclusive enjoyment of the raw materials and the markets of the newly acquired colony.

Since, therefore, it is the division of world society into national states that has led to modern imperialism, we are concerned in our study of this social phenomenon with the effect of political nationalism upon modern economy and with the policies adopted and carried out by states, as states, to promote national economic and political interests. How individuals within a state influence and capitalize these policies for their own material interest is, to be sure, a factor of great importance, but nevertheless subordinate to national interests as conceived by the governments themselves.

The Old Imperialism.—The period of European expansion from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century is sometimes called the period of the Old Imperialism, to distinguish it from the New Im-

erialism which took a grip upon the nations after 1870. This early modern colonialism has already been sufficiently described for our purpose. It will be recalled that it was largely a dynastic enterprise prompted mainly by the economic needs of the new national monarchies in general, and by the needs of the absolute princes themselves in particular. The way to satisfy those needs was dictated by the economic theories embodied in mercantilism. By way of applying the general conclusions presented in the preceding paragraphs to the old imperialist activity, it is illuminating to notice that under the dogmas of mercantilism the free exchange of the articles of commerce and the free circulation of money or capital were blocked by embargoes, tariffs, and monopolies, backed by military and naval power. Hence the bitter rivalry for the choice regions possessed by weaker peoples, and the long series of commercial wars during the colonial period. But despite its iniquities, we should again be reminded, the colonial movement extended and enriched the economic life of Western society, carried European culture to new areas, and laid the foundations for a group of new nations.

The revolt against mercantilism and the Old Imperialism.—

For nearly three centuries mercantilism continued to dictate the policies of the dynastic states. Even Great Britain, the only country then possessing such a political novelty as a parliament, held only a little less firmly to the old dogma. But during the eighteenth century certain English observers began to raise doubts as to the validity of mercantilist economy, and made public their views in a succession of pamphlets. In 1776, while the American war for independence was in progress, Adam Smith published his great work the *Wealth of Nations*, with its attack upon the old economy. Then, as if to bear his theories out in the world of facts, came the early commercial results of the American Revolution which appeared to offer a direct contradiction to mercantilist reasoning; for, once the Americans had set their house in order, their growing prosperity was reflected in an expanding commerce with England. The colonies free were proving better customers than they had been as British possessions held in check commercially by monopolistic policy. Meanwhile over on the Continent the French economists were already busy spreading the gospel of laissez-faire. Then came the Industrial Revolution, with its devastating effects upon British mercantilism.

How did the new economic doctrine of *laissez-faire* square with the Old Imperialism? The new economists reasoned in this fashion. Since *laissez-faire* was the undoubted way to individual wealth and by counting individual fortunes, also the way to national wealth, the shackles upon the economic freedom of colonies should be struck off. And if the colonies of Britain and, it was hoped, the colonies of all other countries, were thrown open to free trade, what was the point in holding them? They were an endless source of expense; armies and navies had to be maintained to hold them; their administration was also costly. The logic of the situation argued that colonies should be given independence as soon as they were able to stand on their own legs; and they should become free with Britain's blessing upon them, as having performed an act quite as beneficial to the mother country as to themselves. Thus armies and navies could be cut down and other colonial expenses saved, so that presently there would be large revenues available for the building of a better and happier society at home; and war, the destroyer of wealth would become a thing of the past, for, under free trade, nations would no longer have to fight for commerce and empire. So reasoned the advocates of *laissez-faire*. In a free-trade world, they expected that the old notion of the desirability of an exclusive, monopolistic, national economy would give way to an unobstructed world economy in which all might freely buy where prices were lowest and sell where they were highest.

It looked for a time as if these expectations might be realized. Britain was completely successful, as we have seen, in the inauguration of a free-trade policy, which she extended to her colonial possessions; she was successful to a degree in persuading Continental countries to follow her example, although in none of them was free trade established as a complete system. In England lists were drawn up of colonies which, as some argued, should be given the independence at once. None were actually set adrift, but the accepted opinion was that it was only a matter of time before British colonies would mature and withdraw from the Empire—and to the good of England. In the fifties Britain appeared to be convinced of the folly of further aggressive imperialism. But less than two decades later articles and books began to appear indicating that the tide was setting in against indifference to empire, and before long positive sentiment arose favorable to the imperial expansion. How is the about-face to be explained?

THE REVIVAL OF IMPERIALISM AFTER 1870

Space forbids mention of all the factors in the revival of the imperialist movement in Europe after 1870, but a few of the most important may be examined. Curiously enough, the Industrial revolution, which had been a primary cause of Britain's adoption of an anti-imperialist policy, was now to be a primary cause of a reversion to what had been abandoned. The paradox is not difficult to explain. By reason of the fact that Britain had been the cradle of the mechanical revolution, she had acquired for a generation a monopoly in machine production. No other country could compete with her; she had, in truth, become the workshop of the world; and she prospered mightily. Her exports piled up surplus capital, which she began to lend in large sums to more backward countries on the Continent and to the young republic of America. In spite of the removal of the tariffs against the importation of grain her agriculture continued to flourish, and she was largely able to feed herself. The world looked rosy indeed for Britain. Then almost suddenly she awoke to the fact that she was living in a transformed world. To understand that transformation we must look to the events in Europe and the United States.

Why continental business men wanted colonies.—No large country can support a dense population upon an agricultural basis unless it is willing to accept a low standard of living. One of the most astonishing facts of nineteenth century history is the phenomenal increase of population. From 1800 to 1900, Great Britain increased from some 16,000,000 to over 41,000,000; Germany from 17,000,000 to over 56,000,000; Italy from over 18,000,000 to more than 32,000,000; Austria-Hungary from 23,000,000 to 45,000,000; European Russia from nearly 39,000,000 to over 111,000,000; the whole of Europe from 180,000,000 to 450,000,000 (in 1910). From these countries of Europe, particularly from Germany and Italy, emigrants were leaving by thousands to better themselves. Conditions were favorable for industrialization. The money which had been lent by Britain to states on the Continent was being put into railroads, public works, and industrial plants. The revolution in industry was in motion in those countries and in others. How would the financiers and business classes generally react to these changed conditions, and what was to be the attitude of their governments?

Private business immediately embraced the opportunities for rich

rewards by turning to machinery. But there were obstacles to overcome. Infant industries could hardly hope to compete with the established industries of Britain; free trade was, for them, a serious disadvantage; they required protection. Moreover, these countries lacked the necessary raw materials. They were unwilling to depend on competing nations for the supply; prices would be high and supplies precarious under abnormal conditions, as for example, during period of war. They must likewise have foreign markets, they argued. Britain had established a large measure of control over the markets of the world; to buy of Britain had become a tradition; besides, there were ominous signs that the free-trade era was drawing to a close; the bars were already going up against foreign trade. Lastly there was accumulating, with the advance of industrial enterprise, surplus capital, which presently could not hope for high returns if invested in the home country. The logic of the whole situation, as the great business interests saw it, demanded that the state come to their rescue, that it intervene in their behalf. What they desired from the state was protective tariffs at home, and colonies abroad to furnish raw materials, markets, and places for profitable investment. In other words, they demanded imperialism. Thus the industrial change which drove Britain against imperialism was, under the altered conditions existing in other countries, driving opinion toward its vigorous support.

Why governments supported the business men.—How would this program of the business men appeal to government, that is, to presidents, premiers, cabinets, and parliaments—or to kings and emperors? In the industrial countries governments were won over—in Germany, France, Belgium, Russia, Italy, and finally in the United States. Conditions were not quite the same in all of them and the considerations which weighed most were not always the same; but we can explain the support given to the business and financial interests in fairly general terms.

Business classes were, of course, interested in profits. Government officials and politicians soon found that business interests ran parallel with certain vital interests of state, and that in supporting business, government appeared to be safeguarding its own interests. Hence, there arose a tacit partnership between government and business, and the industrial states turned to a policy of imperialism.

It will be recalled that the bourgeois governments in Europe reacted back no further than approximately the decade of the seventies

that is to say, the middle class has only recently come into power. Bourgeois governments are infants, historically speaking; and they came into existence only after a terrific and prolonged struggle with the aristocratic power that preceded them. They had no sooner triumphed over their traditional enemy than they found themselves confronted by the working classes from below who, having become indoctrinated with the ideas of socialism, were opposed to capitalism, and, by that token, to the bourgeois class and the bourgeois governments. Under the circumstances the bourgeois governments had no reason to feel overly secure. Their hope lay in the creation of a broad political base to rest upon; a broad political base might presumably be created if socialism could be undermined by jobs for the jobless and good wages and good working conditions for all. With populations growing rapidly, such a program was not easy of realization. Industry expanded and intensified to yield even greater production appeared to be a possible solution. That was precisely what the business classes were calling for; what meant profits for them meant jobs and better wages for the working man and promised safety and stability for the bourgeois governments.

If industrial expansion was a bulwark to bourgeois political supremacy, then it seemed reasonable that the government should support industrial expansion. And if industrial expansion depended upon controlled sources of raw materials, markets, and so on, the conclusion appeared convincing that the state should turn to protection and imperialism. Moreover, colonies would offer another means of sawing off a discontented excess population without the loss to the country of these valuable citizens after they had been educated and trained at home to produce wealth or to fight in the army. Then, too, big business was frequently interested in products indispensable to government—for example, in petroleum and its by-products; in the cause of security there must be oil for naval craft, for locomotives, for aircraft; it would seem then a duty of governments not to let these limited supplies of the precious products get into the hands of potential enemies. It sometimes happened, too, that imperialists discovered opportunities for profit in islands of strategic naval importance; in such cases, plain duty called for the state to acquire or control such points; if the state safeguarded itself the profit of business enterprise, so much the better for business. And, finally, it is not to be forgotten that these imperialist governments are the governments of the business classes. The men who

sit in power in cabinets and parliaments are products of the same business traditions as those not in power; sometimes they are business or financial leaders themselves, owning large blocks of stock that may be benefited by government action. It is humanly impossible for most men not to see in their own interests the interests of the country at large.

Changing conception of the rôle of the state.—It is evident that the clamor of big business for government aid, and the response of governments to the clamor, are indicative of a growing revolt from the *laissez-faire* doctrine. A number of factors, discussed in earlier chapters, contributed to bring the change about; the influence of certain historical events of the sixties is pertinent. The unification of Germany and of Italy drew men's minds decisively to the significant part which governments played in society. In both cases revolutionary democratic movements had miserably failed in their great enterprises of unification, while governments had signal triumphed. The general result was to exalt government. Writers began to point out that the state had a great rôle to play in society. The hands-off doctrine of *laissez-faire* was no longer to be trusted. Society, they said, must be organized, directed, controlled, and safeguarded by the state. It seemed evident that the future belonged to the great states—the powerful imperial states. We have already seen how governments proceeded to launch wide programs of social legislation in response to this changing conception of the proper rôle of government. The intervention of the state in external affairs—imperialism—is another expression of the same influence.

The exalting of the state had a stimulating effect on the nationalistic emotions of the "man in the street." The all-powerful state, now almost a sublimated entity, with its capacity for good to the citizenry, became a kind of thing to be worshipped; and patriotism was its religion. In such a soil, national egotism flourished; a belief in racial or national superiority became a kind of cult. It was not difficult to clothe the conception with the necessary trappings to complete it. Having created a civilization superior to all others, the people must protect it not only in the home land but also in the colonies whose preservation, it was argued, was requisite to the well-being of the motherland. The obtaining of colonies might mean jobs, prosperity, and security. As for the backward peoples of the earth, they too must share in the benefits of a superior civilization. This was a duty of the superior to the inferior; this was the "whi-

an's burden." Thus, where and when it became necessary to appeal to the electorate to furnish the sinews of naval expansion, the building of a railroad in a far-off land, or the execution of a military campaign, the ammunition was at hand to make an impassioned plea to stir men's emotions.

Revival of imperialism in Great Britain.—It has been necessary to go far afield to explain the transformed European world that confronted Britain in the seventies and eighties. It was this situation, and a changed situation in the United States too, which brought clouds on the horizon of British prosperity and supremacy. It was from the far-inland farms of the United States that the newly constructed railroads and waterways brought grain to compete with English farmers in the seventies, a competition that largely undermined the old agriculture of England. Now for the first time she found herself compelled to obtain the bulk of certain food staples abroad. Profits which had earlier gone into foreign loans must be diverted, to a degree, to pay for food imports. Because of world conditions of finance, too, England found interest rates falling, and prices as well. The way out appeared to lie in speeding up industry and increasing trade, which was the heart's blood of British prosperity. But there were obstacles in the way that had not existed in Britain since the Industrial Revolution. Fortune had played a serious trick on British business; the very capital which had gone to the United States from England had been used to build the railroads that carried the grain to undersell the English farmer. And the loans that had gone to Germany had helped in the building of an industrial state that was becoming a serious competitor to Great Britain. Markets which had been more or less of a monopoly were being invaded by Germany, later by the United States. Countries like Germany and France were turning to protection to reduce or discourage competing products from Britain and from elsewhere. And Germany and France were turning to a vigorous imperialism to dispute with the greatest imperial power the control of lands not yet occupied by the European states.

Such were some of the new forces acting upon British opinion and British policy. British opinion gradually veered away from the earlier indifference to empire. With other nations striving for new markets the world over Britain must not rest content with what she had; a new race for empire was on; and she must throw herself into the contest. The Empire, said Joseph Chamberlain, was com-

merce; it had been created by commerce; it could not exist without commerce. It was urged further that the day of the "little Englander," as the anti-imperialists were called, was over; the world had changed; the future did belong to the great states. Bereft of her Empire, it was argued, England would sink to the rank of a third class power, as Holland had done. For proud Britain such a position was unthinkable. And so Great Britain, after a brief interval of some half a century, turned again to a forthright imperial policy.

Beginnings of American imperialism.—Imperialism developed later in the United States than in European countries. As the industrialization of the country proceeded after the sixties, markets were available for the products at home. In fact, the whole West was an empire into which the pioneers were steadily carrying American culture and creating new markets. Capital was not abundant; large sums had to be borrowed abroad, so that whatever surplus American capital existed could find profitable investment without seeking outside fields. But gradually the situation was changing. Population grew from less than 32,000,000 in 1860 to nearly 76,000,000 in 1900 and to 92,000,000 in 1910. Capital was accumulating with the growth of industry and internal commerce; manufacture of the partnership type with limited capital and small output began to give way to corporations; small plants were bought up or strangled by cutthroat competition, and big plants emerged with greatly increased output. Big business and the trusts were at hand.

How industrialism marched rapidly forward in the United States after the Civil War has been indicated in an earlier chapter. Manufactured goods and capital were increasing at an unparalleled pace. Previously the need of foreign markets to absorb the surplus products of industry had been insignificant; in the twentieth century they became of increasingly great importance to some of our large-scale industries. The expansion of industry called for ever increasing stocks of raw materials, many of which could not be procured at home. The phenomenal increase in surplus capital meant, so some said, that the country was becoming financially "saturated." Foreign outlets were necessary as fields of investment. In other words, the time had become ripe for an imperial policy. Though haltingly, the state has responded, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean area. An American empire has become a fact; and it will in all probability become a more im-

ssive fact as time goes on. Even now the United States rules
er an extraterritorial area approximating 1,000,000 square miles,
h a population of more than 21,000,000.

Imperialism in historical perspective.—Thus far the discussion
s been mainly confined to a consideration of the roots of imperial-
t—to the forces and human interests that have furnished the
mendous drive behind the movement. It is evident that its
ts run deep into the economic and political life of modern society.
n in perspective, the facts presented may serve to clarify the
ject by reducing it to simple terms. What seems to have hap-
ped is this: beginning in the Middle Ages, Western society lived
der a type of economy in which the economic energy of the com-
nity was totally absorbed in a narrow locale from which it drew
ctically the whole support of its poverty-ridden existence. Then
ard the close of the period, and particularly in the opening cen-
ies of the modern era, commerce entered as an important factor in
nomic life; and as a result new desires took possession of certain
sses of society, desires which could no longer be satisfied within
narrow limits of the local environment. Thus society reached
eyond intervening continents and seas to obtain the materials
ch would enrich life and satisfy new human longings. Then
e the machines as a kind of savior of populations many times
ltiplied. With material betterment and human comfort as a
ninant ideal, the new industrial society accepted the idea that
nomic progress means expansion—production and ever more
duction—with, incidentally, profits and ever greater profits.
ustry must go on; to stand still meant to go back. Such an
ensification of industry, with its rich and ever more elaborate
put, must needs draw for the materials that feed the machines
l for markets to consume the product not on a local environment
on the producing country but upon every corner of the globe.
us modern imperialism in its final essence is an incident in an
ormous industrial expansion. This is, to be sure, an over-
simplification, yet it contains the kernel of an essential truth about
perialism.

HOW THE IMPERIALISTS ACQUIRED NEW LANDS

The fields of modern imperialism.—The fields of the old im-
ialism were for the most part confined to the Americas, southern

Asia, and the islands of the sea, particularly the islands of the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean. When the new desire for territory seized the industrial countries, Africa, all but untouched in the earlier period, became a major field for exploitation. China and Turkey were added as imperialist prizes also, together with islands here and there which had remained free or had become free through the disintegration of the old Portuguese and Spanish empires. To these areas must be added those of Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central and South America, which have become largely an outlet for American loans and investments.

All these areas caught the attention of the imperialists because they possessed products more or less valuable, and in some cases indispensable, to the Western industrial nations. In the eyes of the imperialists here was great wealth not being utilized by societies. And much of it was unutilized, for in many of these regions the inhabitants had not reached a stage of culture in which either the desire or the capacity to develop their resources was present. Economically they were "backward" peoples. In the second place, these lands were affected in varying degrees by political instability and weakness—they had not developed "strong" governments; they were unable to maintain order; they lacked both the science and the wealth necessary to produce military strength comparable with that of the European states. Here then were lands displaying alluring wealth and opportunities for Western enterprise to be had by those who dared to put out their hands to take them; and there existed no governments sufficiently strong to prevent. To all profit-seeking Europeans such regions looked like a kind of imperialist's paradise.

Although these lands possessed more or less in common, the characteristics mentioned above, yet they obviously differed widely in some other particulars. There is little that is comparable between the tribal lands of a South African king and the highly civilized land of China with its hundreds of millions of inhabitants, between the power of a South African king and that of the sultan of Morocco. When it comes to the question of procedure in acquiring possessions and power in these widely varying territories, it is clear that the imperialist's technique would have to be suited to prevailing conditions. The fact is that the methods used differ so widely that it will be impossible here to do more than suggest a few of the typical procedures.

Methods used in Central and South Africa.—Let us consider the case of Central and South Africa, where political organization had not yet advanced to the creation of national states, and where the population comprised hundreds of separate tribes occupying separate lands under separate chiefs or kings. Sometimes these tribal lands were taken outright by soldiers sent out by the exploiting country, or by the private soldiers of a European company. Usually such direct and ruthless methods were excused on the ground of some overt act committed by natives, such as an attack upon the white intruders by tribes who resented the white man's invasion. A more common procedure was that of organizing a private company which proceeded to send a body of explorers into Africa with instructions to obtain title to lands by entering into treaties with the chiefs. The chief, ignorant of the ways of the white man, ignorant of the language in which the treaty was written, and not infrequently put into receptive mood by gifts and the white man's liquors, was induced to part with the tribal possessions for more or less trifling considerations. Henry M. Stanley, the great explorer, acting as agent for the Committee of the Upper Congo, secured for the Committee a vast region in central Africa, nearly one million square miles, the right of possession, as Stanley viewed the transaction, being based upon some four hundred and fifty separate treaties. The considerations entering into one of these treaties will make the matter concrete. In one case sovereignty and possession was passed to the Company by a tribal chief who received as compensation "one coat of red cloth with gold facings, one red cap, one white tunic, one piece of white baft, one piece of dpoint, one dozen boxes of liquors, four demijohns of rum, two boxes of gin, one hundred twenty-eight bottles of Holland gin, twenty pieces of red handkerchiefs, forty singlets, and forty cotton caps." Stanley's treaties were typical of many that figured in the transfer of African lands. In other cases the compensation took the form of money payments or gifts of firearms and ammunition or promises of protection to a tribal ruler against hostile rulers of neighboring tribes.

Lands so acquired were usually governed and exploited by a private company under a charter obtained from the home government. Commonly, because the company found itself unable to defend its holdings or to finance the project, the land was turned over to the government for a consideration. Under the government it fre-

quently became a protectorate, or it might be annexed. Still another procedure was for a nation to acquire in some region a virtual monopoly in all economic exploitation except commerce. This was called a "sphere of influence." Spheres of influence might be acquired by agreements among the European nations without knowledge of the natives concerned, or by treaties entered into with native chiefs. Such arrangements were usually the early steps in the process of establishing protectorates, which carried political as well as economic dominance, or of effecting out-and-out annexation.

Methods used in North Africa.—Such were some of the methods followed in South and Central Africa. In North Africa—in Morocco, Tunis, and Egypt—and in certain other Mohammedan lands, the technique was of another sort. This region, once a part of the medieval empire of the Arabians, later conquered in large part by the Turks, was divided into a number of semi-oriental despotisms. Though their civilization was advanced in some respects, political and economic weakness made them an easy prey for the European nations. The princes who ruled usually enjoyed supreme authority as they were able to enforce by physical means against the turbulent chiefs. Politically they were therefore unstable, subject at any time to uprisings. Economically, too, these countries were weak; the ruling princes were chronically in need of money, and there was little wealth to tax for revenue, inasmuch as their rich natural resources were largely undeveloped. Upon this potential wealth certain European nations cast longing eyes. All these circumstances combined supplied both the lure and the opportunity for imperialist groups and governments.

The opening wedge was usually made by private companies through a process of economic penetration. That is to say, the companies obtained concessions from the ruler to exploit agricultural or mineral lands or to build railroads or other public works, and investment bankers extended to him much needed loans. These concessions created an economic stake in the country to be safeguarded in case of difficulty. And the difficulty was frequently supplied by the ruler's financial dealings with the European investors. Loans made at exceedingly high rates called for interest payments which the ruler attempted to obtain by heavier taxation. Heavier taxation frequently brought a revolt of his subjects. To put down the revolts he needed more loans, and the more he borrowed the greater became the stake of the white intruders, and the

water the danger to their investments. When European governments intervened, as they did, to straighten out the financial tangle and to safeguard their nationals, it was only a matter of time until it was found necessary for them to set up protectorates by force. Such was the procedure, with minor variations, which carried France into Tunis and Morocco, Britain into Egypt, Italy into Tripoli, and Russia into Persia.

The procedure followed in Turkey and China by the European powers, and by the United States in the Pacific, the Caribbean, and other parts of Latin America, would involve us in complications of detail beyond the scope of this brief treatment of the subject. The illustrations given will afford some conception of the spirit and the process of modern imperialism. The process has been successful during the whole modern period—so far as the acquisition of territory and power is concerned, for at present more than half the area of the entire globe has been brought more or less completely under the authority of the imperialist countries.

HOW THE IMPERIALISTS EXPLOIT THEIR POSSESSIONS

Extension of Western technology to backward countries.—When we discuss methods of exploiting the wealth of imperial possessions, we should recall what was said at the opening of this chapter. From a broadly social point of view, what is happening under imperialism is the enrichment of the material life of society. From the point of view of the individual exploiter, what is happening is the enrichment of his own financial returns. He is interested in possession and authority in these lands as a means to an end; the end is commonly the opportunity to make profits. He wants gold, diamonds, copper, tin, lead, chromium, mica, manganese, fertilizers, cotton, hemp, wool, tea, rubber, ivory, palm oil, petroleum, grains, spices, fruits, and scores of other things. It is the backwardness of the peoples possessing these things that gives the imperialist undeveloped or even virgin fields in which to operate. Many of these products he could not get—at least in sufficient quantity—by a policy of permitting the natives to gather or produce them, because they lack the knowledge and technical equipment to do it.

What the exploiter does, therefore, is to carry his technology with him to the spot, and apply it with such modifications as circumstances impose. He introduces his productive paraphernalia—

science and machines—and the methods of the West amid strange surroundings. Furthermore, to utilize the resources, he finds it necessary to engage in numerous public works; he improves rivers and harbors for navigation; constructs highways and bridges, roads, telegraph and telephone lines; establishes banks and post offices. These modern facilities are doubly profitable when they are introduced into countries like China, India, and Turkey, where their construction has meant the purchase of materials in the exploiting country to be paid for in part by the country exploited. In countries like South and Central Africa where the natives have little or nothing to give, the expense often falls upon the taxpayer at home. It is obvious, however, that the introduction of Western technology into countries that are less advanced economically will ultimately result in material enrichment.

Labor problems in exploiting backward countries.—In countries where economic development is most retarded, as in Central and South Africa, another serious problem exists. Among the natives there generally, the concept of labor as an obligation did not exist before the white man came. Such a concept found no lodgment in their traditions. There was largely a collection economy, but not wholly so, for there was in some regions a considerable amount of cultivation, handicraft, and trade. Material needs, however, were simple, and nature furnished most of what was needed without much labor. Nor did money compensation for regular hours of labor present any particular lure for the native. He had not generally experienced the need of it. Here then was the problem: white labor did not exist in sufficient quantity to meet the demands of the exploiter; in many cases the white appeared to be unsuited to work under the climatic conditions; methods must be devised therefore to induce the native to submit to regularized employment, as he had never done before. With few legal hindrances to check him the imperialist found himself, particularly in the earlier years, fairly free to use any procedure which he found efficacious. The result was much inhuman and brutal treatment of the helpless natives.

To the credit of imperialism in Africa it may be said that slavery which had flourished there down to the closing decades of the nineteenth century, was almost completely abolished as a result of extended and vigorous methods of suppression. To the discredit of imperialism it must likewise be said that it imposed upon the

African blacks a system of forced labor that in some instances was little removed from slavery itself. Native labor has been "forced" by various ingenious methods. In the Congo Free State the natives were deprived of the lands upon which they had earlier subsisted, and upon each native village was imposed the delivery of a stipulated amount of rubber, ivory, or food to the agents of the Association of the Congo or of concessionaire companies. Failure to deliver the stipulated amounts brought the most severe punishment—flogging, maiming; the killing of men, women, and children; the burning of villages; the taking of women and children as hostages. Another method was that of inducing natives to enter into long-term labor contracts, the laborers sometimes being brought from distant points and held under strict authority.

The use of taxation was a more common practice. Raw materials might be obtained by the laying of taxes in kind upon the natives; or the obligation might be in the form of a poll tax under which the native was compelled to give so much labor a year to public works of various kinds. Again, he might be forced to show that he had been employed by whites so much time each year; and failing to prove this, he was under the law forced to accept labor at a wage. Since money was not primarily a lure to the native, one effective method was found to be that of imposing a tax to be paid in money upon the heads of the natives; in order to be able to pay the tax, the native was forced to some gainful occupation for at least a part of the year.

Most of the policies thus far described gave little or no attention to the preservation of native economy. That is to say, the natives were deprived of their lands and opportunities for subsistence, and thus reduced to more or less complete dependence upon the white man. He preached the gospel of work as a means of raising what he regarded as a biologically inferior species of the human race to a higher and more acceptable stage in his development. As factors in his quest for profits, the imperialist treated the natives as part of the mechanism of his gold mill. His was essentially a dehumanized process.

Of late years a reaction has set in against such treatment that has mitigated the inhumanity of the white man's practices in some parts of Africa. Spurred on in part by the protests of certain conscience-ridden groups and individuals, home and colonial governments have intervened through legislative enactments for the protection of natives. In the inauguration of more enlightened and humane

policies Great Britain has, on the whole, led the way. The new idea is to preserve as much of the native economy as practicable. The native is permitted to retain his lands, and is encouraged to gather the native products or to utilize the soil for agriculture, the fruits of his labor being sold to the white man at a fair price. In certain parts of Africa the British have used this method with excellent results both to the native and to themselves financially. At present the procedure is applicable, with satisfactory results, to the collecting of certain natural products and to products requiring more simple cultivation. As the natives gradually acquire more of the Western technique in agriculture, the British policy will probably be more widely extended.

Imperialism and the spread of Western culture.—Our brief sketch of imperialism in action will clear up statements made incidentally earlier in this book, that the imperialist process is carrying Western culture over the world. By his use of certain features of Western political machinery to bring and hold subject communities in control, the imperialist is introducing backward peoples to phases of modern government, both good and bad. In the extension of Western technology and its products, he is teaching the elements of modern economy. Along with these political and economic practices of the West, imperialism is incidentally introducing countless items of Western civilization touching such matters as religion, morals, vices, education, customs of dress, amusements, and the like. The tendency over the whole globe is toward a greater degree of homogeneity than has ever existed before. Thus these affected regions are now in a state of transition, with all of the advantages and evils that transition involves. The student evaluates these "civilizing" agencies with reservations. Perhaps he is unduly influenced by the conviction that such as they are, these "gifts" of civilization are largely by-products of the imperialist's pursuit of material gain. Nevertheless, the facts do lend a measure of truth to the appealing popular picture of the imperialist struggling under the "white man's burden," in his high mission of carrying civilization to the dark corners of the earth.

A CRITICAL VIEW OF IMPERIALISM

Imperialism is still powerful in the world today. It represents a system of rationalized beliefs and practices accepted by those in

high places as the road to national prosperity. It fits consistently into an age of rampant nationalism and materialism. It carries the fierce competitive spirit of the modern industrial world into the field of international relations. It is mercantilism over again in slightly altered form. In a world economically interdependent it sets up as its ideal the mercantilist goal of the self-sufficing state. To such lengths has the idea progressed that the whole globe, particularly since the World War, presents a picture of rival and antagonistic states digging themselves in behind high tariff barriers both at home and to a considerable degree in their colonies. In a distracted world where the fundamental need is a reasonable freedom to buy and sell according to the economic requirements of each, states wage a bitter economic war against one another that contributes heavily to the strangulation of international trade and the stagnation of economic life. The nations that have no colonial empire have caught the contagion of economic nationalism and are following the lead of the great Powers. Against this background, it becomes clear that imperialism is playing a double rôle in modern economy. It has contributed to a world economy by spinning a web of commercial threads between the industrial countries and the undeveloped areas of the globe. At the same time imperialist policies present the most formidable obstacles to the harmonious operation of an international economic order.

Imperialism and international peace.—Imperialism is an expression of nationalism flowing in economic channels—an aspect of economic nationalism. In the nineteenth century the highest moral implication of nationalism was the right of nations to order their own lives according to their own desires and interests as they conceived them. Accordingly, patriotism was invoked to achieve and maintain liberty and independence. Under imperialist practices nationalism and patriotism are invoked in enterprises that deprive other weaker peoples of liberty and independence. It is this fact that has led some to speak of imperialism as a perversion of nationalism. Thus the imperialist world presents the spectacle of three hundred million people in India, heirs to an ancient civilization, in active revolt against Great Britain; of Arabians in Syria in a state of smoldering discontent against France; and of the inhabitants of the Philippines pressing hard against the American government for liberty and independence. There are many other focal points of disturbance in the imperialist world.

Under such circumstances lasting peace becomes a mirage. Conflict on a small scale between imperialist countries and their subject peoples is going on almost perpetually. A greater menace to international peace¹ lies in the rivalry among the imperialist states for the choice areas of the globe, a rivalry that becomes dangerous because of the inherent tendency of imperialism toward exclusion and monopoly both at home and in colonial possessions. Ill feeling and international friction are the inevitable result. In such an atmosphere the imperialist states are drawn to the conviction that in the last analysis success in imperial ventures depends upon physical power; hence they vie with one another for superiority on land and sea. Soldiers and battleships are multiplied until the cost of armaments lays a crushing burden upon the taxpayers. Nor does the evil end there; to augment their power still further they enter into what are termed defensive alliances, which, in reality, are all too frequently designed to insure success in imperialist ambitions. Such calculations were of major importance in the creation both of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente in the pre-war period. Thus colonial commercial interests have become intimately bound up with militarism, navalism, and war. States have been brought to the verge of war several times by intense colonial rivalries—the French and British in the Sudan in 1898, the French and Germans in Morocco in 1905 and 1911. Every international war during the last forty years has had its roots largely in imperialism.

Such are some of the weighty costs, moral and material, that must be marked up against imperialism. One is led to inquire whether the advantages enjoyed under imperialism by Western society compensate for its costs. Where the economist is not convinced that they do not, he at least has serious doubts on the question. An adequate discussion of this phase of the subject leads into a labyrinth of statistical data. We shall have to be content with a few statements of conclusions that writers have drawn from the evidence available.

Economic returns of imperialism.—Imperialists emphasize the great importance of colonial markets and the control of raw materials to the industrial nations. There can be no doubt about markets; colonial markets are of great importance in international trade, and they are growing more so as the backward countries advance in economic development. But does imperialism determine

¹See pp. 564-567.

the distribution of colonial trade among the imperialist countries? In other words, does possession and the opportunity to manipulate colonial tariffs determine who shall enjoy colonial markets? Economists point out that answers to that question, based upon trade statistics, are strikingly contradictory. By manipulating tariffs in their colonial possessions some countries have apparently obtained the lion's share of the trade, but in many other cases they have failed to get as much of the trade of their own colonies as is enjoyed by other countries. Geographic factors, freight rates, and other considerations often prevail against the supposed advantages of possession and tariff preferences, in determining the direction of commerce. And what is said here concerning markets holds essentially true when one considers the advantage of colonies as sources of raw materials. In the first place, no state can acquire possession of enough of the world's resources to make itself self-sufficient; and in the second place, the possession of sources and the control of colonial tariffs has by no means guaranteed to the possessors the full enjoyment of the raw materials of their colonies. It would be interesting to know just how much the imperialists would lose in colonial trade and raw materials if colonies were thrown open to the commerce of the world. In all probability, far less than they think. The emigration of trained men to other countries is an undoubted economic loss to the motherland—and also to her available manpower for military purposes, but the argument that the possession of colonies prevents this loss is unsound. Few Germans could be induced to go to the German colonies while Germany had colonies; no appreciable number of Frenchmen have been persuaded to go to the French North African empire, or Italians to Tripoli, or Japanese to Manchuria. Few men are willing to confess that they belong to the "excess population"; most prefer to cleave to the country of their birth, or, if they must leave, prefer the older settled countries to the new.

Another pertinent question in evaluating imperialism is this: Granted that direct investors may make handsome profits out of imperialist enterprise, can the same be said of the nation as a whole? Do the profits of investment bankers, planters, mining and oil corporations trickle down to the masses who have no direct stake in imperialistic exploitation? An extreme answer to the question is to say that the nation affords the protection and pays the expenses, and the individual exploiters and stockholders receive the profits.

Such an answer has a kernel of truth, but it does not suffice. Profits to individuals do affect the economic well-being of the common man to some slight degree. Just how much is an intricate problem for the economist to decide.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF IMPERIALISM

What is to be done about imperialism? Should the imperialist states use their authority to abolish it? They could not do it if they desired; and it would probably be unwise if they could. Modern industrial and commercial expansion is a force of such tremendous power that it is out of the question to confine it. Local areas and national areas have long ceased, as we have seen, to suffice the economic needs of modern society; it is not justifiable that certain backward peoples should be permitted to fence off products indispensable to that society. The question is: How can imperialist practices be shorn of their evils, so that all peoples may enjoy the fruits of the earth without the risks and wrongs bound up with present practices? The solution that at present seems to offer the best chances of some success is that of international control. If an international control could be so designed as to protect the exploited peoples on the one hand, and to compose the dangerous rivalries of the imperialist states on the other, by providing for a distribution of markets and raw materials on some equitable basis, then the problem would be solved in some of its most important aspects. Some half-hearted attempts have been made in this direction under the authority of the League of Nations, but little has been accomplished thus far. That such a solution is the only one that can hope to succeed is clear, since the problem of imperialism is above all an international one. If a satisfactory international solution is effected, imperialism will cease to be—at least the thing which we now call imperialism.

The failure of the imperialist states to effect an international solution of this sort will mean ultimately the abolition of the practice through the action of the exploited peoples themselves. The most significant consequence of imperialism is the steady "westernizing" of its victims. Subject peoples are everywhere learning the tricks of their masters. In general, wherever the white man goes he carries his economic technique with him, his conception of law, his political practices. And it is these very things, particularly his economic supremacy, that have made him superior in power and enabled him

to enforce his will among backward peoples. Once they learn his ways the awakening gradually begins. Disunited or discordant communities are slowly welded together by a national consciousness and a nationalist emotional drive; the white man's military technique is introduced; and out of a feebleness and helplessness prevailing hitherto is born a new strength to be used to thrust out the conqueror. This is not a fanciful picture. The evolution is now recording itself in history. By a remarkably rapid adoption of Western ways Japan closed her doors on the imperialist at the very hour of his contemplated entrance. China, slower to act, became a victim, first of the European Powers, then of Japan. The grip of the European countries has already been greatly weakened; and despite the imposing force with which Japan has established herself in Chinese territory, it is hardly conceivable that she will be able to maintain her position permanently against four hundred million Chinese among whom the signs of an awakening nationalism have become clearly discernible during recent years. Most spectacular of all is the stirring of nationalism in India after centuries of subjection to British power. In Africa the end of imperialism will be delayed, but there is no reason to believe that the ultimate result will not be the same.

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PART V

THE DESCENT OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

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CHAPTER XXIV

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: THE STATE

WHAT is the fundamental social need that has brought political institutions into existence? At the risk of over-simplification of a rather vague term one might say that the political function is essentially an adjustment function. In human society there is an ever-present need for some systematic method of making adjustments in human relationships, and the more highly developed the society the greater the need. One might conceive of a community of human beings in which all live in amicable accord, with full knowledge of how to live a perfect social life, and a willingness to live it. We would then have what Herbert Spencer called a "state of perfect equilibrium," and there would be no adjustment problems to attend to. But it is hardly necessary to say that human societies known in history have never reached such a state of perfection, and there seems to be little prospect of their doing so in the near future.

The inclusive nature of political functions.—In a fairly simple society problems of this nature may be so unimportant that there would be no need for special institutional arrangements to meet them. This is said to be true of certain Eskimo tribes, but it is not true of groups that have developed complicated social structures, or those that have made much progress in the arts of civilization. With them there are constantly recurring problems arising from maladjustments that come from conflicting interests of individuals and groups within the community, and from conflicting interests with other communities. Perhaps it is because problems of this nature are constantly recurring that institutions evolve which take over the task of settling them in some systematic and orderly way. At any rate such institutions do arise. When the problems are such as to affect the entire community, actually or potentially, the institutions that take them over are said to be dealing with matters of common interest, or general welfare. These are the ones that have come to

be known as political institutions. Thus, there are institutions for common defense against hostile attacks from without, others to keep the peace and maintain general order within the community, others to formulate rules of conduct for the group as a whole; still others, or perhaps the same ones, to see that they are enforced, and so on. Generally speaking, they are those social institutions that are primarily concerned with the maintenance of order and the general welfare of a community through the regulation and control of the external relations of its members.

The political function is thus not only negative in character but positive as well. It involves not only the imposition of restraints to keep the peace, but positive efforts looking toward the general good of the community. It may affect any aspect of individual or social life—whether it be economic, religious, or domestic in character—whenever such activities develop problems of general concern. The problem which faces the farmer of disposing of wheat at a fair price is economic in nature; it becomes political also when the rest of the community becomes seriously affected. Again, the steel manufacturer's problem of selling his produce at a fair profit is economic; but it is also political if the maintenance of steel factories is threatened and the community as a whole thus affected. In either case political institutions would be expected to intervene, not to aid the farmer or steel manufacturer primarily, but to see to it that the general welfare did not suffer from an economic maladjustment. Just when such problems become matters of general concern is necessarily a matter of opinion. Perhaps the best we can do is to remember that the political institutions themselves decide the question, and that, in common with all other institutions, they do sometimes get into fields that are only indirectly related to their primary functions.

THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The actual beginnings of political institutions will probably never be known. All we do know is that they were present in well-developed forms at the dawn of history and have persisted up to the present. In the absence of actual knowledge of political origin various beliefs about the matter have prevailed from time to time—beliefs which became convictions and had so potent an influence in shaping political institutions that they cannot be ignored. Some of these will be described.

Divine right.—First may be considered the Theory of Divine origins. The prevailing idea during the Middle Ages, and for some time after, was that political institutions were express creations of God. This theory fitted into the picture of special creation as related in the Biblical account of the creation of man. It was first advanced by secular princes in opposition to papal claims of supremacy in temporal matters. According to their conception of the divine plan, two powers were set up on earth, one spiritual, the other temporal. The Church ruled in the realm of the spiritual; the princes ruled in the temporal world. Each had a separate existence and was expressly created by divine fiat. Later on, the princes found the theory extremely useful in resisting the claims of their subjects to a share in political authority. Here the theory of divine origin was supplemented by the theory of divine right to rule. Thus not only was political authority divinely created but the princes themselves were divinely ordained to exercise it; hence revolt was regarded as a sin against God. The theory was of tremendous importance for centuries not only in assisting in the development of the modern state but in maintaining the autocratic rulers of the day.

The compact theory.—When opposition to the divine right of kings appeared in the eighteenth century, a counter theory was presented as an instrument to break down the earlier political order. This is known as the compact theory. The compact theory attributed the origin of political society to a formal agreement among men. Political institutions, it was asserted, were purely artificial mechanisms created by man himself to serve his own ends, and entirely devoid of the sacrosanct character claimed for them by the divine-right theorists. This theory of the contractual origin of the state was developed in various ways, but it was always predicated on the assumption that there existed, before political control appeared, an original state of nature, in which all men possessed complete freedom to do as they pleased and to defend their rights and interests as best they could against the rest of mankind. Sometimes the state of nature was pictured as a condition of continuous, potential, or actual warfare; sometimes as one of reasonable contentment. But it had obvious inconveniences, to say the least, which any rational man could see; and man, being a rational animal, invented political society as an improvement. The procedure was simple. Each gave up his natural right to do as he pleased and agreed with all others to set up a political authority which all

promised to obey, in return for which they received protection and security. This, according to the theory, was the original compact creating political society. To it was usually added another in which men covenanted with some particular person or persons to exercise the political authority created by the first contract. This was known as the governmental compact.

A fairy story? Perhaps. None the less, it was for some time generally believed to be the true account of political origins. It was the dogma upon which all popular governments of modern times have been erected. If political power came originally from the people, government by consent of the governed seemed the logical conclusion. But other implications were equally possible, for much depended on the nature of the compact the people were supposed to have entered into. For instance, Thomas Hobbes, writing in England during the turbulent days of the Puritan revolution of the seventeenth century, insisted in a notable work, *The Great Leviathan*, that the people by divesting themselves of their original rights and establishing political authority which they promised to obey, were perpetually bound to obedience, and were morally bound not to resort to revolution. He thus sought to persuade the discontented to accept the blessings of law and order as preferable to revolution and anarchy. Later in the same century the philosopher John Locke, in his *Two Treatises on Government*, invoked the compact theory to justify revolution. As he interpreted it, political power was established for the limited purposes of protecting the lives and property of the people, and all other rights possessed by man in the state of nature were left undisturbed. When, therefore, government exceeded the limited purposes for which it had been created, the compact was broken and the people were free to enter into new arrangements.

Locke's interpretation of the compact theory had a deep influence upon his time and the revolutionary period that followed in the eighteenth century. What he did was to rationalize the right of revolution. He is known as the philosopher of the "bloodless Revolution of 1688 in England, which resulted in the establishment of parliamentary supremacy, and settled forever, so far as England was concerned, the pretensions of divine right and absolutism. His doctrine was likewise generally accepted in America, where it became the theoretical basis for the revolt against England in 1775 and where it found clear expression in its essentials in the *Declaration*

Independence, and contributed to the idea of limited government which became imbedded in our constitutional system. It likewise influenced the revolutionary philosophy of revolt which became current preceding the outbreak of the great French Revolution of 1789, as indicated earlier in this work.

That influence was most potent upon the French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau, who presented still another conception of the social compact in a celebrated work *The Social Contract*. He agreed with Hobbes that in entering into the covenant to establish political society man gave up all his natural rights, and obtained in return political security in a political society; but the exchange of natural rights for political security was made only on condition that all should share in the political power thus established. His conclusion was that all governments in which the people do not participate are illegitimate—popular sovereignty is the only justifiable basis for any political society. Along with Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau is given a place among the trilogy of writers who are, by common consent, recognized as the greatest exponents of the compact theory. The writings of these three men are the classics of the political literature of this type.

The force theory.—A third explanation of the origin of political institutions is called the force theory. The force theory repudiates both the idea of divine right and that of the social compact, and insists that force, and force alone, explains the way in which governments arose. No extended explanation of the meaning of this theory is necessary. Among the writers who have held this view was Bodin, a great French jurist of the sixteenth century, who did much to clarify the meaning and nature of the modern state. His conception was that there existed in primitive society heads of households who ruled the family members in a patriarchal hegemony. Some powerful head then subjected weaker household heads to his control and thus built up political power. Bodin's contribution to our knowledge of the method by which the French state had developed, and what we have learned of the beginnings of some other of the modern states would lend some credence to the idea that political origins can thus be explained.

Evolution.—Modern studies of social institutions, however, have led to a very general rejection of all these theories as being only in part true, if true at all. The current opinion seems to be that all social institutions result from slow processes of change from simple

social structures that were, in earlier times, mixtures of religious, economic, and other elements. This conception fits into the widely accepted view of evolution in the animal world and the facts of institutional development as revealed in history. It accepts the idea that the factors mentioned in the foregoing theories may have had part in the process. However, it seems very unlikely that man played any conscious part in the origins of political institutions, although he has, in the process of their development, deliberately reshaped them at times in order to make them serve his purposes more effectively.

WHAT IS A STATE?

The complex civilization in which we live today includes many highly developed agencies that serve political purposes. There are institutions of legislation, which formulate general rules for the governing of society; institutions of administration that get the rules enforced; the courts, which settle disputes and administer justice in general; political parties; and a host of others that might be mentioned. Any analysis of these institutions would present a bewildering task were it not for the fact that practically all of them are included in what are known as governmental agencies; and most of these are part of, or directly related to, one great, basic political association called the state. The easiest approach, therefore, to the study of political institutions is through an examination of the state, for only after one has a clear conception of its nature can the others be properly understood.

Sufficient has been said in preceding chapters to make it clear that definitions are always relative to the point of view of the person attempting them. This is certainly true of the state, which has such a variety of aspects that many definitions may be, and have been formulated, each with a certain validity. With this precautionary statement, we may accept Professor Garner's definition as being most satisfactory for our present purposes. It is as follows: "A state . . . is a community of persons more or less numerous permanently occupying a definite territory, independent, or nearly so, of external control, and possessing organized government to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience." This statement describes with sufficient accuracy the nature of the

¹J. W. Garner, *Political Science and Government*, American Book Co., 1928, 1932, p. 52.

fty-odd political communities into which the modern world is divided. It includes the following elements: people, territory, government, permanence, independence, and sovereignty.

Physical attributes of the state.—Of the first two physical elements of the state little need be said. It is obvious that people must be included, and the number is not a matter of importance. States have varied, and do vary, in population from a few thousand, as in the little state of Monaco, to world-wide empires of many millions. Whether small, homogeneous states are more desirable than larger ones, or even a world state, involves interesting speculations into which we need not enter here. As to territory, the better view seems to conform to our definition, which demands a fixed abode for the state, although nomadic tribes that are independent and have effective government are considered states by some writers.

The third important element in the state is government. By government is meant the organized machinery through which the state expresses its authoritative judgments and gets them enforced. It is not different in kind from similar machinery found in other social institutions; but, in common with them, the state must possess some organization or it could not survive. It is just as essential to the state as is the physical body to the individual. There is thus a distinction between the state and its government which should always be kept clear, although the two are often confused. The distinction is important because it would be very misleading to attribute characteristics of the state to the government of the state, and in some instances it would be fatal to an understanding of the nature of either. The relation between the state and the government can best be illustrated perhaps, by reference to a business corporation. The corporation is the entire association of stockholders, officers, agents, *et al.*, organized for certain business purposes. We use the term "corporation" to apply to the entire aggregate, which has an identity of its own as a group, just as we use the term "state" to apply to the political aggregate. The organization of the corporation may consist of a board of directors, a president, and other officers of the group, just as does the government in the state. But just as it would be improper to speak of the board of directors, or the president, as being the corporation, so is it improper to refer to the government as the state. It is merely the physical agency through which the state gets its work done.

Consideration of another aspect of the state—that of permanence

—will also help to show more clearly the difference between state and government. It is true that the state could not exist long without some form of government; but the government may change, may even be changed completely, without disturbing the state. The Revolution in France at the close of the eighteenth century transformed the French government completely from a monarchy to a long succession of other types, but the state of France was not destroyed. It remained, and remains today, under the French Republic. Even so drastic a revolution as that in Russia in 1917 changed merely the governmental machine of the Russian state. The state therefore is a permanent thing, while governments are constantly changing. Permanence, however, does not mean perpetuity. A state may be destroyed by conquest, by absorption into another state, by voluntary annexation to another state, and in various other ways.

State independence.—Independence is another requisite element of the state. A group of persons living in a given territory with a government of their own may still fall short of being a state because they do not possess independence from external control. Villages, counties, cities, and other local governmental areas therefore, are not states; for local autonomy does not constitute independence. Actually such local units may enjoy the greatest measure of control over their own affairs, but if there exists an outside authority that can interfere legally—can legally put an end to their local self-government, then they cannot be said to have the quality of independence all states must have. On the other hand, some communities that are formally recognized as states do not possess complete freedom from external political control. For example, Cuba is recognized as an independent state by all the political powers of the world; and yet, by virtue of a treaty with the United States, the latter has the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of Cuba under certain circumstances. In instances such as this, the degree of external control is not considered sufficiently great to destroy the status of statehood.

From what has been said it should be clear that such units in our government as Ohio, Kentucky, etc., are not to be considered as states in the strict sense, although they are called such. The powers that these units exercise are not determined by them but by the Constitution of the United States. The reasons why they are called states are largely historical. Before the adoption of the Constitu-

on, in 1789, they were independent states in the real sense, and even after they were merged into the federal union created by the constitution they continued to use the term even though they had lost the attributes of statehood. Similar reasons explain why in the German Empire, before the World War, local units such as Bavaria and Saxony were called states.

State sovereignty.—We now come to the last and most vital characteristic of the state—sovereignty. Sovereignty is not merely power which the state exerts over its members. All human associations exert power over their members, as long as they are members. The head of a family exerts authority within the family; an economic institution does likewise over its members. By sovereignty of the state we refer to the supreme, coercive authority which is attributed to the state alone, and which is its real essence. It differs from other forms of authority, as found in other institutions, in several important respects. In the first place, sovereignty implies supremacy in that no human authority is recognized above it, either from within or from outside the territory of the state. In other words, it implies practical independence from external authority; it also implies that there is no equal or competing authority within the state. In this respect the state recognizes no rivals. Sovereignty is also said to be unlimited in the scope of its authority over individuals and groups within the state; invisible, for, being ultimate and supreme, its very nature does not permit of division; inalienable, for to part with it would be to lose it altogether; and territorially exclusive, in that it reaches all persons and things within the area of the state. It is even thought by some to be infallible. From such terms as these does one get an idea of the nature of this most essential feature of the modern state. Indeed, as one reads the literature about sovereignty, one might well experience a sense of dizziness trying to comprehend its impressive omnipotence.

Legal and political sovereignty distinguished.—One need not be too over-awed, however, if one will recall that the term “sovereignty” was an invention of the lawyers, and was intended to describe something quite definite. Looking at the state as a political institution we have seen that it has its own peculiar duties or functions. These include the duty of determining formal rules of conduct that shall apply generally throughout the region of the state’s jurisdiction. They are called laws and represent the expressed

will of the community. Manifestly there must be, somewhere within the state, a definite human agency, some person or group of persons with recognized authority to say the final word as to what the law shall be. This agency may be a king, a parliament, a constitutional convention, or any other definite group or groups; but the authority to act for the community must be recognized as final. Every political state has some such authoritative source of law. It is called the legal sovereign, and the power it possesses is called legal sovereignty. The task of trying to locate the legal sovereign in any particular state is sometimes difficult, but it can be done. In England, for instance, it is clearly the parliament; in the United States, it is the aggregate of legislatures or constitutional conventions which, together with Congress, can amend the Constitution.

The term "sovereignty," however, is not used exclusively in this legal sense. It is often used to indicate the basic political controls that lie back of the legal sovereign and influence its action. For instance, it has been said that Parliament in England is the legal sovereign because it has ultimate authority to make and change the law at will. But Parliament, or more strictly speaking the House of Commons,¹ is elected by popular vote, and the voters thus have control over their sovereign, Parliament. In the United States the organs of government that share in the power to amend the Constitution exercise legal sovereignty, but they in turn are elective and are thus amenable to the voters. In either case, therefore, it may be said that the voters can determine what the fundamental law shall be by the control which they have over the political organs that make it. It is this power that is called political sovereignty as distinguished from legal sovereignty; it is also called popular sovereignty, or the sovereignty of the "people." It would be possible of course to combine the two. For instance, if the voters actually made the fundamental law, as they do in some of our local "states," they would be exercising legal sovereignty.

Legal sovereignty and political sovereignty are thus not two conflicting ideas. They refer to two distinctly different kinds of things, and both ideas are entirely legitimate. But when we see that, in states democratically organized, the people can control their legal sovereign, much of its omnipotence disappears. It is apparent that it is ultimate and supreme only in terms of law. In the broader

¹The English parliament is composed of two houses, but the upper, the House of Lords, has been shorn of most of its power over public legislation.

political sense it is the people, and particularly the voters, that possess the ultimate supremacy.

Finally, it should be remembered that the people themselves are constantly subjected to thousands of pressures that determine their action and their ideas. These are geographical, biological, or social in nature. They are constantly conditioning the conduct of political as well as all other social institutions. But they are so changeable, intermixed, and so elusive that we are soon lost in a maze when we try to trace the original sources of control in political life. And after all is said, it remains true that these forces, however important they may be, have no legal recognition. If they are to have influence in determining what the law shall be, they must always be exerted through the recognized legal channels—that is, through the legal sovereign.

Sovereignty and international relations.—One important aspect of sovereignty, which will receive more detailed treatment in a later chapter, should receive passing mention here,—that is the effect which the conception of sovereignty has upon the relation of states to each other. It is significant to notice that the independent power of the state inherent in sovereignty, which is a source of orderly social existence in the civil community, becomes a source of disorder in the community of states in the world at large. How can this be?

As already explained, under the conception of sovereignty all political states are independent. It follows that in the field of international politics all states are theoretically equal; and if all are equal in rights there can be no recognition of a superstate or super-national authority. Limitations upon the conduct of states in relation to one another must therefore have their source in prohibitions which states impose upon themselves in agreement with one another, or in a kind of nebulous thing which has been termed the moral conscience of mankind." But experience has taught that neither international law nor moral force is efficacious to a satisfactory degree, particularly in emergencies, because there is at present no recognized authority which can bring a state or states into court and enforce a judgment. The result is a condition of affairs in the world that has been aptly described as an "international anarchy," a situation which, in principle, is as dangerous to the tranquillity and peace of the world community as would be the absence of a recognized authority in the civil community. Funda-

mentally, the present League of Nations and the World Court represent a groping of society toward the elimination of this dangerous situation.

The state and the nation.—Such are the characteristic elements differentiating the state from other institutions. As a final point in clarifying our definition, it may be well to remove a common confusion arising from a failure to distinguish the state from the nation.¹ Strictly speaking, the terms “state” and “nation” have quite different meanings. The former is a political concept and refers to the sort of independent, politically organized group that has been described. The latter was originally an ethnic, or racial, concept used to denote a group bound together by ties of kinship; but it has come to be applied to any group that has developed conscious sentiments of unity, or a group spirit that distinguishes its members from others. It need not have, and sometimes does not have, political organization of any sort. But the national spirit, when it exists, comes normally to demand a separate political life of its own. States built up on this foundation of a unity of spirit and culture are known as national states, and most of the great states of our day can, at least roughly, be classed as such.

It is this fact that explains why, in our times, the terms “state” and “nation” have come so generally to be used interchangeably. Thus common usage frequently leads us to use the word “nation,” when it is the politically organized group—the state—that is referred to. We also commonly speak of the spirit of nationalism as meaning identically the same thing as the spirit of patriotism, which is the term more accurately used to indicate our attachment to the political unit to which we belong. Such usage is so common particularly in England and America, that some authorities have come to accept it as proper. In our own country, for example, the political state—the United States of America—is called the nation and, to add to the confusion which results, one rarely refers to the state except in connection with such local units as New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, which are not, properly speaking, states at all.

The state contrasted with other institutions.—From what has been said of the character of the state, certain major features which differentiate the state from other institutions should be clear. In the first place, the state differs conspicuously from all other institu-

¹For a more detailed discussion, see pp. 507-510.

ons in that its membership is compulsory—one is born into the state, while membership in others is voluntary. It follows that while one may belong to as many “voluntary” institutions as he chooses to or as will admit him, he may hold membership in only one state at one time. The jurisdiction of a state is also distinctive, that it is territorially exclusive; that is, it reaches only such persons as reside in a given area. The jurisdiction of other institutions is not so limited. The jurisdiction of a church, for example, may be world-wide; a bank may extend its authority to several countries. Again, the state possesses the peculiar function of maintaining order in society and of serving common interests, while other institutions serve each a particular rather than a general interest of society. Finally, the state, of all institutions, is the only one possessing that supreme authority called sovereignty, this being regarded as the chief earmark of the state—its most distinctive feature.

It will be seen that it is chiefly this claim to sovereignty which the state makes that establishes its relations to other institutions. Its unquestioned supremacy makes it paramount in the political group itself, for, with the exception of certain international institutions that are developing in our day, all political institutions other than the state are merely parts of it and are clearly subordinate to it. They are governmental institutions that do the work of the state. In large measure, non-political institutions are also subject to the state. The state, it is true, cannot perform the functions of other institutions. It has its own; but the nature of its functions gives it a certain position of preëminence over the others, for the welfare of the community may demand the regulation and restraint of institutions, just as much as of individuals. They all come within the supreme regulatory authority of the state. They have lives of their own to live, but their lives as institutions are no more outside the competency of the state than are the lives of individuals. When, then, we look at society from this point of view, it takes on certain aspects of unity, coherence, oneness, at least within the politically organized group we call the state; and the thing which gives this unity is said to be the ultimate authority the state possesses. This has come to be the generally accepted view of the nature of the state and its relation to individuals and other social institutions. It is sometimes referred to as the monistic theory of the state.

Recent writers have attacked this view as unsound and com-

pletely out of harmony with reality. In their examination of society the thing that impresses them most is diversity rather than unity. They see a great multiplicity of social groups, each with its own peculiar function, often having origins and an existence quite independently of state authority, and demanding and getting allegiance from its members much as does the state. To these writers therefore, society appears as a multiple thing without the unity of a coördinating authority—such as the state claims to be, but has never been able to establish in fact. State sovereignty, they say, is a pure fiction which ought to be forgotten, and the state should be regarded as only one of many groups, in the entire galaxy of which it should accept a position of equality rather than superiority. Their general viewpoint has come to be known as the pluralistic theory of the state. It has many intriguing aspects, but the bulk of opinion seems to be that the pluralists have failed to make out a convincing case against the theory of state sovereignty, which remains the orthodox theory. However, their realistic way of looking at society has value. It has indicated clearly the need of a thorough re-examination of the organization of our governmental machinery to keep it in line with the rapidly changing social and economic structure of our day.¹

THE CHARACTER AND FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE STATE

It was stated earlier in this discussion that one of the functions of political institutions is to maintain order in the community. This function they perform by the making and enforcing of laws. Laws in the political sense, are general rules of conduct which the state accepts and enforces. When the state has accepted them as its own they are said to express the will of the state. Within the state the courts are the political agencies that apply the law and interpret its meaning; hence law is sometimes said to be rules of conduct that the courts will enforce. The meaning is the same. A system of law is necessary in any society. It is true that our behavior patterns in society are conditioned by customs deeply rooted in the culture of the community. Generally speaking, therefore, our conduct fits into these customs, and we observe them as a matter of course. But they are not always observed; they are not always definite

¹The theory of pluralism is elaborately treated in the works of Figgis, Laski, Duguit and others. See especially Harold Laski, *The Modern Problem of Sovereignty*.

and they are constantly and imperceptibly changing. For these reasons, if for no other, law becomes a necessity. It gives precision to the rules of conduct, makes them universally applicable, and puts the power of the state back of them to insure their observance.¹

Common law.—There are two general kinds of law—the customary or common law, and written law. The customary law consists of those rules or customs existing in the community, which the courts accept and apply. It is not formally declared at any given time and it is not written, but it is none the less definite. The body of the common law has developed through centuries of growth and out of decisions of the judges in applying the customs of the community. It is now a huge system of law in itself, and has come to be a very rigid system with a procedure of its own. It does change, however, for the courts, from one generation to another, are called on to apply its well-settled principles to new conditions; and new meanings or interpretations thus creep into it. In one sense, this type of law is never made by the state; it exists in custom, and the court merely recognizes it and gives it a sanction—that is, requires its observance. But in another sense it is judge-made law, for the recognition of the custom by the court is the thing that gives it the stamp of authority, and transforms it into law. This is precisely the difference between an ordinary custom which most of us normally observe, and common law which the state compels us to observe. One may violate a custom without incurring more than social disapproval, but to violate a custom which has been declared common law is to risk heavy penalties imposed by the state.

Statute law.—In addition to the common law there is the great mass of written law, formally declared by the proper legislative and constitutional organs of the state. It is, in fact, this type which we usually have in mind when we speak of law as being the expressed will of the state. In substance it may be nothing more than a formal statement of the principles of the common law; it may be a modification of the common law; or it may contain entirely new principles and programs unknown to the common law. In any event, it always supersedes the common law when the two conflict. In our legal system we thus have the two systems of law existing side by side. The common law prevails until it is modified or abolished by written law.

See R. G. Gettell, *Introduction to Political Science*, Ginn & Co., 1922, Ch. 10.

Constitutional law.—In England written law always takes the form of statutes enacted by Parliament, regardless of the nature of the subject matter with which it deals. In the United States, and in practically all other countries, a distinction is made between what is known as fundamental, or constitutional, law and ordinary statute law. The former is embodied in separate written documents called constitutions, containing the major principles on which the political structure is founded, and which relate to the structure and powers of the different organs of government. It is in the constitutional law that one finds the statement of the basic conditions on which political society functions, what rights the individual can claim, what the organs of government shall be, and what they can do. It is the supreme law of the land—an expression of the will of the legislative sovereign. Statute law, on the other hand, comprises the ordinary statutes enacted by the legislative bodies established and controlled by the constitutional law. Thus, for example, the Constitution of the United States creates our Congress and vests it with powers to regulate interstate commerce. By virtue of this authority, Congress then enacts laws regulating railroads and other interstate carriers, as well as business of an interstate character.

Western civilization has produced two great systems of law that have survived. The first is the system of Roman law. As has been pointed out in preceding chapters, this represents the distinctive contribution which Rome made to progress in the Western world. Beginning with the most primitive rules of custom and religious rites, Rome developed a complete system of legal rules based on universal principles and practices, thoroughly systematized and reduced to writing in the great *Justinian Code* of the late Empire. Revived after the days of feudalism, this code came to be the basis of the modern law of Continental European states. The other great system of law is known as the English common-law system, which gradually evolved in England after the period of the Norman Conquest and is now used in practically all the English-speaking portions of the Western world. It is a part of our own heritage.

FORMS OF GOVERNMENT

One question further should be raised concerning the state, before bringing this survey to a conclusion. Can states be classified and

so, how? Mention has been made of the fact that most political institutions form parts of the larger entity we have been describing the state, and that the only outward form which the state takes expressed in its governmental machinery. When, therefore, we speak of the forms of political institutions we refer to the forms of government, and when we classify states on the basis of their forms, what we are really doing is classifying governments. Only in this sense, then, can it be accurately said that states may be classified. As to governments, they may be classified from many points of view, but the oldest, and one of the most valuable classifications, is that which is based on a consideration of the number of persons in whom governmental power is vested. From this point of view governments are monarchies, aristocracies, or democracies.

Monarchy is government in which all power is centralized in the hands of one person, usually called a king, emperor, or dictator. If this ruler exercises his power arbitrarily and without reference to general laws the government is called an absolute monarchy, a despotism, or a tyranny; if, however, he governs in accordance with general laws, it is said to be a constitutional or limited monarchy. Monarchy as a type of government is conceded to have great strength, particularly in times of emergency, for it eliminates the dangers of divided counsel, and hence admits of more decisive action. When power is vested in a few members of the community the government is said to be aristocratic. The basis of selection of the few that wield the power of the state may be wealth, heredity, or ability. Aristocracies of ability have the peculiar merit of insuring a greater amount of wisdom in the conduct of affairs of state than any other form, but the difficulty of agreeing upon any standards by which to determine ability seems almost insuperable. Moreover, even the best aristocracies inevitably tend to become corrupt as the ruling few exercise their power to enhance their own group interests at the expense of the masses. An aristocracy that takes this perverted form is usually called an oligarchy.

When political power is widely distributed among the masses the government is said to be democratic. It does not mean that a majority of the people must share in political power, for this would be a requirement which no government could meet. Although the line of demarcation between aristocracies and democracies is not in all cases clearly drawn, the difference between them is usually discernible. When popular or democratic government first developed

it was of the more conservative sort, with relatively few of the masses actually having power, and the majority exercising theirs only through representatives; the term "republican" was then used to distinguish this form of government from the monarchical and aristocratic. Later on popular governments tended to extend the electorate, and an increasing number of people were permitted to share in the power of the state; and as this practice became established, the term "democratic" came gradually to displace the older term "republican." However, both are still used at times to indicate any government in which the bulk of the people possess political power. The more conservative type of democracy, in which the power of the people is exercised through representatives, is called representative democracy, and the more extreme type, in which the people exercise their powers directly without a representative as an intermediary, is called pure, or direct democracy. The latter is found in Switzerland, in some parts of the United States, and in some other countries; but most democracies of the past, as well as the present, have been and are of the representative type.

Several advantages are attributed to democratic government constituting a particular merit. First, it tends to greater stability in government, because the masses are less likely to be dissatisfied with the results of their own handiwork. Second, it reflects more accurately than any other form the common welfare. Third, the mass opinion, at least in countries with a fairly high level of intelligence and enlightenment, will be a wiser opinion than that of one man or a few men. Lastly, it stimulates an interest in public affairs, and acts as an educative influence in the development of better citizenship.

Although it is not accurate to say that in the development of political institutions society presents an evolutionary process under which peoples pass through each of these stages in succession from autocracy, in which one person combines all political power in his own person, to democracy, in which political power becomes the possession of all; yet history does justify the conclusion that, as knowledge becomes more widely disseminated and new groups become political-minded, pressure is brought to bear upon political institutions to broaden downward, so that step by step an increasing number of the population of the state are admitted to political rights founded on law. This fact will become apparent when we turn to the historical development of political institutions.

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CHAPTER XXV

THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

IT IS clear from the preceding characterization of the state that protection from without and order within have been regarded as matters of fundamental importance to society. To meet these needs the state came into existence. To make it effective in the performance of its functions, society invested the state with the unlimited power called sovereignty. If this power could be exercised with such superlative wisdom and even-handed justice as to satisfy the legitimate needs of the individual and of the various groups within the state, there would probably be a reasonable agreement among the citizens of the state as to the degree of power the state should exercise. Such a situation one might associate with an ideal state. But an ideal state of this character never has existed and never will, for in the world of realities the state does not function as an automatic mechanism, but only under the direction and driving power of human minds. Consequently the question has been repeatedly raised as to how far the state should go in the exercise of its power over individuals subject to its authority.

The question may be restated in this form: How far is the liberty of the individual compatible with the authority which the state must exercise if it is to realize the fundamental aims of society for which it was created? Man is not a machine which can be harnessed to the dynamo of the state with a belt or a cog wheel. He is a human personality, a sentient being, possessing a sense of human values which he cherishes and from the violation of which he shrinks as from a blow to his personality. Hence the never-ending conflict between liberty and authority. The problem of finding a place for freedom in a political society possessing powers that may be exerted in unlimited degree in any direction, is one that has taxed the ingenuity of men for centuries. It raises the whole question as to what rights, if any, the individual may claim in the state, and as to the extent to which the state should impose restraints upon individual action; for it should not be inferred that because the state

s complete authority it is always wise for it to exercise it. These questions of individual rights and the functions of the state will be considered in the present chapter, particularly as they have arisen in modern society.

THE QUESTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

The doctrine of natural rights.—One attempt to solve the problem of reconciling individual liberty with authority found expression in the so-called doctrine of natural rights. It appeared early as the fourteenth century; and, it will be recalled, became a force of great significance in connection with the revolutionary movements of the eighteenth century. It is based on the assumption that freedom means absence of restraint and that the only way to have both freedom and authority is to limit the latter to certain bounds and recognize liberty of action in others. It was asserted that nature endows men with certain rights, usually summed up in the terms life, liberty, property, or, as the Americans expressed it, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. These are a sort of possession enjoyed by each individual born into this world, are an essential part of him, and are, therefore, "unalienable." Political authority cannot legitimately interfere with them; on the contrary, political authority is established for the express purpose of protecting man in the enjoyment of these rights. As will be seen, liberty itself is regarded as one of these inherent privileges.

One serious difficulty with the whole doctrine lies in the vagueness of the meaning of the terms used to express it. What, for instance, is meant by liberty? In its absolute sense liberty is, of course, impossible in any human society. One may leave out of consideration all physical limitations on human action—all limitations of time and space, of environment and physical capacity—even then complete freedom of choice and action could not exist. If it existed for one individual it would be nonexistent for another, for if we all have freedom of choice the very fact that we all have it would make the object of our choice unattainable for most of us. Moreover, what significance could one's liberty have if no one were inclined to respect it? Claiming it as a natural right would not be effective assurance that one would be able to enjoy it.

Legal rights.—Difficulties such as these have caused the doctrine of natural rights to lose caste. It is coming to be seen that the

value of a right we may claim depends not so much on our claiming it as in getting others to respect it, and the effective way of getting others to respect it is to get legal recognition for it. When this is done it becomes a legal right and has back of it the sanction of the state. It becomes a thing of real significance, for the authority of the state can then be invoked to prevent others from interfering with us in our enjoyment of it. Just as one's rights mean little unless others are prevented from interfering with them, so liberty means nothing unless authority accompanies it to make it effective. Instead of being hostile to each other, liberty and authority are necessary to each other. The highways, for instance, are said to be free to all; but it is only when the use of the highways is regulated and controlled that they come to be free in a real sense; and the more people come to exercise their right to use the highways, the more obvious becomes the necessity for regulation. Rights therefore may be thought of as coming from the state, and the only liberty worth mentioning is liberty under the law, or liberty without license or abuse.

Most modern states recognize it as sound policy to establish a sphere of individual liberty and guarantee it against encroachment from other individuals or from the government itself. This is one of the express purposes of written constitutions that contain formal statements of individual rights. For this reason they are sometimes called constitutional or fundamental rights. They are of two general kinds, civil and political. By civil rights is meant personal rights which one may enjoy in society without interference from the government. They usually include such rights as freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of religious worship, freedom of the person, protection of private property, equality before the law, and certain long recognized rights of persons accused of crimes such as jury trial, indictment by grand jury, and so on. By political rights is meant rights to share in the processes of government, such as voting, holding office, jury service, and the like. Civil rights are conferred upon all alike, while political rights are always limited to certain persons who possess the necessary qualifications which the state establishes as tests for public service. However, neither civil nor political rights are regarded as absolute, for they are all subject to limitations that may be imposed by law to prevent abuse. For example, freedom of speech may be severely curtailed during time of war, when unbridled liberty would seriously affect the successful

conduct of the war and thus endanger the very existence of the state. The same is true of religious freedom, which is guaranteed, but which is also subject to control and regulation by law, when the exercise of it threatens injury to the body politic.¹

How are these rights guaranteed? In the United States they are formally stated in our written constitutions. Our rights against the national government are set forth in the Federal Constitution, while those against the state governments are included in the "bills of rights" in the state constitutions. Whenever any individual thinks his constitutional rights are infringed by a law of Congress or of a state legislature, he appeals to the courts to protect him; and if the courts think his appeal is justified they will refuse to enforce the law, by declaring it inoperative or "void" because it conflicts with the constitutional guarantees. The courts are thus the guardians of our constitutional liberties by virtue of the fact that they possess the power to interpret the meaning of fundamental law. In England, on the other hand, where no written constitution exists, individual liberties are embodied in the common law and in custom. But since the custom and common law are subject to change at any time at the will of parliament, individual rights are at the mercy of the lawmakers. Nevertheless, so zealously does parliament respect them, that it is a remarkable fact that individual liberties are perhaps more extensively enjoyed in England than in any other country of the world.

Moral rights.—What has been said concerning the nature of individual rights should not be construed as denying the validity of moral rights. Legal and moral rights are quite different in nature. Legal rights are those which are recognized and protected by the state, regardless of whether they are right or wrong in the moral sense. Moral rights are rights which any individual considers himself justified in claiming, and which others ought to respect. Whether or not they will be respected is left to the moral conscience of him who threatens them, just as the actual determination of what they are must be left to the moral judgment of him who is threatened. That which is legally right may be morally wrong. Some legal rights may be regarded by many as highly immoral, but they are nevertheless protected by the state as long as they remain legal rights. Generally speaking, the attempt is

¹See R. G. Gettell, *Introduction to Political Science*, Ginn & Co., 1922, Ch. 9.

usually made to get moral rights expressed as legal rights, but it is never done completely. It should be recognized, of course, that all individuals reserve for themselves the right to make moral judgments; and if so-called natural rights, discussed above, are regarded as moral rights, they might be said to be valid as such. Thus, if one considers that every person has a moral claim to life, liberty, or property, regardless of what use he makes of them, then he might be said to have a natural or moral right to these things.

The theory of the rights of the governed against the authority of established government reached its most extreme expression in the eighteenth-century assertion of the right of revolution. It will be remembered that when the revolting American colonists were in process of severing the British connection they fell back upon the political philosophy of John Locke and asserted, in the Declaration of Independence, their right "to alter or abolish" the existing government. But the right of revolution, from the very nature of things, is a moral right; never a legal one. This must be so, for by revolution is meant any illegal change in the government. It is quite possible to imagine conditions under which a conscientious citizen might feel himself morally justified in trying to overthrow the government under which he lives and to set up a new one. One must, if he be a moral person, pass judgment on his state and what it does or fails to do, just as he would on his own actions. The state is not above moral law, and ought to conform to it, and the only way in which it can be kept within the bounds of morality is by having its citizens insist on its actions conforming scrupulously to moral codes. The right of revolution, therefore, exists as a final means of compelling one's political organization to conform to what is right. But when we say the state is not above moral law we do not mean to say that it cannot disregard moral law. It may do so and, unfortunately, does so at times with impunity.

STATE FUNCTIONS: UNDERLYING THEORIES

How far the citizen may actually enjoy individual rights in a given state will be determined by several factors. The status of the individual in the state depends not only upon the establishment of constitutional guarantees which leave him free to act within limits; it depends also on the extent to which the state exercises the power which it undoubtedly possesses. And the extent to which it does

exercise those powers—that is to say, the extent to which it concedes individual liberty, and the strictness or rigidity with which it interprets individual rights under the law—will be determined in considerable degree by the attitude which it assumes toward the individual or the general theory which it accepts as to the functions of the state. There have been, and always will be, widely divergent views as to the extent to which the state should regulate the affairs of private individuals, or engage in enterprises of its own that might have been left to private enterprise. One group of extremists has insisted that the state has no legitimate functions whatever; another group has claimed that the state should absorb practically all activities of private individuals. Beginning with the first of these extreme views, we may proceed to discuss briefly the major theories of state functions.

The theory of anarchism.—In a strict sense the theory of anarchism is not a theory of what the state should do, but rather a theory that the state should do nothing. The anarchist insists that there is no legitimate function for the state to perform in society and that it should therefore be abolished. To them the state is unnecessary and a distinct evil; for, whatever good it may accomplish, its method of coercion, which is the characteristic feature of state action, is fundamentally undesirable and unjustifiable. It is, therefore, this one feature of the state—compulsion—to which they object. As one writer puts it, society has no more right to coerce the individual than the individual has to coerce society. They have no objection as such to organized efforts to accomplish common ends; but instead of the coercive power of the state being used for such purposes, they believe these ends might equally well be accomplished by purely voluntary associations, to which individuals could attach themselves or not as they please. Thus, in an anarchistic society, all who felt the need for police protection could associate for that purpose, but those who could see no benefit to be derived from it would not be called upon to support it. Their plan, therefore, would be to substitute voluntary associations for the state, whenever common action is necessary to attain a desired end.

Anarchists vary in kind from the bomb-throwing type, comprising those who call for immediate destruction of the political state by means of violence and terror, to the purely philosophical type represented by such men as Kropotkin and Godwin, who regarded an anarchistic society as an ideal toward which conscious progress

should be made, but one not immediately possible of realization. However, there is very general agreement among thoughtful people that the basic notions of anarchism are false, that coercion is not necessarily an evil, and that, even if it were, the plan to substitute voluntary coöperation would not eliminate coercion, since coercion against members as well as non-members of such associations would be inevitable if effective results were to be obtained. It is probably the very philosophy underlying anarchy that explains why anarchy itself has captured comparatively few adherents and is so bitterly fought and carefully guarded against by existing governments.

The theory of individualism.—From the point of view of state functions, the individualist agrees with the anarchist that the state is an evil, but breaks with him sharply when he insists that it is unnecessary. The individualist believes that it would be impossible to dispense with the state entirely, for the reason that men have not learned how to live peaceably in society. They require the restraining compulsion of the state to prevent them from doing violence to the rights and interests of others. Nevertheless, they think the state should confine its activities to a minimum. It can properly furnish protection against external violence and internal disorder and concern itself generally with keeping the peace. These functions would involve the maintenance of an army and navy, police administration, punishment for crime, administration of justice in the courts, and the imposing and collecting of taxes with which to defray the expenses of the state. Such functions represent a maximum of activity for the state, and beyond them the extreme individualist would not venture. Others less extreme might admit other functions if their desirability could be demonstrated, but doubt would always be resolved against them. Jefferson expressed the point of view of the individualist when he said that that government is best which governs least. This point of view received its widest support during the last quarter of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries. It was the logical successor to the theory of natural rights which had had great vogue just previously. It had some very important effects on state policies in England and the United States as well as on the continent of Europe, but after the middle of the last century it underwent considerable modification.

The modern doctrine of individualism arose as a logical reaction against the extreme interventionist policy of the governments of the

earlier modern period, which had largely ignored the individual in what was conceived to be the interest of the state. Thus, the individualists came to regard all restraint upon the individual as an evil, because it retarded him in the full development of his physical, mental, and moral nature. His individuality and initiative were crushed in a regime of state regulation, and he was prevented from developing his powers and capacities to the fullest extent.

Later many of them looked upon state regulation as contrary to the natural laws of struggle and survival of the fittest. They were greatly impressed by what seemed to be the natural law of evolution as expressed by Darwin. In the animal world progress seemed to them to be based on a constant struggle for existence, the fittest surviving in the contest, the weak succumbing. Since that seemed to be the process in the natural world, it was thought to be the proper path of progress in human society as well, for progress could be made only by permitting those unfitted for survival in society to succumb. State regulation was constantly interfering with the natural order by aiding the weak against the strong. Finally, it should be recalled that the great economists of the day, from Adam Smith on, lent their support by declaring it sound economic doctrine to permit unrestricted competition under the laws of supply and demand. Thus economists, natural scientists, and moral philosophers combined to denounce state regulation.

There is much that is commendable in the position of the individualists. Their emphasis on the dignity and worth of the individual, on the virtue of self-reliance, and of individual freedom of judgment and action wherever possible, would seem to merit general approval. However, their critics have pointed to some fundamental weaknesses in the major premises of their doctrine. History does not seem to show, for example, that the state has been a positive evil rather than a positive good; nor does it indicate that an increase in state functions is necessarily a net loss to individual freedom. As pointed out on preceding pages, restraints imposed by legislation often enlarge the field of liberty of action by removing existing barriers. Then, too, a great amount of state action cannot fairly be regarded as restraint. The promotion of scientific knowledge and general education, the dredging of harbors and waterways, the maintenance of a postal service, and a host of other ordinary functions of present-day states, are positive aids rather than restrictions.

Critics of individualism have also pointed to the error of assuming

that the individual is always in a position to understand best his own interests. As Professor Garner has said, "No one lives in a badly drained house, drinks water polluted with sewage, or eats adulterated food because his interest leads him to do so, but generally because he is ignorant of the real character of the service or article which he uses or consumes, or because he cannot help himself. Finally, it should be remembered that, however important may be the individual and his interests, he is not an independent entity. He is largely the product of the society in which he lives, and his obligations to others, as well as to society, must be considered before a true picture of the functions of the state can be drawn.

Collectivism and socialism.—Out of the reaction against individualism there emerged two theories of the function of state that are closely related but clearly distinguishable—collectivism and socialism. Collectivism represents an attitude or point of view which was largely accepted by the adherents of the established forms of government during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, while socialism was supported by groups outside the orthodox political ranks. Collectivism in Great Britain—known by other names on the Continent—took the position that the stressing of the "absolute rights" of the individual had resulted to the detriment of society as a whole, or of man collectively considered. The stress the collectivists asserted, should thenceforth be laid upon the paramount interests of the community. Their opposition, obviously, was directed against the non-interventionist policy of the state under individualism. The individuals needed to be restrained, they declared, because by reason of superior power, or ignorance, or lack of ethical consideration, they trampled on the rights of the poor, the weak, or the less aggressive, with results injurious to society. Accordingly they advocated restraining legislation for the control of the individual in the uses to which he should put his own property, in the treatment which he should accord to his employees, in the service which he should render to society, and in the character of goods which he should sell to the community; and they advocated positive regulations of all sorts looking to the social welfare of those classes least able to minister to their own interests.

As a critic of individualism the socialist takes a much more extreme position than the collectivist. Socialists look upon the state

¹*Political Science and Government*, American Book Company, 1928, 1932, p. 472.

is a positive good, a necessary and very desirable agency for the promotion of the welfare of the individual, as well as the collective welfare of the community. Rather than restrict state functions, they would enlarge them far beyond the point reached in most of the present-day states. They would expand the activities of the state in the fields of education, scientific research, general culture, and in social and humanitarian enterprises of various sorts. Basically, however, they believe that most of the present ills of society are economic, and they call for drastic changes in present methods of producing and distributing economic goods. They would substitute public ownership and management for private ownership and management of land, capital, and the instruments of production and transportation. Lands, factories, mines, railways, public utility services would thus become collective enterprises in which private capital would be eliminated; but in other respects private property would remain as it is. One can readily see what an enormous expansion of state activities socialism implies.

Within the socialist ranks there are wide differences of opinion as to the methods of carrying out this program, but few of these differences need concern us here. At present there are two distinct wings of the movement. The more radical, or left wing, believes that socialism will be brought about by class war, in which present capitalistic states will be overthrown by violence and the new régime inaugurated. They insist that there shall be no compromise with the prevailing system of competitive individualism, which must be destroyed root and branch. It was in this form that modern socialism first appeared, in connection with the Revolution of 1848 in France. The failure of the movement at that time contributed to create what came to be known as the moderate wing of the socialist movement. The moderates believed in the ideals presented in the socialist program, but became convinced that they could, and should, be realized, not by class struggle and revolution, but by a slow process of education. They would work within legitimate constitutional channels, win elections, and thus get control of the government, and gradually apply their principles as they came to be accepted by the masses of the people. Another important difference between these two groups of socialists lies in the refusal of the extremists to be content with anything less than complete elimination of private capital within the fields mentioned, while the moderate socialist is willing to compromise with the

present system by accepting regulation and control of private enterprises in lieu of public ownership—at least as temporary expedients.

The moderate wing probably represents a majority of present-day socialists. Socialism is strong in most of the European countries, has captured one of the largest parties in England today and is about the only type of socialism that has met with an approval in the United States. On the other hand the radical wing of the movement has possession of the Russian government and is making the effort to apply extreme socialism on the broadest scale that the Western world has seen. The results are being watched with great interest, as a sort of practical test of the workableness of socialist theories.

Communism.—On the extreme left wing of socialism lies communism, which represents the last word in the enhancement of state functions. Communists would eliminate all private property, private interests, and private relationships, all of which they conceive to be inherently bad and a menace to public interests and public welfare. The individual must be completely merged in society and learn to think and act in terms of communal rather than private interests. The state must become the complete owner of property, the use of which is to be shared by all on equal terms. The state is to supply the individual's body with food and clothing, his soul with religion, provide shelter for him, dictate the type of labor in which he shall engage, and have the disposition of his leisure. Domestic relations, like all other private relations, are to be determined by the state, and the family, as we know it, to disappear. In Russia, where the communist doctrines are now being worked out, so strong has become the conviction of the incompatibility of bourgeois individualist ideas and communist ideals that the new socialist state has instituted a bitter warfare and discrimination against the middle class of the Tsarist régime and has established the dictatorship of the proletariat, an idea which has become more or less inseparably connected with communist doctrine.

Communism is thus so closely akin to extreme socialism that it is difficult to draw a line of demarcation between these two theories of government. As a modern theory communism emerged as a part of the radical socialist movement and is still rather definitely identified with it. The Russian experiment of the Soviet Republic is a communistic-socialist experiment, and, as said before, is the

st large-scale enterprise of the sort known to history; in practice, however, Russia has been unable to apply the ideal completely. On a much smaller scale it has been tried in many parts of the world in an experimental way with select communities, but none of them has proved to be lasting. The idea of communism is not new; it is at least as old as Plato, the great Greek philosopher, who considered it an ideal arrangement within the class of rulers in his perfect state, as described in his *Republic*.

Let us briefly review these four theories concerning the proper fields for the activity of the state. First, there is that of the anarchist, who would have the state go out of business entirely, being unnecessary and dangerous; second, that of the individualist, who admits its necessity but restricts its functions to a minimum; third, that of the socialist, who would expand the functions of the state to include collective ownership and operation of the means of production and exchange; and fourth, that of the communist, who would have the state control all activities of man in society and completely eliminate private property and private interests.

STATE FUNCTIONS: MODERN PRACTICES

To what extent do the theories just enumerated find expression in modern practice? It is obvious, even to the most casual observer, that no one of them accurately describes the functions of the modern state. In the first place, although one can see the results of the theory of individualism in our present practices, we are far from being individualists in any complete sense. The movement was at its height about three-quarters of a century ago, and the swing since then has been very pronouncedly away from the theory, and toward a régime of intensive state regulation. The state of our day interests itself in the formal education of the youth; it regulates the family relationship; it protects the health of the community by enormous codes of health and sanitation; it prescribes the qualifications of lawyers, doctors, surgeons, engineers, druggists, plumbers, pilots, barbers, and a host of others; it carefully lays down the principles governing the conduct of business, and controls the corporate activities of business concerns; it protects labor against itself as well as against employers, by regulating hours of work and conditions of employment, providing compensation for accidents, and regulating employment of women and children in particular;

it engages in huge projects of reclamation of waste and arid lands flood prevention, highway construction and waterway improvement; it maintains parks and recreation facilities, as well as libraries and museums. These are only suggestions of the types of activities in which the state engages. They are by no means exhaustive, and are listed merely to help us visualize the enormous contrast between the individualist's conception of what the state should do and what it is actually doing in our time.

But this does not mean that we have entered the state of socialism, although it is true one finds here and there clear applications of the ideas of the socialists. Even in the United States the state conducts a school system, and a postal system, while in local communities one finds government-owned railways, street-car systems, water, light, and power utilities, and even government theatres, pawnshops, employment agencies, and other enterprises that are ordinarily left in private hands. The instances, however, are only sporadic and have usually resulted from peculiar local conditions rather than from any faith in the basic principles of socialism.

In other countries socialism has made greater headway. One often finds government-owned railways, telephone and telegraph systems, local lighting and power systems, and street railways. In New Zealand, settled by individualistic Englishmen with all the traditions of English liberties, we find the land owned largely by the government and rented to tenants; private homes constructed by the government, and government-owned mines, railways, telephone and telegraph services, as well as municipally owned local utilities.

On the whole, then, it may be said that present practices indicate a midway position between socialism and individualism. The state is undoubtedly regarded as a powerful agency for good. It is seen that state regulation and state activity in general do not necessarily mean a loss of individual freedom but often a net gain, and that indeed, much of the intensive activity of the state represents definite efforts to maintain the individual in a condition of greater freedom and equality of opportunity than would be possible if he were left unaided by the state. Although complaints (and legitimate ones at times) are heard against one or another particular form of state "interference," we are gradually becoming accustomed to more and more of it, as we see frontier and rural life receding into the past and our highly socialized, industrial civilization taking its place.

indeed we are likely to see more, rather than less, activity of the state in the future. Whether a continued expansion of state functions through regulation and control will lead ultimately to a full realization of socialism must be left to the future to determine. The socialists, of course, insist that it will, and that the present is merely a transitional step in that direction; others are inclined to believe that effective regulation by the state of private enterprise will meet all the needs of general welfare, and will more adequately serve the purposes of individual progress, and that the general trend toward socialism will cease before the final step of taking over private enterprise by the state shall be realized.

ESSENTIAL AND OPTIONAL FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE

In the light of the wide divergence of opinion and theory concerning the functions of the state, is it possible to find common ground upon which all of these warring groups may stand? It is possible if we omit the anarchist, for all except the anarchist are agreed that there are certain essential activities in which the state must engage if it is to exist and serve its ends as a political institution. These may be summed up as the maintenance of peace and order internally, and the maintenance of organized forces with which to repel attacks from the outside. The former involves the developing of rules of law, the enforcement of law, and the punishment of violators; for these purposes there must be legislatures, police, courts, and correctional institutions. The latter involves the maintenance of armies and navies made essential by the existing political organization of the world into numerous sovereign states with no machinery to keep the peace among them. The outstanding political problem of our day is that of developing some such machinery; until this problem is solved the opinion will doubtless prevail that the states must remain armed camps or risk annihilation. A third essential function is fiscal—the raising of revenue and the disbursement of funds to meet expenses. The basic character of the fiscal function is at once revealed when it is realized that without such physical maintenance modern governments would come to a standstill.

All functions other than those mentioned as essential may be classed as optional. Some are conceded to be so desirable, and have come to be so universally exercised, that even individualists of our day would scarcely refuse to recognize them as proper activities of

the state. In this category may be mentioned, among others education, charity administration, sanitation and health, collection of statistics, and some degree of regulation of commerce, industry and labor. But when we get beyond those functions that have received traditional acceptance, we encounter the varying opinions as to their desirability that have been suggested in this chapter.

Is it possible to establish any standards by which we may determine the desirability of the state's assuming optional functions? Individualists and socialists alike render judgment on proposals of this sort, on the basis of their doctrinaire programs of action. The strict individualist, believing that state action means loss of liberty, would be inclined to reject such proposals on principle, regardless of any real need for state action, or of any immediate good that might result from it. The socialist, on the other hand, would be likely to accept them if they seemed to fit into his program of public ownership and operation, even if experience had demonstrated the ineffectiveness of state action in this particular field.

The mistake that both seem to make lies in the dogmatic assumption that state action is good or bad in itself. The individualist is right in insisting on the importance of individual liberty, but he is incorrect when he thinks this implies the desirability of a fixed policy of inactivity by the state. As we have seen, it sometimes implies just the reverse, for state intervention may be the most effective means of obtaining greater individual freedom for a majority of the community. The socialist may be right in stressing the importance of the collective welfare of the community, and in pointing out the positive good that can result from collective action through the political state. But it is by no means demonstrated that his particular program is the best means of attaining the goal desired; for state regulation may often serve the collective interests of society more satisfactorily than state ownership and operation.

Although the coercive power of the state may thus be employed at times to effect a larger individual freedom, or to satisfy some social demand, it does not follow that it is at all times the most appropriate agency to use for such purposes. For example, history has often demonstrated the futility of trying to use the state as a means of enforcing standards of morality, religion, personal taste and habits that run counter to deeply rooted mores of the community. The evils that result from such attempts often outweigh the good accomplished; and they are evils that might be avoided if

other social institutions rather than the state were utilized to accomplish the very laudable objective in mind. The usefulness of the state to the community it serves must always depend upon the wisdom displayed in invoking its power. Finally, it may be noted that the promotion of individual and group welfare does not sum up all the possibilities of the state's usefulness. It can perform a still higher, if less immediate, service to mankind as a whole; and its moral obligations to the world should be kept in mind when we try to reach any conclusions about the functions it should undertake.

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CHAPTER XXVI

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE MIDDLE AGES

WE HAVE been studying the state as a laboratory specimen. We turn now to political institutions in history. We cannot trace them to their ultimate sources, because they had already been long in existence before history began; but we can take them as we find them and follow their lines of descent from the distant past to the present. Although our present concern takes us no further back than the Middle Ages, earlier studies in this work have revealed our debt to the ancient cultures in political thought and political organization. No study of medieval institutions can ignore that heritage, for the Middle Ages do not represent a complete break with the preceding past or a void separating the modern era from the ancient. Rather is the period to be viewed as a segment of a continuous stream of history, hence its institutions cannot be studied in complete isolation. They grew out of preceding institutions and contributed to succeeding ones. We must, therefore, first take a glance at the Roman heritage.

Our political heritage from Rome.—It will be recalled that from the seventh century B. C. to the fifth century A. D., Rome ran the whole gamut of political development, from insignificant village to world empire; from sturdy democracy to absolute monarchy and military despotism; from adolescent vigor to senescent decay. But through it all there runs an aptitude—or genius, as some have it—for government and administration that influences the political life of all occidental countries today. Most of our political vocabulary comes, directly or indirectly, from Rome. Such terms as emperor, president, senate, congress, parliament, council, consul, prefect, colony, magistrate, veto, municipality, censor, committee, province,—these and many others bear witness to our debt to Rome; and though the institutions they represent do not always bear a very close resemblance to the originals, in most cases the connection may be clearly traced. The relation

s shown, for example, in the systems of administration in most of the countries of Continental Europe. The administrative subdivisions—communes, cantons, provinces—indicate the Imperial influence; while the prefect, presiding over the Department in France or the Province in Belgium and Italy, may be considered as a direct descendant of the Roman official of the same name.

In the field of municipal administration and of law, the whole world has drawn upon the Roman heritage. The very concept of a municipality, as well as the name, originated in Rome. In pre-Roman days, a city was merely the aggregate of its citizens, and had no legal existence apart from them, but Rome developed the idea of the city as a corporate institution or legal person, apart from its inhabitants. The city as we know it today, possessing a charter—the attribute of permanence—the right to sue and be sued, to own property, and to operate public utilities, is based on the Roman idea of a municipality. But in the field of politics, we owe most of all to Rome as the lawgiver of the world. The entire Western world, with the exception of the United States, England, and most of the British colonies and dominions, bases its legal system primarily upon Roman law. Even in the United States, Louisiana, and in the British Empire, Scotland, Quebec, the Union of South Africa, and Ceylon follow the Civil Law of Rome rather than the Common Law of England.

It was from Rome, it will be recalled, that medieval and early modern rulers borrowed the idea of the divinity of kings as a heritage from the deification of the Roman emperors, an idea which, in the seventeenth century, was extended and elaborated to invest kings with a divine right to rule. The idea is much older than the Roman tradition, to be sure, for divinity was ascribed to the kings and emperors of ancient Egypt and the Orient; but so far as medieval Europe is concerned the idea came by way of Rome. Although that theory is no longer seriously held, its modern counterpart is to be found in the immunity of the state from legal action (in England and the United States). The sovereign was divine and could do no wrong, therefore could not be sued or prosecuted. When the king as a person lost his omnipotence, sovereignty was transferred to the state, but its attributes remained substantially the same. Thus, the state, or sovereign, in our legal fiction can do no wrong, hence cannot be the defendant in a legal action without its own consent.

Finally, Europe became the legatee of the Roman imperial idea, the idea of a world state. In the course of her career of expansion Roman nationalism was lost in the conception of a political unity of the known world under the supremacy of Rome. That conception continued to be dynamic in European history after the fall of the Roman empire in the West. It had its influence upon the political aspirations and achievements of the Roman Catholic Church. In the case of certain lay princes, it resulted in the attempt to reconstruct a new Roman empire on even broader geographical foundations. Such appears to have been the more or less conscious purpose of the Frankish Emperor Charlemagne and of the German kings who sought to realize the ideal in the Holy Roman Empire. Such, too, was the aim of the emperor Charles V in the sixteenth century, if we may trust his own words; and of Napoleon Bonaparte more than two centuries later. Not until the modern idea of constructing the state upon a national basis became so deeply rooted in European politics as to defy the efforts of the most ambitious statesmen and princes was the Roman idea finally set at rest as a potent fact in the political history of Europe.

The enumerated items constitute, in part, our political heritage from Rome; and though these influences were not always apparent in the Middle Ages, they were never entirely lost sight of, sometimes lying dormant, sometimes submerged in ignorance or barbarian customs, or preserved only in unread volumes in secluded monasteries, but ready, nevertheless, for revival when Europe, at the time of the Renaissance, should shake off its lethargy and again assert its leadership in world affairs.

Political disintegration after the fall of Rome.—In the East it will be remembered, the Byzantine Empire, with its center at Constantinople, stood essentially intact against the impact of the Germanic invasions. There political order was maintained. In the West the extinction of the Roman line of emperors in 476 A. D. was followed by the political disintegration of society. In that year Romulus Augustulus renounced his claim to the imperial throne, and there was no other emperor in the West until Charlemagne, three hundred twenty-four years later. During that interval of three and a quarter centuries, Western Europe presented a scene of great political disorder. The petty kings among the conquering tribesmen were in perpetual strife, and the frontiers of

their kingdoms advanced and receded as the fortunes of war tipped the scale of their power up or down.

Out of the disorder there finally emerged a number of independent kingdoms and territories of sufficient stability to place their names temporarily on the political map. Such were the Kingdom of the Goths in Italy; the Kingdom of the Vandals, comprised of North Africa, Sardinia, Corsica, and the Balearic Islands; the Kingdom of the West Goths, covering most of the Iberian Peninsula; the Kingdom of the Franks, extending from the Loire to the Rhine; the Kingdom of the Burgundians, in the region of the present province of Burgundy; and the lands of the Ostrogoths, Alamanni, Saxons, Frisians, Thuringians. In theory, these kingdoms and territories acknowledged the suzerainty of the emperor in Constantinople, but for all practical purposes they were independent, except for a brief period in the sixth century when Justinian was able to effect a temporary reunion of the East and the West. The political organization of these kingdoms and principalities need not detain us, for the most part, they proved to be ephemeral. Europe was in a state of political flux.

In the modern world the nation-state prevails generally over the feudal world as the accepted type of political organization. A survey of the political life of the Middle Ages discloses no such uniformity of pattern. As we view the entire period, we can discern successive political currents or trends dominating political thought and practice, and resulting in several distinctive types of political organization. First, one discerns the straining after the revival in the West of a universal state—of a new Roman empire, in which the major emphasis was upon the centralization of political power. With the failure of this high project, a counter movement set in, representing a trend toward political localism or particularism as contrasted with the earlier ideal of political centralization. The change is marked by the emergence of two types of political institutions: (a) a peculiar political system known as feudalism, and (b) the city-state. Finally, there set in new political currents; the localism of the feudal and city-state organizations gave way to the conception of national organization; the change heralded the coming of the nation-states and the approach of the modern age. We shall briefly examine each of these trends and the resulting political institutions.

CENTRALIZATION OF POLITICAL POWER

The trend toward the centralization of power is indicative of the sway of an earlier ideal—the Roman. It was not to be realized as a permanent solution of the problem of establishing order in European society; the conditions of the time, as we shall presently see, were opposed to such a consummation. But the ideal was not completely lost during the medieval period, which, we recall, tended toward universal patterns. The most successful achievement of centralized political power is represented by the Byzantine Empire, already established when the Middle Ages began, and potent in the corner of Europe down to the middle of the fifteenth century.

The Byzantine Empire.—When Constantine moved his capital from Rome to Constantinople, in 327 A. D., he had no intention of establishing a new empire. He was merely changing the seat of the old one. The union of the Latin West with the Greek East was, as we have seen, an unnatural one; but East and West continued as a single political union until 395, when the Roman Empire was divided for convenience of administration. For the next eighty-four years there were two lines of emperors, one at Constantinople and one at Rome. They were not conceived as emperors of separate empires, but as colleagues jointly ruling a single empire. They were, for all practical purposes, separate, but the political thought of the time was saturated with the idea of world unity, both in church and state, so the theory of a united empire persisted. In 476, the Western line of emperors was extinguished, and the line of demarcation became more obvious. With the revival of the Empire in the West and the coronation of Charlemagne in 800, the break was very nearly complete; but the Christian Church, with all its political ramifications, still served as a connecting link. How this last bond was snapped in the eleventh century has already been told. The Eastern empire had become a separate political and religious entity.¹

It purported to carry on the Roman tradition. It adhered to Roman law, and, in the Justinian Code of the sixth century, gave it a definiteness and clarity that was not surpassed until the appearance of the Napoleonic Code in the early part of the nineteenth century. Its government was modeled on the Roman pattern.

¹See pp. 228 f., above.

rulers were the successors of the Caesars, and enjoyed the same prerogatives. As time went on, however, they fell more and more under the influence of the Orient. Their courts were invested with more pomp and circumstance than was ever the case in Rome. The government became a pure military despotism of the Oriental type. Its life depended almost wholly upon military force; there was some justification for this in the fact that it was forever on the defensive.

Throughout most of its history, the Empire was practically an armed camp. The army and navy were literally the life of the state. The Church, too, maintained a position in the state quite different from that occupied by the Church in the West. For centuries the Eastern Church was the dominant political factor. Though it was itself aristocratic, it often checked and mitigated the otherwise absolute rule of kings and princes. The Church in the East, however, was never such a vigorous institution. It was always subservient to the government, and was used to sanction and strengthen the authority of the emperors; so, instead of mitigating an absolute monarchy, the Church helped to make it more absolute and despotic. The East never distinguished itself for efficiency in administration as did the Roman Empire, or even the later empires of Charlemagne, the Ottos, and the Hohenstaufen, but it did distinguish itself in the conduct of its foreign affairs. It developed diplomacy to a fine art. For centuries its successful resistance to its enemies was due more to craft than to military prowess. It kept the barbarians divided and fighting among themselves. It held back the Mohammedan world largely through its control of the sea, and this result was effected partly through a series of alliances with the maritime cities of Italy. Then too, it was partly through Eastern diplomacy that Western Christendom was persuaded to undertake the Crusades, which kept the Moslems engaged for the greater part of two hundred years and gave the East a welcome respite. Thus did a decadent empire preserve itself until the final triumph of the Turks in 1453.

The empire of Charlemagne.—So long as no successful counter-empire was set up in the West, the Byzantine emperors were in a position to maintain a show of authority there; in the accepted theory of the time the unity of the ancient empire was thus preserved. In the year 800 a dramatic event occurred in Rome which established just such a counterclaim. It was then that a remarkable king of the Franks, Charlemagne, was crowned as emperor at the

hands of the pope and before a group of Romans from the city. The meaning of the event in the minds of those who witnessed it was revealed in the shout that went up: "Long life and victory to Charles, Augustus, crowned of God, the great and peace-giving emperor of the Romans." To them the episode signified the restoration of the authority of the Eastern emperors in Rome and in the West. It was a much sought relief from the tyranny of Constantinople; for in the theory of the time the Empire of Charlemagne was not to be differentiated from the old Roman Empire which had preceded it. Charlemagne was the heir to the Roman tradition. As the event was viewed, he had merely returned to the West the Empire which since 476, had been transferred to the East; he was the direct successor to the crown of the Caesars, and the sixty-eighth emperor in line from Augustus. When the Carolingian line (the line of Charlemagne) died out, the crown and the tradition passed on to a new dynasty; but there was no break in the legal continuity of the Empire. Though Charlemagne's reign as emperor lasted only forty-four years, and though his empire disintegrated soon after his death, it is, nevertheless, worthy of separate consideration.

Charlemagne's lands were not so wide as the old Roman Empire, yet they were of impressive proportions. They consisted, roughly, of what is now France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Corsica, and the better part of the Italian peninsula. How had so wide a region been brought under the authority of one man? The answer seems to confirm the theory of those who believe that the origin of states is to be found in force. Beginning his career as a people not particularly to be distinguished from other Germanic tribes, the Franks set in motion from a region near the mouth of the Rhine, and piled conquest upon conquest among the peoples of Western Europe, until the achievement indicated was complete. The mighty enterprise was in no small measure the work of a number of distinguished Frankish kings, among whom Charlemagne stands out as the ablest and most famous—one of the truly significant figures of the Middle Ages. His wise and benevolent rule and his devotion to learning and to public improvement made him a unique figure in his age. He kept comparative peace and order in his realm, constructed bridges and public buildings, developed a government that was relatively efficient, and showed an interest in learning that was not to be equaled in Europe for centuries. He respected the clergy and kept on friendly terms with

Church without, in practice at least, acknowledging its supremacy. He, himself, learned to read and to speak Latin, accomplishments which were rare indeed among the rulers of his day. The Carolingian government was, in form, an absolute, centralized monarchy, all power being vested in, and emanating from, the emperor. Though modelled on that of Rome, it lacked the elaborate administrative machinery of the Roman state and was never so efficiently organized. The imperial court consisted of two classes of retainers: Ministers, which included the counts of the palace, chamberlains, cellarers, and constables; and Ministeriales, grooms, porters, and so on. The king's council, or *curia regis*, served as a sort of cabinet, but was composed entirely of the king's friends, and served in an advisory capacity only. The outlying parts of the Empire were ruled through dukes and counts who, originally holding office for life, were subject to removal by the emperor, and were, therefore, responsible directly to him. They received no salaries but were permitted to keep one-third of the revenues collected in their domains. Four times a year royal messengers, *missi dominici*, were sent to the various provinces on tours of inspection. Thus the emperor kept in touch with all parts of his realm. All new laws or capitularies were drawn up in general assemblies which met twice each year—in spring and autumn. Theoretically, all freemen might sit in these assemblies, but in practice this was impossible. Because of the great distance involved, poor means of communication, and economic considerations such as the inability of the freeman to leave his work—only a small fraction could attend. Thus actual control usually lay with the nobles and the members of the king's household, who were always present. Further, if the assembly became recalcitrant, the emperor might issue decrees which had the force of law. The assembly was not, therefore, an effective check upon imperial authority. All freemen were subject to military service, but the army was actually recruited upon a selective basis; hence the provision of arms came to be associated with the nobility or the fighting class. There was no general system of taxation within the empire, and none was needed, as the expenses of the state were small. All officials were paid in tolls, privileges, land-grants, and the like. Such revenue as the emperor required came from the royal estates, or from special tolls and levies. Indeed, it was customary for him to move from place to place with his retinue, and

demand hospitality from his vassals; consequently the maintenance of his court was not a very heavy burden.

The Holy Roman Empire.—In 814 the great Charlemagne died. His empire at once fell into confusion and soon broke up. The Western empire was gone in fact; but the theory of imperial unity persisted until it was again given a frail embodiment in the tenth century in the creation of the Holy Roman Empire,—a frail embodiment, because upon analysis we are bound to agree to the essential truth of Voltaire's famous epigram, that it was "neither Holy, Roman, nor an Empire." Its only claim to holiness lay in the fact that its existence enjoyed papal sanction—though popes and the emperors were often the bitterest rivals for temporal supremacy. Certainly it was Roman in no real sense. It never embraced more than half the territory of the old Roman Empire; its capital was never at Rome, and all its rulers were Teutonic, and were most of its subjects. Its claim to imperium, too, was weak, because throughout most of its life its authority was nominal, actual power being wielded by local rulers who were subordinate to the emperor only in theory. Yet the name "Holy Roman Empire" persisted as an embodiment of the old ideal of unity, of one church and one empire, the bounds of which were to be continuous. This idea had become so firmly embedded in the medieval mind that it persisted for centuries after all factual basis for it had disappeared.

The new embodiment of the imperial ideal was, at the outset, the work of a king of the German peoples, Otto I, of the Saxon line, and, like the empire of Charlemagne, it was largely a creation of military force. Otto was not even a king in Germany, in the ordinary sense; much of the real political power was in the hands of the great German nobles who had elected Otto as their overlord. During his reign and during the reigns of a succession of German kings, much time and energy were spent in a fruitless struggle between the king and the German dukes, each party to the conflict bent upon tipping the political scales in its favor. Nevertheless Otto was ambitious to gain the imperial title.

Conditions in Italy favored the design. There the pope and Italian nobles were at serious odds with the king of Italy and appealed to the powerful Otto for succor. Otto responded with alacrity, and his reward was the imperial crown, placed upon his head with due ceremony by the pope in Rome. Thus was created

first Holy Roman Emperor in 962, and thus, too, began the glorious connection between Germany and Italy. The German emperors were ambitious to restore the ancient political unity of Europe, to make facts correspond with theory; but their desires were never realized. The Holy Roman Empire waxed and waned, but never embraced an area comparable with that of Charlemagne. Roughly, it contained the German lands, to which were added Bohemia, certain lesser Slavic areas, Burgundy, and most of the Italian peninsula.

As already noted, the Holy Roman Empire was not regarded as a new entity, but a mere continuation of an old one. In reality it may be said to have begun with the coronation of Charlemagne. It not only did it begin with Charlemagne, but it may be said to have reached its highest development under him, for the authority of the Holy Roman Emperors as a reality was never comparable to that of Charlemagne. In the first place, they did not hold the imperial office by inheritance; the office was elective, and, in theory, any prince of Europe, whether German, French, English, Spanish, or Italian, might aspire to the title. It was simply due to favorable circumstances that the emperors continued to be of German blood. The power to choose was in the hands of a small group of powerful German nobles called Electors.

It is difficult to generalize concerning the real authority of the emperors, for it rose and fell as strong and capable men or weaker men were raised to the office; but, in general, it may be said that imperial power declined after the twelfth century, and by the opening of the modern era it had become but a shadow. There was no imperial treasury, because the emperor had no power to tax; there was no power to lay imperial customs, for that was a local matter; there was no imperial army, except as the emperor could draw from the lands which he ruled directly as king or nobleman. There was an imperial diet, but it was not a true legislative body of the Empire. Nor was it a truly elective body; it was made up of the seven electors composing one house or estate, the lesser nobles composing another, and representatives from the towns composing a third. It was largely a clearing house for the settlement of differences among individual nobles or groups. Each body, being jealous of its local privileges and power, looked upon the authority of the emperor with the utmost suspicion, so that such fundamental legislation as would have created real political unity

and made the emperor's authority effective, was successfully defeated. Besides, there was the rising power of the Roman Church to clip still further the wings of aspiring emperors. Thus the imperial title conferred a certain prestige and dignity, but little else. Nevertheless, the Empire staggered on down through the centuries until its final dissolution in 1806.

The medieval Church in politics.—Neither the Carolingian state nor the Holy Roman Empire achieved the political unity of European society. From the point of view of the magnitude of the plan, the Church offers the most impressive example of an attempt at the centralization of political power during medieval times. A glimpse of the political position of the Church was given in an earlier chapter. Here we shall examine the development and character of its political power.

While the political functions assumed by the Roman Catholic Church were in a sense incidental to the character of its fundamental religious aims, they were, nevertheless, wide in their scope and tremendous in their power, when the Church stood at the peak of its authority. To explain the phenomenon we need first to recall the strength of the Church at the opening of the Middle Ages, contrasted with the relative weakness of political institutions. The Church was in its pristine vigor when the Roman state fell in decay. The Empire fell, but the Church carried on. It will be recalled that it was this disintegration of civil authority and civil agencies that invited the Church, already providing intellectual and spiritual leadership, to assume political leadership as well, in a number of directions. Nor must we forget the permeating power that resided in the institution by reason of its remarkable organization, based as it was in large measure on the organization of the Roman Empire itself. If we add to all this the power that came from its immense landholdings and the influence of its clergy over the minds of the people, we shall not find it surprising that when the time became ripe the Church should attempt to assume political supremacy in Europe as a logical consequence of its many-sided authority.

But the time was not ripe for such assumption of supremacy in the earlier centuries of the Middle Ages. Tradition was strong in its defense of the political supremacy of the emperor. During the closing years of the Roman Empire the belief had become widespread that the Empire was eternal, and that "God had appointed

emperor to rule over the world, giving him supremacy over it." The belief was obviously consistent with the theory of imperial authority which persisted during the Middle Ages. If such a belief could be realized in fact, the Church must obviously take a subordinate position in relation to the state. To a considerable degree Charlemagne was able to maintain supremacy for the state. But history was preparing the way for a pronouncement of Church authority that was destined to overshadow the authority of princes. In the eleventh century Europe was a welter of confusion and political weakness; feudalism was at its height; the "age of Disorder" had arrived. There sat upon the papal throne toward the close of the eleventh century one of the most powerful personages to occupy that seat, Gregory VII. With him the claims of the Church were to receive their most decisive and far-reaching character up to that time.

Papal claims to supremacy.—The papal theory which Gregory VII initiated stood in direct opposition to imperial supremacy. According to the Petrine theory, Christ had designated the apostle Peter as his successor. "Our Lord, Jesus Christ," said Gregory, "made the blessed St. Peter ruler over the kingdoms of this world." The significance of the event, as the papacy viewed it, was that the Church, standing at the head of God's kingdom on earth, was eternal, rather than the empire; and "in place of the emperor, the pope was, by divine right, the ruler of the world, having the right to make and depose emperors and kings." In any conflict between temporal and spiritual authority the Church held the latter to possess the superior position, for temporal authority is a material and therefore an ephemeral thing, while the spiritual is of God and eternal. Thus were popes to be the arbiters in the temporal concerns of princes; princes held their power as a kind of trusteeship, and were amenable to the Church for the execution of their trust in accordance with Christian principles. Failing in such duty they might be disciplined by excommunication, by the absolving of their subjects from obedience; and, as popes had the power to make kings and emperors, so did they have authority to unmake them by deposing them.

Such, in brief, was the theory of papal supremacy. Were the popes able to realize their claims in fact? They were to a considerable degree, because circumstances favored their ambitions. The comparative feebleness of political institutions must not be for-

gotten. In the solution of numerous problems, medieval princes had grown accustomed to lean upon the powerful Church for aid. Popes, being called in to support the ambitions of princes or to act as arbiters, demanded and received their rewards. One of the Carolingians, the father of Charlemagne, had once given lands to the popes. Far more spectacular was the so-called Donation of Constantine, by which, in return for a miraculous cure performed upon him by Pope Sylvester, the emperor was said to have given to the pope and his successors wide lands, and to have conferred upon them a "constitutional sovereignty over all the Western Empire." Much later the whole episode was proved to be a myth, and the document a forgery; but for the time being these incidents exerted their influence in support of papal claims. Numerous quotations from the Scriptures were also resorted to, to bolster up the position of the Church. But more powerful, perhaps, was the appeal which the popes were able to make to history. The practice of anointing kings and emperors, and their coronation at the hands of the popes, had furnished a basis for the assertion that the authority of princes was derived from the power of the Church. Upon such foundations did the temporal power rise to its heights in the middle centuries of the medieval period; after the thirteenth the decline was rapid in the face of the development of strong national monarchies.

The Papal States in Italy.—Finally, in considering the rôle which the medieval Church played in the field of politics, it must not be forgotten that the popes gradually established their rule over a considerable part of the Italian peninsula, the so-called Papal States, lying north and south of the Tiber, with their capital at Rome. The territorial basis of this principality was a grant of certain Italian lands to the popes, to which were later added neighboring lands by the activity of the popes themselves. Territorial claims were also based upon asserted rights under the spurious Donation of Constantine mentioned above. After the fall of the Western emperors, the popes, by reason of their superior position as heads of the Church, had always exerted a considerable influence and authority in Rome; but they at first made no claims to sovereignty over the territory. For many years they recognized the authority of the Byzantine emperors. With the establishment of the empire of Charlemagne they transferred their allegiance to him. When, however, the time became ripe for the proclaiming of their sovereignty over Rome and the surrounding territory, they appealed

the Donation of Constantine as a constitutional basis of their aim. By the close of the Middle Ages they had come to exercise their Italian possessions powers like those of lay princes, and they freely involved themselves in the diplomacy and intrigue which characterized politics and international relations throughout the checkered career of the peninsula. Not until after the unification of Italy was completed did the popes (1870) relinquish their temporal authority in the Papal States, and then only after decisive defeat by the Italian armies.

THE TREND TOWARD POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION

It is quite clear that the Roman conception of unity exerted a powerful influence upon the imagination of medieval rulers and upon political institutions. But a mere theory of the state is difficult of realization if the facts of life are opposed. And so it was in this case; the theory persisted but political realities did not conform. The high point in making theory and fact one, in the West, came with the establishment of Charlemagne's empire, as we have observed; but his achievements, impressive as they were, fell far short of the complete realization of the ideal. Signs of disintegration had appeared even before his death, and with his passing came confusion; and the political structure which he and his ancestors had reared at a prodigious cost of labor fell to pieces. Accompanying the process of disruption, a counter movement set in toward political localism. The establishment of the Holy Roman Empire meant centralization in theory, but in practice it proved feeble to check the growth of local political authority.

The collapse of imperial authority.—The influences that retarded the realization of a universal state in Europe present too tangled a skein to unravel here. But the situation offers a point of interest to the student of human institutions which should not be wholly overlooked. The collapse of the Carolingian empire illustrates well the circumstances under which institutions may change or pass away. The relaxing of the strong and able hands of Charlemagne is not the explanation of the collapse. Even had his statesmanship continued it could only have slowed up decentralization; with his authority placed in much weaker hands after his death, the process was quickened. The essential fact was that the government was no longer capable of exercising the functions of

a state; it could not keep order within, and it could not defend population from dangers from without. The weakness of rule combined with the absence of adequate means of communication and transportation, made government helpless during a critical period.

And a critical period had arrived. The establishment of Mohammedan power in Northern Africa and Spain, alluded to earlier in this volume, exposed the European communities along the Mediterranean to numerous attacks. The ninth and tenth centuries added new dangers along the northern and western frontiers of Christendom when conditions in the region of the Baltic set in motion fresh bands of Germanic invaders—the Northmen. Taking to the sea these hardy, warlike people made discoveries and settlements in Iceland and Greenland, made conquest in the British Isles, forced a landing in France and founded the Normandy, launched their war boats on the rivers and penetrated into the more civilized lands to the south. These events largely created the crisis which the government was helpless to meet. The result was that great nobles everywhere organized the populations of their locality for the defense of their lives and property. Such, baldly put, were the decisive beginnings of a great decentralizing movement that issued in feudalism and the feudal system.

The feudal system.—Feudalism appears to be a kind of organization which grows logically out of such conditions as existed in Europe in the ninth and tenth centuries. At any rate, it was peculiar either to the Middle Ages or to Europe; it has existed as widely separated regions as Egypt, Japan, and Madagascar. But it is with feudalism as it existed in Europe in the Middle Ages that we are primarily interested here. Its roots may be found both in Roman and Teutonic practices, and vestiges of it persist well into the modern era.

If the lands over which a feudal noble—a duke, a count, an earl or a baron—were extensive, he usually divided his holdings among other nobles, who, in their turn, might subdivide what they had received, and place portions in the hands of still other lords. The one who had thus received land became the vassals of him who had bestowed it. Thus most lords were also vassals. Between vassal and lord there existed a contract sealed by a solemn oath. Under this contract the vassal entered into such relations to his overlord that the latter was empowered, not only to administer local govern-

it, but to perform acts which, at first sight, appear to be functions only of a sovereign state. First, under the feudal contract, vassal was obligated to make payments to his lord at stated times, and under stated conditions. Second, he was bound to the lord in government by furnishing counsel to his lord, and by sitting in the feudal courts. Third, he was bound to furnish his lord with a stipulated number of armed knights for service in the lord's army when occasion should demand. It was for these noble and honorable services that he received and occupied his lands.

Thus the feudal lord looks much like an independent prince and the organized community much like a state. He had his feudal revenues from his vassals, and material support from still other sources, all of which were due him by virtue of his authority as lord. He enjoyed judicial powers exercised through his feudal courts, whose jurisdiction might not ordinarily be invaded. He commanded an army as truly as any independent prince. He might exact dues from those who transported goods over his feudal domains. In some cases he enjoyed the right to issue his own coinage. He might even enter into political alliances with other nobles or with kings. Did, then, these political entities constitute sovereign states? The term is sometimes applied to them, but such designation is open to question. It can hardly be said that a noble sovereign who is himself a vassal to some other lord to whom he is bound by the obligations of a vassal. According to feudal theory he could not be wholly independent. In reality, however, he might make himself independent if he could muster the military strength to defy his lord successfully, for this was the Age of Force, when solemn oaths and feudal contracts were too weak to hold an ambitious vassal who might possess superior power. For a considerable time the Dukes of Normandy were thus independent in fact, by reason of the reduction of their vassals to a state of submission and their decisive defeat of the king of France, who was their overlord. Even though the term "state" might perhaps be applied in such a case, it is not accurate to speak of all feudal entities in this way.

With the establishment of the feudal system, practically all of Europe became a vast political checkerboard of many hundreds of these local governments, a checkerboard over which the feudal nobles maneuvered their armies in perpetual warfare to maintain and extend their glory and power. There were kings, to be sure, but

their real authority was little more than that which they maintained over the lands which they ruled directly—that is, as feudal lords. In fact, some of their lands they themselves held as vassals. The English king John held his English realm as a fief from the pope, and the Continental lands of the Norman kings of England were held as fiefs of the king of France. The medieval Church was likewise drawn into the feudal system, since it owned land which was subject to vassals on feudal tenure. It did, however, do all in its power to ameliorate the evils of feudalism. In the interest of peace it instituted the “Truce of God” and the “Peace of God”—holidays when fighting was forbidden—and it hallowed the practices of chivalry, such as succor to the weak and defenseless, and magnanimity to the vanquished.

The feudal system is commonly conceived as embracing two sets of quite different relations: (1) the relations between lord and vassal, which were honorable relations between nobles, that is, between social equals who belonged to the ruling and fighting class; (2) the relations between noble and ignoble, that is, relations between the socially superior and the socially inferior. The former were the bases of feudalism proper; the latter of the manorial system. The former were feudal relations; the latter manorial relations. The two sets of relations were intimately bound up with each other, but they are clearly distinguishable and should not be confused. Feudalism was a form of local, private government; the manorial system, as indicated in an earlier chapter, was a form of economic organization. The latter served as the physical foundation upon which the former rested, and by which it was sustained. The manorial system existed before feudalism was established, and remained after feudalism was destroyed. As a form of government, feudalism was little better than organized confusion; but it served society as something better than complete anarchy during the interval of something like five centuries between the collapse of centralized government and the establishment of the national state.

The city-states.—For some time, side by side with the so-called feudal states there existed another form of local political organization—the city-states. How did they arise? The physical basis of feudalism was agriculture; the feudal nobility were a landed aristocracy, whose position and power were derived from land. It will be recalled that in the eleventh century there appeared in European society a burgher class whose interests were industrial and com-

cial rather than agricultural. These dwellers in the towns, like the dwellers on the manor, were at first under the authority of the nobles to whom they were obligated to pay certain dues. But from their very character, industrial and commercial pursuits did not fit into the manorial arrangement of agricultural society; and the economic interests of the burghers were sharply opposed to those of the feudal nobility. The burgher longed for peace, law, and order, the feudal nobility comprised a class born to rule and to fight, to whom war was the highly esteemed instrument of glory and all that made life worth living. This conflict of aims and interests found expression in a struggle between the two classes, resulting finally in the emancipation of the towns from feudal authority. Towns able to cut the bonds completely became independent, and organized their communities into city-states. And those not so fortunate were able to maintain a local autonomy that set them apart politically from those who dwelt on the manor. The towns, as we have seen, appeared for the most part at points of strategic importance in matters of trade and industry—along the Mediterranean, particularly in the Italian peninsula; in the Celtic area; in the Netherlands; along the water courses and other important highways of internal trade. Italy, in the Middle Ages, was a veritable congeries of these burgher communities called *communes*.

The communes of Italy developed into city-states by a series of political changes. When the authority of the Church declined, magistrates called consuls began to replace the ecclesiastical authorities of importance, just as the latter had replaced the imperial authorities at the dissolution of the Roman Empire. The consuls, themselves formerly subservient to emperor or pope, now came to occupy the position of presidents of small, independent commonwealths. Out of these communes grew the cities, among the foremost of which we find Venice, Florence, Milan, Genoa, Pisa, Pavia, Verona, Parma, Piacenza, Parma, Modena, Reggio, Bologna, Ravenna, Lucca, Siena.¹ These great cities often held sway over the smaller ones in their immediate vicinity, and they frequently fought with each other for commercial supremacy.

Though the city-states in Italy arose as democratic republics in form, they were by no means pure democracies. At first, all legisla-

Rome, of course, was the foremost city in Italy, but its growth far antedates that of the commune, which was of little importance before the tenth century.

tive power belonged to general assemblies which met and passed measures by shouting "Fiat! Fiat!" But this was purely formal. There was no parliamentary organization and no debate, and the assemblies rarely did more than assent to measures proposed by the consuls. Further, these bodies were not truly representative, but, as a rule, composed of members of notable families—or at least dominated by them. Gradually the meetings of the assemblies became less frequent and less significant until in the later years of the city-states the militia was the nearest approach to a popular assembly. There continued in existence certain councils of state but they were in no real sense representative legislatures.

The real authority of government was vested in the magistracy of consuls. The composition of this body varied from city to city but as a rule it consisted of from four to twenty men, elected annually. At first, they were chosen by the local bishops and viscounts but these officials quickly declined in power, and the magistracy became virtually self-perpetuating; that is, the outgoing consuls were able to select their successors. Thus the consulships became a monopoly of a few noble families. The consuls possessed executive and judicial power, appointing and supervising all nobles, judges, and subordinate administrative officials. Practically they possessed the legislative power also, throughout a greater part of the time, due to the decline of the assemblies and the subservience of the councils.

The complete political authority which thus came to be concentrated in the magistracy of consuls did not remain there. By about 1200, the plural magistracy began to give way to a single, or principal, magistrate called the *podesta*, who may be likened to the modern city-manager, except that the responsibility of the *podesta* for his acts was not so effectively provided for. He was usually, though not always, an outsider, chosen for his administrative abilities. He had command of the army and the police force, and directed internal affairs, though he was not supposed to control legislation or foreign affairs. From here, the transition to complete dictatorship was relatively brief and simple. Though the fiction of election and responsibility continued, by the end of the Middle Ages most of the Italian city-states had fallen under virtual dictators—as the pope in Rome, the dukes in Naples and Ravenna, and the doges of Venice and Genoa, who ruled through bureaucracies composed of dependent nobles.

The German cities on the shores of the North and Baltic seas developed somewhat later than the Italian cities. They came to occupy a position of practical independence limited only by the fact that they formed themselves, for commercial purposes, into a sort of confederation called the Hanseatic League. One advantage of this confederation was that there was less rivalry and warfare between these northern cities than between those in Italy. The governments of the Hanse towns made little pretense of direct democracy, yet they never became wholly autocratic or despotic. They remained plutocratic from first to last. The patrician merchants kept affairs pretty largely in their own hands through their control of the *raths* or councils, though occasionally they were forced to compromise with the burghers or with the craft guilds. Small merchants and working men had very little voice in government, except through their trade or craft guilds, each guild enjoying a measure of political autonomy, with corresponding authority over its members.

The government of the League—if it can be called a government—was carried on through an assembly called the Hansetage, which was irregularly held and scantily attended. The League made no attempt to regulate the internal affairs of its member cities, but confined its activities to the protection of trade routes and the adjustment of commercial disputes. There was nothing corresponding to a federal executive or judiciary. The expenses of the League were met by direct levies on the merchants of the Hanse, rather than by contributions of the member cities.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATIONAL STATES

To one living in the twentieth century all these political forms look strange—universal empires, feudal states, city-states. They look strange because national states are now the approved political type. How did it come about that medieval political organizations lost their hold upon society, and Europe became cut up into political units called national states? The elements that produced the change and their rise in the Middle Ages and emerged as a mighty force called nationalism. In Western history nationalism has been like a great river with many tributaries. As it flowed it gained momentum, and in the nineteenth century it became an irresistible flood. Nationalism needs to be understood because it probably reveals

more of the character of contemporary civilization than any other single influence.

Cultural nationalism and political nationalism.—Nationalism is not simple to define. As a force working in society it may be understood by its works. The result of nationalism is the nation which may exhibit itself in the form of a cultural group merely or in the form of a political entity called a national state. The two are not the same. There are nations that are not states. In their culture the French Canadians represent a nation, but they are not a state; they are part of the Canadian state. Before the World War the Poles were a nation, but they were distributed among the German and Russian empires and the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy. These peoples—Canadian-French and Poles and others that might be mentioned—are the creation of what is called cultural nationalism. When, for the purpose of preserving national culture, a people turn to political nationalism they strive to establish their separate political independence. If they are successful they create a national state; if not, they usually remain a nation but they are not a state. Cultural nationalism and political nationalism are likely to be present together, and fundamentally they are products of the same thing—a sense of nationality.

The sense of nationality is a cohesive force within the national group. It is a sense of solidarity, a consciousness of belonging together, of having common fundamental interests. The members of such a group are conscious of similarity and sympathy with their kind, and of difference and antagonism with those who are not their kind. The characteristic behavior of their kind looks familiar, friendly, and natural; the characteristic behavior of those not their kind looks strange and uncongenial. This cultural bias holds cultural kinsmen together and repels the foreigner. Emotionally this group solidarity expresses itself in patriotism—a love of the fatherland. But patriotism may be local in its attachment, not national. It widens as communication and contacts with communities widen. The process reaches its limits when it strikes the frontiers of a common culture, when the forbidding walls of what is different and strange are reached. Local solidarity gradually gives ground to national solidarity, and local patriotism is gradually overborne by national patriotism.

The basis of this sense of nationality is complex. In general it appears to grow out of a more or less common cultural heritage

common memories of the past, suffering in a common cause, joys in a common triumph, a sense of deep common interests—all enter into the life of the nation. Yet the accidents of history have produced many anomalies in nations. One would expect commonness of race to be one of the bases of the nation. It is to some degree, but lines of nationality do not coincide with racial lines. A moment's thought shows that national lines cut across racial lines in Europe. Not a single European nation embraces a pure racial group. A negro or a Chinese born in this country may be as strongly American as a Bostonian descended from Mayflower stock. A common language would seem to be essential. It is important, but not indispensable. The Swiss constitute a nation, but in different regions of the country different languages are spoken—German, French, and Italian. A common religion may be an important bond, but a moment's reflection reveals differences of religious belief in practically all nations. Great historical emergencies have played a considerable part. The long dynastic wars in the last centuries of the Middle Ages, in which the French fought to prevent the partition of France by the English kings, slowly awakened a national consciousness in France. The long struggle of the Spanish to rid the peninsula of the Moors stimulated national feeling among the divided Spanish.

How nations became national states.—All of these forces and others contributed to create the nations of the Western world. But it is doubtful that they alone would ever have created the political entities called national states during the Middle Ages and early modern period, for the early national monarchies were not the result of the deliberate ambition of the masses of the populations to construct politically united states. The people had no such ambition, it was outside their experience and powers of imagination. Not until the French Revolution, with its battle cry of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity," did nationalism in this sense become a dominant creative force in the building of nation states. Then nationalism became political, dynamic, and well-nigh irresistible—the nationalism that we know in our own civilization. But in the earlier period, when the absolute monarchies were emerging as national political organizations, the welding force came from the will of the strong absolute princes, whose will to power and dynastic grandeur drove them to unite the communities within their realms under the royal political power. It was they who beat down the local authority of the feudal nobles by war and diplomacy; it

was they who disputed successfully the ambitions of medieval emperors to draw the royal lands into their imitation Roman empire and the pretensions of the popes to interfere in the temporal concerns of the kings. Undoubtedly they were aided by the fact that a nation and a national sense had developed, but it was not the people who fought to bring the national monarchy into being; it was dynastic armies who neither knew nor cared what the king was about; there were no national armies in the modern sense. The towns, it is true, afforded conspicuous aid, for the burghers were interested in law, order, and peace as most conducive to the fruitful pursuit of business, industry, and trade, and they came to realize that the best way to get these things was through a national authority in the hands of kings; so the towns generally supported the king in their political ambitions. But it was the rulers, not the masses who were the master builders of the early national states, and even in the nineteenth century, when political nationalism had become powerful, such national states as Germany and Italy were in considerable degree the work of kings and powerful ministers working from above.

It took centuries to complete these early political amalgamations. As we look back over the scene we are inclined to think that it was a high time that such a change was brought about. The old order had lost its efficiency and a new one was needed. Feudalism had become out of joint with the times, and separate city-states as well as the Society was growing tired of the anarchy of the feudal age. Commerce and industry, hampered by the innumerable tolls levied by each petty state through which trade passed, demanded the protection that only a new and more comprehensive economy could give. Thus there was a decided need for a state more exalted and powerful than the feudal barony or the city-state. The process was only well started by the beginning of the modern era. England, France, and Spain were the leaders in establishing political unity, but Portugal and Holland were not far behind. Germany and Italy, however, were delayed until the second half of the nineteenth century. Once started, nationalism spread rapidly to become the most impressive factor in our political life.

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CHAPTER XXVII

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN MODERN SOCIETY

THE development of national monarchies ruled by absolute kings created a new political pattern for European society; but, as we have seen, one not universally adopted. For although absolute monarchies were typical of the early modern period, few of them had become nation-states; such states as those in the Italian peninsula and in German lands were more truly remnants of feudal territories now considerably enlarged by conquest or other means. The process of drawing or hammering those feudal remnants into national states is a characteristic feature of political development down to our own time. Nor had all the medieval city-states been extinguished by the beginning of the modern period; they still flourished in Italy, and some of the German imperial towns continued to enjoy a large measure of independence. It is quite evident then, that 1600 does not mark a general uprooting of medieval political institutions. In general, we may say that the transition from the Middle Ages to modern times was characterized not so much by a complete change of institutions as by a change in emphasis. In the Middle Ages, the elements of the national state were present, and theories of absolute monarchy were held, but the emphasis was on feudalism. In the early modern period the influence of feudalism still persisted, but the emphasis had now shifted to absolute monarchy, and the political trend was toward the national state.

ABSOLUTE MONARCHY

The theory and practice of absolute monarchy based on divine right to rule are as old as written history—probably older. They immediately come to mind rulers of the ancient Near East who were themselves deified, or who claimed to rule by divine sanction. Usually they traced their ancestry to some god or goddess. This was distinctly an Oriental idea, but it was not at all repugnant to Western rulers once they became acquainted with it and saw its

possibilities. Alexander the Great embraced it after his conquest of the East. So did the Roman emperors three hundred years later. The idea persisted throughout the Middle Ages, in slightly varied form, in the Holy Roman Emperor, who claimed divineunction, transmitted through the pope; and the pope himself sometimes played the rôle of a divinely appointed temporal sovereign. With the growth of the national states in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, absolute monarchy based on the theory of divine right became the accepted form of government.

In fact, it was not until the seventeenth century that the theory took on its attributes and implications in complete form. It was a French churchman, Bossuet, and an English king, James I, who gave the theory classic expression. According to them a prince was not ordinary clay; he was anointed of God, and his person took something of divinity itself. His authority was absolute and autocratic and came direct from God to whom, and to whom only, he was responsible. It followed that rebellion became a religious sin, as well as an offense against the state. It was impious and sacrilegious to question what a king might do, or to rise against him. If he was weak or unjust in his rule, the only recourse of the injured subject was to pray that the heart of the prince might be changed. The effect of the whole conception was to inspire the subjects with awe of the royal person, induce obedience, and check any disposition to revolt.

Under the theory, the prince was essentially the state; sovereignty resided in his person. He was the source of political power in which not even the highest of the nobility might share, not to mention the articulate mass of the commons. He was the fountain of justice; in large measure the words of his mouth became the law of the land. He imposed the religion of the state upon his subjects. Those who dared to deviate from the religious pattern set by the king must suffer the disabilities and penalties imposed upon heretics and nonconformers. Under the doctrine of mercantilism, as already observed, the subject's economic activity was regulated in detail by the royal authority. Even the intellectual life was regulated by the sovereign and the Church in ways that would seem intolerable today. While the lines of the picture drawn here were somewhat softened in certain respects in England, they held largely true even here, particularly until absolutism was overthrown by the Revolution of 1688.

Although there were many fulminations against it, absolute monarchy lived down to the twentieth century and died hard. In such countries as Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, some of the characteristic features of absolutism still remained until they were given their death blow as a result of the World War. And even now, as we shall see later in this discussion, new political trends, absolutist in their dominating spirit, are again becoming a force in modern political life. As absolute monarchy gave ground to opposing forces—here suddenly through violent revolution, and there slowly by orderly processes of change—a new type of political control emerged, usually described as popular government.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT

No definite time or place can be designated as the starting point of popular government. Examples and precedents may be found in ancient and medieval times. Even the most autocratic governments were subject, at times, to a modicum of popular control—feared revolution often forced the sovereign to take some account of public opinion. We scarcely need concern ourselves here with the ancient experiments in popular government, as they contribute comparatively little to modern forms. By the growth of popular government in modern times we refer to the increasing limitations and restraints imposed upon the king, and the gradual transfer of power to parliaments and assemblies that were, in theory at least, representative of a considerable portion of the population. Typically the transfer was accompanied by the establishment of written constitutions which placed rather definite legal limitations upon what the king or other executive might do in the exercise of his authority.

So far as modern governments are concerned that transfer came in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as indicated in an earlier chapter. A new political philosophy expounding the right of the people to control their government had gradually been shaping itself over a considerable period, but not until the American Revolution do we find the beginning of a series of movements designed to establish the principle in fact. England offers an exception to this chronology, to be sure, since absolutism was laid definitely to rest in the late seventeenth century, and Parliament assumed the sovereign position in British government; but it was not until the

teenth century that Parliament came to represent anything approaching democratic control.

Development of popular government in England.—England is usually cited as an illustration of the orderly development of popular government. Scarcely had the kingdom been unified and powers of the king consolidated when there began a movement on the part of the nobles to check the sovereign in the arbitrary exercise of the royal prerogatives. In 1215 the English Barons, at Runnymede, forced King John to accept the Great Charter. By this charter it was agreed that: "No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send upon him, except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."

The same document, in a later passage, attempts to guarantee these and other rights by authorizing the barons to elect twenty-four of their number to see that the laws were observed, and to proceed against the king with arms and to seize his castles and estates should he continue to disregard the rights of his free subjects. In the evolution of popular government Magna Charta is of great historical significance because it established the principle that English kings were not above the law of the land, that there were legal limitations upon the royal authority that might be overstepped only at the king's peril. The provisions set down in the Charter did not guarantee the rights of the people as a whole, to be sure, as the term "freemen" embraced a relatively small portion of the English people. The Charter was extorted from the king by the nobles, and mainly for their own benefit; but it did pave the way for the development of more general rights, inasmuch as the principles here embodied were later extended to all the people of England.

Many documents and declarations entered into the foundations of the liberties of the English people, but the significant check upon the royal power came about through the development of Parliament, and in this development the true foundation of popular government was laid. The British parliament, like other institutions, is of evolutionary origin. Its beginning was not brought about as a result of demands from the people, or of any class thereof, for a greater voice in the government. Instead, the kings themselves called it into being as a means by which they might increase their own powers. Having established their rulership over extensive areas, the monarchs of the late Middle Ages found that their powers

could be enhanced and their royal coffers enriched by calling counsel from the most influential persons in their realm. The act was taken without thought of surrendering any power or even danger of any future loss. The immediate result was an increase in the power of the king, and that was the object he was seeking. On the other hand, Parliament became a permanent feature of the government of England, however, it steadily gained in authority—principally through its control of the purse—until its power completely eclipsed that of the king. It is now the undisputed sovereign in England. The English parliament is often called the mother of parliaments not only because England was the first modern country to develop a representative legislative assembly, but also because all legislatures of today are, to some extent, modeled after it. When the Continental countries, one after another, threw absolutism overboard, it was from England they learned how to set up the machinery necessary to give practical effect to the political theories that placed the people in an important position in government.

Theoretical bases of popular government.—Outside of England no country presents so orderly a continuity in the development of popular government. Where revolutionary movements even occurred in popular government, they were the outward expression of new political theories. This does not mean that the new theories caused the revolutionary changes, so much as that they were attempts to rationalize and justify political changes that had come to seem desirable as a means of realizing the interests of the unprivileged classes. As pointed out earlier in this book, the institutions of the Old Order had ceased to be effective social instruments for the satisfaction of human needs and desires; social change had outrun institutional change. Only by a process of modification or destruction could institutions be brought into readjustment. The middle class, the so-called bourgeoisie, and to a degree the agricultural class had become too powerful to permit their interests and rights to be ignored any longer. It is not necessary to review those interests again, but it is well to remember the absence of economic liberty and equality, the denial of religious freedom, the glaring social inequalities. It was these barriers to self-realization that unenfranchised classes hoped to remove by means of the political instruments which popular governments would place in their hands. Thus the institutionalizing of the new political ideas was thought of as a means to an end, not an end in itself.

How nicely political theories were contrived to meet the needs of time has already been discussed.¹ We have seen how the theory of natural rights was used as an effective weapon against the traditional privileges of the aristocracy; how the social contract afforded the fulcrum in prying up the ancient foundations of absolutism and divine right, even to the extent of justifying revolution, and at the same time provided a theoretical basis of popular control. As one writer has put it, the divine right of kings had given way to the divine right of the people.

Although this theoretical basis of popular control no longer appears to bear close examination, and although no new theory quite so positive has been evolved to replace it, the idea of popular sovereignty is as firmly intrenched today as at any time during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The older theories of the divine right of kings or the historical rights of aristocracies have been shown to be as naïve and absurd as the theory of the natural rights of man and the theory of the social contract; and since no new theory—down to the post-war period at least—has been formulated that presents a worthy challenger of the democratic idea, democracy continues to hold a wide support.

Moreover, other defenses have been thrown about popular sovereignty; it has been defended on the moral grounds of abstract justice, on grounds of expediency, and by the pragmatic test of results. Once the theory of divine right was exploded, it seemed eminently just that every man should have some voice in his own government. Those who argue from expediency assert that the people, having once perceived their power, will never permit a regression to autocracy or aristocracy; thus, they argue, popular government becomes the only possible government in the modern world. Finally, it is asserted that popular sovereignty or democracy, bungling and inefficient as it may be at times, justifies itself in the long run. By its superior claims upon the loyalty of its people, it has a latent strength that enables it to withstand shocks that would cause the strongest autocracy to crumble. In support of this claim, it is pointed out that, in spite of the fact that some of our governments were highly efficient, all of the great autocratic empires broke under the strain of the World War, while the democratic countries emerged politically intact. It will be pointed out in

¹ p. 283 ff.

the following chapter, however, that democracy has not been proved infallible, and that it is subject to considerable criticism.

The legal or constitutional basis of popular governments

As long as governments remain autocratic or aristocratic in form there is little reason for establishing permanent rules respecting organization and powers. A single monarch or dictator may theoretically determine for himself what powers he shall exercise, and therefore, he may set up and reorganize his subordinate administrative agencies as he sees fit. The same is true in a general way with respect to aristocracies. Their only problem is that of drawing some plan by which they may reach agreements among themselves.

With the establishment of democratic forms of government, however, the problem of organization and powers becomes more fundamental. Except for the mass meeting of the people in a pure democracy, all of the branches of government are established merely as agencies of the people for the purpose of carrying out the popular will. It therefore becomes necessary for the people, in establishing a representative form of government, to lay down rules with respect to the structure of the governmental agency, the methods by which that agency shall operate, and the powers which it, or any of its branches, shall be permitted to exercise. Many minor regulations may, of course, be left to the decision of the higher authorities of the government itself; but the fundamental ones must be beyond the control of those authorities, either by express legal provision or by custom so well grounded in tradition that no attempt will be made to bring about a change except in response to a clear and direct expression of the popular will.

This body of rules according to which the government of a state is established and operates is known as the constitution. A constitution may take one or more of a number of forms, depending primarily upon the conditions under which it has been established or developed. For instance, while we in America are prone to think of a constitution as a single written document adopted and amended through some special procedure prescribed therein, we find that the French constitution consists of three documents framed and adopted at different times; and it is often said, though erroneously, that England has no written constitution.

Just as England gives us the best illustration of the development of popular government, so does she also present the outstanding illustration of the evolution of constitutional government. For

through a process of progressively placing limitations upon the
ing and prescribing rules for the operation of government—the es-
sential characteristics of a constitution—that popular government
was finally brought into being. Since the development of democ-
racy was gradual, it was natural that the constitution should be
made piece by piece. Many of the provisions were committed to
writing, in such documents as the Magna Charta and the Bill of
Rights, and in statutes of Parliament regulating the succession to
the throne, the suffrage, the powers of the House of Lords, and
other similar matters. Other provisions, however, have never been
reduced to writing, but have, through custom, received general
recognition and acceptance. At no time has it been considered
necessary in England to incorporate all of these rules in a single
document. Parliament, being legally sovereign, has the power to
alter the constitutional rules at will, in the same way as it enacts
other laws; but, as a matter of practice built up by tradition, it
does not make any important modifications in them without a defi-
nite mandate from the people.

In the United States, on the other hand, the conditions under
which the constitution was established were different. A new state
was formed after the Revolution, and a new government had to be
set up. It was therefore necessary to draw up a set of rules for the
government within a relatively short period of time. What would
be more natural than to attempt to put all of the essential rules into
a single document? Furthermore, the dominant political philoso-
phies of the eighteenth century emphasized the ideas that govern-
ments were established by compact, that individuals had certain
“unalienable rights” against their governments, and that somehow
the people could set up “governments of laws” which could not be
manipulated to satisfy the whims of those in authority at any par-
ticular time. The result was that limitations upon governments were
set down in the form of contracts or “thou-shalt-not” command-
ments which supposedly could be changed only by some method be-
yond the control of the governmental authorities. Other countries,
in which absolute governments were overthrown by revolution or
forced to concede certain powers to their citizens, followed the
American idea of adopting constitutions in the form of single writ-
ten documents, so that today England is the only state of any con-
sequence which has no document to which it can point as “the con-
stitution.”

But as our constitution, or any constitution, grows older, it tends to take on a character more and more like that of Great Britain. New rules are set down in writing, partly by formal addition to the original document, but much more frequently in separate documents such as our Supreme Court opinions or acts of Congress. In some other cases customs develop, and—as is the case with our cabinet system—they often come to be looked upon as essential parts of the constitutional system.

It may thus be seen that the form which a constitution takes is relatively unimportant. If the objects attained are the same, it matters not whether the rules are laid down in one document, three documents, or an innumerable collection of documents and unwritten traditions. In fact, any constitution long established takes the last mentioned form.

VARIATIONS IN THE FORM OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS

In an earlier chapter governments were classified as monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies. In sketching the political development of Western society from the Roman imperial period to the eighteenth century, we have been dealing with the first two classes—monarchies and aristocracies. With the rise of popular governments we pass to a consideration of democracies, for, of course, popular governments universally imply some measure of democratic control, although there may be present certain monarchic or aristocratic features, as in the case of England. England is essentially democratic in government, even though she has a king or “monarch” and a House of Lords representing a hereditary aristocracy, for democratic control is effected through the practical supremacy, in the English government, of the House of Commons, which is composed of members elected by universal suffrage.

Direct and indirect democracies.—Although the principle of popular sovereignty is now almost universally accepted, the problem of putting it into satisfactory operation has proved to be a most difficult one. And it must be said that the problem still remains largely unsolved. In the course of attempts to make democracy function, that is, to make the will and decision of the electorate effective in government, two forms of popular government have emerged, direct and indirect democracies—both of which existed in ancient societies.

Direct democracy, or pure democracy, as it is sometimes called, signifies a government in which the laws are made by the people *en masse*. Some modern classic examples of this are the New England towns, governed through town-meetings, and some of the cantons in Switzerland, in which the entire adult male population (theoretically) meets at stated intervals and adopts such policies and legislation as seem necessary or desirable. On the other hand, indirect democracy, which is the system most widely used, refers to government through representatives chosen by the people. Thus, our own state and national governments, along with most of the governments of Europe, are examples of indirect democracies.

Obviously, direct democracy of the type referred to above is not possible except in small communities, and even there its success is questionable. Few of the New England towns retain their "town" form of government after they reach populations of thirty-five or forty thousand, and many smaller ones have abandoned it. Likewise the Swiss cantons, one after another, are turning to the representative system. It is difficult to imagine several thousand citizens reaching conclusions by deliberating together. What actually happens—whether it be in a colonial town-meeting or in any other large body—is that the chairman of the meeting, or some other leader, presents a number of proposals that have been framed by an executive or legislative committee, and the assembled multitude expresses its approval or disapproval. Usually the measures are approved as matters of course. Direct democracy of this sort does not differ greatly from representative democracy, in that, in both cases, most of the governmental policies are formulated by a few leaders.

Initiative and referendum.—Within the last half century a new variation of direct democracy has developed under what is called the initiative and referendum, a device used in Switzerland and in many of our American states. It is intended to check and control unworthy legislatures by re-establishing the direct influence of the electorate over legislation in cases that appear to make such action desirable. In practice the procedure has proved to have serious limitations. Under the initiative and referendum, a certain percentage of the voters may, by petition, propose new legislation or call for a vote of the people on legislation already decided upon by the legislature. The citizens thereby have the power to overrule their representative body. But, except as it employs the secret ballot,

which makes it adaptable to larger communities, the system has advantages over the old mass meeting; while, on the other hand has the disadvantage of making deliberation impossible. Besides the procedure is too cumbersome for frequent effective use, and a great mass of legislation never comes before the people for direct decision. These drawbacks have relegated the device to a relatively unimportant place in modern government.

Though the representative system is subject to many criticisms such as the corruption and inefficiency of political parties and the demagoguery and "bossism" to which the party system lends itself, it does not appear to be any worse off in these respects than direct democracy. In fact, representative democracy seems to be the only kind of democracy possible in large communities, and the most practical sort even in small communities.

VARIATIONS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS

Although most popular governments are now organized according to the principle of representation, there are many variations from state to state with respect to details of organization. For the most part these differences are not of sufficient importance to warrant specific consideration in a general discussion such as this. There are, however, two phases of organization with respect to which two variations will be considered. One is the organization of the executive branch of government in its relation to the legislative branch; the other is the distribution of powers between the central government and the governments of the subdivisions of the state.

Presidential government and cabinet government.—Classified according to the character of the executive, most modern democracies fall readily into one or the other of two well-defined classes: (1) presidential government, found in the United States and in most Latin-American countries; and (2) cabinet government, found in most of the states of Europe and in the British commonwealths. A few governments, such as the council form in Switzerland and the soviet system in Russia, present variations from the typical forms that place them outside both of the classifications mentioned.

It is to be noticed that the name given to the nominal head of the executive or to his advisory council in a particular state is not necessarily indicative of the type of government found in that state.

France has a "president," but its government is not of the presidential type; nor does the United States have a cabinet type of government even though it does have a "cabinet." The distinction between the two types lies in the difference in the nature of the relationship of the executive to the legislative branch exhibited in the two types. Since the head of the executive branch almost inevitably comes to be looked upon as a leader in proposing legislation, this relationship affects the content of the law as much as, if not more than, it does the actual administration of existing law.

What, then, is the difference in the relationships of the executive to the legislative branch that determines whether the government is to be classified as presidential or cabinet in form? In a presidential government the nominal executive head, whether he be a king, a president, a governor, or a mayor, is the actual head. The method by which he attains office may vary from state to state, or from time to time in the same state; but once he is in office, his tenure is independent of the will of the legislative body except in extreme cases where he may be impeached for treason or crime. His principal powers are conferred upon him by the constitution and are not subject to control by the legislature except in so far as its approval may be necessary to validate certain of his acts. He appoints his official advisers and principal assistants—cabinet members—from without the legislative body and with little or no regard for its desires. These subordinate officials, once appointed, are responsible to the executive head, and their tenure of office is dependent upon his will.

The relationship of a presidential executive to the legislative branch is distinctive in another way. In matters of legislation the presidential executive makes recommendations and uses various forms of pressure to obtain passage of his measures; but he does not formally introduce bills, nor does he or any of his cabinet members take part in debate on the floor in the legislative chambers. After bills have been passed by the legislative branch, he has an absolute or qualified veto power. Ordinarily the executive and the legislative branches are controlled by the same political party, with the result that coöperation is secured; but there are times when the legislative policies of the two branches are completely out of accord with each other. In such cases there may be a deadlock between the executive and the legislative body, as was true during the last years of President Wilson's administration.

In the cabinet type of government—known also as “ministerial,” “parliamentary,” and “responsible” government—the relationship of the executive to the legislative branch is quite different. Such a government has a nominal head—a king or president—who has little or no real power. His function is primarily ceremonial, symbolic, and social, although the newer European constitutions give the nominal executive somewhat greater independence and power. The real executive in the cabinet system of government is the ministry, which consists of persons selected from the party or parties controlling a majority of the votes in the legislative branch of the government. Although these are formally appointed by the nominal executive, they are actually dependent upon the legislative branch for their tenure in office. When a new “government”—a name given to the ministry—is to be formed, the nominal executive selects from among the members of the legislative body a person acceptable to the majority of the members to serve as prime minister or chancellor. With the advice of the prime minister the nominal executive selects the other ministers, always keeping in mind that it is necessary for the ministry to have the support of the majority in the legislative body. Each minister serves as the head of one department of the government and is responsible for its administration. Within the ministry there is an inner circle called the cabinet, consisting of some fifteen or twenty members of the ministry. The cabinet members in addition to their individual duties serve collectively as a policy-forming agency. They meet periodically under the leadership of the prime minister to determine the policy of the government both in domestic and in foreign affairs. They cannot, of course, pass laws without the approval of the legislative body, but that approval is usually given, for reasons which will presently be explained.

Unlike the executive head under the presidential form of government, the real executive under the cabinet system has no definite term of office, but is dependent for his tenure upon the pleasure of the majority of the members in the legislative body, or of the most powerful branch of the legislative body. The legislative body may at any time vote to overthrow the ministry, either by the direct vote of “lack of confidence” or by refusal to approve an important policy of the “government.” In such cases the ministry may resign and allow a new “government” to be formed from the majority group in the legislative body, or it may—as it usually does in Great

tain—ask the nominal executive to dissolve the legislative body and call a new election. Such requests are always complied with by the nominal executive, and thereby the voters are allowed to indicate whether the ministry or the majority group enjoys the support of the electorate. When the new legislative body assembles, a ministry is formed from the majority party or parties within the newly elected group, and this ministry in turn remains in office as long as it retains legislative support.

It is apparent, therefore, that there is agreement in matters of policy between the executive and legislative branches under cabinet government. No deadlock will occur unless it occurs within the legislative branch. The members of the ministry, being members of the legislative branch, may introduce bills and debate them on the legislative floor. Thus the executive authority, while being a leader in matters of legislation as well as in matters of executing the law, is at all times responsible to the legislative body and remains in power only so long as it retains the support of that body. As to the nominal head, whether king or president, his part in the governing process is small. He does not select his ministers, and he does not control them. No act of his is valid without the countersignature of a minister, and he cannot refuse his signature to measures passed by the legislative body. The ministry is practically supreme as long as it can command the support of the legislative branch, but it is checked in the arbitrary exercise of its power by the knowledge that it may be turned out of office at any time by an adverse vote of that body. Thus all executive authority is vested in a ministry which is at all times directly responsible to the elected representatives of the people.

It should be clear that the distinction drawn between the presidential and the cabinet type of government is fundamental. It is not merely a distinction of external forms but of the inner workings of the governmental process, and this latter feature is the more important. Once popular government became the established ideal to which modern society aspired, the question of constructing political machinery whereby the will of the electorate might function became primary in its importance. Under the presidential system communities have attempted to solve the problem in one way; under the cabinet form of government they have sought to solve it in another. Considerable discussion has centered about the question as to which of these major types functions the more effectively,

but we shall defer this bit of speculation to the close of our discussion.

Federal and unitary governments.—A less important distinction between governments is made on the basis of the distribution of political power among constituent parts of the state. In every state of any size some of the functions of government necessarily devolve upon relatively minor governments having jurisdiction over their respective subdivisions of the state. The relationship between the central government and these principal local governments varies from country to country. On the basis of this relationship, governments have been classified as either unitary or federal. The classification depends, not upon the existence of subdivisions similar to our states, nor upon the functions of the governments at any particular time, but upon the powers of the central and local governments with respect to each other.

In a unitary government all of the powers granted by the constitution are, in the final analysis, in the hands of the central government of the state. The central government may establish local governments and may delegate some of its powers to the local governments. But the powers thus obtained may be exercised by them only so long as the central government sees fit to have them exercised so. The central government may overrule the local governments at any time; it may redistribute the powers whenever it sees fit; or, legally, it may deprive the local governments of all of their powers and abolish them if it wishes. France and England are typical examples of the unitary plan; and in a general way the relationship between the states of the United States and the local governments within those states have characteristics of this system of government.

The essential characteristic of a federal government is division of power between the central government and the governments of the principal political subdivisions of the state. The powers of each are granted by the constitution. An outstanding example of the federal system of government is illustrated by the relationship between the national government and the state governments in the United States. The system is also found within the British dominions or commonwealths, in some of the Latin-American states and in several of the central European countries. In the United States the division is brought about by delegating certain powers to the central government and then providing that those not :

delegated shall be reserved to the states of the Union. In Canada the method of division is reversed. In a federal system the central government cannot decide important matters of power or change the distribution of powers of its own accord. Any important change in these matters requires the consent of a certain proportion of the member provinces or of a majority of the electorate of the entire nation. Since disputes will inevitably arise as to the allocation of powers, it is necessary to have a peaceful, and perhaps a judicial, method of settling such controversies.

MOVEMENTS AGAINST POPULAR GOVERNMENT

From the discussion thus far, one may be led to believe that all modern governments are democratic in form. That is not the case. In fact, popular government is less common today than it was at the close of the World War. As the suffrage was extended to new classes, a greater variety of economic groups sought to advance their own interests by pressing for governmental action; and, particularly after the War, certain groups came to demand fundamental changes in the economic systems of the world. In several European states the conflicts became so bitter that the representative bodies were almost completely deadlocked. Out of this near chaos there arose new movements—usually supported or encouraged by strong economic interests—which demanded unity of leadership, and, incidentally, which often sought to block the rising socialistic groups. The result was the establishment of military or quasi-military dictatorships, the modern counterpart of the earlier absolute monarchies.

Modern dictatorships.—Italy's Fascist government is the outstanding example of modern dictatorship; but it is not the sole example. Poland has a military dictatorship; Russia, a "dictatorship of the proletariat"; and other central European and South American governments are autocratic or aristocratic in form rather than democratic. It is true that none of the states which have had representative governments long enough to establish real democratic traditions have discarded the system; but, on the other hand, the democratic idea certainly has not gained in prestige during the last decade.

The new dictatorships do not differ greatly from the older monarchies, except in that the former retain—perhaps in form only—the democratic tradition of operating under constitutions; and that they

justify their existence on the basis of a pragmatic test—that is, the test of results—rather than on any claim to divine selection. In other words, the advocates argue that democracy cannot work successfully, and that certain persons are justified in taking control of the government because of their superior ability to foresee and carry out those policies which are best for the state as a whole.

Just as these newer dictatorships have retained the vestiges of constitutionalism, so have they also retained the formality of legislative deliberation. But the legislative body is little more than a debating society. The dictator not only determines what matters shall be considered in the legislature, but he also has the power to overrule it at any time, and even to legislate by decree. Therefore his power is absolute, in the sense that he is bound only by the necessity of retaining sufficient popular support to prevent a forceful overthrow by opposing factions.

GOVERNMENT AND ITS SOCIAL SETTING

By way of conclusion we may raise the question, much discussed. Are there any best governments? It hardly needs to be said that no form of political organization has been proved absolutely “best.” There is no universally accepted standard by which such a choice can be made. If we apply the pragmatic test we find the evidence to be inconclusive, or even conflicting. The “results” themselves are difficult to evaluate. One may argue that presidential government is better than cabinet and “prove” the point by comparing the United States with the post-war German republic; but it would be just as easy to “prove” the opposite by comparing England with Mexico or Brazil. Italy can likewise point out examples to show that dictatorship is better than democracy. As a matter of fact, each form has its conspicuous successes, its moderate successes, and its failures. The same is true of federal and unitary systems. England and France have succeeded comparatively well with unitary systems, but it is not at all certain that the United States could have done so. The relatively large area and the great variation in territorial interests in the United States create problems which must be solved by methods different from those used in the more compact states.

One conclusion seems obvious; that is, that political institutions like other institutions, can hardly be divorced from the circum-

nances under which they operate. The cabinet system of government is indigenous to England. It fits into the political experience the people there—having grown out of that experience—and it serves its purpose reasonably well; but when another country copies and attempts to superimpose it upon a political development which has been quite different, that system is not likely to function admirably as it does in England. The same is true, of course, when a country with a history and tradition quite different from our own copies our form of government. This is not to say that the country cannot profitably borrow from another. It can, and often does; but when the institution is torn out of the soil in which it grew and is transplanted to an alien environment, it is not likely to remain the same. It must undergo such modifications as are necessary to adapt itself to the new society, or it will not thrive. But let us not conclude that because our government has been developed in the United States and adapted to our society it should never be changed. As will be pointed out in the next chapter, no existing government can be considered perfect. And features in government that may be excellent and adequate in one stage of social development may be rendered obsolete later by deep-seated social change. In the contemporary world it is a rapidly changing social setting that makes it imperative that political institutions be permitted to grow vigorously enough to meet the moods of a dynamic society. Political rigidity may be a prolific cause of serious social problems.

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CHAPTER XXVIII

POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

ALL political institutions are man-made, and all political machines work for society only under the direction of human intelligence. No man-made and man-operated no government, no matter how ingeniously contrived, can work perfectly. There have always been problems of government and there always will be. The call upon man's intelligence and his moral integrity is perpetual if government is to perform satisfactorily the functions for which it is created. In this discussion we are concerned with some of the major problems of government. There are two ways of approaching the subject. One is to select a number of typical problems—such as civil liberty, censorship, the conservation of natural resources, and the like—and to make an analysis of each one. The other is to examine the general nature of problems underlying government, without reference to particular questions except for purposes of illustration. In the present study we shall follow the latter procedure, partly because it is more fundamental and partly because space precludes an adequate treatment of any considerable number of problems, even if we could agree upon the ones to be included.

The core of the whole problem of government may be reduced to three questions: (1) What shall be the functions of government? and (2) What shall be the character of the organization and powers of government? In other words—What do you expect your government to do, and how can it best accomplish its purpose? Related to each of these questions and growing out of them is a third: What should be the nature of the relationship between the governmental agency and the citizens, who are at once its masters and its subjects? These questions appear fairly simple at first glance. As a matter of fact they are not simple, as will be abundantly shown upon analysis.

FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT

The existence of the state and of government can be justified only in terms of services rendered. The state has no inherent right to

claim the allegiance of the people within its territory or to exercise authority over them. Like other institutions, it has been established for the purpose of satisfying what is considered a basic need or needs of mankind, and its existence must be justified by its ability to fulfill its purpose. Our first question—that relating to the functions of government—is therefore the fundamental problem of political institutions, to which all other problems are supplementary.

The nature of the problem.—A consideration of the general principles involved in this question immediately draws us into a discussion of a highly controversial subject concerning the relative merits of the five schools of political thought discussed in an earlier chapter—anarchism, individualism, collectivism, socialism, and communism. It will be recalled that the theories there represented range from a complete rejection of government—as an institution valueless to society—to the idea that government should control practically all social activities, particularly in the field of economic life.

If we could be quite certain as to which of these conceptions is best suited to the needs of each and every community, we should have the key to a solution of the fundamental problem of governmental functions. But we can have no certainty that any one of these systems is best, or that one system should be established to the exclusion of all others. In the first place, politics cannot be reduced to an exact science. The material with which we deal is bewilderingly elusive and fragmentary, and it hardly admits of the laboratory method of analysis. Furthermore, actual experience cannot answer our question, for we have never had the opportunity to observe any one system in operation under conditions sufficiently alike to justify the drawing of final conclusions.

History has not revealed any society in which genuine anarchism has existed. The other four systems have been tried, or are being tried at the present time, to a greater or less degree, but in different places and under different conditions. Pioneer society in America was a good example of individualism, while most modern governments combine individualism with collectivism and some features of socialism. Supporters of the theory of communism are in control of the government of Russia, but the ideas of the communists have not yet been put into complete operation; their leaders still say that they are "building socialism." We can see, therefore, that, because of the varying conditions under which the different systems have

on applied and the fragmentary nature of their application, no definitive conclusions as to their merits can be drawn from observation.

But there is another important reason why we cannot draw general conclusions as to what the functions of government should

The problem is not purely political. It involves the whole question of directing the cultural development of a community, and so may affect any or all institutions in that community. We cannot determine what our government should do until we have decided what kind of society we want to build. A few simple questions should illustrate the point: Do we want to encourage a single universal religion, or reject all religion in its present accepted forms; do we want a variety of similar religious beliefs and practices, or complete individual freedom with respect to religion? Do we want a society in which a few people can accumulate great wealth, or do we want a relatively equal distribution of the fruits of production? Do we want to retain the family as an institution, and, if so, what shall be its form? The way in which we answer each of these and other similar questions will determine to a great extent what we want government to do.

These questions suggest another matter that must be considered in respect to the problem of governmental functions; namely, the extent to which we can build the kind of society we want by means of governmental action. Building a society is not like building a house. We do not start with rough lumber or with bricks and mortar. The house is already standing, and we cannot tear it down and build a new one without entailing certain dangers and great hardships before the destroyed structure can be replaced—dangers and hardships that will seldom be worth while, in view of the uncertainty of attaining the proposed goal in the end. The most we can safely do, then, is to remodel the old structure by means of relatively minor changes. We cannot, of course, draw up plans for remodeling the social structure of all states in the same way, but we must rather adapt the changes in each state to fit the existing structure. We must take into consideration the habits, the experiences, and the desires of the people within the community, as well as available materials such as natural resources and established industries.

Difficulties of political remodeling.—Political remodeling is commonly the process by which a community adjusts and readjusts its governmental machinery to meet changing social needs. The

remodeling may be slight or somewhat extensive, according to degree of departure from old political conceptions and methods necessary in a given case to enable government to perform a function or functions hitherto not performed. Successful adjustments of this sort are indispensable to healthy political growth; a failure to make such adjustments, seriously prolonged, leads to social unrest; government tends to break down and a clamor for radical change is likely to arise. The principle appears simple enough, but the practical working out of plans for political remodeling is beset by numerous difficulties.

One of these obstacles is the kind of rigidity of mind that comes from personal biases. The bias may take the form of deeply rooted ideas of the inherent superiority of one political philosophy over another. The existence of such prejudices reveals itself frequently in the practice of attaching labels or slogans to proposed legislation to excite emotional support or opposition, so that decisions of voters and legislators frequently lack a rational basis. For example, the cry of "socialism" is sometimes raised against an attempt to have the government operate telegraph lines, although another system of communication, the postal system, has been in the hands of the government since its beginning without arousing fear of socialism. Likewise, many voices have been heard to cry, "We don't want a dole," when proposals have been made to establish unemployment insurance systems or to appropriate funds from the national or state treasuries for aid to unemployed persons. This cry has been somewhat quieted, however, by the realization that private charity and relief from local governments—which, for some reason, have not been classed as "dole"—are inadequate, and that the state and national governments have been practically compelled to assist in providing relief funds. Likewise, the opposition to unemployment insurance is subsiding, because we are beginning to realize that the fundamental problems—economic and political—are not being solved by the resort to temporary "stop-gaps." The problem of preventing large-scale unemployment and the hardships which have accompanied it still lies before us, and it is one of the basic needs to be considered in determining what governmental functions are desirable.

Another popular American slogan requiring careful analysis is that it lead us to overlook the more fundamental nature of the function of government is, "Keep government out of business." Chamberlain

commerce have frequently repeated this slogan in arguments against expanding governmental activity. Recently the national House of representatives appointed a committee to investigate the extent to which our government is engaged in "business." But let us ask, and attempt to answer, two simple but pertinent questions: (1) What is the field of private business? and (2) How shall we determine when government has entered into business?

In answer to the first question a number of criteria have been set forth and should be analyzed. One argument is that there are several functions which are "governmental" or "public" because they are essential to society, while other functions not so essential are private. What is there any real difference? The construction of highways is generally considered as public, but are highways really more essential today than the gasoline needed to operate an automobile? The paved street in front of an apartment building really more essential than the building itself, or the maintenance of an army more essential than the manufacture of ammunition and equipment for the use of that army? One could find an endless list of similar comparisons, without bringing in such marginal functions as the maintenance of bridges, the supplying of water, or the collecting of waste.

The second criterion, important in the minds of business men, is that of profit. If an activity lends itself to profit making, it should be private, unless such fundamental matters as the protection of life and property against violence are involved. But there are few governmental activities which would not lend themselves to profit-making. The postal system, schools, fire protection, and even the collection of taxes, could no doubt be operated on a profit basis were it left to government to turn them over to private industry. It is true that there is little opposition from business when government takes over an unprofitable industry, but that fact does not make profit the basis of distinction. It merely shows that private greed is a reasonable basis of opposition to governmental intervention in new fields.

The only other criterion of importance, and no doubt the one which, consciously or unconsciously, governs the classification of activities as public or private, is the *status quo*. Those activities which within our own generation have customarily been carried on by private enterprise are considered private, while those which have customarily been carried on by government are classed as governmental or public. But have we any reason for crystallizing for the

future the division of functions as it exists at the beginning of twentieth century? If at an earlier time the status as it existed in 1700 had been chosen as the test, education, health protection, and many other similar services would have remained entirely outside the sphere of governmental activity. It is true the entrance of government into a field in which private profit seekers are engaged results in competition, with temporary hardship for certain business men, but fundamentally the justification of such expansion involves a principle almost identical with that involved in the substitution of labor-saving machines in a factory for human workers.

With respect to the second question—When has government entered into business?—it is equally difficult to draw a line of demarcation. Our government levies tariff duties upon imports from foreign countries in order to help certain American producers increase their sales; it seeks markets in foreign countries for American products; it lends money to private and quasi-public agencies in order that they may carry on business; and it builds highways which are used by private business. In many cases its activities create advantages in competition as between one group of citizens and another, and the cost of such activities is very seldom borne entirely by the persons benefited thereby. The difference between services such as those mentioned above and the assumption of complete control of a service by government is primarily a difference in degree; yet those who fight hardest against the latter type of governmental action are frequently the very ones who exert the most pressure to obtain the former to promote their own private interests.

It is apparent, therefore, that the slogan, "Keep government out of business," is of no real value as a guide to solving the problem of governmental functions. It is hardly more than a tear-gas bomb thrown at the public by certain interests in order that the more fundamental nature of the problem may be obscured from sight.

When should government assume new functions?—In the preceding pages the attempt has been made to indicate how "labels" and slogans may be used to defeat the extension of governmental services to the community. It is apparent that such action frequently arises from the self-seeking of powerful groups, commonly with intent on material gain. But opposition does not always arise from such sources, nor is it to be assumed that the blocking of the wider extension of governmental functions in a given case is necessarily undesirable and wrong. Governmental intervention is not de-

per se. What then should be the guide to determining whether particular activity should be carried on by government or left to private initiative?

There seems to be no other test than that of results. In the words of the writer, "If certain results essential to the welfare of all or any considerable part of the community can be achieved only by governmental action, or can be more successfully achieved by governmental action than in any other way, then it is the business of government to accomplish those results."¹ In applying this test there is no uniform rule applicable to all communities alike, because much depends upon the character of the particular government as well as upon that of the private agencies involved.

Likewise, the performance by government of services to assist private enterprise can be justified only in so far as these services benefit the entire community. This is a particularly hazardous kind of activity for any government to enter, because once special assistance is granted, there is a tendency toward a general rush of interest groups to government to seek special favors for themselves. The likely result is that either a few powerful groups obtain favors at the expense of the rest of the community, or else the favors counteract each other in such a way that no one gains any net benefit while all are burdened by the cost of additional work imposed upon the government.

But this conclusion leads us into another problem equally difficult: How are we to determine what results are desirable, and when governmental action is more successful than other methods? The first part of the question was touched upon earlier in this chapter, where it was pointed out that the results sought depend upon what kind of society we want to build. With respect to the second part of the question, the method of determination depends primarily upon the nature of the particular problem confronting us. If we are attempting to determine whether the government or a private company should operate a city streetcar line or some other public utility, the conclusions may be reached by honest and impartial political and engineering studies. The greatest difficulty here lies in finding cases that are truly comparable. If the comparison is made between well-managed utilities in private hands and poorly managed municipal utilities, or vice versa, the conclusions will be

Chester C. Maxey, *The Problem of Government*, F. S. Crofts & Co., pp. 50-51.

valueless. Conclusions will likewise be valueless if comparisons are made between the two types of utilities where the opportunities of obtaining power economically are not essentially equal. For such reasons, it may be difficult for a given city contemplating municipal ownership to find a situation sufficiently like its own to furnish a valid basis of comparison to aid it in coming to a decision.

Most problems, however, offer far more difficulty, because they are less concrete. Let us take, for example, the question of whether or not a city should maintain recreation centers and employ recreation supervisors. It may be conclusively demonstrated that such an activity reduces the number of accidents which result from children playing on the streets, and that the type of recreation sponsored is healthful. There may even be evidence of its value as a system of character building and crime prevention. But we cannot measure the benefits in terms of any mathematical unit, and therefore we cannot draw positive conclusions as to the value of the service or the amount of money that the city is justified in expending for it. Conclusions must necessarily be in the form of opinions of qualified persons.

A third, and very important, test of the desirability of a particular governmental action is that of public satisfaction. In final analysis, all services, whether performed by government or private enterprise, are of value only in so far as they satisfy human needs and wants. This fact must be given special consideration with respect to governmental services, because they are frequently of such nature that the individual is not permitted to accept or reject them as he wishes. The principal weakness of the test of human satisfaction is the fact that so often the public response is one of indifference and uncertainty. Too many people have formed no opinions on the question, and if opinions have been formed, they are seldom sufficiently in agreement to constitute what can be called a definite public opinion. In the case of legal regulations, however, it is improbable that enforcement can attain any degree of satisfaction—even in the most absolute monarchy—if as many as two per cent of the people actively oppose it, and particularly so if a great mass of the population remains indifferent. When such a regulation is likely to affect the attitude toward law in general, it is perhaps better to submit to the minority opposition than to attempt to enforce what is not enforceable.

Before public opinion or opinions can be depended upon as a

the desirability of any particular governmental action, three conditions are necessary: (1) the people must have adequate and understandable information about the operation and results of the undertaking; (2) they must be sufficiently educated and intelligent as a whole to interpret that information; and (3) there must be adequate means by which they can make their desires and experiences known to the governing authorities. This leads us directly to the second major problem; namely, "How shall government be organized and administered?"

THE ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT

Is democracy a failure?—It has been rather widely held that of all forms of political organization, democracy offers the only possibility of realizing the three conditions listed above as requisite to the effective utilization of public opinion in determining governmental action. But it must be said that that possibility still remains unproved. For that reason democracy is still on trial—or may be more correct to say that democracy does not truly exist. One of the war cries during the years of 1917 and 1918 was that the Allies were fighting to "make the world safe for democracy." At the close of the war many observers pointed out enthusiastically that none of the monarchies engaged in the struggle survived local revolution, while the governments which were chosen by election retained the allegiance of their citizens. But since the war, developments have taken a different course. Russia has not adopted a system of government based upon the generally accepted theory of democracy. Italy has been governed by a Fascist dictatorship for more than a decade; Germany appears to be following in the wake of Italy; and a military dictatorship has existed for some time in Poland. Governments in South America have continued to change by means of revolution rather than by use of the ballot, and several other nations of the world now seem to be on the verge of abandoning the democratic system. In fact, the future of democracy is so uncertain that some commentators regard it as being in its death throes and predict that dictatorship will be considered by future historians as characteristic of the twentieth century.

Two different reasons are set forth by political observers and thinkers as the causes of the apparent faltering of democracy. Some believe that the theory of representative democracy is fundament-

ally in error, and that some other theory of government must be substituted for it. Others hold that democracy, although good in principle, is not working satisfactorily because of inadequately developed mechanism for its operation.

The outstanding advocates of the first viewpoint are the Fascists who are in control of the government of Italy. Fascism holds that the interests of a social group as a whole—such as of a state—do not always coincide with the interests of the individuals in that group (they cite the sacrifice of individuals in war as an illustration), and that “the capacity to ignore individual private interests in favor of the higher demands of society and of history is a very rare gift and the privilege of the chosen few.”¹ No definite rule is set up for insuring the control of government by the “chosen few,” the power being left, apparently, to “the efficient authority at any given phase of social development.”²

The advocates of democracy base their argument upon the idea that the state is no more than a collection of individuals and that its services are of value only to the extent that they benefit the large mass of individuals within its territory. They point out, however, that so far democratic governments have failed through the lack of proper machinery for their operation. As was stated earlier in this chapter, effective democracy requires intelligent voters; it requires impartial and adequate means of obtaining necessary information, and it requires adequate methods by which the opinions of the people may be expressed and incorporated as far as possible into the policies of the state. Can machinery be devised for the realization of these requisites?

Our achievements to date offer little encouragement. Although universal education has been established, and although our system of education is apparently being improved year after year, the character of our entire social life has become so complex that the average citizen of today is probably less capable of passing judgment on the action of his government than was the average citizen of the nineteenth century. It is doubtful whether we can hope to educate individuals to a point where they can draw intelligent conclusions with respect to even a few of the most important political problems of the nation.

¹Alfredo Rocco, “The Political Doctrine of Fascism,” *International Conciliator*, Pamphlet No. 223 (Oct., 1926), p. 405.

²J. S. Barnes, *The Universal Aspects of Fascism*, Williams & Norgate, 1929, p. 101.

It is likewise difficult for the voter to obtain reliable information from which to draw conclusions. No news organ can print or otherwise distribute all of the news, nor can it print facts without interpretation. News is printed as seen and heard through human eyes and ears. It is easy to omit some parts or to emphasize other parts in order to give implications which tend to sway the reader in one direction or another. This fact, combined with the other fact that owners and editors so frequently use their news organs as means of asserting political and partisan influence in the community, means that such news organs can seldom be depended upon as reliable sources of information.

The third problem—that of making our opinions and experiences genuine influence in the determination of the policies of the state—is equally complex and confusing. In the first place, if a voter has definite opinions with respect to several issues, he is likely to find that the platforms so cut across his convictions that no one platform satisfies him. Furthermore, the opinions of voters on numerous issues are so vague and so varied that even after election few conclusions can be drawn as to what action the people really want. The fact that one candidate receives a few more votes than his opponent is of little value in determining what are the predominant opinions with respect to the numerous questions which face a congressman or a president.

If the mind of the average voter is in a state of bewilderment over political issues, the situation is no less serious in respect to the qualifications of candidates for political office. This is particularly true in American state and local affairs. In many instances each voter is expected to pass judgment on the relative qualifications of several hundred candidates at a single election. In Philadelphia, for example, about seventy local officials are elected at large, and more than six thousand others are elected by wards or districts. Though the theoretical purpose of this system is to give the people more direct voice in their government, the result is precisely the opposite. Even the most conscientious voter can inform himself about only a few important candidates, and must vote blindly on the rest. Usually he votes on the basis of party designation; and party leaders, knowing this, often put up candidates who have no qualifications other than their willingness to work—honestly or dishonestly—for the leaders of the party machine.

With such problems facing us, what remedies can the advocates

of democracy propose to improve the machinery of their ideal form of government? The suggested solutions are too numerous and too uncertain of success to be discussed at any length here. There are two proposals, however, which should be given brief consideration, one relating particularly to the problem of candidates for office and the other applying to all of the problems mentioned above.

The solution to the problem of candidates would be relatively simple were it not for the fact that the reform must be brought about in the face of opposition from party leaders and officeholders who profit by the existing system. According to a national organization which sponsors the short-ballot movement, "Only those offices should be elective which are important enough to attract and deserve public interest." These would include governors, state legislators, city councilmen, and perhaps a few other officials who are constantly in the spotlight of public interest. All other officers should be appointed by the elected officials or their principal subordinates. Not only would these officials be in better position to determine the qualifications of candidates than are the majority of the voters, but they would also have greater sense of responsibility than do the unofficial party leaders who otherwise do the actual selecting.

The other proposed solution is much broader in its scope, but—in part because of its broad scope—less concrete both with respect to details of operation and to expected results. It is proposed that individuals, instead of attempting to act only as individual voters, form associations with others whose interests and experiences in particular lines are similar to their own. The associations might be economic in nature—trade unions, chambers of commerce, professional associations, and the like—or they might be related to other phases of political interest. They would employ experts to make studies and reports on matters of interest to the members, and they would be used to bring about united and organized support for policies desired by the group. The individual would be as free as before to determine his own political action, but the purpose of the associations would be to obtain intelligent representation of interests rather than of individuals. It is believed by many that the policy-determining authorities of the state would give serious consideration to the views of such associations, and that when interests conflicted, compromises would be reached by which the greatest common benefit could be gained.

The plan has never been tried as thoroughly as its advocates would propose; but so far as it has been tried, it does not seem to have resulted in any appreciable improvement in democratic government. The trouble may lie, however, in the fact that with some groups organized and others unorganized, the activities of the former will tend to result in distorted views as to what the majority of the people really desire.

Alternatives to democracy.—Before giving up the case of democracy, however, we must consider the alternatives. No machinery has been developed for the setting up of a dictatorship or any form of aristocracy in which we are certain that the "best minds" are to determine the policies of government. The primary difference between democratic government and dictatorships is that in the former two or more parties contend for the control of government, while in the latter one party, which has won enough support to gain control at a particular time, has outlawed the opposing parties, and has thereby made changes in policy more difficult. On the other hand, the same rule applies to dictatorship as to democracy: no government is sufficiently secure to be efficient and responsible unless it has at least the passive support of a large proportion of the people.

There are two methods by which this support may be maintained. Either the mass of the people must be kept in ignorance so that they will not know when the state's policies are harmful to their interests, or else the dictator must himself watch the trend of opinions and follow the predominant views in order to retain public allegiance. The first method must be rejected by any person who looks forward to a more highly cultured human society, while the latter is hardly unlike that of representative democracy. It is true that the self-appointed government can usually act with less fear of early overthrow, and that the elimination of debates between conflicting interests represented in a parliamentary body results in greater speed and efficiency of action. But the danger is that this efficiency will be obtained at the expense of responsibility, in that the government may act contrary to the desires of the great mass of citizens, and that when overthrow does come it will be violent and will result in greater hardship to the community as a whole.

We must remember, however, that no form of government has proved itself superior to all others, nor has any particular form been developed to a point of perfection. We must continually

look at government as something of an experiment, being willing to submit our own system to critical examination, and to effect such reorganization as seems necessary from time to time to meet the needs of our changing social order.

Internal organization of governmental machinery.—No matter what the fundamental principle upon which government is based may be, there are problems of organizing the personnel which is to decide upon and carry out the public services. In an absolute government the person or persons in control may presumably alter the organization at will in order to carry out their own plans. But in a representative government such as our own, the problem is one that should be understood to some degree by all of the citizens. The discussion of this aspect of the subject will be limited to a brief consideration of two important features: (1) the structural nature of each of the two branches of government which have to do respectively with the determination of the policy and with the administration of policy; (2) the nature of the relationship between these two branches.

What should be the structural nature of the legislature? The democratic principle accepts the idea of a representative legislature, but the structure and organization of that body vary somewhat among modern states. There are many problems which arise with respect to this matter of organization, but only two important ones will be considered here: (1) Should the legislature consist of a single chamber, or should it consist of two chambers acting independently? (2) On what bases should representatives be chosen? With respect to each of these questions the solution should be determined by the character of the particular community which the legislative body is serving.

If the people fear action more than inaction, or if the distribution of interest groups is such that a single basis of representation cannot be adopted without sacrificing allegiance of a large portion of the people, a bicameral legislature may be preferable. The dual basis of representation in the Congress of the United States may be justified on the ground that the rural areas of the west can thereby prevent the urban east from determining all legislation. But in our state legislatures where the basis of representation in the two chambers often differs only with respect to the number of persons represented by each member, that justification for the bicameral system does not exist. In cities the system has been all but completely

scarded. The replacement of the individualistic theory of government by the collectivist theory has resulted in need for action rather than for checks and balances.

The method of election of legislators involves a problem more difficult to solve. Because of tradition, we apply the principle of election by geographic districts; but there are many who believe that it would be more logical and just to have legislators chosen by occupational interest groups—some by farmers, some by doctors, and so on, in proportion to the number of people in each group. Still others argue that while geographic areas should be retained as bases of representation, a system of proportional representation should be adopted to give representation to minority interests within the respective areas. Thus, instead of having one representative elected from each district, they would have larger districts with several representatives for each, and they would adopt a system of voting which would insure the distribution of these representatives among the political parties in approximate proportion to the distribution of the votes cast. The idea of proportional representation has been adopted by a number of cities with apparently good success. It has also been tried by a few European states, though apparently with less success.

The danger involved in either occupational representation or proportional representation for a community having an extensive area and greatly varying interests is that there will tend to be many small parties or factions, with the result that neither effective leadership nor unity of policy is obtained. Although our system of electing legislators results generally in our having only one representative for each district, it does encourage the two-party system, which in turn tends to result in the control of government by a single party. This does not mean, however, that the members of the minority party are entirely without representation, for a legislator will attempt to satisfy the wishes of any large group of voters within his district whether that group constitutes an absolute majority or not. As to the structure of the second branch of government—that which has to do with the administration of policies, two important principles are now generally accepted. The first, as stated by one authority, is that "a good machine should consist of the smallest possible number of separate parts, so as to operate with the utmost smoothness, precision, and efficiency."¹ There should be, as far as

¹Maxey, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

practicable, centralized supervision over the various departments for the purpose of securing responsibility and coördination, and for the purpose of eliminating waste and duplication of effort. The second principle, which is particularly important in modern government where problems of a specialized nature must be dealt with, is that the persons engaged in administering the policies should be capable and efficient. This requisite calls for a system of selection and removal which will bring into service capable persons and induce them to put their best efforts into their work. The mechanism best suited to these purposes may vary with the nature of the position to be filled; but the regulations should be sufficiently rigid to prevent removals merely as a means of distributing the spoils of political victory, and yet not so rigid as to prevent the removal of those who have been found to be inefficient.

There should always be close relationship between the policy-determining branch of government and the administrative branch, for unless the former can direct and criticize the work of the latter it will be unable to determine policy in any true sense. On the other hand, the administrative branch is best situated to observe the work of the state, and it can therefore advise the legislative branch as to what changes, if any, should be made in existing policies. Furthermore, the administrative branch is in the best position to collect detailed facts and to make computations upon which the policy is to be based. Direct contact with the legislative branch must necessarily be through the head of the administrative branch—the executive. The particular types of relationship which exist have been discussed in the preceding chapter.¹ Let it suffice to say here that our American government is based upon a theory of separation of powers, and that such coöperative relationship exists to a great extent extra-constitutional and often ineffectively.

GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY

Responsibility and authority in government.—The entire problem of the functions and organization of government carries with it another fundamental consideration, that is, the nature of the relationship existing between the government and the citizen. Basically, the inquiry leads directly to a discussion of the reciprocal character of responsibility and authority. If we would load up

¹Pp. 522 ff.

government the responsibility of rescuing the community whenever it gets into a serious jam, we must expect that government to assume greater authority over personal liberties. It has been stated above that government is essentially an agent of public service. But we must not suppose that the power to render service is unlimited. Government is not a supernatural or a metaphysical thing. It cannot defy the laws of physics. It has no inexhaustible supply of power or resources. It has only such authority and power as derive from the population.

The functions of government, like those of every other institution, should be based upon practical considerations involving a delicate balance of forces. Students are familiar with the law of physics, that for every force there must be an equal and opposing force. Something of the same sort may be said to apply to government; for the balance here is between power and responsibility, rights and obligations. In other words, the government should have powers and rights commensurate with its responsibilities and obligations. If we hold that the government must provide work for the unemployed, food and clothing for the destitute, and markets for the farmer and manufacturer, then we must grant it the means whereby to do these things. If this is accepted as a permanent responsibility of the government, and not a mere temporary relief measure, it will probably mean that the government must have the authority to assign unemployed persons to jobs, whether they like them or not, and to regulate the output of the farmer and manufacturer to the point of telling them what they may produce and how much. If we place upon the government the responsibility of keeping a nation sober, we must expect it to exercise its authority sometimes in ways that will impress us as an invasion of what we have hitherto regarded as our "sacred" individual rights.

Whether increased governmental control of affairs heretofore considered "private" is desirable or not, it is the natural concomitant of increased governmental responsibility. If government must provide for health and education, it is obvious that it must control these matters. It must have the means to provide the school and compel the child to attend. It must provide pure water and enforce strict sanitary regulations. Such matters as garbage and sewage disposal can no longer be left to the discretion and the initiative of the individual householder. If we conclude that the welfare of the community demands that government shoulder these

additional burdens, then we must also recognize and accept the right and the necessity of the government to invade the field of individual freedom, where such invasion is requisite to the performance of service required.

Unfortunately, this principle does not seem to be very well understood, for while we are insisting on more and more services, there are in some quarters, a growing demand that the rights and powers of government be curtailed. When we asked little more than protection of life and property, we granted all the powers necessary to this protection, but now we hear on all sides such questions as these: What right has the state to dictate to a private corporation what it shall charge for gas or electricity, or to say that every child must be vaccinated before entering school, or to force men to serve in the army in time of war? These cries and others of a like nature are being echoed and re-echoed from lecture platforms and through the columns of our newspapers, while the responsibility for social maladjustment is being heaped more and more on the head of government.

The inconsistency of our behavior is apparent. It is to be explained largely by the fact that American society is passing through a transitional stage; our traditional belief in individualism is struggling to maintain itself in a social situation now grown so complex that resort to positive intervention on the part of government appears to be inescapable. We must make up our mind to one thing; if we decide to make government the physician to our social ills, we must not refuse to take the medicine which it prescribes. If, after a decision is made in a particular case, we have government in the carrying out of a policy which we have demanded, its course is likely to be uncertain and inept and the results feeble and unsatisfactory.

The question of civil liberties.—There is another category of individual liberties, however, that lies largely outside the question of the authority which government must exercise in the performance of services laid upon it by the community. These are what are termed civil liberties, which were regarded during our constitutional period as of so vital importance that the attempt was made to safeguard them in the fundamental law. Here we shall limit our consideration to the question of freedom in the expression of opinion.

If, as we have suggested above, it is the business of those

thority in the state to satisfy the wants of those whom they govern, it is obvious that the authorities should be informed of those wants. It is also obvious that wants cannot be made known unless the governed are free to express their opinions. A legislative body could be in no position to legislate intelligently on tariffs, for instance, if only those who manufactured products in competition with foreign imports could express their views on the subject. And there is no more reason why a person should be suppressed if he believes that there can be no political democracy without a more equitable distribution of property and that the latter can be accomplished only by revolution. Suppression does not change his opinion. It merely tends to convince him further that the present order is corrupt and that revolution is the only practical method of effecting a change. Furthermore, it must be remembered that all progress in new directions is led by a very small minority. The majority are wedded inflexibly to standardized opinion, and tend to consider all ideas bad which conflict with the present order. Therefore, although very few people desire to express opinions completely at odds with the traditional ideas of the community, it is important that the way should be open so that the thinking few with courage really have the opportunity to assist in the building of a better society. And this conclusion holds true even when it is admitted that among the dissenters there are some whose views are foolish and fantastic.

It is likewise important that freedom of peaceful assembly should be allowed, for it is only through group action that dissenters can make their views felt. Even though we disagree sharply with the new ideas, should we suppress them? If they are bad, they should be answered in open discussion; and if we cannot answer them, we have no right to classify them as bad. Furthermore, we should remember that the only condition under which an existing order is likely to be overthrown is one in which those in power refuse to make any concession to conflicting sentiments. We should also remember that the denial of freedom of expression—which includes the freedom of peaceful assembly—means the preservation of some existing special interests which cannot maintain themselves in the face of open discussion.

But theoretical rights cannot be maintained if public sentiment is hostile, or is indifferent to, their suppression. Even with our express constitutional guarantees, fear has been instilled in the mass of the

people to the extent that freedom of expression has often been denied. If the demand of the great mass is overwhelming, as in times of emergency, the government will act accordingly, notwithstanding express constitutional guarantees to the contrary. Or if the government does not act, secret organizations may be formed, with the result that there is far less certainty of justice than if there had been governmental action in violation of constitutional guarantees. But freedom of expression is frequently denied when there is no real emergency. Persons depending upon wages or salaries frequently dare not express dissenting opinions for fear that their incomes may be cut off. Debtors may be suppressed by creditors, or other forms of extralegal punishment may be imposed by persons with economic power, to quiet those whose opinions are considered dangerous to existing vested interests.

What then, it may be asked, is the value of advocating a guarantee of freedom of expression? Is it not useless to advocate a right which can be denied in so many ways? The answer is that a strong sentiment in favor of this right—even though advocated only by an active minority—will do much to preserve the freedom that is to be desired, for it is an apathetic public that fosters suppression. Although perfection may not be attained, neither government authorities nor private powers will go as far in the face of strong opposition as they otherwise would. On the other hand, if the violations of the right of free expression pass unchallenged in the extreme cases, the danger is—as was shown during the war—that the grip of power will slowly be tightened until even those whose beliefs differ only moderately from traditional ideas will find themselves persecuted for their opinions.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP

In conclusion, let it be kept in mind that government is the only general agency through which the welfare of mankind can be protected and the progress of society directed. Government is not all-powerful, nor can it wander far afield in its activities from the ways of the society over which it is established. But it is the most powerful organized agency having supervision of practically the entire field of social activities within a community. If it is controlled by a few for the development of their own selfish interests it cannot serve the purpose for which it should exist. On the other

and, if it is managed—by a few or by many—for the betterment of society as a whole, it is serving a worthy purpose. But the complexity of the problems confronting government calls for all the intelligence and integrity that the community can marshal. It is therefore very important that those persons who, because of their experience, training, or native ability, are more able than others to deal with these problems should take an active interest in its work. If they do not serve directly as officials or governmental employees, they ought to be ready to coöperate with the authorities by giving advice and information, or by criticism and political activity of the higher type where that is deemed necessary. The criticism, however, should be direct and open, not of the kind which is sometimes heard at teas and bridge tables, when those who are the objects of the criticism are absent. The college graduate, especially, should feel it his duty to participate directly or indirectly in the improvement of government—not to sit back and be amused at political corruption or the way the masses are misled, but rather to combat the interests which are taking advantage of the less fortunate.

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CHAPTER XXIX

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND PROBLEMS

OUR survey of the development of civilization during the Christian era has revealed a steady economic and political integration of peoples. That is to say, society has steadily broadened its economic basis so that small communities, which once drew their material subsistence from limited local areas, have joined hands economically with other communities about them until they now draw upon the resources of the earth to satisfy their economic needs. Parallel with this economic integration, society has drawn upon its experience to combine ever larger groups under one political organization or under coordinate political machinery which is linked to a central political organization. In these two parallel movements the political has kept pace with the economic; our economic life has become a world pattern, while politically we have hardly passed beyond the pattern set by the national, or, at best, the imperial state. When we consider this economic interdependence of nations we are forced to recognize that today *the* state is only *a* state, whose life is lived in constant contact with others. In other words, a world of independent and unrelated state societies is at present in a process of passing away to the development of a world society. It is this fact that makes it of particular importance to complete an examination of political institutions with (1) a consideration of international institutions as they are carried on through the medium of the state, and (2) an examination of international institutions and processes. It is the first of these subjects that will be considered in the present chapter. It will be desirable at the outset to clear up a possible confusion of terms. Attention has already been drawn to the common and rather loose use of the terms "nation" and "national" when the state is really the subject in mind. Such an inaccurate usage prevails in the field of external politics. When the term "international relations" is used, it is "interstate relations" that is really meant, for it is the state which maintains contact and intercourse with other states. There are "nations" which have no

political external relations because they are not "states"; and they have been "states" which had external political relations, but which were not "nations"; the city-states of Greece and of Italy are illustrations in point. Consequently, it will be understood in this discussion that when the terms "nation," "national," and "international" are used it is the political society known as the state which is in mind.

Relations among ancient and medieval communities.

The beginnings of intercommunity relations of a sort obviously go back further than historical records. The peaceful contacts of trade and the hostile contacts of war probably began as soon as a community ceased absolutely to live unto itself; but only when such relations come to be truly political do they fall under the purview of the political scientist. As commerce developed the ancient societies entered into treaties, sent embassies, and regulated their contacts under a rudimentary system of law. But these contacts were, on the whole, those of war rather than of peace. Evidence of this may be found in the Old Testament as well as in the reconstructions which are now being made of the early history of the entire Mediterranean basin. Within the Greek world we have an even clearer picture of a system of intercity relationships comparable at certain points to the system of international relations of modern times. With the development of the universalism of Rome, however, we are confronted with the organization of a Western imperial society rather than with the organization of a system of international relations. With her wide conquests Rome lost her sense of nationality, and with it the conception of national communities with rights of political independence. Important political relations between the constituent parts of the Empire were controlled by the imperial state, and the Roman peace became a source of imperial pride.

As already observed, during the earlier centuries of the Middle Ages unsuccessful attempts were made to attain again the old imperial unity of Rome. Theoretically both medieval empire and Church laid claim to a position as arbiter between the embryonic national communities that were beginning to develop, and to some degree they did in reality so act. But since the political unity of Western Europe was never realized, the power of Church and empire never approximated that enjoyed by imperial Rome. With the development of feudalism, European society entered the age

ce and disorder. Then central authority so broke down as to cast the Christian world into international chaos, though the church did strive with some little success to mitigate the horrors of perpetual war. Chivalry also attempted to introduce a code of honor and an etiquette of arms to be observed in feudal conflict. It is only with the establishment of the nation-states that international relations enter the pages of history with which we are primarily concerned in the present discussion.

The central problem of modern international relations.—

The present states-system is a comparatively recent thing. Its development is usually dated from the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, which ended the disastrous Thirty Years' War. Then, for the first time, treaties, the Treaties of Westphalia, were negotiated on the basis of the independence and the equality of the signatory states. This event serves to mark, formally and finally, the end of the universal hierarchical organization of Europe, which had been one of the significant expressions of the medieval system. From this time, both in theory and in practice, Europe and the world came to be compartmented into separate political societies which were gradually forced to develop a system of interstate relationships and to organize for the purpose of carrying on those relations. Thus international relations came to be conceived as the relations of states which are regarded as independent of one another and which are subject to no external authority. Each is considered to be completely in control of its own territories, and, within certain limits, of all individuals and groups who come within its territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, each is considered to be equal with every other state both in the making of law and before the law.

This division of Europe into national states created a disordered world. If each state maintained its sovereign right to determine and judge its own conduct in relation to other states, what chance could there be for peace and order among the members of the family of nations? That was the fundamental problem that society faced in the seventeenth century, and the problem is not yet solved. To have ignored it then would have meant chaos. Statesmen had sufficient realization of the gravity of the situation to seek a way out. At the beginning of the modern period they had little to build upon. In the development of their relations with one another, the states started without any other legal basis of relationship than that presented by a few customary practices which had been developed

or inherited from the medieval or Renaissance periods. What was wanted was some system of rules regulating their intercourse.

THE INTRODUCTION OF LAW INTO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Such a system early modern thinkers found in the Roman law which has been of fundamental importance in the development of the body of law within the limits of which modern international relations are conducted. The Roman *jus gentium*, "the law of the nations," however, differs from modern international law in a number of important respects. In the first place, it was law laid down by a superior, rather than law agreed to by independent political societies. In the second place, it was law enforced by the power of Rome rather than law resting on the basis of self-enforcement by those who had voluntarily accepted it. And in the third place, it regulated the relations of those individuals who were not Roman citizens, and who were foreigners to the community in which they found themselves, rather than concerned itself with the regulation of interstate relations. In addition to the principles of the *jus gentium*, which were drawn upon in the attempt to construct a system of international law, Rome furnished the model of a society of states with the conception of the territorial basis of authority, which contrasted with the personal basis of authority underlying legal and political relationships among the Germanic tribes. By 1648 the Roman conception had prevailed and authority came to be established fundamentally on the territorial basis.

Beginnings of modern international law.—One of the first notable works to draw upon the Roman sources, and other sources too, was that of Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist. In 1625, while the Thirty Years' War was still raging, Grotius published his epoch-making book *On the Law of War and Peace*. Explaining why he wrote the book, he said that he "saw prevailing throughout the Christian world a license in making war of which even barbarous nations would have been ashamed. Recourse was had to arms for slight reasons or no reasons; and when arms were taken up, all reverence for divine and human law was thrown away, just as men were thenceforth authorized to commit all crimes without restraint." The treatise gained wide recognition and acceptance as laying down the legal rules which should control the intercourse of states. Grotius is generally called the father of modern international law.

tional law, and the present system, in its main outlines, is a Grotian system.

In the elaboration of his system Grotius drew upon two sources. In the first place, he made his approach that of the historian, studying the practice of states to find out what principles were accepted—and what acceptable—as governing international relations. To this extent his approach was positive. In the second place, he attempted to fill in the gaps—and also to elevate the tone of international life—by laying down rules which did not rest upon customary practice. These he founded upon the conception of natural law, supporting his “natural” principles by a reference to Roman law, and to Jewish law as set forth in the Scriptures. Thus he did two distinct things which, however, remained long confused. He stated as law the practice of states, and he stated as law what can best be described as international ethics. He confused what was with what, and his judgment, should be the legal basis of international relations. But gradually, and strikingly during the nineteenth century, the difference between the two was perceived, and international law came to assume a more positive form, resting on customary practice and on explicit agreement among the states. During the earlier stage of development, so-called international law was marked as much by its breach as by its observance, largely because of the fact that state conduct was measured as much by ethical principles as by accepted rules of state conduct.

Characteristics of early international law.—In its earlier development, it should be remarked, the law governing international relations was much more fully established for the war relationship than for that of peace-time. This was the case largely because the contacts of states at an earlier time were established almost exclusively in terms of antagonism. Until the nineteenth century the peace-time contacts of states were irregular and casual. Great movements of peoples, when they took place, were for purposes of conquest and not for purposes of peaceful trade. The Frenchman knew the German, when he knew him at all, as an enemy against whom he had been fighting. There was not the constant and regular movement of shipping with which we are so familiar today. Nor was there so great an interweaving of economic life which made each community dependent on others for foodstuffs, raw materials, and markets. Consequently, on the side of law, there was no great need except for assurance (1) that if an embassy was sent to a foreign

country its members would be protected so that they could fulfil their mission, and (2) that the belligerent contacts of states would result in as little continuing injury as possible.

A second characteristic of the earlier period of development was the limited field in which international relations found full expression. The world embraced within the rule of law was a European Christian world. The European states had relations with the non-European world, it is true, but they were separately adjusted outside the European system. Thus there was trade with the East through Constantinople, and contact with various parts of the Ottoman Empire, and there were commercial relations with some parts of the Far East. But relations at Constantinople were regulated on the basis of the Capitulations, that is, by grants of special privileges and concessions to European nations; while relations at Canton and Nagasaki, until after the middle of the last century, were fixed on a basis established by China and Japan, respectively. The Philippines and parts of India were being brought within the European system as conquered communities rather than as independent states. And both North and South America were partitioned among the states of Europe as colonies.

Extension of the field of international law.—But this condition rapidly changed after the American Revolution. First, the United States entered into relations with the states of Europe within the framework of the European system of international law. Later, much of the Western hemisphere broke off from dependence on European states, until, with the freeing of Cuba from Spanish control, only Canada, the Guianas, and some of the West Indian islands remained dependent. And now Canada is, to all intents and purposes, a separate member of the family of nations. Before the nineteenth century then, the Americas affected international relations by serving as a bone of contention among the European states, whereas since then the American states have directly participated in international relations instead of only affecting them.

Furthermore, since 1800, the family of nations has been expanded by the inclusion of states of a non-European and non-Christian background. China and Japan were brought out of their seclusion and forced to enter into treaty relations with the European states in 1842 and 1854, respectively. Turkey was formally admitted into the European society in 1856, largely for the purpose of protecting her against the pressure of certain European states by throw-

safeguards of law about her. And gradually the Balkan states, when they had thrust off the Turkish yoke, were recognized as independent states. Finally, the settlements following the World War resulted in a considerable enlargement of the number of recognized states. Thus one notable change affecting international relations has been the enlargement of the number of those political entities which have international personality, and which have consequently been enabled to enter into international relations. The world today is organized into approximately sixty units organized on a territorial basis and on the theoretical basis of independence of state action and policy. This independence is, however, qualified by the necessity of acting within the limits set by international law.

INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

In the process of drawing an increasing number of states within a system of international law, international problems have been multiplied. It is evident that the more states there are the greater will be the possibilities of friction. Thus there are more boundaries to be disputed over. Each new state signalizes the achievement of political independence by the erection of a tariff wall around itself, and each new tariff wall enlarges the possible area of friction. There is a greater variety of customs formalities, with consequent disputes. A wider field for conflict over nationality laws is created. There is a multiplying of separate authorities, and a consequent enlargement of the range of possibility of disputes over jurisdiction. There are also more states, with a theoretically equal voice, to participate in the making of international law, with a correspondingly lessened chance of unanimous agreement. There is a greater disparity between states in terms of size, wealth, international interests, and power, with a division in interest of the large and the small states. And there is, finally, the complication arising from the necessity on the part of each member of the society of states to formulate some policy with respect to the recognition of new states. Since the exact nature of some of the other complications mentioned will be more fully revealed in other parts of the discussion of international relations and of international organization, at this point attention may be concentrated on the question of recognition.

Problems of recognition.—Under the accepted code of rules a state does not, as of right, become a member of the society of states.

It assumes international personality, as distinguished from existence as a state, as a result of recognition. And each state has the right to determine for itself, according to its own tests, whether or not it will recognize and enter into relations with a new state or a new government in an old state. This leads to such an anomalous situation as that of Russia in relation to other states, where it has international personality so far as some states are concerned, but it is denied that status by others—by the United States, for example.

At the end of the eighteenth century the problem of state recognition was really presented for the first time, in a fundamental way, when the thirteen colonies declared their independence of England and sought recognition by the states of Europe. The test largely applied by European states up to that time had been that of the legitimacy of birth of the new society. But the United States was born illegitimately out of the process of revolution. Expediency, rather than the desire to strike a blow at England, rather than equity or precedent, dictated the recognition of the United States by England and her rivals. When, in turn, the United States was confronted by the same problem, especially with the revolt of the Spanish colonies, it refused to deny its revolutionary birth, and laid down and followed the principle that whenever any peoples had established their form of political association and organization, and the new entity had proved itself stable, it should be recognized. That is, a *de facto* state or government should be recognized *de jure* when it became clear that it would have to be reckoned with as a rather permanent entity. There was no attempt to pass judgment on the form of the state, on the nature of the government, or on the method by which it had been established.

By the time, however, when other states had come really to act on the basis of this principle, the United States had added to its *de facto* existence the test of the willingness and the ability of the state seeking recognition to discharge its obligations to other states and to their nationals. Then, under President Wilson, the government found it expedient to return to the conception of legitimacy put upon a new basis, when it followed the policy of non-recognition of governments which had attained power as the result of irregular or revolutionary methods. This makes necessary the examination by the United States of the basis of authority in another state and a judgment as to the rightfulness of that authority. It has led to virtual intervention in the internal affairs of other states, particu-

ly in Mexico, the Caribbean area, and in Central America, and has on occasion to serious friction. In the case of Russia, the United States has added to the other features of its policy the right to refuse to recognize a state which carries on subversive propaganda directed against the institutions of other states.

This brief discussion of the question of recognition may serve to indicate the three sources of the problems involved: (1) problems in international relations grow out of the application of differing policies among the several states; (2) friction frequently results by reason of the fact that only national policies are involved, without international standards being established; (3) the growth in the number of states and changes in the character of state life add to the complexities and dangers involved in recognition cases. So long as questions of recognition are settled according to the will of each state, it is evident that problems of this sort will continue to complicate international life.

Problems of nationalism.—The character of modern nationalism and its importance as a dynamic force in history has already been indicated in earlier chapters. Here our interest centers upon some of the specific ways in which it has complicated international relations. It will be recalled that from the French Revolution on, political nationalism created a powerful drive for the establishment of states basically national in character. These movements for political unification or political independence gave rise to grave international complications, since they destroyed the balance of power in Europe; that is, they destroyed the equilibrium of political forces by disturbing national boundaries and the distribution of territory. The political unification of Germany and of Italy offers illustrations in point.

In the middle of the nineteenth century the German people culturally comprised a nation, but politically they were divided into some thirty-odd states. A strong nationalist spirit excited the desire to unite the German peoples in one state. The attempt to achieve this purpose by popular action failed in 1848; but under the leadership of Bismarck unification was accomplished. It was his superior statesmanship that enabled him to succeed without waging a widespread European war. As it was, unification involved one conflict with Denmark, a second with Austria, and a third with France. The sudden emergence of a new, first-class state on the Continent disturbed the balance of power; and to preserve

the fruits of his victories, Bismarck felt it necessary to build a complicated system of alliances which had a profound effect on the international relations of Europe and led finally to the division of Europe into hostile groups, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. Besides, it was in the course of unification that Germany took the fateful step of incorporating the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine and thus directed French national spirit into war channels.

In the Italian peninsula nationalism had likewise stirred people to attempt to convert a cultural nation into a united state. There, too, a popular movement failed. It was left to the statesmanship of Cavour to succeed, but only at the expense of a conflict between the little state of Sardinia and the Austrian power which led into a conflict into which France was drawn on the Sardinian side.

Situations similarly dangerous to the concord of nations have arisen out of movements for political independence among minorities within states. Within Germany and Russia, to cite only two examples among many, it was considered that the state must be nationalized by making "good" Germans or Russians of the minority national elements—such as Poles, Finns, Lorrainers, and others—who had been thrust, either by accident or through conquest, within the limits of the national state. Out of such situations there arose policies of "Germanization" or "Russification." Similar policies were pursued in a number of states with varying degrees of intensity during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The process commonly involved attempts to force the language of the state upon the minority groups, to enforce religious uniformity, or otherwise to stimulate the minority to exchange their customs and habits for those of the dominant state. The general purpose was to denationalize, as far as possible, the subject peoples within the state.

The inevitable result, in most cases, was twofold. It stimulated a movement on the part of the minority group to join their "brotherly" in a neighboring state, or if there was no such state to achieve political independence. At the same time it created a passionate desire on the part of the neighboring state to extend its boundaries to include its "unredeemed" brethren across its frontiers. Thus there arose in certain localities an instability and irritation which poisoned international relations and proved dangerous to the peace of Europe. It was such a situation that led to the *revolutions*

vement in France for the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine after 1871, and to irredentism in Italy for the redemption of the Italian minorities in the Austro-Hungarian state. It was the desire on the part of the Serbian state to incorporate the Serbs of Austria that set the stage for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and thus precipitated the World War in 1914.

Attempts to solve the problems of nationalism.—At the close of the World War it was clear to the statesmen who sat down to formulate the terms of the Treaty of Versailles that the spirit of nationalism working within these groups of subject peoples had become so explosive as to endanger the political stability of Europe. Something needed to be done to satisfy the longings of these peoples for political independence. The problems were not everywhere the same. (1) There were those large groups, like the Czechs of Bohemia who had long been a subject community in Austria-Hungary, and the Poles who had been ruthlessly distributed among Russian, German, and Austrian states. Culturally these peoples constituted nations. What they now demanded was the right to preserve their culture by organizing themselves into independent states. (2) A somewhat different aspect of the problem appeared in the case of smaller cultural groups that lay contiguous to independent states of their own culture, like the Transylvanians in Hungary, who were culturally related to their neighbors in Rumania; and like some of the south Slavs, who were culturally related to the Serbians just across the frontier, but who were prevented from joining their blood brethren by reason of their incorporation in the Austro-Hungarian state. (3) There were numerous smaller, scattered groups which could neither be organized into independent states nor easily joined to a neighboring state. Such were the German communities in Bohemia and in Poland, the Slovenians in Italy, the Lithuanians in Poland.

The Paris Peace Conference (1918-19) attempted to solve the first two of these problems by theoretically basing the territorial settlement of Europe on the principle of self-determination of the peoples. The weakness in its application is to be found in the fact that it was uniformly applied in such a way as to undermine the Central Powers. But this does not alter the fact that it was given a theoretical application on a wide scale. The result was to break up Austria-Hungary into its component national elements. Thus Hungary and German Austria have been left standing alone,

while the amputated territories have either been erected into new states or joined to neighboring ones. These new creations, known as the Succession States, were established on the basis of nationality and boundaries were fixed at the expense of pre-war Austria-Hungary, Germany, Bulgaria, and Russia, so that the old States have disappeared and Yugoslavia has taken its place, and a great Roumania has risen on the international checkerboard. In addition a number of new states have been recognized which have emerged out of the former Russian Empire, and they also are justified on the basis of nationality.

But this application of the principle of self-determination does not solve the problem of minorities still remaining as subject peoples. Many of these new states contain substantial national minorities. Consequently several of them, as a condition of recognition, were compelled to enter into treaties with the Allied Powers by which they agreed to certain treatment of minorities in respect of nationality, language, and religion. Under these treaties the dominant culture group in the state agreed, in effect, to tolerate rather than to denationalize those of divergent cultures. With this "internationally guaranteed" toleration, it was hoped to make minority groups better contented with their situation. The rights of minorities under the treaties were placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. It should be noted, however, that this principle of toleration is not universally applied. It finds application only among the Succession States. Italy, for example, is under no such obligation toward the Germans brought within the Italian state under the terms of the peace treaties.

Problems created by imperialism.—Some of the characteristic features of modern imperialism were examined in an earlier chapter. The study reveals the intimate way in which imperialism is bound up with the political relations of states. In fact, it may be said that imperialism is largely concerned with the play of economic forces that condition international relations. Here interest centers upon some of the ways in which imperialism has added new problems to international politics or intensified the difficulties of old ones.

Modern imperialism is one of the roots of the evil of excessive armaments. In the pursuit of imperialist interests the leading industrial states have steadily extended their colonial possessions and thus enlarged their boundaries in this or that direction, until now they have vulnerable appendages in almost every quarter

globe. National security has ceased in such cases to be a matter of home defense; the frontiers of the big imperialist states, for practical purposes, are to be found on almost every continent and on numerous islands of the seas, as well as at home. With ever increasing imperial interests to protect, the problem of defense becomes increasingly formidable; and armaments on land and sea have been increased until the world today has taken on the appearance of a vast military camp. The reaction upon the small non-imperialist countries has been clearly observable; most of them, striving for their safety, have built armaments out of all proportion to their population and wealth. Moreover, the fierce rivalry for colonial possessions has led to the conviction that military and naval power is necessary to put teeth into the demands of diplomatists in competition for colonial prizes. In other words, to be most successful diplomacy must be backed by the mailed fist held over rivals as a threat of war.

Such a situation in the contemporary world obviously breeds a widespread feeling of fear and insecurity, and every serious controversy over colonial interests tends to produce a crisis during which the issue of war or peace hangs as by a thread. More fundamental is the fact that excessive armaments are an expression of distrust on the part of statesmen as to the effectiveness of international agreements and agencies to protect the interests of states or to preserve international peace. The conviction prevails that the measure of what the state gets and what it holds is national power. Such a psychology is unfavorable to the development of effective machinery for an orderly settlement of international disputes and to the maintenance of peace.

Imperialism has been a major factor in the creation of secret alliances, which are often little more than additional instruments of power for safeguarding imperialist possessions already obtained or for the acquisition of further territory. When states standing alone begin to fear that their own strength is insufficient to achieve their imperial ambitions they look for friends—allies. Secret treaties are usually the basis of these alliances, and the treaty provisions betray the nature of the bargain that has been struck for giving and receiving aid—diplomatic or military—looking to the acquisition of concessions, spheres of influence, and territory. Considerations of this sort weighed heavily in the establishment of the alliances which divided Europe before the World War. The se-

curity of what they already had and the desire to further the imperialist interests in Morocco and Egypt lay at the basis of the entente between France and Great Britain in 1904. This entente was ripened into a virtual alliance largely by the heat generated by the imperialist rivalry between France and Germany on the one hand, and Germany and Great Britain on the other. The impulse which drew Italy into an alliance with the Central Powers was a passionate desire to block the further advance of France in North Africa and to pave the way for Italian accessions in Tripoli.

Defensive alliances, so called, have contributed heavily, particularly when they have been kept secret, in creating and complicating international problems. The sense of increased power that comes from alliances—often secretly dedicated to the execution of special imperialist aggressions—naturally encourages the states concerned to embark upon what is termed a "spirited foreign policy." A spirited foreign policy usually signalizes an aggressive forward movement in colonial adventures. No sooner had France entered into her entente with Great Britain than she began a vigorous intervention in Morocco in 1905. Feeling that her own Moroccan interests were threatened, Germany protested so strongly that war was narrowly averted. In 1911 an even graver crisis arose in Morocco out of the continued rivalry of the two powers. In 1908, encouraged by a secret agreement with Russia, Austria-Hungary proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and again Europe was brought to the verge of war. When such crises arise, alliances tend to throw serious obstacles in the way of concerted action by diplomats in their efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the problems involved. This phase of the subject will be discussed a little later.

One point further needs to be emphasized to reveal the full force of imperialism as a disturbing factor in international relations. Imperialism, it will be recalled, is another expression of nationalism. The emotional driving power behind the movement comes from the stimulation of national pride and a sense of cultural superiority expressed in terms of "manifest destiny," and a moral obligation to promote the advance of backward peoples. Joseph Chamberlain spoke proudly of the British as "the greatest governing race the world has ever seen . . . which will infallibly be the pre-dominant force of future history and universal civilization." And the Navy League of the United States characterized America

perialism as "a duty and a credit to humanity," and the American the "highest type of imperial master." Jules Ferry exalted the French mission of civilizing backward peoples, and the Germans proudly announced the superiority of their *Kultur*. This strong sense of national pride in imperialist achievement stimulates a kind of national psychology dangerous to peace when crises arise out of serious conflicts in the imperialist world. At such times, too, the imperialist finds the best opportunity to arouse the nation to its patriotic duty of supplying increased armament to enable the state to play a worthy part in the struggle for empire.

The combined forces flowing from imperialism make it the most prolific source of international disturbances at the present time. It lay at the roots of the British war in South Africa in 1899 and the Russo-Japanese conflict over Korea and Manchuria in 1904. It was a major factor in bringing on the world struggle of 1914. With the close of the World War the first serious attempt was made to deal with some of the basic problems of imperialism, when the mandatory system was set up under the League of Nations. One of the chief objects of this system is to allow access to raw materials on competitive terms, to the nationals of states other than those in control. Herein is an application of the principle of the "open door," made under the supervision of the League of Nations Commission on Mandates, which receives detailed reports from the mandatory state on the steps it has taken to govern the territories entrusted to it.

Force as a factor in international relations.—References to the part which force plays in international problems have frequently appeared in this study. It is hardly necessary to say that force—potential or actual—pervades the field of international relations on all occasions when differences regarded as vital to the interests of nations arise among states. To comprehend the significance of its effect we must again consider the effect of the doctrine of sovereignty on the behavior of states in their dealings with one another. It has been explained that international relations were built on the basis of the conception of the state as an entity independent of external control and equal before the law to every other member of the family of nations. In that position it asserted its right to be the sole judge of its own acts. Before the nineteenth century, it was pointed out, states were able to make that conception of independence a reality to a great extent; neither states nor the

mass of citizens had yet been brought into close or extensive contact with one another, and such contacts as existed were in terms of antagonism rather than in terms of close mutuality of interest.

That situation passed rapidly during the nineteenth century. The growing interdependence of the world following the industrial revolution produced a more intimate relationship between states, but the change did not appreciably modify the political theory of state independence. Nevertheless, restrictions on the state in the form of international law were somewhat enlarged and its jurisdiction came to be more carefully defined and delimited. The rules under which the game of war was to be played were elaborated in more and more extensive codes. But each state remained largely the judge of its own conduct, and remained in control of the final word of policy. That is, each state largely determined for itself what was its right, and to its interest, to do in the furtherance of its national interest. When policies of two states brought them into conflict, if the difference could not be adjusted by direct negotiation, and if the subject matter of the dispute was of great enough importance, each state had a right to attempt to impose its views on the other by force. The law itself, together with the treaty rights of states, was supported, in the final analysis, by self-help on the part of the state.

It was under such circumstances as these that the state found it necessary to build up armies and navies of sufficient strength to enable it to defend itself against attack, and also to put into effect the policies which it devised as a means of defending and advancing its national interests. In the building up of its armaments program the state was the sole judge of the military and naval force necessary to its defence. Where the interests of two states clashed, it was natural and inevitable that each should arm against the other. And where all states were drawn into a general competition for markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities, it was inevitable that a general competition in armament should begin. As states tended, to the extent of their resources, to follow the maxim of President Washington, "In time of peace prepare for war," as contacts became closer throughout the world, and as more states industrialized themselves, competition became ever keener, and competitive policies bred competitive armament on a scale of increasing magnitude. Ordinarily there was no disposition of governments to use these instruments of force without warning; but on

peaceful efforts of diplomatists had failed, there was danger that nations would be plunged into war.

ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE INTERNATIONAL DISORDER

Thus far in the discussion interest has centered mainly upon the complex of forces that have multiplied and tangled the threads of international relations. It is pertinent to ask at this point what the statesmen have done to reduce international life to some semblance of order. The question will be more fully answered in the chapter following, where international machinery and institutions thus established will be considered. Here we shall simply sketch the general development of certain political activities directed toward the accomplishment of that aim, and of certain broad conceptions as to how states might be brought into more orderly and peaceful relations with one another.

The balance-of-power conception.—So long as the world remains at peace man is inclined to think, with some justification, that society is on the march toward a more rational international order. With the recurrence of war every advance that society has painfully made appears for the time to be lost. War thus appears as the outward expression of the failure to achieve an orderly world. It is one reason why modern statesmen have usually conceived peace as the supreme goal of their endeavor in the field of international politics. In the early modern period—and the idea has persisted down to our own day—statesmen regarded one danger to international peace as standing out above all others. That was the danger that arose when one member of the family of nations should gain such advantage through increase of power as to overtop all other members and so threaten their interests or even their independence. It was out of such situations on the Continent that the conception of the balance of power was born. It was thought, to put the matter crudely, that so long as each state remained content with what it had, the existing state of affairs would not be disturbed; political forces would remain in a condition of equilibrium, and the stability of European society would remain secure. Thus the balance-of-power conception has been regarded as a stabilizing and pacific conception; and the aims of statesmen generally, and of Great Britain in particular, have been to preserve the balance of power on the Continent and in the world at large.

The problem was: How should the balance be maintained or restored if one power grew to giant stature, or if it gathered about it allies who joined to hers their military and naval strength for aggressive purposes? The procedure was, from the sixteenth century on, to organize counter alliances among the powers threatened. Such was the procedure in the sixteenth century when Charles V threatened to revive the medieval idea of one great Continental power. Such again was the procedure against the aggressive designs of Louis XIV of France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when he sought to devour certain of his neighbors to make a greater French state, and still again when Napoleon seemed bent upon creating a great Continental empire. Seen from this perspective, the balance-of-power idea was an expression of the determination of rulers and statesmen to maintain the modern idea of the independent rights of the nation state against the medieval idea of the restoration of something resembling the old Roman empire; it was a clash of the new and the old, of the modern against the medieval, so far as political organization was concerned.

The balance-of-power idea might have proved more effective in the maintaining of European peace if the great Continental states had accepted the idea in good faith. The fact is that they showed no particular desire to preserve the balance of power unless its maintenance was regarded as advantageous to them. Circumstances appearing favorable, each powerful dynastic house was disposed to destroy the balance in its own interest. This disposition appears natural enough in an age when war was regarded as a legitimate instrument for the enhancement of dynastic interests to be utilized generally with no more moral compunction than diplomacy itself. The result was that the early centuries of the modern age present a succession of balances destroyed and balances restored.

The "Concert-of-Europe" conception.—Out of the experience of the Napoleonic wars, 1799-1815, grew a new conception of procedure for the maintaining of peace and order among the members of the family of nations—the conception of the Concert of Europe. In earlier attempts to preserve the balance of power the European states had resorted to temporary alliances; when the aggressor had been put down and the balance restored, the alliances broke up. This performance was repeated at the next critical period. The result was that on each occasion there was usually no alliance

stance early enough to anticipate and forestall conflict; all the alliance could do was to match might with might until the issue was fought out. And in each case Europe was divided into antagonistic camps, the victors seeking to impose their will on the vanquished. It was the impressive lesson as to what a state like Napoleonic France might do to the thrones of Europe and to the European family of nation states that shocked statesmen into a consideration of a more effective procedure for the prevention of so disastrous experience in the future.

What they argued, in effect, was this: instead of dissolving the alliance of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria at the close of the wars in 1815, why would it not be desirable to maintain the combination against a possible fresh outbreak of France, should she be in a position again to run amuck in the European family? With such an international system in existence, conferences could be arranged periodically to survey the European horizon for threatening disturbances. These could then be dealt with before they could eventuate in conflict either within the state or between the states of the family. And to prevent the division of Europe into insiders and outsiders, all the great powers should ultimately be drawn into the conferences. Accordingly, France, hitherto regarded as the great trouble maker in the family, was admitted in 1818. Thus was created the Concert of Europe. The actual organization maintained by the quintuple alliance did not last long; the five powers presently realized that they could not intervene harmoniously in the affairs of Europe, because it was not always to the interest of the whole group so to intervene. By 1830 the organization had ceased to be a factor, but the idea of the Concert has remained down to the present as a conception valuable to peace.

After the dissolution of the quintuple alliance the idea expressed itself in the form of conceiving the public law of Europe as being, in a sense, in the keeping of the Concert. Accordingly, when the public law was violated, it was considered to be the proper rôle for those states signatory to the treaties transgressed to demand that changes thus brought about in boundaries, territory, and the like, must be laid before the Concert—before an international congress to be denied, altered, or confirmed. Such conferences were frequent during the nineteenth century, and despite failures to achieve complete success, they undoubtedly accomplished much in the direction of international accord and peace.

Destruction of the Concert and the World War.—So long as the Concert idea remained potent in European international affairs there was a fair prospect that the conflicting interests of the European states would be sufficiently adjusted to prevent a general European war. But in the last quarter of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century a deep schism gradually developed among the great powers of Europe that destroyed the effective working of the Concert and so made diplomacy helpless to ward off the calamity of a world conflict. How did that situation come about?

By 1871 the balance of power had been upset by the formation of the strong German Empire and by subsequent alliances of Germany with Italy and Austria. The result of this development was a joining of the forces of three powers in the event of conflict. Russia, for example, had to reckon not only with the military power of Germany but also with that of Austria in case of war. A similar union of forces—those of Germany and Italy—had to be feared by France if she should seek to regain Alsace-Lorraine. Consequently in 1893, Russia and France drew together in an alliance, which was transformed into the Triple Entente by the adhesion of Great Britain a few years later. From this time on there was not only an acceleration of armament, but a progressive development of the system of alliances, until Europe was divided, when the fatal year 1914 was ushered in, into two groups, each heavily armed and each hoping that it was stronger, in the event of war, than the other group.

It was said that between these two sets of forces there existed a balance so nicely adjusted that neither could safely attack the other. This, however, proved to be a delusion, as did the views of those who relied on extensive armament as a means of ensuring the state against the hazards of war. Neither armaments nor alliances prevented the outbreak of war in 1914. In fact, the reverse seemed to have been true, for the augmenting of armaments on the part of any member of the Triple Alliance so stimulated fear and anxiety in the opposing camp that it, in turn, proceeded to increase its own armaments. The forming of two great allied groups, instead of producing an equilibrium which made for peace, produced rather an intense rivalry between them and drove the members of each group into a closer and more aggressive union. This deep schism destroyed the Concert, with the result that in the search for

diplomatic solution of the Serbian crisis, the two camps found themselves lined up sharply on different sides. Each was intent upon a solution in accordance with its own interests rather than the interests of the European family as a whole. The result was a failure of pacific methods and an appeal to force.

The "World-Concert" conception.—The World War revealed the grave danger of unrestricted armaments and secret treaties to international peace. Accordingly the nations took a stand against both these evils in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Furthermore, since the War, various other attempts have been made to bring about agreement on the limitation of armament. The Washington, Geneva, and London Naval Conferences have all been directed toward this end. The work of the Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations—with which the United States has been collaborating—and of the Geneva Disarmament Conference (1932) has been pointed in the same direction. The League of Nations itself is, in large measure, an expression of the conviction that the Concert should be restored on a much more solid and lasting foundation than ever before. But the day of a European Concert is past; so interdependent have the countries of the world become that a serious conflict in one part may involve the globe, as was the case in 1914. Thus the present situation has called for a league of all the states; the Concert of Europe has sought to become the Concert of the World.

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CHAPTER XXX

INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND INSTITUTIONS

Two major facts stand out in the preceding discussion of the development of international relations during the modern era: (1) that the family of nations has expanded from a European to a world scope, and (2) that the forces affecting the relations of its members have multiplied until the problem of establishing an orderly existence among the states has become a prodigious one. One gets the impression, too, of the groping of statesmen to find a formula or principle which might light the way toward a solution. The present task is one of examining in a more detailed way the instruments which have been devised and the agencies and institutions which have been established (1) to bring international relations under control, and (2) to satisfy the needs of an international society which may be conceived as something distinct in its interests from the several national societies upon which we have concentrated our attention in earlier chapters.

State independence as an obstacle to international order.—To bring the central feature of the problem of international order into clear relief, it is desirable to refer again to the supreme emphasis which was laid upon the independence of the state, and to repeat that prior to the middle of the nineteenth century the fabric of society was almost entirely national. There had emerged, to be sure, the so-called family of nations, but each member of the family was separate and independent to such a degree as to make the conception more of a fiction than a fact. Except for a very brief period there was no regularly constituted family council, no common organs of administration. Only too frequently the relations of members of the family were disturbed by conflicts of policy which often issued in war. And with war there came the breakdown of relationships between the belligerents and a disturbance of the normal relations of neutrals with the belligerents. International conferences were usually called to make peace rather than to solve the peace-time problems of international life. In other words,

international conferences met almost exclusively for purposes relating to war, either to bring about its termination, its regulation or, occasionally, its specific avoidance. This statement holds essentially true despite the fact that periodically plans were presented for unifying the interests of the states, as was the case in the organization of the Concert of Europe.

The strong initial emphasis on the independence of states is not difficult to understand. The attempt had been made through the Roman Catholic Church and the medieval imperial hierarchy to maintain the unity of Europe after the fall of Rome. The development of national cultures, however, served so to distinguish European national groups from one another as to replace the conception of European unity with that of European division. This led to a reaction against the domination both of the Roman Catholic Church and the imperial principle expressed through the Holy Roman Empire. The reaction took the form of an extreme emphasis on national or state sovereignty and independence. After 1648 there was a continual fear lest the state should be subordinate to an external authority with the resultant sacrifice of the interests of both ruler and people. Consequently the centripetal tendencies were continually strengthened as against the centrifugal, until the conceptions of independence of external control and the equality of all states, irrespective of size and power, had assumed the character of dogmas.

The extreme conception of independence, however, was a valid one only so long as states were economically largely self-sufficient and out of intimate contact with one another because of the slowness of communications. But in the nineteenth century scientific invention revolutionized communications. The result has been that from the standpoint of contact, the world has steadily contracted in size as measured by communication miles. In 1800 London was not days but weeks distant from New York. This was true both with respect to the movement of peoples and of goods, and with respect to the communication of intelligence. On land, travel was by means of the stagecoach. On the seas, communication and trade were in terms of the sailing packet, dependent on winds and tides. The consequence was that communities were measurably isolated from one another. There was trade, to be sure, but it was slow and uncertain, irregular and spasmodic. By 1900 the steam vessel had supplanted the sailing packet and the stagecoach had been replaced

the railway. Cables had been laid under the ocean, and telegraph lines had been erected on the land. The telephone was coming into use, regular national as well as international postal services were in operation, and the steam printing press had taken the place of the hand press. The consequence of these changes in the methods of communication was that distance had begun to be annihilated. From the standpoint of the movement of peoples and of goods, New York, London, and Tokyo were closer together in 1900 than Boston and New York had been in 1800. And from the standpoint of the communication of intelligence, the change was even more startling. New York and Cincinnati could learn of the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo more quickly, in 1914, than Lexington could of the movement of troops out of Boston in 1775.

Growing limitations on state independence.—It is not to be wondered at, then, that despite the assertion of state independence, the rules of international law steadily widened in their scope through the multiplying of treaties. Thus international law gradually came to assume form as a system accepted and habitually observed by states in their relations with one another. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries states found it expedient to enter into agreements to govern their conduct by new rules. The laws especially of war and of neutrality were extended and given definite form by means of explicit international agreement. The laws of peace developed more slowly, on the basis of customary practice and by means of the spinning of a web of bilateral treaties. Thus the relations of states have come to be adjusted on the basis of law in an increasing number of rather specific cases. No nation today interprets its right of independence so rigidly as to disregard the established and accepted rules of international law in the development and expression of its policies.

Likewise, procedures for the adjustment of international disputes, without a resort to war, have been in the slow process of evolution within the last century and a quarter. This evolution also has flowed from a gradual recognition of the fact that states are today dependent upon one another for foodstuffs, for vitally important raw materials, for markets, and for fields for the investment of their surplus capital. Thus all states are, in varying degree, bound intimately together. War, which severs their contacts and fundamentally disturbs the course of trade, has much more serious consequences to society today than it had a century ago. Consequently

it has come to be considered as something to be avoided if possible. This necessitates the development of satisfactory alternative methods for the settlement of disputes.

Furthermore, the controls accepted by the state have been extended beyond the limits fixed in international law inasmuch as relations of states have been put on the basis of treaty agreements. Thus states have not only entered into treaties of alliance—which look in the direction of war even where they are cast in terms purely defensive arrangements—but they have put more and more of their normal intercourse on the basis of agreement. The United States, to cite it as an example of what is universally true, has entered into commercial and consular conventions, into extradition treaties, into treaties restricting its freedom in the development of its armaments program, and into arbitration and conciliation conventions, to mention only a few classes of cases.

INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY: (I) DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICES

The growth of international law, the development of procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the multiplying of treaty agreements signify that limitations are increasingly being placed upon the independence of states in their dealings with one another. To the extent that such controls are made effective, order is being introduced into international life. How have these controls come into existence, and through what instrumentalities have they been made to function? To answer these questions we shall have to consider some of the important types of international machinery which are now being utilized—some types newly created, other adaptations of machinery long in use.

In the building up of our present treaty system, as well as in the general conduct of international relations, the states have long maintained the necessary contact with one another by means of diplomatic and consular offices. Both of these have been modified at intervals since the states-system came into being during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to make them conform to changing needs. The changes which have taken place have followed the lines marked out by that extension of both political and commercial intercourse which has resulted from the improvement of communications and the development of trade on a world basis.

At first, when the intercourse of states was irregular and sporadic,

dic, the state did not find it necessary to establish permanent political representation abroad. As intercourse became more regular and constant, the present system of permanent diplomatic representation was found to be necessary. Just here it may be noted that all development of international machinery, and of law, comes following a demonstration of its necessity. There has been little extension of state into interstate life that has not been the result of an attempt on the part of politics to take up the slack left by more rapid economic and social movement. Certainly this has been true in the development of machinery for the conduct of international relations.

As a matter of fact, in a very real sense diplomacy may be considered not as an extension of national into international organization but rather as a necessary feature of national organization. Both the diplomat and the consul are national officers appointed by the heads of their respective governments, paid out of the national treasury, and with their primary duties and responsibilities to the state. The diplomat is the medium for the conduct of intercourse and negotiation between his own government and that to which he is sent, and thus his functions are essentially political. The consul, on the other hand, is concerned with the supervision and development of trade relations between the two states. But both are national officers.

Both have, however, a place of basic importance in the scheme of international organization, even though the offices are national. With every state maintaining diplomatic representatives at the seat of government of every other state, and consular representation in every important commercial and industrial center, contact is maintained regularly and constantly between the members of the family of nations. These agencies serve to draw the nations together and encourage the development of a sense of community of interests. Points of view can be interchanged, and points of difference can be discussed and often adjusted in a friendly manner. It should be noted, however, that these ends can be attained only if the governments concerned are willing to settle their differences in a friendly manner, for, as a national officer, the diplomat receives his instructions from his government, through the medium of the Foreign Office or, as it is called in the United States, the Department of State. The head of this department, in turn, acts under the direction of the government which, in a democratic system, is supposed

to be controlled by public opinion. Thus national opinion acts through the medium of the foreign service to control and direct the foreign relations of the state, and it is the conception of national rather than of international interest which finds an expression through the diplomatic and consular channels.

From the standpoint of organization the situation may be made clearer by drawing lines on a world map, running from Washington to the capital of every recognized country. These lines can represent the diplomatic channels between this country and the other members of the family of nations. Now if the same thing is done for every country, and if additional lines are drawn from every capital to every important port and commercial center, it will be readily seen what an intricate web has been woven to enable the requirements of modern society for international intercourse to be met through diplomatic and consular representation.

(2) INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES AND THEIR FUNCTIONS

A second type of international machinery, the conference, has been of major importance in the development of international controls. During the nineteenth century, it will be recalled, the practice began of holding international conferences to consider questions and problems of immediate concern to several states. The problems of general interest could be more easily considered in conference than through complicated separate negotiations. As the practice continued the representation at international conferences was gradually broadened and conference functions were greatly extended. Consequently, their value for the adjustment of international problems has steadily increased.

The growing concern with problems of peace time.—Fundamentally, international conferences were justified during the nineteenth century, as already pointed out, on the basis of the Concert of Europe, that is, on the ground that the affairs of Europe had been composed and fixed by international agreement, and that the Powers dictating the terms of a given treaty or convention must confer concerning their enforcement and observance. Thus they were "continuation" conferences, following the conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, as well as after the conference at Paris in 1919. On the same principle, the Crimean war was brought to an end through a peace arrived at in an international conference.

leader in its composition than the belligerent states, and understanding more than merely to arrive at the terms of peace. Just as the Vienna Congress of 1815 laid down rules of international law, so the Paris Congress of 1856 attempted to exercise legislative powers on the international community. A third conference of this type is that at Berlin in 1878, when Russia was compelled to bring the terms of her treaty of peace with Turkey before a European conference for consideration and revision. A final example of this type of international conference, which possessed or assumed wider functions than those of a peace conference, was the Conference of Versailles called at the end of the World War.

A somewhat different function is performed by conferences summoned, not for the purpose of composing conflicting international interests after they have been disturbed by war or other disruptive forces, but for anticipating changes in the *status quo*, which threaten the rupture of friendly relations involving several Powers. Such was the Berlin Conference, called in 1885, when King Leopold of Belgium and his associates launched a huge imperialist project in the Congo region of Africa, which, it was feared, might precipitate a dangerous rivalry for African territory among the European imperialist states. A better example still was furnished by the Congress of Algéciras in 1906, which was assembled to fix by agreement the status of the European states in Morocco, where France threatened to disturb the *status quo* and involve herself in war with Germany. Such a war, if it had broken out, would probably have drawn in all of the great Powers of Europe.

International administrative organs.—Still another important kind of international conference is that called for the consideration of administrative questions involving postal, telegraphic, health, and similar matters. These conferences or congresses have resulted in the formation of the first truly international organs, the importance of which is not lessened because they are administrative in character. The first step toward the limiting of national control by the substitution of international control is almost invariably effected by international conferences. And the conference, if agreement is reached, results in the signing of an international convention embodying the terms of this agreement. The agreement may be on international standards to control the work of national administrative bodies, without any international organs of administration being established. Or provision may be made

for a permanent administrative organ, usually called a Bureau, and for periodic congresses to revise the terms of the fundamental agreement or convention, and for conferences to revise the technical rules of the organization. It is not possible here to go into the question of international administration in any detail. But the nature of the development may be illustrated by reference to the International Postal Union and other similar international agencies.

Before 1863 each state was free to handle mails of foreign origin in any way that it saw fit. It could set its own charges for handling them, while the routing of the mails was a difficult problem which had to be solved by the individual, who must consider both transportation facilities and varying charges. Thus there was a wide variation in the cost of sending a letter between two places, depending on just how, and through what countries, it was routed. If it had to go by steamer and it missed a steamer, it could not be sent over an alternative route because of this factor of variable charges. Much inconvenience and undue expense resulted from this situation. At first the attempt was made to avoid the difficulties by means of bilateral treaties. Even after the inconvenience to business became overwhelming, states only very reluctantly moved toward a relaxation of their control of the mails. Finally the pressure became so great that an international conference was held, and an agreement was reached to create an organization for the sole purpose of solving the problem. The result was the establishment of the International Postal Union. This organization sets uniform charges and establishes regulations for the handling of mails of foreign origin, each state being bound to handle all such mails at rates internationally agreed upon, even though the ultimate destination is a third state.

A little thought will reveal clearly the drastic character of this and similar innovations, so far as national sovereignty is concerned. The extent of the innovation is emphasized when it is remembered that the expenses of the organization are not borne equally by all members of the Union but are prorated among them on a fixed scale also internationally agreed upon. This particular Union has developed and entrenched itself because its usefulness has been completely revealed. It is now so firmly established that there has even been a relaxation of the usual rule that there must be unanimous consent before changes can be made in the Convention, for in spite of the formal maintenance of the rule of unanimity for

amendment of the Convention, it has been conclusively demonstrated that no state can prevent change in the face of a strong majority opinion that it should be made.

In the field of the communication of intelligence, what was found to be necessary in relation to the posts, leading to the formation of the Postal Union, has also been found necessary in the case of telegraphic and radio-telegraphic communication. Thus the Telegraphic Union was established in 1865, and subsequently an international radiotelegraphy convention was signed. In the same way it has been found necessary to establish international rules for navigation, with international organs to supervise their administration. It was also early found that the disease germ did not hesitate to cross national frontiers. Consequently, regional health councils were established, and the *Office International d'Hygiène Publique* came into being in 1903. Similarly, at a considerably earlier period, the need of international regulation of navigation on certain great river highways became evident. Thus the Rhine Commission was established in 1804, the Danube Commission in 1856; and there has been a steady tendency since that time to internationalize the control and use of international waterways. It is noticeable in all these examples of the development of international administrative agencies that one feature is common to all: they have to do with forms of communication which could reach their maximum of usefulness only if all interested parties could participate in their control.

Many other instances might be added to illustrate the multiplying of international agencies. One of peculiar interest to the United States is the Pan-American Union, which performs a wide variety of useful work, fact finding in the main. It also serves the needs of the periodic conferences of American States, the most recent of which was the conference held at Havana in 1928. These conferences consider a wide range of subjects, including the codification of international public and private law, arbitration, customs formalities, and the like, and thus promote Pan-American friendship.

The Hague Conferences.—Still another development of the conference system was forecast in 1899 with the summoning of the first Hague Conference. While it was called ostensibly to consider the question of the growing competition in armament, its chief importance inheres in the work it has done in defining the arbitral

process, in making provision for a so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration, and in providing for the constitution of Commission of Inquiry. This and the second Hague Conference (1907) were the first real international conferences meeting in time of peace for the purpose of considering problems unrelated to the settlement of the conduct of war, or to the adjustment of existing acute controversies between states. And yet here again the great preoccupation was with international disputes. A change in attitude of fundamental importance, however, is indicated, since the point of emphasis was not the regulation of war but the perfection of methods for the pacific settlement of disputes.

The Hague Conferences were also distinguished from preceding political conferences by reason of their extended membership. Representatives of twenty-six states attended the 1899 Conference—twenty European, four Asiatic, and two American. And the membership of the 1907 Conference was even more inclusive. Still further significance attaches to the development by reason of the decision to hold successive conferences. A third was projected to meet in 1915 but was blocked by the outbreak of the World War. It may be pointed out as significant that the economic integration of the world was making frequent international discussion so necessary that periodic conferences on the problems of peace were coming to be considered a normal and inevitable feature of international life. This fact represents a considerable departure from the days when states communicated with one another irregularly through the sending of special diplomatic missions for purposes of negotiation.

1914—A TURNING POINT

The expansion of international agreements and the creating of new machinery for their enforcement constitute for the nineteenth and the early twentieth century a record of achievement in the direction of international order. During this period a body of rules and an administrative procedure were developed to smooth the paths of necessary international intercourse. As one international problem after another arose, the community interests of society at large were impressively borne in upon statesmen. Each achievement became a point of departure for further advance, and each made its contribution to international-mindedness. Experience was impressing the lesson that the way of progress lay in di-

cession and compromise about the conference table. The idea of sovereignty was still triumphant but it was held less rigidly and dogmatically. It was becoming more and more evident that state independence must make some concessions if world society was to be reduced to order. Thus there was some basis for optimism in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Then came the World War. International law, treaties, and conventions were violated on all sides and by all parties to the struggle, whenever it appeared that such agreements stood in the way of victory. It looked as if the international system so laboriously constructed had crashed to the ground, and international anarchy had taken its place. International agreements had failed to bind the nations in matters of supreme interest to mankind; practically the entire world was at war. It was out of the bitter experiences of that ordeal that the conviction arose which found expression in the establishment of new international institutions designed to facilitate the solution of the manifold problems of international life. It appeared that it was the failure to provide such instruments in advance that had rendered futile all attempts to find a peaceful solution in 1914. In this sense 1914 marks the beginning of a new chapter in the history of international politics. The institutions created in or after 1919 are the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the International Labor Office. Each of these bodies has its separate organization and separate functions, but in their workings they are interrelated, and in a sense comprise an integrated system of activities directed along numerous channels but toward one general end—the realization of the common interests of a world society. The procedures governing these activities are definitely set down in agreements accepted by the member states, and the procedure applied is determined by the nature of the problem presented for solution. The significance of this comprehensive international organization will become clear as the discussion proceeds.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The League an extension of the Concert idea.—The establishment of the League of Nations does not represent a violent break with the traditions and the developments of the past. On the contrary, it represents an upbuilding on the basis of past experi-

ence. There is implicit in it the conception of the concert of nations broadened to include the small states as well as the great Powers, and extended to the entire world. Thus the League has a membership comprising all the states of the world with the exception of the United States, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, and a few other less important states. While two of the great Powers are not members, five of them are actively participating in this world institution. And instead of the great Powers alone attempting to settle the affairs of Europe and of the world, the weaker states, such as Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Costa Rica, and China, have a real voice in world affairs.

Furthermore, the conference idea, as it had found its highest expression through the Hague Conference system, has been institutionalized and further developed as a normal and necessary feature of international life. This fact becomes clear when we examine the character of the Council and the Assembly, which are the major organs of the League. The Council of the League is in essence a diplomatic conference of five permanent and nine representative members, which meets regularly three times a year and more frequently if the occasion arises. The assembly is an annual conference of all states members of the League, each with not more than three representatives. The composition of the Council represents a recognition of the fact that some states, by reason of their size, their wealth, their power, and their international interests, are more vitally concerned with the proper ordering of world affairs than are others. The composition of the Assembly represents a recognition of the old principle of the equality of states. The double provision made for conference represents, consequently, an adjustment of the legal theory of equality to the physical fact of inequality.

The usefulness of the League is not confined to the activities of the conferences of the Council and the Assembly; League machinery has been used to promote many conferences outside those bodies. Among these may be mentioned the Barcelona Conference on Transit and Communications, out of which grew a valuable technical organization on transit and communications; the Brussels Financial Conference, which recommended to the Council the establishment of the present Financial and Economic Organization; the Opium Conference; the World Economic Conference; the Hague Conference on the Codification of International Law; and the Geneva Disarmament Conference. This application of the conference method

to the solution of international problems, it must be emphasized, is directly in line with the development which was taking place before the war. The pre-war system has only been regularized, systematized, and extended.

The comparative stability of League membership, the frequency and regularity of its Council and Assembly meetings, and its usefulness in the promotion of outside conferences have combined to give the conference system a place of lasting importance in the ordering of our international life. The system is further strengthened by the existence of the Secretariat, a third important organ of the League of Nations.

The Secretariat and its work.—The Secretariat is an international civil service comparable in many respects to national civil services. Its members, now more than four hundred in number, are selected on the basis of technical qualification, they are paid by the League, and are in almost every respect international officers. They devote all of their time year in and year out to a careful actual study of the problems of international relations which are of concern to the League and to its members. Thus they are in a position to facilitate the work of League conferences in a number of ways. It is the Secretariat which, under the supervision of the Council, prepares the agenda of League conferences and makes the necessary arrangements for their convocation. Within the Secretariat the essential preliminary studies of the problems to be considered can be made so that the state representatives when they meet in conference can have before them the factual data which are necessary if agreement on policy is to be reached. And if agreement is not reached, the Secretariat, as a permanent body of experts, can carry on the study of the problem between conferences. It is also available for the purpose of administering any decisions that may be reached. It is largely the Secretariat, together with the Council and the Assembly, which holds the League together as a permanent and continuing international institution.

The specific character of the Secretariat's work can best be understood in the light of the purposes of the League, which the Secretariat is designed to serve. The purposes of the League are broadly described in the Covenant, which is its constitution, as the promotion of international coöperation and the preservation of the peace. It may be pointed out here that in one sense these are not separate and distinct purposes. The more completely the world

is committed to the principle of coöperation as against unregulated competition in the carrying on of international relations, the greatest assurance is the assurance that the peace will be preserved. In another sense, however, they do represent two distinct lines of development. In the endeavor to advance international coöperation, the League has necessarily promoted the holding of a large number of international conferences. By this means it directs a constant stream of attention to economic, social, humanitarian, and general administrative problems upon which there is need for international agreement. Beyond this activity, its functions with respect to international coöperation are fairly reflected in the activities of the Secretariat.

Those activities present an impressive medley. The Covenant provides that all treaties to be binding must be registered with the League. This work of registration is performed by the Secretariat. The Secretariat assists in the preparation of studies on international economic and financial questions. It makes a study of such international social problems as those growing out of the manufacture and distribution of opium and other narcotics, of the international traffic in women and children, and of health conditions in the various parts of the world; and it works out plans for the international regulation of these matters. Its activities are also related to the work of the technical organization on transit and communications; to work on the problem of armament and the taking of action looking toward international disarmament; to the supervision of the special regimes instituted at Danzig and in the Saar Basin and to the supervision of the mandatory system and of the minority treaties. Several of these activities indicated above are specified in provisions of the Peace Treaties and of the Covenant; still others have developed as a result of an application of the general conception of international coöperation. To these might be added a number of important activities developed through subordinate or autonomous parts of the League organization, whose work and organization might be described if space permitted. One of these, the International Labor Office, will be discussed a little later.

The League and the preservation of peace.—The foregoing brief characterization of the work of the Secretariat as a reflection of the activities of the League will suggest something of the League's importance in the promotion of international coöperation. In that field it has proved indispensable. Yet most of these achievements have escaped the public eye. Popular interest and attention

have been directed toward the League's second general purpose, namely, the preservation of peace, as the more immediately important.

The Covenant (Art. 8) recognizes the relationship between war and armament, and consequently directs that steps shall be taken to bring about the reduction of armament to a level consistent with the maintenance of national security and the preservation of domestic order. It also recommends that the international traffic in arms be brought under international control. Consequently a large measure of League activity has been directed toward the study of the problem of armament and the promotion of international agreements on national armament and the trade in arms. The culmination of a decade of work was the convocation of the general Disarmament Conference which met at Geneva at the beginning of 1932. But so far no great results have been achieved as a result of the expenditure of a great amount of time and energy. If a reduction of armament is a necessary part of the preservation of peace it must be recognized that permanent peace has not as yet resulted from the constitution of the League of Nations.

A major part of the explanation of the failure to achieve tangible results lies in the fact that national importance and also national security have been based upon national armament. In the settlement of international disputes war has frequently been the ultimate procedure. With the possibility of war there is created the necessity of armament. Consequently it is only as satisfactory pacific procedures for the settlement of international disputes are agreed upon, and as there is an assurance that only these pacific procedures will be utilized, that states will be willing to forego extensive national armament.

This was recognized by the drafters of the Covenant. They attempted to create a feeling of security by having the members of the League agree to respect and to preserve as against external aggression the independence and the territorial integrity of the states members of the League (Art. 10). The effect of this should be to transfer responsibility for its defense against attack from the state to the members of the society of states. The next article (11) of the Covenant makes war or any threat of war a matter of concern to the whole League. Consequently, it authorizes the taking of such action as may be deemed wise and effectual to preserve peace. When the Covenant provides an agreement among the member

states that they will never resort to war until after a dispute has been submitted either to arbitration, judicial settlement through Court, or conciliation by the League Council. If conciliation unsuccessful then (until after the signature of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928) the disputants are legally free to engage in war; but, if the Council's recommendations for settlement are accepted by one party, the other members of the League agree not to go to war with it in support of the other party to the dispute.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact helps to bring to completion this peaceful structure. Its first article provides for a renunciation of war as a means of national policy. Its second article constitutes an agreement of the signatories that they will settle all disputes by peaceful means; that is, by arbitration, judicial settlement, or conciliation. There is no provision made, as there is in Article 15 of the League Covenant, for an ultimate resort to war after the employment of these procedures of peaceful settlement. Consequently those states that have signed the Covenant and also accepted the Kellogg-Briand Pact have lost such legal right of resort to war as they retained under the Covenant. Since all of the members of the League have accepted the Kellogg-Briand Pact, it may be said that the Pact has importance because it completes the Covenant from the standpoint of a prohibition of a resort to war. It has further importance because some of its signatories are non-members of the League. These, including the United States and Russia, through the Pact accept the obligation already accepted by League members to settle disputes by peaceful means. Thus, implicitly, they associate themselves with the League in its endeavor to preserve the peace.

This attempt at the legal prohibition of war represents a marked departure, and the most notable one, from the evolution of pre-war days. Then war was regarded not merely as legal but also as inherent in the nature of international life; and the effort made was one to regulate it and to minimize its consequences rather than to get rid of it. With the establishment of the League and the acceptance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, prohibition rather than regulation becomes the point of emphasis. With the legal prohibition of war as a future goal, the ideal achievement would be the establishment of a judicial procedure which could be applied to international disputes liable to result in war. The trend during recent years has been in the direction of such a development. To follow the line

of experience that have contributed to it, we shall need to sketch briefly the history of the Permanent Court of International Justice, commonly spoken of as the World Court.

THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

The evolution of the Permanent Court.—The pacific procedures for the settlement of disputes stipulated in the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the Kellogg-Briand Pact were in the process of development long before the World War. Of the three procedures stipulated in the Covenant—arbitration, judicial settlement, and conciliation—the first is the oldest and best established. Arbitration was employed by the Greeks and the other ancient societies but fell largely into disuse until the nineteenth century. It was revived in the Jay treaty, signed in 1794, and was frequently made use of during the nineteenth century. It was formally accepted as a sound international procedure at the first Hague Conference. Both the Hague Conferences devoted considerable attention to working out in detail the method of resort to arbitration. During the years from 1900 to 1914, furthermore, a number of states signed agreements to submit certain specified types of disputes to arbitration. By a resort to arbitration is meant an agreement to set up a special tribunal to which the disputants grant authority, under defined conditions, to settle the dispute. They accept in advance an obligation to carry into effect in good faith the decision of the tribunal. This is called the award. The Hague Conferences standardized the procedure. They also provided for the constitution of a so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. This, in fact, is neither permanent nor a court. It is merely a list of names of those qualified to serve as arbitrators.

Experience with arbitration resulted in the feeling that it should be made as nearly as possible like the national judicial process. To accomplish this it was first of all necessary to establish a real court to replace or to supplement the Hague panel of arbitrators. This was attempted unsuccessfully at the second Hague Conference. But the feeling of need continued, and it led to the provision made in the League Covenant for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice (Art. 14). The Council undertook this as one of its first tasks. As a result the World Court was set up in 1920.

Settlement by judicial decision and by arbitration.—The Court consists now of fifteen judges and four deputy judges. It sits at The Hague, and for that reason it is sometimes confused with the Hague Court of Arbitration which continues to exist. It meets regularly, just as does the Supreme Court of the United States, and is empowered to hear and render judgment in any cases submitted to it by the states that have accepted the obligations of membership in the Court. Furthermore, a number of states have submitted themselves completely to its jurisdiction for the settlement of certain specified types of disputes. By this is meant that they have given up the right to refuse to take these classes of disputes to court. Thus they can be sued by other states, without their consent being given to the particular suit, provided the other state has also accepted the same obligation. This is called giving the Court compulsory jurisdiction. In effect it gives to the Court itself the right to determine the limits of its jurisdiction in relation to a controversy instead of leaving that determination to the agreement of the states concerned. This tendency is in the direction of making the Court competent to hear disputes between sovereign states just as the Supreme Court of the United States is competent to decide disputes between states in the American Union.

Thus the League Covenant declares, and the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact have also accepted, the obligation to settle disputes which can be decided according to legal principles either by setting up a special court of arbitration or by taking the dispute to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The League Assembly has attempted to perfect this obligation. It has stimulated the negotiation of special agreements between states further defining the obligation and the procedure for making it effective. It has attempted to make the procedure more compulsory when it elaborated the Geneva Protocol in 1924. And since then, the Protocol having failed of acceptance, it has worked out model treaties of arbitration and conciliation and urged the states to accept them. All of this, of course, is in addition to the establishment of the Permanent Court.

Settlement by conciliation.—Conciliation—the third type of procedure stipulated in the League Covenant—rests upon a recognition of the fact that there are many international disputes which cannot be taken to the Court or submitted to arbitration. These disputes involve conflicts of national policies in fields unregulated by

aw. Consequently no state is willing to agree to permit a tribunal to decide them, because the decision would have to represent the judgment of the tribunal as to the expedient thing to do. Such disputes, however, frequently can be compromised even though they cannot be authoritatively decided. Often it is found that the major difficulty comes from lack of agreement as to the facts. Consequently, for this type of dispute the Hague Conferences made provision for the use of "good offices," "mediation," and Commissions of Inquiry. Out of the last mentioned grew the procedure of conciliation. This involves investigation into the facts in dispute and also the making of proposals for its settlement. But these proposals are recommendations which are not binding on the disputants as is the award of an arbitral tribunal or the judgment of the Permanent Court.

Since the establishment of the League a new impetus has been given to the establishment of permanent conciliation commissions to handle disputes between particular states. This has resulted from the success of the Council, acting both under Article 11 and Article 15 (the Conciliation Article) of the Covenant, in settling disputes which the states involved were not willing to arbitrate.

Moral force as a factor in the peace problem.—But the preservation of peace depends on more than the perfection of procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes. It depends upon the invariable utilization of these procedures. This leads to a consideration of a final question: What assurance is there that the states of the world will live up to their agreements under the Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact to settle their disputes by pacific means? What are the supports for the observance of such fundamental international engagements?

The first reliance necessarily has to be placed on the good faith of states. The second is said to be the compelling power of public opinion. Through the League Council and the Assembly it is now possible to focus attention on the behavior of states in relation to these engagements, in a way that was totally impossible before the establishment of the League. In this way international opinion may be directed toward the condemnation of a state that resorts to war, or even the use of force short of war, in violation of its international engagements. Good faith and the pressure of public opinion to ensure the maintenance of the faith are sometimes said to be all the compulsions necessary to preserve this peace system.

This has been the view of the United States. However, the League Covenant goes one step further and, in Article 16, provides for the direction of an economic and financial boycott against a state that violates its League engagements. Time alone can tell how effective these compulsions will prove to be. But implicit in the whole movement toward more effective international organization is the conception that the society of states must accept some measure of responsibility for the protection of the state. The only other alternative is self-preservation through the development of national power by means of armament, and this alternative has been consciously rejected by thoughtful leaders since the World War.

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE

The dominant interest in international peace which pervades the activities of the League and the Permanent Court appears in the considerations leading to the establishment of the International Labor Office. In its inception those who were responsible for the creation of the Labor Office had in mind the fact that many labor problems are international in character, and at times have a direct bearing upon international good will. In addition there were the needs of organized labor throughout the world to consider, at a time when triumphant Russian communism was reaching out beckoning hands to the workers of Europe.

Organized labor had long recognized that one of the difficulties of establishing and maintaining a satisfactory standard of life had its source in the wide variations in working conditions, hours, and wages in different countries. Under a competitive system, low standards in one country tended to pull down standards in another where conditions were more favorable. Sincere good will and sympathy were difficult to maintain between the working populations of nations where widely divergent standards prevailed. Thus in the interest of amity and in the interest of better living conditions, organized labor sought to "level up" standards where they were low.

Such was one of the important aims of the socialist wings of the working class when they established what is called The International in 1864, an organization which, beginning with a few nations, soon extended its influence as to include labor groups in almost every nation during the first decade of the twentieth century. So far as

his particular aim is concerned, the significant fact is that what labor sought to do by means of The International, which was completely separated from governments, is now to be done, among other things, by the International Labor Office, whose business it is to investigate labor conditions throughout the world and to promote agreement among the states, looking toward a progressive improvement of those conditions.

The International Labor Organization is closely related to the League of Nations, but it has its own constitutional foundation in a charter set forth in the Treaty of Versailles. The organization consists of three bodies: a Conference, a Governing Body, and a Labor Office. The Conference is a distinct organization which meets annually. Its members consist of three classes of representatives: (1) a state delegation of two members chosen by the government, (2) one representative nominated by the organized workers, and (3) one nominated by the employers, the two last, however, receiving official appointment by the government. Since the members vote as individuals, the Conference is really divided into three groups. Conventions may be accepted by majority vote of the Conference and presented to the state governments for their ratification, without which no Conference convention can become effective. The Governing Body is composed (1) of four delegates from each of the eight states of chief industrial importance elected by the government representatives at the Conference, (2) of six workers' delegates elected by the labor representatives, and (3) of a like delegation chosen by the employers' representatives. The Labor Office comprises the permanent Secretariat of the labor organization. It is headed by a Director, and is divided into sections as a means of specializing its functions, after the general fashion of the Secretariat of the League of Nations itself. The work of the Labor Office is mainly that of making investigations and studies of various aspects of the labor problem, and of publishing its findings. In addition, it prepares the agenda for the annual Conference and performs the necessary services for the Conference and for the Governing Body, under whose supervision the Director works. It also follows up the work of the Conference, keeping track of the ratification of the conventions signed, and stimulating and facilitating the work of ratification.

The work of the Labor Office is interwoven at numerous points with that of the League of Nations; both specifically, by reason of

provisions of the Covenant and of the Peace Treaties, and generally from the nature of the work of the two organizations. The budget of the Labor Office is carried as part of the regular League budget although as a separate head, and it is voted annually by the League Assembly. Nevertheless, in spite of these relationships, and in spite of the fact that League members automatically become members of the International Labor Office, the latter must be considered as an autonomous rather than as a subordinate organization.

THE LEAGUE A PROMISE FOR THE FUTURE

The establishment of the League, together with its allied institutions—the World Court and the International Labor Office—represents an impressive forward step in the building of a world order. That they fall far short of a complete realization of the needs of a world society goes without saying. But when one stops to reflect upon the obstinate barriers set up by the traditions of state sovereignty and by national biases and antipathies, which had to be surmounted before these structures could be erected, he must admit that the work thus far accomplished is a remarkable achievement. In this sense they represent a new forward-looking statecraft. But fundamentally they are still ahead of world thought and feeling. They are international institutions, forced to function in a world still dominated by the provincialism inherent in political nationalism. If they have suffered disappointing failures it is because men who are still under the spell of national biases and old conceptions largely furnish the directing force behind the machinery. Then too, these institutions are still in their infancy, and their friends in positions of power fear to subject them to the dangerous strains and stresses that might result in the calamity of a collapse. In the ordinary course of events it is not too much to expect that with the accumulation of experience and the growth of something like an international mind, the organs now in existence may be gradually improved as international mechanisms and their functions extended to meet the vital demands of a world community of states. Some evolution of this kind appears to be the only approach to a rational organization of world society.

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PART VI

THE DESCENT OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS

- XXXI. The Nature of Domestic Institutions
- XXXII. The Development of Domestic Institutions
- XXXIII. Domestic Problems in Contemporary Society

JAMES A. QUINN

CHAPTER XXXI

THE NATURE OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS

THERE is no other type of associated life that touches the individual quite so closely as do domestic institutions—marriage and the family. Most persons are born or adopted into a family and are reared within it; their lives are more completely and intimately bound up with its activities and traditions than with those of any other institution; its influences are stamped so indelibly upon their personality and character that they never get away from them completely as long as they live. So far as we know there was no society in all the past that did not develop some form of domestic organization, and there is no contemporary society that has not inherited most of its domestic practices from those of the past. But before we turn to the interesting study of their descent we shall need to know something of the general character and functions of domestic institutions.

Family and marriage defined in terms of social relationships.

—The most important domestic institutions are marriage and the family. Frequently they are not distinguished in popular usage, probably because they are so closely bound together in everyday life that they seem to be a single indivisible unit. It is quite possible, however, for a marriage union to be formed that does not result in a family, and it is likewise possible for at least a partial family to exist without the relation of marriage. The family is a parent-child relationship; marriage, a relationship of husband-wife.

The term "family" is commonly used to denote a group of individuals who are related to one another *biologically* as parent and offspring, a usage which does not imply the necessity of social relationships. In contrast with this popular use of the term we shall emphasize the fact of *social* relationships as essential to a definition of the family. A family is, to the social scientist, essentially a social group of older and younger who live in more or less intimate contact with one another. It is not the fact of blood kinship that determines the family to which one belongs. The human family

must be defined in terms of its social functions and relationships. From this point of view it may be defined as an institutional grouping of adults and children, having as its basic, primary functions the physical care and socialization of the immature members. In the human family the father is not necessarily the biological ancestor of the child, but the one who, according to the standards of group culture, acts in the social relationship of a father and performs the functions expected of a father.

Some examples may help to clarify this social definition of the family. A married man and woman living together without children are not a family, but a marriage group. John Doe, who is working in Detroit; his wife from whom he is separated, and who lives in Chicago; and their three children who have been adopted by other persons—these persons do not constitute a family, for the reason that they do not constitute a social unit in which care is given to immature offspring by mature adults. An older brother and sister who assume the rôles of parents and care for their younger brothers and sisters constitute, with them, a family group. A man and his wife, together with their adopted children, likewise constitute a family.

Marriage, too, is a social relationship. It consists of a sanctioned union of persons of opposite sexes, recognized by the group as the husband-wife relationship. The functions of the marriage group, which are essential to a complete definition of it, will be discussed later in the chapter.

Care must be taken not to confuse marriage as a social institution with the marriage ceremony or wedding. Marriage involves a kind of relationship between husband and wife, or husbands and wives, and the exclusion of others from equal participation in the union; it involves social rôles which the husband and wife play in relation to each other. The wedding, on the other hand, is simply the social gesture by means of which the group places its approval upon these relationships between husband and wife. The ceremony has something of the same function as the granting of a charter to an industrial corporation by governmental authority; it signifies the public sanction of a new social group.

The relation of biological needs to domestic groupings.—We know nothing concerning the original form of domestic institutions, but we can point to certain features in animal life which were probably factors in the rise of domestic groups, regardless of what

may have been the original form of these groups. A knowledge of these conditions makes the nature of marriage and the family more intelligible.

Domestic groupings do not exist among all species of animals, even those in which a union of the two sexes is necessary for reproduction. For example, the relation between male and female insects of many species ceases after the fertilization of the ova has been accomplished, the female depositing the fertilized eggs in some satisfactory spot where they are to be hatched by the action of the elements. Neither the female nor the male affords any sort of care or protection to the eggs or to the young. The insects are independent and self-supporting from the moment of hatching. Reptiles frequently show the same lack of parental care; some of the larger snakes, however, coil themselves about their eggs, and certain varieties remain with their young for a short period. The mammals, representing a higher stage of animal life, exhibit a greater development in the relation of young and old. Among the higher mammals, whose young pass through a longer period of immaturity and are therefore more completely dependent, a more enduring union exists between mother and offspring. Among some mammals the female is partially incapacitated during her reproductive period, and the male coöperates in caring for her and her young. In the case of man, the highest mammal, these traits of dependence of offspring and incapacity of the mother are most pronounced. The domestic life of birds exhibits a higher form of relationship than the biological facts seem to require, but since it does not contradict the principles under present examination it will not be discussed here.

These facts, together with others found in animal life, suggest the following conclusions: (1) As increasingly complex forms of animal life developed, they tended to produce fewer offspring progressively more helpless at birth and dependent through an ever-increasing period of time. The survival of the higher species demanded more effective parental care of the less numerous and more dependent offspring. Family life probably emerged in the first place to meet this demand. The family became more inevitable and more enduring as the helplessness of the young increased in degree and duration. (2) Marriage, the enduring union of adults of opposite sexes, probably arose as a result of the coöperation of parents in the care of immature offspring and the protection of the incapacitated female by the male. The family was, therefore, the

first domestic form, with marriage developing out of it. (3) Sex was not the factor originally responsible for either marriage or the family. Sexual union for procreation is found among the insects but neither marriage nor the family appears there. Sex union is of course necessary for the biological production of offspring, without which there could be no family, but it is not the factor which accounts for the protracted associations of parents and children or of male and female, which are the basic facts of the family and marriage.

Functions of the family.—We have already emphasized the importance of the family in providing for the physical care of immature offspring, as a means of preserving the human species. The production of offspring through mating is not a function of the family but a function of marriage, if of any domestic group whatsoever. But once offspring have been brought into existence it is within the social unit, the family, that they are ordinarily afforded care. This has been a basic, universal function of the family, both among men and animals, regardless of time, place, and level of culture. Slight exceptions must be made for those rare instances where older children are given communal care by a larger group than the family.

The human family performs another function, not found among animals, which is likewise basic and universal, the function of socialization. It is almost axiomatic in modern social theory that "human nature" is a product of group life. The offspring of man is not truly human at birth, but develops his humanness—that is, those superorganic characteristics which are exclusively man's, and which mark him off from the animal world—in association with others. Life in the family offers the best possible environment for the early socialization of the child. It is in the family that he gets his first adjustments to social life. It is there that he begins to develop his primary ideals, to take on the fundamental culture traits of his group, and to establish the first characteristic organization of his personality, all of which vitally affect the entire course of his life. This function of socialization is, for the human family, fully as important as that of physical care.

The human family contributes not only to the development of its immature members but also to the rejuvenation of the adults. Nothing is more likely to keep an adult from falling into a rut and from getting out of touch with the new developments of succeeding generations than an intelligent and sympathetic contact with

rowing children. The development of self-sacrifice and tolerance—ideals of great social significance—may also be fostered in parents' rough contacts with their children.

The family institution functions in numerous other ways, none of which are so basic to personal development. Of them we shall mention three functions of social importance suggested by Rivers: (1) descent, the transmission from generation to generation of membership and status in social groups; (2) succession, the transmission of hereditary titles and ranks; (3) inheritance, the transmission of property. These three functions are not universal or necessary characteristics of family organization. In some groups one or more of them are lacking. Of the three functions inheritance is most widely diffused.

The family has at some time or place performed almost every social function. Religious practices have been part of the normal domestic ritual in many cultures, particularly in those where ancestor worship has been important. But in other cultures, including Western civilization, many families have assumed some sort of religious function. Economic production and consumption have frequently been carried on in the home, at times almost exclusively so. Education has usually been a function of the family, particularly before the development of modern public educational systems. The list of historical functions of the family could be extended almost indefinitely.¹

Functions of marriage.—Marriage has as one of its most important functions the control of relations between the sexes; for man generally, in all times and places, has felt the need of restricting his sex interest and has developed regulative codes of sex morals to determine the shape of institutional organizations. It is true that the form of marriage as we know it has not been universal either in time or in place. In fact, the variations in cultural codes of morality are so great that many observers, judging from superficial acquaintance and using their own standards of morality as the norm, have declared that some preliterate peoples are totally immoral. But such is not the case. Every people possesses a code of sex conduct which becomes discernible as soon as one understands its culture. Some form of marriage is universally one of the means

¹For a detailed treatment of this subject, consult W. Goodsell, *A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution*. Most of the diverse activities described by Goodsell are, however, incidental rather than basic facts of family life.

by which such codes are made effective. This is another way of saying that promiscuity in sex relations has never been sanctioned.

A second function of marriage is economic in character. This economic aspect has been so obvious that many thinkers have declared that marriage is essentially an economic phenomenon, having arisen either out of the exploitation of the female by the male, or out of the desire to protect and transmit private property. Marriage is ordinarily an economic asset either to the man or the woman or both. Among many preliterate peoples, the wife becomes a servant or laborer for her husband. Conditions of life in most agricultural societies place a premium on the services of the wife and make marriage a most attractive arrangement for the male. On the other hand, many civilizations recognize the wife's right to economic support by her husband. A large proportion of the women of today still find their greatest economic security in marriage.

A third function of marriage is that related to the procreation of children and the care of the wife during her consequent period of incapacity. It is a likely consequence of woman's necessary function in childbearing that she will always be more narrowly confined to the home and more dependent on others for support than man, at least during a portion of her life. This conclusion is not invalidated by the failure of individual women to perform the function of childbearing.

A fourth function of marriage—that of providing intimate companionship—has become highly important in modern social life.

VARIATIONS AMONG DOMESTIC FORMS AND PRACTICES

As one surveys the cultures of the world he can scarcely fail to be impressed by the wide variations in domestic institutions and practices. For our use, it will not be necessary to go far into the complicated patterns of domestic life. Our attention will be mainly directed to those practices which at some time or place have entered the history of domestic life among Western societies or which serve, through contrast, to bring Western domestic life into relief.

Forms of the family.—Variations in the character of the membership offer a basis for the classification of families into "small" and "large." The small family consists, typically, of only the immediate parents and children of two generations. The actual

number of parents or children is of no significance in making this distinction. In a culture such as our own, where monogamic marriage prevails, the small family consists of father, mother, and their natural or adopted offspring. It is a "small family" even when there are a large number of children. It is to this group of parents and children of two generations that one usually has reference in our culture when he uses the term "family" without any qualifying adjectives. One can, however, refer to a larger group of relatives as belonging to his family, without creating much confusion. In cultures where polygyny prevails the small family consists typically of one father, two or more mothers and their offspring.

The large family includes as a fundamental part of its composition more than the immediate parents and children of two generations. Its inclusiveness varies from group to group, depending on local customs, but embraces as a minimum membership parents, children, grandparents, uncles, aunts, and first cousins. In its greatest inclusiveness, the large family takes in all persons with whom kinship can be traced. Perhaps a warning should be inserted that there are various methods of reckoning kinship, of which our own is only one. In cultures where the large family is the basic domestic unit, there may be nothing corresponding to our small family.

In discussing the inclusiveness of the family, one needs to avoid the frequent misuse of the term "family" which makes it synonymous with "household." The household consists of those persons who live together under a common roof, regardless of whether or not they are members of a single family. It may include boarders, servants, relatives, or any other persons who habitually reside there. A single man or woman or a childless couple having their own home may constitute a household. At the other extreme lies the large hotel or institution for the aged, each of which is likewise a household.

A second important basis for the classification of families is offered by a determination of the source or seat of authority. Families in which the father is the recognized highest authority are said to be patriarchal in form. This type of family was characteristic of many of the early historic peoples—Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans. The patriarchal authority was so nearly absolute in at least one of these groups that the father had the right to put his children to death or sell them into slavery. No absolute matriarchal family—that is, one in which the mother has supreme power—

has ever been found. The family organizations of the Iroquois and Pueblo Indians were of a modified matriarchal type.

In our society we think of kinship in terms of blood relationship. Such is not the case in all cultures; frequently kinship is determined by custom rather than by actual biological relationships. The practice is not to be explained by ignorance of the biological connections. The most common example of departures of this sort is found in those cultures where relationship is recognized on only one side of the family. In some groups, custom decrees that kinship be recognized only through the father; that is, a child is related only to the relatives of the father, not to those of the mother. Groups of this sort are designated as patrilineal. Correspondingly, in other groups in which kinship is traced exclusively through the mother, the group is described as matrilineal. This unilateral or one-sided system of tracing descent frequently introduces some interesting but complicating factors into the domestic organization of preliterate peoples.

Regardless of the variety of forms which it displays in different cultures, the family always performs the basic functions of physical care and socialization of the child. These seem to be indispensable universal functions of the family institution.

Forms of marriage.—One of the most obvious variations in the institutional forms of marriage is the variation in the number of mates which the man or woman habitually takes at one time. Using this criterion as a basis, one may classify the forms of marriage as follows:

FORMS OF MARRIAGE	NUMBER OF MEN	NUMBER OF WOMEN
Monogamy	One	One
Polygamy		
Polyandry	More than one	One
Polygyny	One	More than one
Group marriage	Several	Several

The term "polygamy" as used in the above chart does not refer to a specific form of marriage. It is a term which means "much married," and includes the two forms polyandry and polygyny. There are multitudinous minor variations within these classes of marriage which cannot be described in this introductory discussion.

Group marriages and polyandry are rare. Since neither of these forms is significant in the development of domestic institutions in Western cultures, we may dismiss them without further notice.

Polygyny is of more frequent occurrence, but it is to be observed that it never appears as the exclusive form in a given culture; it invariably exists side by side with monogamy. Monogamy is the most usual and widespread form of marriage. It has been argued that, since the numbers of the sexes are equal throughout the world, polyandry or polygyny can never be the universally accepted marriage form. The only types of marriage which can maintain the balance of the sexes are monogamy and group marriage. Of these two, monogamy is the only practicable form in a complex mobile civilization such as our own.

Group customs limiting matrimony.—Every group has placed some sort of limitations upon entrance into the married state. The most important and universal of these limitations is the prohibition of marriages between persons within certain degrees of kinship. There are wide variations of the limits of such restrictions. All people unite in prohibiting the marriage of parent and child. A few permit the marriage of brother and sister, the most important instances being found among peoples who consider royal blood of such importance that only a close relative is fit to marry the ruler. Most peoples prohibit the marriage of an uncle to his niece or an aunt to her nephew. Others set the limits of eligibility at increasingly distant degree of relationship, until, at the extreme, all persons of any relationship whatsoever are forbidden to marry. At one period of its history the Christian Church held that the marriage of a man and woman made them one flesh. This conception led to the conclusion that relatives of a husband and wife were biologically related; consequently, they were forbidden to marry. Going further still, the Church included the idea of spiritual relationship as a bar to marriage. The Emperor Justinian forbade the marriage of a man and woman who had stood as godparents to the same child. The problem of possible relationship of prospective mates became so involved that in the year 802 Charlemagne ruled that no person could marry until the church officials had made a careful study of possible relationships.

Prohibitions of marriage based on barriers of race, nationality, and religion have been frequently set up. In the fourth century the church fathers decreed that marriage between a Christian and Jew was a capital crime. This prohibition was later extended to include heretics and unbaptized persons. At present several of the states in the American union prohibit marriage between Negroes

and Whites. The trend of modern legislation in America is to prohibit the marriage only of those who are not physically or mentally good potential parents. These restrictions apply principally to individuals who exhibit the undesirable defects rather than to religious, racial, or national groups as a whole.

Forms of the marriage contract.—The mode of contracting marriage with which we are most familiar in the United States is the prearrangement by the man and woman directly concerned, but with the knowledge and sanction of the community and in full accord with the customary religious and civil formulas. Elopement usually indicating a desire for secrecy and avoidance of formalities is a departure from standard procedure, but is nevertheless tolerated even though it does not receive complete group sanction.

Other times and places have approved different methods of contracting marriage, of which marriage by purchase is the most widely diffused form. Purchase may involve the payment of either money or goods. Cattle have been customarily accepted as a standard unit of payment when bargaining for a wife, but payment by service has also been widely practiced. This latter was the means by which Jacob, of Biblical fame, obtained his wives, Rachel and Leah. Marriage by exchange has also been practiced. According to this custom, the man who has control of a marriageable female—sister, daughter, or servant—may exchange her for a wife.

Marriage by capture has seized upon the human imagination as the primitive method of obtaining a mate. This picturesque procedure, which is so vividly set forth in popular presentations of cave-man life, has, however, seldom been encountered in history. There is no reason to believe that the capture of wives has ever been a widespread custom.

The custom of arranging marriages without consulting the wishes, or obtaining the willing consent, of the prospective bride and groom was common in the past, and still prevails to a considerable extent. Such a custom is particularly strong in those parts of the world where marriage is regarded primarily as a method of effecting alliances between families. Until recently, Japanese custom carried the practice to an extreme form. There, parents were expected to arrange for the marriage of their son or daughter, usually employing the services of a marriage broker, and never permitting the boy and girl to see each other until the wedding day. Where marriage is essentially an economic consideration, woman is regarded

as a commodity to be sold or exchanged and ordinarily has no right of choice. The husband has the right to choose the wife he buys, unless the purchase is arranged by his parents. In contrast with these customs are the marriage contracts of the present day, which are arranged by the contracting parties themselves for the satisfaction of their own desires and the development of their own personalities, with property and family considerations reduced to a minimum.

The question of origins.—Can the origins of these variations in domestic practices and forms be explained? Some of them can, but since the origins of many of them reach back into the prehistoric period, the question offers a difficult problem. Variations in the forms of marriage have provoked considerable speculation. Numerous students have attempted to find a general formula which would explain why a certain form of marriage had become established in a particular culture. In the case of polyandry, for example, they have argued that its appearance is dependent upon hard conditions of life which make it difficult for a man to support a wife. They cite instances in support of their hypothesis, but fail to give an adequate explanation for the exceptions which have been discovered. They do not explain, for example, the historical fact that many of the preliterate who live most meagerly practice monogamy rather than polyandry. Similarly, it has been argued that female infanticide is a causal factor in polyandry. But again the exceptions refute the generalization. It is true that infanticide is customary among the Todas, a people of southern India; and that the Todas practice polyandry. On the other hand, the agricultural communities of Tibet are also polyandrous, but they do not practice infanticide. Again, infanticide is practiced by certain Eskimo groups that do not recognize polyandry as a form of marriage. No satisfactory explanation of polyandry has been worked out that will fit all the known facts.

Polygyny likewise cannot be explained by any single generalization. Different combinations of factors are, no doubt, responsible for this practice among different peoples. Polygyny seems, however, to have some degree of positive correlation with certain social factors, as for example the accumulation of wealth, which makes wives profitable, or the capture of women in war and their purchase as slaves. But sometimes polygyny has a religious rather than an economic basis. No single explanation seems to cover all known cases.

A FINAL NOTE

To close this brief study with a definite impression of the wide variations in domestic practices would perhaps fix the final emphasis on features of subordinate importance. The dominant emphasis does not belong on variations, if we are searching for what is of greatest social significance in the development of domestic institutions. The emphasis belongs on certain features that run universally through the domestic life of all times and places that we know anything about. Those features are the basic functions of marriage and the family which were outlined earlier in this study. Marriage and the family, let it be remembered, have always furnished the necessary social machinery for the preservation of the race, in that they have proved themselves efficacious in ministering to the physical care of the child and in initiating that process by which he is adjusted to the ways of the group in which he is to spend his life. The universality of those functions should give food for thought to those who predict the future disintegration of domestic institutions.

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CHAPTER XXXII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS¹

As we have already observed, the written records of man's achievement are relatively recent, dating back less than five thousand years before Christ. These records are not sufficient to give an adequate picture of domestic life and institutions throughout the entire period, but they do present an astounding complexity and diversity of institutional forms within the limited area and short span of time of which they treat. For the present purpose, perhaps the most profitable way to study the descent of modern domestic institutions is to trace the lines of development which have produced existing institutions of marriage and the family, and to observe how changing conditions of social life have, from time to time, necessitated changes in the organization of domestic groupings. Thus we shall arrive at our contemporary American institutions, naturally the subject of most immediate interest to us. We in America have borrowed most of our institutions. We have taken some of our culture forms indirectly from the Hebrews, Greeks, Romans, and early Teutons, and have directly borrowed others from modern European countries, particularly from England. This mass of borrowed elements has been reworked and remodeled in our own land to adjust them to new conditions. It will be our purpose to indicate some of the major sources to which we are indebted for different features of our domestic institutions, and to analyze some of the important influences in our own history which have caused us to introduce new forms of domestic adjustments.

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN ANCIENT HEBREW CULTURE

One important line of descent in the development of modern domestic institutions leads back to the early Hebrew culture. This influence has been partly indirect, through Christianity, which is

¹The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Willystine Goodsell, whose work, *A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution* (The Macmillan Company, 1915), was an important source in the preparation of this chapter.

rooted deep in Judaism; and partly direct, through the transmission of the old Hebrew culture to the modern Jew, who is an important component of our population. Jewish domestic institutions have undergone important changes within the period of their written history, so that statements concerning them are necessarily true within only a limited period of time.

The Hebrew family.—The earliest records of the Hebrews do not give an adequate picture of their cultural predecessors. We do not know enough about their history to enable us to determine the sources of their domestic forms. The first picture we glimpse shows them living in isolated household groups under the somewhat rigid control of the father or “patriarch.” The household consisted of (1) a relatively small group who traced their descent through the father, (2) the wives of the married males, and (3) the servants. Infrequent strangers who visited the group were classed as temporary members of the household and were subject to the authority of the father.

During their early nomadic wanderings prior to their sojourn in Egypt, the Hebrews had acquired a strong tribal organization referred to in the Biblical narrative as the Twelve Tribes of Israel. After the conquest of Canaan, the apportionment of the land among the tribes, the establishment of an agricultural existence, and the subsequent increase of population, tribal feeling gradually became weaker. Small neighborhood groups, consisting of several households united by kinship or by process of adoption, came to be a more important social unit than the tribe itself, although tribal membership and traditions were preserved. These neighborhood units were probably the “families” or “houses” which are so frequently mentioned in the Old Testament. The small family consisting of parents and children, and sometimes the household including grandparents, existed within these “houses” and assumed a more important institutional rôle as the Hebrews developed a more urbanized civilization.

Throughout the period of its known history the Hebrew family has been patriarchal and patrilineal. The powers of the father—which originally included the right to kill his children—were continually redefined until they came to comprise the elaborate code contained in the Talmud. The Hebrew woman was under male control throughout most of her life—of her father or older brother prior to marriage, and of her husband or father-in-law after mar-

riage. The only free, honorable woman was the widowed mother who lived with her son. The wife had, however, an honored and respected position in the home. She performed valuable functions—the production of legitimate offspring, the discharge of household tasks, and the education of children. She was respected by the husband and obeyed by the children. Legally, however, she was subject to her husband and enjoyed only a few, rigidly restricted social, property, and religious rights.

An important attitude which characterized the Hebrews and exerted a profound influence upon some of their domestic practices was their tendency to consider the group as of more consequence than the individual. This was not formally declared by their great thinkers but, more significantly, it was assumed as unquestionable by the people themselves. No adequate, logical explanation has been made of this characteristic point of view, which the Hebrews share with many historical peoples of antiquity as well as with contemporary preliterate peoples. Perhaps the religious tradition that the Hebrews were the chosen people of God, and that through them all the nations of the earth should be blessed, was a factor. The development of religious ritual by which children ministered to the well-being of their departed ancestors in the "life beyond" likewise supported the attitude but is not sufficient to explain it.

The Hebrew conception of marriage and divorce.—The root desire for the continuance of the tribe, house, or family was one expression of this basic interest of the Hebrew. The need for continuance could be best realized through the institution of marriage. Marriage provided for the production of legitimate offspring to perpetuate the line. Because of this basic desire for offspring, barrenness was regarded as a great misfortune. A husband who married a barren wife was allowed by custom either to divorce her and marry another, or to produce children by a second wife or a concubine. The practice of polygyny, which was widespread among the Hebrews, was, no doubt, frequently the outcome of this desire for offspring. Such exaggerated polygyny as was practiced by King Solomon can, however, hardly be explained on this ground. The practice of the *levirate*, according to which a younger brother married his brother's widow and produced children for him, had its roots in the demand for legitimate offspring.

The economic value of marriage was of greatest importance among the pastoral Hebrews, and, in fact, remained high throughout most

of their history. The economic services of the wife were conspicuous; she was the overseer of the home and the producer of many useful articles.

Both marriage and divorce were regarded as private matters requiring neither public, religious, nor civil sanction. Priests were frequently invited to participate in both the betrothal and nuptial ceremonies, but their presence was a matter of courtesy only and not necessary to make the union valid. Although marriage was private it was not individual; it was a concern of the family, consummated primarily to perpetuate the biological line, rather than to enrich the lives of the husband and wife. A similar attitude existed toward divorce; since woman was subjected to man and had practically no rights, she could secure a divorce only with the greatest difficulty. The man, on the other hand, might divorce his wife at any time he chose. He was, however, subject to the censure of the group if he violated the *mores* and divorced her for any trivial reason. As a consequence he did not exercise the right with great frequency.

Hebrew influences in modern society.—In conclusion we may summarize the historical importance of the Hebrew family. Among the Hebrew influences which have come to us directly and indirectly are: (1) the emphasis upon the patriarchal organization of the family; (2) the subordinate yet highly respected position of woman; (3) the conception of woman's natural place in the home, and (4) the subordination of children and the demand that they respect and obey their parents.

DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AMONG THE ANCIENT GREEKS

Although Greek culture has profoundly influenced the Western world, especially through its philosophers and artists, Greek domestic institutions did not play an important rôle in molding our domestic life.

Characteristic features.—The ancient Greeks, like the Romans and Hebrews, exhibit a patriarchal family from the beginning of the historical period. Their dependence upon still earlier, preliterate forms of organization is indicated by the fact that the Athenians at the time of Solon were divided into four tribes. The tribe was divided into three religious units, called *phratries*, each of which was in turn divided into thirty *gentes* or great families. Descen

was patrilineal; but kinship was based primarily upon common worship of the family gods and submission to the authority of the father rather than upon blood ties.

Among the Athenians woman was conspicuously subordinated. She had practically no legal powers and was severely restricted in her ordinary life. Her place was the home, from which she could venture only upon few occasions. She was deprived of educational advantages and of companionship with other women of her class. She was not allowed to meet her husband's friends or dine with them even in her own home. She was primarily a mechanism for the production of legitimate offspring. Her narrowness of interest and lack of education usually made her a totally unsatisfactory companion for her cultured husband, who spent his days in the market place discussing philosophy and Greek affairs.

The public life of Greek men was, however, not devoid of feminine companionship. A group of brilliant women, known as the *hetærae*, became the public associates of many of the Greek citizens and in some cases achieved positions of eminence and power in the affairs of the state. Men could take women from this group as mistresses without great public condemnation. The standards of sex morality demanded of them were lax, from our point of view. Despite this fact, absolute chastity was demanded upon the part of the wife. In other words, the so-called double standard of morality obtained in Greek society. Naturally under such a system sons were held in high esteem, while daughters, regarded as inferior, were looked upon as a misfortune, and infanticide was freely practiced. Prior to the naming of the child, the Greek father could arbitrarily decide whether or not it was to be exposed.

Marriage among the Greeks was, as among the Hebrews, essentially a group concern. It was the means by which the family could be perpetuated, property transmitted, and the worship of the family gods carried on. Parents arranged marriages with little reference to the wishes of the young people. Here again marriage was not regarded as a mechanism for satisfying the needs of the bride and groom, but rather for the furtherance of the interests of the families of the parents. Although marriage was essentially a religious matter, it was private in nature; the father, representing the ancestral gods, could perform the necessary ceremonies, and either a religious nor a political sanction was needed for the union. The Spartans, while differing from the Athenians in many re-

spects, exhibit one emphasis which is typical of the Greeks, namely the subordination of the individual to the welfare of the group. The small city-states were constantly at war and always in need of soldiers. The domestic institutions must satisfy this need; hence great care was taken in Sparta to insure unions which would produce strong, virile offspring. In consequence, men of older years or deficient in physique would encourage the mating of their wives with younger and more vigorous men and would claim the offspring as their own.

Plato's advanced ideas.—Certain of the Greek philosophers whose writings have been so significant in the thought of the Western world advanced ideas on domestic life which were quite at variance with the customs of their day. Thus Plato, in his *Republic* proposed a eugenics program, by means of which the most gifted women should mate with superior men to produce the highest possible type of offspring. The children from these unions, it was proposed, should be separated from their parents and reared in state nurseries by persons especially fitted for the task. Weaklings should be exposed and destroyed. Plato also presented the radical idea that woman is not innately different from man; that she possesses the same capacities and abilities, but in a lesser degree. Woman should, therefore, be given education and training the same as men so that she could develop her capacities and become the true companion of man. These revolutionary ideas appear to have produced no immediate changes in Greek domestic life, although they were in some cases accepted in theory without being applied in practice. During the Renaissance, however, when Plato's philosophy was reëmphasized in the general revival of classical learning these ideas took on a new vigor and became a slow leaven whose influence may be observed in a series of developing trends which have become more and more pronounced and important in our modern domestic institutions. Except for this later revival of Greek philosophy, the influence of Greeks on modern domestic practices has come down to us indirectly; that is, through their influence on other peoples, especially on the Romans.

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY AMONG THE ROMANS

Roman domestic institutions, like those of the Hebrews and the Greeks, varied too widely during successive historical periods to

permit simple, accurate generalizations. First a simple agricultural community, Rome was gradually drawn into contact with every cultural group of the Italian peninsula. Steadily these contacts widened to include the whole Mediterranean world. And all the while internal changes were taking place, and new cultural influences were being brought to bear upon Roman life. In consequence customary practices touching marriage and the family underwent change, just as did other features of Roman civilization.

Characteristic features during the earlier period.—The domestic institutions of the legendary period and of the early republic were highly patriarchal, offering perhaps the most extreme example of patriarchal control ever known. The Roman father had power over all members of the household—over the males throughout his entire lifetime, and over the females until their marriage. The only limitation on his power was that he must seek the advice of the large family, or *gens*, before making certain important decisions. Thus he was required to hold a family conference before condemning a son to death or slavery. Having called the council, however, he acted upon his own judgment with or without the approval of the group. Control over the wife was limited in that he was not permitted to divorce her or put her to death without first calling a meeting of his own and his wife's male relatives.

In economic matters the Roman father enjoyed great power; he controlled completely all property and earnings, with this limitation, that property must always be kept within the *gens*, and could not be alienated even by him. During his lifetime neither the mother nor the children had any property rights of their own. When the patriarch died the property was divided equally among the members of the family, the sons, the widow, and the unmarried daughters each receiving a portion. In practice, however, the estate was ordinarily held intact either through agreement by the heirs or in accordance with the request of the father. This extreme power of the Roman patriarch was not that of an absolute monarch who held the office in his own right; it was delegated to him principally because of his rôle as priest in the worship of the ancestral gods.

The position of the mother and children in early Rome was probably not nearly so harsh as the statement of the powers of the father seems to indicate. The wife occupied a position of great honor within the home; she was not confined to her apartments, as was

the case among the Greeks; she was mistress of the home, performing tasks herself, and supervising the work of the servants. She helped the husband officiate at the altar of the family gods. When she appeared on the street men were expected to make way for her as a mark of respect and honor.

The Romans, like the Hebrews and Greeks, regarded marriage and divorce as a private matter. Marriage was something to be decided on by the families of the bride and groom without public or political, or religious sanction. The parents arranged the union in accordance with the interests of the families rather than the desire of the couple concerned. The parents were, however, limited in their choice by class differences. Until after the year 445 B. C. patricians might not intermarry with plebeians and at the same time maintain their status.

The early Roman marriage ceremony consisted mainly in the transfer of the wife from the power of her father to that of her husband by introducing her to the worship of her husband's ancestors. According to a custom which developed later, the wife remained under the power of her father even after marriage. In question of divorce, the right rested primarily with the husband during the early period of Roman history, but was seldom invoked, and then only for serious offenses such as adultery. Barrenness and consequent failure to produce legitimate offspring for the continuance of the family indicated that the wife had failed in her supreme duty and thus offered unquestioned ground for divorce.

Roman expansion and its effects.—With the growth of Rome towards world power, new influences began to impinge upon her social organization and to exert a profound effect on her domestic institutions. Her increasing participation in wars, especially in those conquests requiring the absence of large numbers of men from home for protracted periods of time, led to the shifting of more and more responsibility to women. Women of outstanding ability assumed an increasingly important share in the management of their husbands' affairs and in the direction of the estate. The enormous losses of man power during these wars tended towards an unbalancing of the numbers of the sexes, making it impossible for many women to depend upon a husband for support and protection.

Important economic changes likewise helped toward the breakdown of the earlier patriarchal life. The small farmer, who at the time of Cincinnatus was the backbone of Roman citizenry, gradually

lost his land to the powerful military and civil officials who were able to control the immense influx of wealth pouring into the treasuries of Rome as a result of her conquests. Rome thus lost the sturdy, independent, self-respecting agricultural class, and in its place remained two groups: one the idle, rich landowners, whose immense estates were worked by thousands of slaves and who themselves disdained manual labor; the other the disgruntled, dispossessed farmers who became a class of discontented wage earners. Added to these disturbing changes was the growth of a high degree of individualism resulting from several influences, chief of which were (1) an increase in urban population; (2) multiplication of contacts with distant cultures; and (3) greater mobility of the population, due largely to a great increase of foreign tradesmen.

With such profound changes within the social structure it was inevitable that Roman domestic institutions should be altered. Three significant results should be noted: (1) The position of woman was elevated. She had assumed numerous economic and political responsibilities during the absence of men at war and had proved her worth. Gradually she became economically independent and was granted a legal and social status almost equal to that of man. Marriage was no longer the only way in which she could maintain a tolerable social position. (2) With the decay of the citizenry, marriage and the family lost many of their former functions, and the domestic group ceased to be the basic social unit to which men or women owed their first allegiance. Among the senatorial class at least marriage was no longer regarded as a religious ceremony. In fact, marriage became so infrequent that the Roman emperors became alarmed, especially as the decrease in marriage was accompanied by a severe decline in the birth rate. At the same time, with the number of marriages on the decline, there was an increase in the practice of divorce. Morals deteriorated, partly because of the new species of immorality which were introduced from Greece. Laws were passed penalizing celibacy and childlessness, but they seem to have had little effect. As for divorce, none of the emperors, from Augustus to Justinian, ever challenged the theory that it was a purely private affair. Until the time of the Christian emperors both marriage and divorce continued to remain outside the jurisdiction of a judicial or religious tribunal. (3) The control the Roman patriarch had exercised over his children during the earlier period was curtailed. The first significant change in this

direction was the granting to a son who had obtained property the performance of military duties the right to dispose of it by will. The right was then extended to all men who had been honorably discharged from the army. Then the father's right to inflict severe punishment was lessened, and in the time of Justinian the exposure of children was forbidden. These improvements in the status and rights of children were due not only to the increase in individualism but also to the influence of Christianity and to the developing idea of a natural law which was founded on justice—a conception which was gaining a wide acceptance in Rome as a basis for civil legislation.

The decadence of Roman domestic institutions has been vividly presented by some writers as affording an object lesson to the present generation. The rise in the position of women, the decline of domestic religion, the concentration of wealth, the increase of individualism and of selfish pleasure-seeking, and the decline in the birth rate—all are noted with alarm by some who feel that America is following the course of Rome and allowing her culture to become decadent. Some of these aspects of the present-day situation which are the center of interest for many modern thinkers will be discussed briefly in the following chapter.

THE CHRISTIAN INFLUENCE UPON DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS

The rise of Christianity was destined to have a profound influence first by way of modifying radically some of the Roman practices and secondly by placing a stamp upon domestic institutions that was to endure down to our own day. This in spite of the fact that Jesus himself had little to say about domestic practices; He apparently accepted the institutions of His time as normal and raised no questions concerning them except in the matter of divorce.

Teachings of the Apostle Paul.—The views of the early Christian Fathers were more directly influenced by the teachings of Paul than by Christ. This enthusiastic disciple, expecting the end of the world to occur within his generation, sought to turn the attention of the people from the things of this world, including domestic life and to direct their thoughts toward a preparation for the Kingdom of God, which he thought to be close at hand. Marriage was therefore not important as a means of producing offspring for the continuance of future generations. It would be better, then, according

Paul, if people would control their sensual desires and refrain from marrying; if, however, they could not restrain their impulses, it would be better for them to marry so that they would not be tempted into adultery.

On the basis of their interpretation of Paul's teachings, the Church fathers developed the theory that there were four levels of sex relations which were successively less desirable: (1) unmarried celibacy, (2) marriage with a high degree of continence, (3) marriage with little restraint, and (4) adultery. Marriage was therefore a choice between the lesser of evils, a relation to be entered upon only by those who were not strong enough to withstand the temptations of the flesh. From this point of view it was conceived as essentially a physical union. The idea that the marriage relation might afford social and spiritual values in addition to sensual gratification, although theoretically recognized by the Church, was strikingly absent from most of the early Christian writings on the subject. The idea of a celibate life as especially pleasing to God developed rapidly under the influence of the Church and resulted in a widespread movement of asceticism. Religious orders, sworn to celibacy, arose and became strong; and the Church prohibited the marriage of the clergy, who were expected to lead a life of celibate purity.

Paul believed also in the inferiority of woman. Following the Adam and Eve story of creation, he held that woman was made for the glory of man. All women partook with Eve of the position of the temptress, who was likely to lead man into sin. Woman must therefore be exceedingly careful to act so as not to lead man into temptation; she must dress modestly and act shamefacedly. A married woman must subject herself to her husband, keep quiet in public places, and ask questions only in her home. Man was, however, commanded to respect woman and treat her as the weaker vessel."

Changes resulting from Christian influences.—So long as the Christians remained a persecuted minority in the Roman populace no widespread influence could be looked for, but when Christianity was elevated to the position of the state church of Rome (in the fourth century) Christian ideas and ideals became current and to a degree enforceable; and thus began to work profound changes in the domestic institutions of Roman society. The changes are significant not only for the period in which they occurred, but for our own

time and culture as well, since they have fixed and colored many the ideas, beliefs, and practices which cluster about domestic institutions today. This statement is to some degree true of the whole Christian world and decidedly true in respect to certain religious groups within that world. Let us observe briefly what some of these changes were.

The early Church followed the usual procedure of religious institutions in its contacts with other elements of the social order and accepted uncritically, for a time, the current domestic customs. In Rome, for example, it did not interfere with marriage for almost three centuries, except to reserve the right to hallow it by bestowing God's blessing upon it. But this blessing was not compulsory, nor was it, at first, insisted on as essential to a valid union. The early efforts of the Church were directed toward the enforcement of certain prohibitions upon marriage, and the limitation of divorce and subsequent freedom of remarriage. From the time of its earliest contact with pagan Rome, however, the Christian Church set itself against the laxness of Roman morals a standard of purity in sexual conduct. Adultery was condemned in extreme terms. Even adultery on the part of the man, which had been condoned in Hebrew traditions, was now vigorously denounced. St. Augustine took the extreme position that adultery by the man was worse than by the woman, since presumably he was of a superior type and more able to withstand temptation. Likewise the Christian idea of a lifelong marriage union, created and sustained by the Church, contrasted sharply with the Roman custom of divorce and remarriage at will. The emphasis of the Church was upon divorce for adultery only and upon prohibition of the remarriage of divorced persons, and consequently was at variance with the Roman position that divorce depended wholly upon the desires of the parties concerned. The Christian emphasis upon the subordinate position of woman was also far different from the then prevalent Roman practice, which granted woman a status practically equal to that of man. Emphasis upon the sacredness of life and the doctrine of the damnation of the unbaptised set the Church sharply against the practices of abortion and infanticide to which the Romans had frequently resorted.

Gradually the influence of the Church made itself felt along all these lines. With the acceptance of Christianity by Constantine and later emperors, the Christian point of view gradually prevailed.

ver the practices of Rome and set the pattern for domestic life. In proportion as the Church came to stress the importance of marriage it insisted that the union of husband and wife be regarded as a religious rather than as a civil or private matter. The theory of marriage as one of the religious sacraments, made in heaven and indissoluble by man, developed out of this emphasis. These are some of the major changes which followed in the wake of Christianity.

EARLY TEUTONIC INFLUENCES

The Germanic barbarians who continued to invade the empire of the Caesars from the closing years of the fourth until well into the sixth century, and the Anglo-Saxons who invaded Britain, contributed to our background of domestic institutions through their influence on Roman, German, and English life.

Characteristics of German domestic institutions.—These barbarians exhibited a strong patriarchal domestic organization, of which the basic unit was the *sippe*. The *sippe* was a group of hundred, by blood or adoption, who were descended from the grandchildren of two common ancestors. The group, which was bilateral, thus traced kinship not from the original pair but from the third generation. This bilateral grouping, contrasting sharply with the unilateral, patrilineal families of the Greeks and Romans, was important in giving us our contemporary pattern of tracing relationships.

The *sippe*, or great family, was the fundamental social unit. Small families existed within it, but they had powers only by permission of the larger group. The *sippe* could protect the children from their father; it acted as a guardian of widows and orphans; it managed the estates; it was responsible for the conduct of its members; it avenged them or paid their wergild when they had wronged a member of another *sippe*. Membership in such a social unit was of utmost importance to every person. The child came under its protecting care almost from the time of birth—but not quite. Until it had tasted food it was not admitted to the *sippe*; up to that time it remained under the control of the father, who might expose the infant if he saw fit; thereafter the measure of authority exercised by the father was limited by the customs of the *sippe*. This measure

of paternal control continued until the child reached his majority usually at the age of fourteen or fifteen years, when he was admitted to the privileges and responsibilities of a freeman. From that time on he was responsible for his own behavior.

Marriage among the Germanic tribes was primarily an economic arrangement. The husband or his relatives bargained with the relatives of the wife concerning the price to be paid for the bride. Even until recent times the customary expression "to purchase a wife" (*ein Weib kaufen*) was used in Germany with reference to marriage. Marriage was purely a private matter—that is, a concern of the *sippe*—until the later Middle Ages, and was consummated after the proper payment simply by transferring the wife to the power of the husband. The wife was definitely subordinated to her mate, whom she was expected to obey. She was regarded primarily as an economic asset and was desired as a diligent and trustworthy worker and as the producer of legitimate offspring.

The compromise between conflicting Germanic and Christian ideas.—When the Germanic customs came into conflict with the teachings of the Christian Church, there were prolonged struggles, usually resulting in some sort of compromise. For example, in the ninth century the church dogma that marriage was one of the seven sacraments and as such demanded a religious ceremony for its consummation came into conflict with the Germanic idea that marriage is a private matter or a civil contract. According to the custom particularly prevalent in England, a man and woman could perform their own marriage ceremony by merely repeating the words "I take thee to be my wedded wife (or husband)," a custom which it may be said in passing, which was the origin of the so-called "common-law" marriages that have persisted down to our own day, and are recognized in twenty-four states of the Union as legal. The Church could not accept these clandestine unions as meeting its requirements, and yet it was unwilling to declare finally that they were not valid, particularly because of the suffering of the children who would thus be classed as illegitimate. A compromise was therefore introduced into canonical law in the form of a distinction between legal and valid marriages. A legal marriage was one which was contracted in conformity with the rules and with the sanction of the Church; a valid marriage was one contracted without the knowledge and sanction of the Church. The Church discouraged merely valid marriages by severe penalties in the form of penance

THE INFLUENCE OF FEUDALISM AND CHIVALRY

It will be recalled that under the feudal system, the lands of western Europe were divided into estates held by the tenant or vassal at the discretion of some overlord who expected rent in the form of military and other services. The most powerful of the nobility might or might not be directly responsible to the king. The development of this feudal landed aristocracy with almost sovereign powers exercised some important influences upon domestic institutions.

The status of women.—The feudal world was a man's world, in which woman lost a considerable number of the rights which had been gradually accruing to her. Her rights to property were severely restricted, she no longer was competent to serve as guardian of her own children, and legally she was a nonentity. "Husband and wife are one person and that person is the husband"; such was the form in which one eminent student described the legal relationship of husband and wife. This decline in the status of the wife was due to changes in the social values which were introduced by feudalism. Military exploits had become paramount in importance. The overlord, looking to his tenants for military services, could more easily exact his demands from a man than from a woman. The overlord was desirous, therefore, that every woman who was heir to an estate should have a master. But a strong counter current set in with the development of chivalry. During periods of rest from warfare the lords of feudal estates might devote their leisure to the improvement of manners. The very isolation of the feudal castle forced the family members to turn to one another for companionship, and at times a close rapport and deep sympathy developed between husband and wife. It became natural, too, for the wife to take over many responsibilities during the absence of her husband. Thus there was a gradual improvement in the position of the lady in the castle.

Chivalry has afforded one of the most fruitful fields for the play of the imagination of the novelist with a romantic bent. Chivalry, at its best, emphasized the ideal and spiritual aspects of love, as contrasted with the sensual conceptions of the preceding periods. It led many a young champion to exhibit unusual endurance and courage for the honor of the lady of his choice. But while it thus tended to set woman on a pedestal and to make of her an object to

be worshiped and loved, it possibly tended also to deprive her any deeper significance in social life.

Chivalry and romantic love.—With the increasing emphasis chivalry upon form and manners, love-making, which had become an important pursuit of the valiant knight, followed a recognized pattern. Formalized codes developed which prescribed elaborate ritualistic etiquette in addressing one's lady, and suggested flower formal phrases for the proper declaration of one's love. These extremes of formalism seem amusing to the young lover of today, but we must not fail to recognize the higher appreciation of the spiritual and social aspects of romantic love as it developed under chivalry as contrasted with the more sordid unions which had preceded it. This change was significant in that the ideals of chivalry form the major basis of the romantic traditions of modern mating.

Actual practices often fell short of the chivalric ideal. Marriages were still ordinarily arranged by the parents with little regard to the wishes of bride and groom. Frequently the couple found themselves incompatible and incapable of forming that ideal spiritual union which was demanded by the chivalric pattern. Many a lonely woman, tempted by the possibility of a romantic relationship with some man of her own choice, claimed the right to enter into such a union outside of the marriage bond. Husbands were expected to shut their eyes to such arrangements and perhaps to form other love unions of their own.

The romantic love of chivalry has been handed down into our modern times, where it sets the pattern for the love life of many adolescents. But unfortunately some of the stabilizing elements of the chivalric pattern have been lost in the transmission. Not a few of the youth of modern times seem to regard romantic love as the only requisite for a happy marriage. Without any appreciation of the complex nature of the union they are contemplating, without any conception of the nature or scope of the responsibilities which will devolve upon them in their new rôle, and without any training for the fulfillment of their new duties, they frequently mistake awakening adolescent passion for complete, ideal, romantic love and embark upon a disastrous matrimonial venture which too often ends in a disillusioning wreck. Unenlightened romantic idealism combined with thoughtless selfishness is probably the immediate source of more unhappiness in present-day married life than any other single factor.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE RENAISSANCE

The intense intellectual activity which characterized the Renaissance was accompanied by important changes in the social life and education of women in Italy. More and more, women came to be recognized as capable of understanding and appreciating the works of the ancient writers, and many achieved distinction in the realm of learning. The breaking away from the traditional molds of domestic behavior was, however, not immediately accomplished. The Renaissance produced no significant changes in marriage rites or in the status of women during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In his doctrine of love between man and woman, Plato had emphasized the ideal of the beautiful, which made it a stepping-stone toward the knowledge and appreciation of the eternal goodness and perfect beauty of God. Plato's conception gained wide acceptance and approval in theory, but was not put into practice as the expected, normal relation between husband and wife. Nevertheless, the impulse toward individualism and the increasing knowledge of the Greek philosophers helped to lay the foundation for changes which were to appear during later times.

When the intellectual ferment of the Renaissance took a religious turn in Germany, Martin Luther as the leader of the Protestant revolt turned part of his lightning against some of the Catholic conceptions of marriage. His first important influence came through his renunciation of marriage as a religious sacrament and his affirmation of it as a civil contract. German leaders quickly followed Luther's teaching, and within a short time the Protestant German states assumed control over marriage. English leaders accepted Luther's position in theory but were not disposed to put it into practice. It was not until 1653, when the Puritans under Cromwell were in power, that an obligatory civil celebration of marriage was required by law; and this law remained in effect only seven years. Nevertheless, the civil nature of marriage was affirmed in the regulations of Puritan New England. Virginia and other southern colonies, however, adhered closely to the point of view of the Anglican Church. Luther's second main influence arose from his opposition to the celibacy of the clergy. He acted upon his own teachings and took a wife. In this innovation he was again quickly followed by German leaders; but the English Church proved

more conservative, holding tenaciously to the old forms in practice while doing lip service to the new point of view.

Probably the most important effect of the Renaissance was the emphasis upon individualism as contrasted with the medieval ideal that the individual should be subordinated to the group. This new emphasis had no immediate revolutionary effects upon the forms of domestic institutions. The modifications which have resulted from it appeared slowly and gradually, and it is only now that we are reaping the most abundant harvest of domestic changes germinating from this seed. This is as we should expect, since it has always been characteristic of domestic institutions that they are, in their fundamental aspects, among the most tenacious elements of social organization, yielding to pressure slowly and gradually, sometimes long after corresponding changes have become manifest in other institutions.

DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS IN ENGLAND IN THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES

We shall not be able to consider the many variations in domestic practices that grew up in the national cultures of Europe. We shall confine our attention to developments in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for the domestic institutions of that England of that period are the direct ancestors of the forms which appeared and persisted in colonial America. It was the English institutions transplanted to America which gradually displaced those of the other emigrant cultural groups and furnished the model for our domestic practices.

The subordinate position of the wife.—Domestic institutions in England, in accordance with the forms which had been handed down from the past, were patriarchal in form. Woman was definitely subordinated to man, having practically no legal rights. During the lifetime of her husband her personality was merged with his. She had no rights of guardianship over her children, even after her husband's death. Until 1663 the right of the husband to inflict physical punishment upon his wife was upheld by the courts, and this practice persisted among some social classes of England until a much later time.

During the eighteenth century, it is true, the wife acquired some rights to property. Then the custom of "settlements" became

popular, by which the married woman retained control of her own property. This change, however, was looked upon with disfavor by the husbands, who had grown accustomed to the right of control. Alexander, an eighteenth-century writer, voiced the discontent of the men when he spoke of the custom as an "inequitable bargain" by which "the husband is debarred from enjoying any of the rights of matrimony except the person of his wife." In spite of this concession to women, however, the importance of marriage as a proprietary institution is clearly indicated; whatever else its functions may have been, English marriage served in a large measure to protect private property and to secure its control and inheritance by males.

Having little possibility of becoming economically independent, the English woman came to recognize her primary function in life to be the making of a good marriage. Failure to marry left her a lifetime financial burden upon unwilling parents or relatives and constituted the unquestioned sign of social failure. Charm was a woman's greatest asset. Modest reserve, female delicacy, an attitude of admiration for and inferiority to possible suitors constituted her most effective technique in achieving marriage. Other education than that which would equip her for marriage was regarded as superfluous and even harmful, inasmuch as it would make her lose her maidenly modesty and become less alluring to her possible future master. A change in the point of view came with the restoration of Charles II in 1660. Then English fashionable society, taking as its model the life of the court, entered upon a period of moral deterioration which continued throughout the eighteenth century, and woman, true to her major life task of getting a husband, adapted her ways to the new demands.

Influences of the revolutionary period.—It will be recalled that the closing decades of the eighteenth century marked the beginning of a widespread revolt against the traditions and institutions which had dominated early modern society, and that thenceforth rapid change became a characteristic of Western culture. The social changes included changes in domestic practices. In France the influence was immediate, principally in the direction of elevating the legal status of the wife and children and weakening the patriarchal character of the French family. Outside of France the revolutionary currents affected domestic institutions in varying degrees. In England "alarming" radical ideas of liberty and equality were

spread abroad. Mary Wollstonecraft, a woman of some distinction, saw the broader implications of these new ideals and insisted upon their application to women. Woman, like man, had the right to be treated as an individual, valuable in herself, and not merely as an adjunct to some superior male. These ideas, which began to take deep root for the first time since the days of the Roman Empire, slowly diffused from group to group and marked the effective beginning of what may be called the Woman's Movement.

Relations between parents and children gradually became more kindly and friendly during the eighteenth century, as the ideas of individualism were accepted and applied to the relations of parent to child. Discipline became less severe, and protective legislation was enacted which was the forerunner of many of our modern statutes.

DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

With the colonization of the Atlantic coast in North America, English culture was transplanted to that part of the New World. It is true that there were minority groups from other countries, but, as already indicated, it was the English culture that dominated colonial society, and the English stamp upon colonial marriage and family forms that was deepest and most influential. However, it must be remembered that the thirteen colonies were more or less isolated from one another and that differences in the regional cultures developed. Consequently no universal pattern existed, and no entirely accurate generalizations can be made. Typical characteristics of colonial domestic practices can best be revealed, perhaps, by comparisons among three regions: (1) the northern colonies, (2) the southern colonies, and (3) the frontier.

Contrasting features in northern and southern colonies.—On the whole, the northern colonies preserved in their domestic life a close copy of the institutions of the middle-class Puritans of England, with, of course, some necessary adaptations to the new conditions of colonial life. The Puritans regarded marriage as a civil contract, and divorce as justifiable on such grounds as adultery, cruelty, desertion, or refusal to support. Marriage was held in high esteem, in part because of the desire for large families to help settle the vast areas of territory and to aid in effective protection against the Indians. Woman's position was typically that of the

English middle-class wife, although somewhat higher because of the fact that she was economically indispensable and because of the scarcity of women in the colonies, a situation which gave rise to competition among the males for wives. Widows and widowers remarried shortly after the death of their spouses. Courtship was brief and to the point. The economic emphasis is clearly evident in the open haggling and bargaining about marriage settlements so abundantly illustrated in contemporary records. In keeping with the demands of the time, children became independent and self-supporting at an early age.

Domestic life in the southern colonies was patterned after that of the English manor. The traditions of the Anglican Church led to the acceptance of marriage as a religious matter rather than as a civil contract. Divorce was frowned upon except for extreme causes; South Carolina refused to allow divorce on any ground whatsoever. This unwillingness to grant divorces is evidenced even in present-day legislation. Local influences, too, had their effect in the South. Slavery particularly exercised an effect upon domestic life. White and Negro children could not be entirely segregated, and inevitably some of the standards of the illiterate blacks had their effect upon the whites, with a consequent disintegration of some of the bonds uniting the white family. Standards of sex morality were lax, continuing in part into contemporary life, as evidenced particularly in the facts of miscegenation. The slaves themselves had, on the whole, an unsatisfactory and uncertain domestic life, depending for its continuation upon the wishes of the owner.

Influences of the frontier.—The conditions of life in the frontier communities were different in many respects from those in the more stable and longer-settled areas to the eastward, and these conditions deeply affected pioneer domestic practices. The frontier family of the early colonies became of necessity a closely knit unit, largely self-supporting and self-reliant. Every member of this unit had his part to play. The family was largely dependent on itself for the food, clothing, religion, education, protection, and recreation of its members. Its relative loneliness and isolation forced the members to look to one another for companionship, and fostered a closeness of feeling sometimes amounting to a kind of clannishness. The solidarity of the group was further enhanced by their common interest in protection from the ever-present menace of Indian attack.

The stern exactions of frontier life naturally gave to the father dominating position in the family, an importance shared to some extent by the sons. The responsibility of boys in domestic economy was a heavy one. At an early age they matured and entered upon a rôle of independence. This tended to weaken many aspects of the patriarchal control which had characterized earlier periods.

The westward-moving frontier has been a significant factor in the development of American domestic institutions, particularly as they involve woman's place in the scheme of things. Adjustment to the crude conditions which characterized early colonial life was a never-ending process; there was always one part of our population that was in a pioneering stage. When we add to this phenomenon in American life the circumstance that pioneer life developed a need for woman's service that tended to give her a position of near equality with man, we can understand why the movement toward woman's suffrage was strong in America and also why it developed most rapidly in the newest sections—that is, in the West. The large measure of self-reliance and social freedom of the frontier girl helped to lay the basis for the freedom of the American girl of the present day.

Some consequences of the Industrial Revolution.—Some of the general but far-reaching social consequences of the Industrial Revolution have already been indicated. No institutions existed in countries invaded by the machine technique have wholly escaped its influence; few have been more deeply affected than domestic institutions. In the United States traditional attitudes and practices in the field of domestic relations have bent, and in some cases broken—particularly in the great industrial centers—under the impact of a machine civilization.

With the development of power machinery, the center of industry was moved from the home or small shop to the factory. The married woman who remained at home found her condition fundamentally altered. With the continued growth of more efficient large scale factory production, the duties which she had once performed within the household were taken over by industry. Hitherto she had played a major rôle in supplying clothing and providing food for the family. The numerous tasks which those responsibilities had imposed were now greatly reduced. Endless examples might readily be cited in other fields of woman's work.

At least three important results of removing work from the home

may be noted: (1) The well-to-do woman is freed from the necessity for productive work, and can turn her attention to other interests. Her broadened activity in political, religious, educational, and artistic life today is partially due to the greater leisure which is hers. (2) Woman's decreasing economic services in the home make her less indispensable to man. While formerly the tasks which contributed to man's comfort could be performed only within the household, he now finds himself able to live comfortably at his club or hotel. (3) The ability of woman to enter the industrial and professional fields as an independent individual, her consequent economic freedom, and her recognized status make marriage relatively optional with an increasing number of women. She no longer looks upon the acquiring of a husband and the directing of his household as the only possible road to a contented existence.

Urbanization as a disintegrating force.—If the Industrial Revolution is measured by its indirect as well as by its direct influences, it may be safely regarded as the most important single force effecting the transition from the former stabilized patriarchal to the present-day individualized form of domestic institution. One of these indirect influences is that of urbanization. The amazing growth of cities following the Industrial Revolution has made the urban community the dominant pattern of our civilization; for although only slightly more than half of our population actually live in cities of 2,500 or more, it is the city which sets the patterns for our life. And the conditions created and imposed on us by city life have greatly modified these patterns. The congestion of population with the consequent limitation of space and the crowding of whole families into inadequate quarters where privacy is impossible and decency is difficult, leads to many tensions and disruptions. Under such conditions social life cannot be centered in the home. Neither children nor adults have adequate facilities for entertaining their friends, and recreation is removed almost entirely from the domestic circle. But more important than crowding as a social factor are the extreme mobility and the anonymity of the population. The breakup of the stable "large family" group including uncles, aunts, and cousins was inevitable under conditions of modern urban life, in which specialization and the division of labor necessitate changes in place of abode. Only the small family as an interdependent economic unit can maintain its closeness of relation in such a social order. Even this small group does not remain permanent, the

children frequently leaving the home as soon as they become independent and often separating themselves from their parents by hundreds or thousands of miles.

The small-family unit tends to have only secondary contacts with neighbors. In the more congested districts of the large metropolis it is typical that one knows practically nothing about the people next door. Stories that are sometimes heard of brothers who live for years in the same apartment building without knowing of each other's whereabouts are only slightly exaggerated reflections of the reality. Under conditions of anonymity such as this, the domestic group is largely freed from the customary restrictions which would be placed upon it in a more stable, primary community. It is free to mold its behavior according to its own desires, without praise or censure from the people next door. If perchance community pressure is exerted against a certain family which has deviated too far from approved lines, it is relatively easy for it to move to another urban area where the members find the community controls more to their liking.

Not only can the domestic group escape as a unit from many of the restrictions which it would formerly have encountered, but the members as individuals can do likewise. It is possible for a member to leave the home for an evening's recreation and within an hour be in the midst of almost any type of social standards he cares to find. He has some assurance that his choice of companions will not be known to his family or neighbors unless he cares to tell them. Under such conditions, it is easy to see why the small family has emerged as an individualized unit and why even its solidarity is being threatened by the still greater individualization of its members. The modern urban community furnishes the most fertile soil for the growth of those ideas of individualism which have been taking firmer and firmer root since the time of the Renaissance.

Alien influences in our domestic life.—Successive waves of immigrants have introduced into the United States a bewildering variety of cultures, which have not been reduced to homogeneity by our "melting pot." While the majority have come from European countries and have the same fundamental domestic patterns we must recognize the presence of a significant body of representatives of African and oriental cultures. This cultural heterogeneity has become more pronounced as a result of the development of more effective forms of communication, especially newspapers and motion

pictures, so that we have been continually bombarded by customs, ideas, and standards at variance with our own. These alien influences have poured in on us so rapidly that we have been unable to assimilate them and produce a stable culture complex. We are suffering, therefore, from a sort of cultural indigestion which has been aggravated by our extreme individualism and anonymity. Thus in our own American society—true to the historical precedent of cosmopolitan Rome—the period of cultural diversity is marked by the disintegration of many important institutional forms, of which the domestic is only one.

Birth control.—The increase in the knowledge and practice of birth control constitutes another factor in our changing domestic institutions. Without discussing at this point the moral aspects of the practice, we must recognize the fact that information which makes birth control possible is rapidly being disseminated. The possibility of becoming parents only by choice has resulted in the proposal of a form of marital union known as the companionate marriage. This proposal recognizes the desire of men and women to live together for purposes of companionship, and enables the postponement of parenthood either permanently or for a limited period. Some of the problems and points of view which revolve about companionate marriage will be examined later. The purpose here is merely to point to a developing trend in domestic life.

MODERN DOMESTIC LIFE AS AN EXPRESSION OF INDIVIDUALISM

The growth of individualism and its significance in the development of domestic practices have been noticed incidentally in preceding paragraphs. In conclusion we shall mark this point with special emphasis. In a sense, our changing behavior in contemporary domestic life—our changing attitudes and practices—is an expression of our growing individualism. A brief summary of the fundamental changes that have affected domestic life in Western society since the Renaissance will perhaps make the matter clear. An increasing emphasis upon the worth of individual personality, a recognition of the equality of all persons, a heightened mobility of population, a greater freedom from economic dependence, a disruption of primary neighborhood life, and an increasing knowledge of birth control have combined to make the person rather than the group the central emphasis in modern social life. Domestic institu-

tions reflect these changes in that they are no longer regarded primarily as the method of perpetuating and prolonging a particular group name, as the mechanism for the control of property, or as the means of subordinating woman to the domination of man. Marriage is increasingly being recognized as a tool by which free, mature persons consciously attempt to secure certain individual satisfactions without much reference to the effect of their behavior upon the broader social life of their time. Perhaps the tendency toward individualism is being overdone. Perhaps there is need for reëmphasis upon a stabilized social organization—to be attained, if necessary, at the expense of individual preference and freedom.

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CHAPTER XXXIII

DOMESTIC PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

ONE can hardly read the preceding account of the rapid and deep-seated social changes following the Industrial Revolution without feeling that many of the earlier attitudes and practices in domestic relations are now struggling to survive in an uncongenial environment. This is but another way of saying that some formerly accepted features of marriage and the family appear poorly adapted to present conditions. Here lies the general explanation of the contemporary flood of books and articles and of platform discussions on the subject of marriage and the family. Certain aspects of the domestic problem have come to be regarded as of such vital importance as to challenge thoughtful persons to their consideration and study. They are asking: What is happening to the institutions of marriage and the family that they no longer appear to exercise the functions that they formerly did? Are these institutions outworn and no longer a necessary part of our culture? If they are still necessary, are they in need of radical modification to restore their adjustment to contemporary needs? And if such need does exist, what are the possibilities of such modification?

In so brief a space as this study permits, it is not possible even to touch upon all the factors and questions involved. The attempt will be made simply to indicate some of the most important problems and some of the pertinent evidence on both sides of the questions, bases for tentative conclusions. It is not our purpose to attempt final solutions. We could not do so if we chose, in any other than a dogmatic spirit; and a dogmatic spirit is precisely the state of mind that is to be avoided.

THE PERMANENCE OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS

The question as to whether our domestic institutions can endure may appear absurd to those who take our basic institutions for

granted, and who have not given critical consideration to the problems of change in social organization. But if institutions are to be regarded as tools which society fashions for the satisfaction of certain needs, it is clear that they must change from time to time in order to maintain their adjustment to changing conditions. In the field of material culture we know that many implements used by Stone Age man have long been discarded. The path of history is strewn with outworn ideas, customs, and institutions. Since the same principle is active today, is it not possible that our domestic institutions have outlived their usefulness and should be scrapped or modified? Let us summarize some of the lines of thought that point toward an affirmative answer. For purposes of simplicity illustrations will be limited to the family.

The family as a self-contained unit.—A survey of historical trends shows that the family has gradually but surely been shorn of many functions which once characterized it. The dawn of written history reveals the domestic group as the center of social life—a condition characteristic, as far as our information extends, of both the early oriental and occidental peoples. Prior to the time when these early peoples had developed elaborate civilizations with great cities as their centers of diffusion, the large family group was an almost self-sufficient unit. In the pastoral period of the Hebrew life and the early periods of Greek and Roman history the family was the center of a majority of the functions of social life; it was the economic center both for production and consumption; it was the religious unit whose worship was centered around the household gods; it fulfilled the functions of political organization and control except in times of greatest emergency; it was the most important educational unit through which the cultural heritage of the past was transmitted to each new generation; it was the sole recognized and sanctioned means for reproducing and rearing offspring.

With the growing complexity of social life came the rise of new institutions which took over, in whole or in part, many of the functions formerly belonging to the family. The extremes to which modern civilization has gone in removing functions from the family may be illustrated by a brief summary.

The loss of political, religious, and economic functions.—Political functions have been almost completely transferred to the state. The individual family comes into being and continues only in conformity with law. The rights and duties of parents and

children are defined by law. The state considers itself the ultimate guardian of the children, and maintains the right to interfere whenever it thinks necessary. The family has no right to make and enforce laws, even within its own confines, except by permission of the state. The adult members of the family have, of course, the right to exercise their influence as citizens of the state, but the family as a unit has, in the United States, practically no political functions.

Religious functions have been largely taken over by the church. Even the religious ceremonies formerly practiced in the home, such as family worship and the saying of grace at meals, are disappearing. Religious education, except that which develops out of the spontaneous, informal relations of parents and children, has been taken over by such organizations as the weekly Bible School, the Daily Vacation Bible School, and special classes in religion. Priests, rabbis, ministers, missionaries, and other professional religious leaders have practically monopolized religious functions.

As previously pointed out, the Industrial Revolution inevitably drove the production of economic goods from the home. The housewife no longer spins the thread, weaves the cloth, or sews, the modern tendency being increasingly towards the purchase of all garments "ready-made." Similarly the housewife procures her food in a condition more and more nearly ready for the table; she no longer raises the vegetables in her own garden but depends upon her grocer; she no longer bakes the bread and pastry but calls the delicatessen or bakery; she no longer cans her supply of fruits and vegetables for winter's use, but obtains them from the industrialized cannery. The ability of the housewife to cook with a can opener is in reality much more than a subject for the witticisms of humorists. The rapid growth of dining rooms and restaurants testifies to a still more recent trend which takes not only the function of production out of the home but that of consumption out of the home. Without multiplying illustrations it seems fair to conclude that the family is at present of minor importance as a unit of economic consumption. Earning the livelihood and spending the income are becoming highly individualized.

The loss of the educational function.—The development of widespread public education has been relatively recent. Only two or three generations ago, in many of our communities education was limited to the three R's; pupils started school at about the age

of seven and continued only three or four years, with schools in session only four or five months during the year. Now the regular session is eight to ten months, with increasing emphasis being placed upon summer terms. Children are required by law to enter school at the age of six and continue until they are at least fourteen. High school education is becoming expected of children, and increasing numbers of students are attending colleges and universities. Professional curricula are being extended to six or more years above high school, with additional time required for internships, apprenticeships, and the like. The period of family control over the training of the child is still further shortened by the admission of children to school at an earlier age. Kindergartens admitting the child at the age of five are an accepted part of public education and are attracting more children each year; pre-kindergarten and nursery schools are becoming numerous, and are prepared to take the child as early as it can be separated from the mother.

Not only are children in increasing numbers being continued in school for a longer period of time, but the elementary school is reaching into the home in another way. Modern professional educators are requesting parents not to interfere with the child's education, not to try to teach him to read and study at home, but to leave the whole educational process to the school. With the addition of programs of directed play for the child's free hours, and the introduction of vocational schools, the professional educators are striving for the almost complete removal of educational functions from the family unit.

Radical theories about child care.—Even the family functions of physical reproduction and child care are being questioned in theory. Up to the present time these functions have remained relatively undisturbed, but many theorists, of whom the eugenicists are outstanding, maintain that at present the family is not adequately meeting these needs. Conservative reformers agree that too many defective children are being born, while the more radical ones declare that ultimately we shall have human reproduction reduced to a basis of scientific breeding, in which the mating of only the most fit will be permitted. Mating, the latter say, will be arranged upon a basis of selected physical criteria which are to be reproduced in the offspring, and will be independent of family ties. To accompany this program of scientific physical reproduction, a corresponding program of institutional supervision for the infant

has been proposed. Under this plan the most advanced kind of medical and nursing care would be provided for the child; his diet would be carefully watched, and carefully trained teachers would transmit to him that part of the cultural heritage with which he should become acquainted. It is alleged that untrained mothers in ordinary homes do not afford the child the care necessary to develop his capacities to the limit.

If, as theorists assert, the functions of physical reproduction and early care of the child can be more adequately administered in such specialized institutions, and if the educational, religious, political, economic, and recreational functions continue to be removed from the family, we might be strongly tempted to agree that the family as a social institution has been outgrown and is ready to be scrapped. Is this the inevitable conclusion? What is the evidence on the other side?

The argument for the family.—Some form of family life has always been a basic element in every known culture. This fact of the universality of domestic institutions seems to indicate that they have grown up because they satisfy some basic human need. In an earlier discussion of this subject, it was shown that the essential functions of the family in all cultures include the physical care of immature offspring, the early socialization of the child and the rejuvenation of the adult. Unless these functions can be better performed by some other social unit, should not the family continue as a basic feature of social life?

The evidence which is available at present indicates that the physical care of the immature infant is still the proper function of the family. Despite considerable advance in dietetics and nursing, no adequate substitutes have yet been found for mother's care in the early life and feeding of the child. The infant mortality rates of child-caring institutions is very high for young children, in some cases as high as eighty, ninety, and even one hundred per cent in the first year. Some of the institutions which have reported high death rates have apparently had good hygienic and sanitary conditions. The fact that the children admitted to these institutions were foundlings, and that they were therefore subjected to exposure prior to admission may have been responsible for some of the deaths. But the same class of children when cared for in individual families shows a mortality rate materially less than that of the large institutions. It is perhaps conceivable that future development of medical

and dietetic knowledge may afford the child adequate physical care in the larger institution, but up to the present time no adequate substitute for the family has been even imagined.

The function of socializing the child depends for its highest efficiency upon several factors, the most important of which are intimacy of contact and variety of social relationships. The infant develops his truly human traits in small, spontaneous, intimate primary groups rather than in more formalized, secondary relationships. The family, including as it does both sexes and all ages, affords the child both an intimate participation in primary relationships and a wide variety of contacts. If, in addition, we take into account the value to the parent of contact with the child, we find it difficult to imagine a group which can ever take the place of the family as a means for the socialization of its members. This basic function cannot be fulfilled by any other group.

How then shall we interpret the changes which have taken place in the functions of the family? In general, they are to be regarded as reflections of the tendency towards division of labor characteristic of complex civilizations. In simple cultures it is possible for one generalized institution to fulfill all of the necessary functions, but in complex civilizations many specialized groups must develop. The rise of separate political, economic, religious, and educational institutions in our civilization is, therefore, directly in line with expectations. The family, like other institutions, is forced to operate within a limited range if it is to be an efficient unit of our complex civilization. The historical trends above outlined may be interpreted, therefore, as merely conforming to this tendency towards specialization and not necessarily as challenging the family as a specialized institution.

SHOULD WE MODIFY OUR DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS?

Granting that domestic institutions are to remain as fundamental units of our culture, must we also believe that they are to retain the same form as in the immediate past? For the sake of variety we shall change our field of illustration from that of the family to that of marriage and ask ourselves whether the prevailing form of marriage is likely to persist.

Although there have been many deviations, our traditional form of marriage is that of a permanent, monogamic union, dominated

more or less completely by the husband, and normally resulting in the establishing of a family. This form was well adapted to the conditions of life in that man-made, relatively stable social organization which preceded the commercial and industrial revolutions. But large-scale industrial production, greater urbanization of population, the breakup of the large-family unit, the increased mobility and anonymity of local life, the decay of local community control, the exaggeration of individualism, and the increase of woman's rights have created new conditions, which challenge the old marriage forms.

The permanent marriage as an ideal.—First let us consider the problem of the permanence of the marriage union. It is indisputable that a decreasing number of marriages are continued as lifetime unions of husband and wife. The clearest and most unmistakable evidence of this is found in the divorce ratio. That divorces have increased rapidly in the United States is well known. According to reports of the United States Bureau of the Census there were only 10,962 divorces granted in the year 1870, while in 1926 the number had increased to 180,868. A more accurate conception of the increase of divorce is indicated by the divorce index for each 1,000 married persons. The index rose from 0.81 in 1870, to 1.07 in 1880, to 1.48 in 1890, to 2.00 in 1900, to 2.31 in 1906, to 2.81 in 1916, and to 3.75 in 1926. Thus in 1926 it was expected that one marriage in every six or seven would end in divorce, for the United States as a whole, while in some of the larger cities the expectation was one divorce for every three or four marriages. In some noted divorce centers, more divorces are granted than marriages performed. The highest divorce rates are found in the most highly urbanized sections of the country, with the exception of Reno, Nevada, where a friendly judge and an easy residence requirement attract prospective divorcees.

Desertion and separation by mutual consent add their toll to marital disasters. The figures pertaining to these cases are more difficult to obtain and are less reliable than those of divorce. In so far as they are available they seem to indicate a decrease in the stability of marriage.

While the diminishing proportionate number of permanent marriages can scarcely be challenged, in view of the available facts, varied interpretations of the significance of the data are possible. One may interpret them to mean that unhappily married couples now

feel more free to resort to divorce. Whereas formerly they would have tolerated the unhappy union, they now dare to dissolve it in the divorce court. The decreased stigma attached to the divorcee has been important in uncovering many incompatibilities formerly borne in silence. Then, too, the obtaining of a divorce does not necessarily mean that the parties involved have renounced permanent marriage as an ideal; they may still believe that a lifelong union is a desired goal, and regard divorce merely as a means of rectifying the mistake made in a first marriage, and of securing freedom to form a permanent union with a more compatible mate.

Granted that there is a good deal of truth in the preceding explanation, it is not wholly satisfactory inasmuch as it overlooks a significant change in the attitude of many persons toward marriage—a change reflected in the feeling that great care need not be taken in the choice of a mate. Many young men and women are willing to try any seemingly desirable union, entering it with the definite mental reservation that if it does not prove satisfactory they may obtain a divorce and try again. In other words, a large number of persons seem to be acquiring the divorce habit, in part, at least, as a result of this new point of view. The significant thing to be remembered is that in practice many persons have changed their attitude toward permanence of marriage while doing theoretical lip service to the old ideal.

A few theorists argue that man is a varietist by nature and that he cannot be expected to form a permanent, exclusive union with one mate. Many modifications of this assumption have been presented by sincere, capable observers, but space precludes their discussion here.

Whatever may be one's attitude toward the desirability of the ideal of permanence in the marital union, fixed conclusions should not be drawn without first weighing carefully the following considerations: (1) Man needs some stable point of organization in order to act effectively in modern social organization. Is there a group which can fill this need better than an intimate, lifelong union based upon confidence and sympathetic understanding? (2) Human beings need contacts involving keen understanding and deep sympathy. It is most unusual for understanding and sympathy to be developed to the highest degree in a temporary union. When satisfactory relations have been established, understanding and sympathy tend to increase with greater permanence. (3) Marriage

s the recognized institution for the reproduction and care of children. Stable family life is indispensable to the highest personal development of parent and child. What form of social relationship can be devised which is superior to a permanent marriage union as the foundation for the family unit?

In weighing these considerations, one should recognize that not everybody will be able to achieve the ideal goal, whatever it may be; but waiving these failures, the problem resolves itself into this: Is the most nearly perfect marriage union one in which the husband and wife are united for life, or one in which they expect their relationship to be temporary?

The question of man's dominance.—Our culture has in the past recognized man as the head of the house. It will be recalled that during many periods of history his power over the wife was so nearly absolute that legally she had no rights whatsoever. We have accepted a modified form of patriarchal domestic organization varying widely in different areas, and among different social classes. Historically, women have been granted progressively greater privileges, until now they are free to enter many fields formerly closed to them: they may attend institutions of public learning; they may own and manage their own property; they may exercise complete political suffrage; they may enter almost every profession and occupation. But even yet, most people regard woman's place as in the home, and her work as that of caring for the home and family. Man's task, as popularly conceived, is that of supporting and protecting the family. Perhaps no other feature of marital relations has been subjected to so violent and persistent attacks as that of the subordination of women. Since the beginning of the woman's movement, women have increasingly insisted upon being recognized as individuals in their own right with privileges and obligations equal to those of men. Perhaps equal obligations have not been pressed in the same degree as equal rights. What is to be said of this new demand?

Two somewhat different problems are involved in a study of the relative status of man and woman: (1) their relative rights as citizens of the broader social group, and (2) their relative status as husband and wife within the limited marital group. While the two are more or less interdependent, we shall limit the present discussion to the latter. The problem may be stated as follows: Which is preferable, definite subordination of wife to husband

according to the ideal of the past, or equal sharing by husband and wife in the affairs of the home?

The ideals which have become increasingly accepted in Western civilization regarding the worth of the person as such, are compatible only with the idea of marriage as a union between mature equals. One author has characterized the older conception of marriage, which woman was subordinated, by the striking statement that the institution of marriage has been responsible for the subjection of more persons to the personal whim of another than has the institution of slavery. Regardless of the numerical accuracy of such a statement, it does emphasize the fact that the older idea of the subjection of woman is incompatible with the newer conceptions of democracy, equality, and the claims of personality. There is no biological evidence available to show that woman is innately inferior to man, except perhaps in physical size. Since man's social value does not vary directly with his weight, there is no valid reason for subordinating woman to man on the basis of such differences. Unquestionably many wives are physically and mentally superior to their husbands. Participation in the affairs of marriage on an equal basis does not mean that leadership or division of labor will be lacking, but only that these matters will be regarded as natural adjustments of the personalities involved and not as predetermined by outworn traditions. It is possible that such a division of responsibility can be worked out that in each phase of domestic affairs one of the partners will be accorded the position of authority.

The implications of the equalitarian conception of marriage are numerous and far-reaching, particularly in relation to such questions as work of the wife outside the home, responsibility for rearing the children, and so on. These problems are so involved and complex that they cannot even be outlined in this brief treatment.

Companionate marriage.—In considering the question as to whether or not our domestic institutions require remodeling, we must not overlook the challenge to our conventional attitudes toward marriage that is presented by the proponents of companionate marriage. As a deviation from the orthodox view, the so-called companionate idea has provoked widespread discussion.

Marriage has commonly been recognized as the accepted method of establishing a family, both in existing and past cultures. This function has been questioned to some extent by the development of the companionate marriage, which recognizes the validity of sex

and companionship unions between man and woman without the necessity of accepting responsibility for producing and rearing children. The companionate has been widely misunderstood. Judge Ben Lindsey, one of its foremost champions, regarded it merely as a temporary condition, a mating union between young people who were not yet ready to undertake the responsibility of rearing a family. E. R. Groves has given it the significant name of 'arrested family.' Usage seems to have changed recently, so that companionate has come to be regarded by many as a more or less permanent marriage relation unaccompanied by the responsibility of producing and rearing children. Companionate marriage is not to be confused with trial marriage, which has quite a different object.

The argument of the advocates of the companionate runs somewhat as follows: Boys and girls tend to mature physically in their early teens. But with the increased lengthening of educational programs, particularly for the professional classes, they are not financially able to assume the responsibilities of marriage and family life until they are at least twenty-five. Under these conditions there is presumably constant danger from an ever-pressing sex urge—either in the form of illicit relations and personal demoralization, or in the form of the repression of this drive and the development of nervous disorders. It is argued, therefore, that it is better that youths should marry early, but postpone the production of offspring until a later period.

The following points, among others, should be weighed in evaluating the companionate as a form of marriage: (1) The relation of 'repressed tendencies' to various nervous disorders has been greatly over-emphasized. (2) The moral demands of one's religious, domestic, and friendship groups cannot be ignored or violated with impunity. Religious doctrines of the indissolubility of marriage and of the wrongness of artificial birth control fall within this category. (3) Family life is basic to social organization. The continuance of the group requires a healthy "new generation." The mature parent needs intimate contact with the immature children. (4) The argument that temporary companionate unions tend to become permanent on a basis of non-production of children has been advanced against the practice. There are at present no data available by which the merits of this contention may be tested. (5) On the other side of the scale is the argument that temporary postponement of child-bearing by the newly married couple may

enable them to make personal adjustments to each other which would be impossible if the wife's energy were devoted, from the beginning, primarily to child-bearing. (6) Then, too, some persons who are physically defective have through the companionate an opportunity to form intimate, satisfying relationships without incurring the danger of bringing defective offspring into existence.

Whatever we may think of the proposal of companionate marriage, we must recognize as a fact that this is merely a new name for a very old practice. We must also recognize that with the rapid spread of information regarding methods of birth control, the practice has increased rapidly. It is impossible to say to what degree this increase has resulted simply from the sincere desire to postpone the responsibility of parenthood to a more favorable time, and to what degree it represents a selfish, egocentric desire for the gratification of physical impulses. But one thing seems certain—widespread public approval of such a relationship at the present time would open the door for a greater amount of selfish, individual exploitation of another person than would otherwise be possible.

PROPOSALS FOR THE SOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

No person taking an objective view of the evidence on both sides can fail to see that marriage and the family, as institutions, still have important functions to perform in society. They may further agree that, so far as modern civilization is concerned, superior merit appears to inhere in the small family unit based upon equalitarian monogamous marriage. But after all this is admitted, the fact remains that domestic institutions themselves are not as effective as thoughtful observers would like to see them. There are many deviations and irregularities in the relations of the sexes which frequently work grave injury to the individual and to society. If the cure is not to destroy domestic institutions, then the pertinent question arises as to whether society, and particularly our own society, can lessen these evils by such means as education and legislation?

The resort to education.—Undoubtedly many evils and unhappy experiences, both within and outside the marriage union, touching the relations of the sexes are the result of ignorance. There is great need of providing intelligent and systematic education for prospective husbands and wives regarding the nature and impor-

ence of domestic institutions. By this we do not mean merely education in home-making, though that is important. Nor do we mean education in personal adjustment, though this too is of great importance in removing many of the immediate, concrete causes of marital discord. In addition to these and other practical forms of education for married life, we would emphasize the necessity for education which will spread a knowledge of the fundamental importance of stable domestic institutions, both for the welfare of the group and for the development of personality. A more thorough understanding of the basic part played by social institutions should serve as a healthy antidote for the light-minded way in which many persons approach the more serious affairs of life.

Education of this sort cannot be confined to the universities if it is to achieve its real purpose, for too small a percentage of people ever reach a university. The situation would seem to call for action by the proper authorities in providing such instruction outside the regular channels of formal education for those who do not go on to the higher schools. The grammar school, which does touch the great majority of our youth, does not answer the purpose, since there the pupil has not reached sufficient maturity. The introduction of such information sufficiently early into the life of the maturing human being presents a challenge which is worthy of the best efforts of our educational leadership. This is, however, primarily a technical and administrative problem and cannot be discussed here.

Marriage and divorce laws.—Legislation is the technique on which we have pinned our hopes in the past, but too often in vain; while legislation is an essential means of control in a complex culture, it cannot take the place of the more fundamental program of education to which we have just referred. It may be desirable, however, to indicate some of the problems which confront legislators and social workers in the fields of domestic affairs.

The confusion of our marriage and divorce laws is the first thing that strikes the attention of the student. There are in the United States forty-nine marriage and divorce codes—a different one for each state and an extra one for the District of Columbia. Some of the state laws are relatively adequate, while others are almost hopeless. Legislators have been turning more attention to marriage than to divorce, on the principle that if the proper marriage unions are formed divorce will tend to take care of itself. But marriage legislation has not been made very effective. It has been examined

and analyzed by several competent authorities whose findings reveal a maze of conflicting ideals and aims.¹ Let us summarize some of the striking facts presented by these writers.

They point out that common-law marriage is still legal in twenty-four states. This means that persons may become man and wife without obtaining a license and without any formal or civil or religious ceremony, by merely proceeding to live together as man and wife and publicly announcing or admitting such a relationship. The consequence is that there is almost entire lack of public control of these unions. Common-law marriage was inherited from England, but was abolished in that country about the middle of the eighteenth century. We continue to recognize the medieval custom.

Next, they reveal that requirements relative to marriage and divorce vary from state to state. Those states which have high standards for marriage find themselves handicapped in their attempt to enforce the laws, by the fact that neighboring states are not particular. It is relatively easy for persons who are not eligible to marry in a state with high standards to cross the line into a neighboring one with low standards and to obtain a license. Some of the communities where standards are low have thus become renowned as places where marriages can be performed quickly, and with little publicity. When economic interests become entrenched in such centers, it is difficult to effect a change of state laws to remedy the conditions. The federal government holds to the principle that control of domestic institutions resides in the state. Whether federal legislation might or might not prove satisfactory is a debatable question.

In the third place, these studies show that existing provisions for the prevention of the marriage of defectives are not adequate. Two states—Florida and New Mexico—place no restrictions on marriage; five others permit feeble-minded persons to marry; eight permit the marriage of the insane. Only six states forbid the marriage of persons who are afflicted with venereal disease. Only five states forbid marriage to all three classes, that is, the defective or diseased, the feeble-minded or insane, and venereals. State regulations vary, likewise, in many other matters, such as the minimum age necessary for marriage, residence, notice of intention to marry, and so on.

¹M. Richmond, and F. Hall, *American Marriage Laws*; *Marriage and the State*; Geoffrey May, *Marriage Laws and Decisions in the United States*.

Lastly, they point out that machinery for the enforcement of marriage laws is ordinarily inadequate. The officer who issues the license frequently has no means of checking up on the statement of the persons who apply for the license. Physical and mental examinations are rare; in most states where they are required, the examination may be conducted by a quack who will issue a certificate to almost any person upon the payment of a satisfactory fee. In Ohio, for instance, the marriage-license clerk must depend upon the sworn statement of the applicant, with the result that feeble-minded, insane, and epileptic persons who are willing to swear that they are eligible to marry are granted licenses. One instance is known where a woman testified under oath that she was not epileptic, was granted a marriage license, and was seized with an epileptic attack before she could get out of the office.

Divorce legislation, like marriage legislation, exhibits a wide diversity among the states. The accepted grounds for divorce vary in number from fourteen in New Hampshire to none in South Carolina. Adultery is the only recognized legal ground for divorce in New York, and is among the most frequently listed legal grounds. Desertion and cruelty are next in importance. But the legal grounds are not so important in determining the divorce rates of a community as is the attitude of its judges. A sympathetic judge can find sufficient evidence for granting a divorce decree on any ground, whereas another judge may refuse it regardless of the number of legal grounds available. There is no correlation between the number of legal grounds for divorce in the various states and the divorce rate for those states. If a state has more adequate divorce laws than its neighbors, there will be a considerable movement of people across the border to obtain the advantages of leniency.

The possibility of legislative remedies.—It is quite evident that so long as states are authorized to pass such legislation as they desire for the regulation of domestic relations, there will continue to be a wide variety of conflicting practices. The absence of federal control makes it impossible to work out a systematized plan elastic enough in detail to meet varying needs in the different states of the Union, but sufficiently unified in fundamentals to protect the high standards of one from the influence of the low standards of another. If such a code could be worked out in accordance with enlightened opinion and in the light of our

long experience with the existing state of things, it might well do much toward the elimination of some of our present evils.

But even under more favorable conditions, marriage legislation has serious limitations as an effective remedy. While it undoubtedly has great value, it fails to solve most of the problems of domestic institutions. The best that can be hoped for from legislation is that defective and diseased persons shall not be allowed to marry, that only mature persons may marry, that the taking of sufficient time for thorough consideration of the step shall be mandatory, that adequate publicity of each marriage shall be arranged, and that careful records shall be maintained. Legislative measures may also aid, directly or indirectly, in stimulating education. It is upon education rather than legislation that the success of the marital union is likely to rest.

The most significant change in the legal treatment of divorce in the past few decades has been the development of courts of domestic relations. In these courts, applications for divorce are not treated as formal, legalistic problems in which the evidence is considered objectively and the judgment is rendered upon the basis of the facts, regardless of the result. On the contrary, in these special divorce courts each case is regarded as a problem in social adjustment and treated as such. Attempts are made, by means of various techniques of social work, to obtain a satisfactory adjustment so that divorce will not be necessary.

Legal treatment of divorce, while necessary and valuable, is even more restricted in its usefulness than is marriage legislation in bringing about adequate domestic adjustments. Divorce can be at best, only the last gesture, giving public sanction to the termination of a union which is recognized as unsatisfactory.

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PART VII

THE DESCENT OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

XXXIV. The Nature and Development of Education

XXXV. Contemporary American Education

SAMUEL L. EBY

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION

EDUCATION in our own day is associated with schools. We usually think of an educated man as one trained and disciplined in institutions created for the purpose. But in a sense, life is a school; living is education. Experience quickens, broadens, and disciplines the human mind. The degree to which the process goes on is determined by opportunities for varied experience and by the quality of the mind itself. A dull mind goes through life like a defective photographic plate that takes on impressions dimly or not at all. When a person systematizes and directs that sort of informal education, we call it self-education and speak of him as a self-educated man. Experience alone is of great importance in the education of the individual—in adjusting him to the demands of social living; but in the present discussion we are not concerned with that kind of education. Education as considered here is a social process directed toward the community or by individuals of the community toward the utilization of socially accepted values. When so conceived and directed, the activity takes on some degree of organization and finally becomes institutionalized.

The functions of education.—In its most fundamental and general sense, education is conceived as the cultural progress of society. Its major function is the extension, conservation, and transmission of all the cultural values and ideas to succeeding generations, to the end that man may progress in physical, economic, social, and ethical well-being. Stop the educational process and the community would return to barbarism. Thus education in the broadest sense must be conceived as the means or agency for the progress of civilization. Under this broad view the field of education includes all branches of knowledge: the physical and natural sciences, social sciences, philosophy, religion, mathematics, literature, language, music, and art. As a world heritage these elements of civilization take on a universal interest as objects of study, but within the common heritage the particular culture of the community

or the nation acquires a special emphasis determined by communal or national aims and ideals. Thus education may take on a narrower function of furthering the group ideal—in Greece, the highest development of personality; in Germany, of service to the state; in France, of culture in its narrower sense; in America, citizenship.

The last-mentioned conception of the function of education appears more or less throughout history whenever education becomes a conscious process. The family inducts the plastic child into the group habits and *mores* of his time; it socializes him. The school or what corresponds to it, takes up and continues the process of social adjustment and makes him still further a sharer in the culture of the group. It goes further and indoctrinates him with group beliefs and loyalties. As a rule, he takes on the common impression of the culture of the community or nation—the cultural bias as they were designated in an earlier chapter. In Russia today we have the interesting example of a state attempting by education to make over the youth by inculcating habits of thought and social attitudes radically different from those of Western Europe.

Within these broader conceptions of the function of education there are many variations, but all are related more or less to the large functions. There is the conception of education as that of individual growth and development—intellectual, social, moral. In this sense education utilizes subject matter as the means of growth and development. This is a popular conception of education. It is what is done to or for the individual in order to train him in habits and behavior, to realize achievement and personal satisfaction. Several other conceptions of education are held. One is that education is mere mastery of subject matter, acquisition of information. It is identical with erudition. This conception of education had a rather large place in the thinking of men in the past; at present it is giving way to the notions of education set forth above.

Education among primitive peoples.—The culture of primitive peoples is relatively static. They have little or no conception of change and are concerned primarily with the preservation of the *status quo*. Innovations are usually taboo. Mental inertia and superstitions are strong. Primitive education reflects these dominant attitudes and interests. It is conceived as a process of adjusting the individual to the group and of inculcating the elements of its culture that they may be handed down as an exact copy from

the generation to another. As a means to these ends, education takes on a twofold character: industrial—or, as we would say today, vocational, in the narrow sense; and religious and moral.

Industrial education aims to train the youth in the simple methods of agriculture, hunting, pottery, implement making, weaving, and building. As culture advances in its development, these occupations tend to become specialized. The "method" used in passing on these skills to the new generation is that of spontaneous or conscious imitation; that is, education is informal. Moral and religious training is highly regarded by primitive peoples as essential to group welfare. Each society has its ethical code or set of *mores*, which is handed down faithfully and effectively. The religion of primitive man is a system of organized beliefs and practices closely related to his everyday life. To these beliefs and practices rigid adherence is enforced as a means of defense against destructive forces of nature. As religion develops a priestly class emerges whose function it is to perform religious ceremonies and to initiate the youth into full membership of the group. The educational result is the inculcation of a set of moral character traits and of group religious beliefs. This achievement seems to be regarded as the most vital part of primitive education.

EDUCATION DURING CLASSICAL TIMES

The Greek ideal.—The Greeks first gave the world the conception of a liberal education. The rapid expansion of commerce and developing ideas of democracy forced new problems on the Greeks. Athens had attained to the hegemony of the Greek world; she had become an imperial power. Political power and wealth created a beauty and splendor at Athens which attracted visitors and settlers from all parts of the Greek world. The keen and versatile Athenian was profoundly affected in his customs, thoughts, and ideals by the social, economic, political, and aesthetic influences surrounding him. An Athenian citizen probably had to participate in more activities than any man either before or since. He had to be a trained soldier ready to serve his country in war; he was a voter who might be called upon to voice his decision in the assembly on any question of local, state, or foreign policy; he became eligible for election to the highest public office; he was subject to call to jury duty—an activity requiring a sound knowledge of the law;

he might be called to serve as juror to decide the merits of dramatic productions in the theater. Besides, he had his duties and responsibilities as the head of his family; he performed the priestly offices at home and state. And finally he had his own vocation to follow in order to provide for his economic well-being. The Athenian state demanded versatility in the citizen. His life was colorful, many-sided, filled with a multitude of practical and intellectual interests.

The Greeks attacked their problems with enthusiasm. They worked out a political philosophy which resolved the conflict between the individual and the state. The life of the individual and that of the state were identified with each other, thus permitting the fullest development of the individual and granting the fullest claims of the state. The state was merely the individual writ large. In the formulating of an educational principle to meet the requirements of their manifold activities, the Greeks cut through the complex pattern of routine life, set up a single goal or objective—the “good life”—and formulated an integrated, balanced regime of training designed to lead directly to a realization of that goal. The scheme of education implied the harmonious development of the individual, physically, morally, aesthetically, and intellectually. The conception is that the ultimate end of education is the development of personality—an integrated, balanced personality that can perform all activities whether political, aesthetic, intellectual, or moral, with ease, efficiency, and pleasure. The achievement of such a personality implied the achievement of the good life.

The Greeks developed a system of schools—elementary, secondary, and higher—formulated a curriculum in the light of the objectives, and perfected operative techniques which were highly effective. The elementary school inculcated in the child the ethical and social ideals of the state; secondary education trained for citizenship and vocational life; higher education in the schools of philosophy and schools of rhetoric evolved a definite and purposive curriculum for the training of the good citizen.

The Greek conception of education has never lost its meaning, though forgotten or lost sight of at times. Education has for its most important function the development of personality—the well-balanced, harmonious, integrated life, or the good life, as expressed by Plato. The Greeks also evolved a hierarchy of values in education. Subjects of higher value, which were pursued for the sake of truth or reality, were called liberal subjects. These have n

mediate practical application or economic value; they exist and are pursued for their own sake. This conception of education is also identified with the idea of pure culture. In modern society the Greek idea is the essential basis of the liberal arts college.

Education among the Romans.—An institution is justified in its social setting. Greek education declined because of changes in the social and political conditions of the city-state. The rich experiences of civic and political life faded out. Creative genius lacked stimulus, and the conception of liberal education changed to one of a mastery of past knowledge and narrowed to a mere study form. The work of the schools became bookish and formal. At this stage the torch of enlightenment passed into the hands of the Roman world, and the Romans in their turn passed their heritage on to the Middle Ages. Roman education, like Roman culture generally, underwent important changes as political expansion multiplied Rome's contacts with other civilizations in the Mediterranean world.

In the early period of Roman history, Roman life was exceedingly simple; in political affairs the state demanded a rigid loyalty of its citizens, just as the Roman father commanded the strict obedience of its members. These features, political and social, dictated the educational objectives, content, and process. The objectives were loyalty and service to the state and reverence for the *mores* of society. In content education was limited to the rudiments of learning; in the selection of subject matter the practical arts of agriculture, law, war, and oratory were emphasized; and necessary knowledge in these subjects was imparted to the children through the father by a process of apprenticeship.

With the invasion of Greek culture into Rome about the third century B. C., Roman education was strongly affected. While it may be an exaggeration to say that the motto of the Romans was "adopt nothing, adapt everything," in a broad sense the statement holds true. Lacking a native literature, the practical Romans borrowed content from the Greeks and adapted it to the needs of Roman life and drew heavily upon Greek educational models. Even in this process of borrowing, Roman characteristics asserted themselves. Practical and realistic, the Romans were somewhat suspicious of Greek culture; they took over Greek educational ideas but they gave them the stamp of Roman character. Liberal education was defined in terms of practical needs of the times, and it

placed chief emphasis on a narrow intellectual and moral training. Physical fitness and training were for military service. Grace and beauty of body and aesthetic education were wholly neglected. The Roman ideal was that of service as soldier, lawyer, or statesman. The rank of orator was the highest position a man could attain in times of peace. But oratory was a practical means to position of eminence as lawyer or statesman, and was broadly conceived as a preparation for public life and service. A liberal education implied a "knowledge of everything important and of all the liberal arts," to the end that the orator might "be armed at all points with the whole panoply of knowledge." In later Roman history the idea of a liberal education necessitated an encyclopedic curriculum as the indispensable foundation for a military, legal, or political career.

Education in Rome never reached the high level attained in Athens. A system of secondary schools developed, but the extent of patronage is obscure. Training was limited chiefly to the field of language and literature. To the core curriculum were added mythology, history, geography, religion, and antiquities. The grammar school training served as a preparation for the rhetoric school.

With the establishment of the imperial government of Rome, preferment in political, legal, and military affairs depended upon the favor of the emperor. The practical ends of education disappeared. Personal ambition was without incentive. Roman education had become rigidly institutionalized. The resulting inertia forced a redefinition of objectives and values. Liberal education was redefined as an end in itself. Education became static and sterile. Substance was neglected; artificiality and affectation flourished. Learning was not for life but for school—an objective which was to emerge at various times in later history. Rome left to posterity no fine treatise of education comparable to the *Republic* of Plato. Educational ideals and practices became crystallized; intellectual stagnation was setting in.

EDUCATION DURING THE MIDDLE AGES

The fusing of Roman and Christian elements.—The medieval world found a system of grammar schools in the cities and towns of imperial Rome and her provinces. The school system was in part

the fruit of Roman genius for political organization. True, the schools were decadent, and the content was formal and artificial and divorced from social and civic needs; still, it must not be overlooked that the schools of the cities of imperial Rome and her provinces had a definite organization and a technique of education. To revise education and make it a dynamic force in medieval society, it was only necessary to infuse new ideals, new objectives, and new content into the schools. Christianity furnished the new content, the new objectives and ideals.

In a small area a trifle larger than the state of New Jersey three dominant religions had their origin: Islamism, Judaism, and Christianity. Christianity was carried west into Rome during the period of the Empire. Among the early church leaders were many who had been educated in the pagan schools. To spread the new Christian ideals and way of life it was necessary to have leaders; the leadership could be provided only through training, that is, education; the requisite for giving such education was a system of schools. The Christian Fathers formulated a new objective and aim of education, namely the preparation of leaders in church and state. When the Church Fathers turned to the schools for aid in training for Christian leadership a perplexing problem was encountered. How could pagan learning train for Christian life and faith? How could the literature of myths and pagan gods train in doctrines of the new creed? These questions were discussed long and seriously.

The problem was still further complicated in Western Europe by reason of the rapid conversion of the barbarians. Carrying pagan learning to recently converted barbarians was fraught with extreme danger to the successful spread of Christianity. Yet the early church Fathers, imbued with classical learning, hesitated to reject such a type of education. In the fourth century the perplexing problem was solved. From this date until the reign of Charlemagne, the official attitude of the Church was a rejection of classical learning, pagan writers, and heathen books. One leader expressed the opinion that it was better to remain in ignorance of classical learning than to be ensnared by its errors. The current of opposition to classical learning ran so strong that the Church soon definitely turned its back upon the pagan heritage except in such instances where the Church could safely borrow to further the new religious ideals and objectives.

The character of medieval education.—The result was the redefinition of the objectives of education. For the masses, the aim was the preparation of loyal adherents of the faith for the salvation of their souls in the next world; for the select minority, the aim was to train leaders for the Church, and somewhat later, for all other affairs requiring literacy. A new curriculum was formulated consisting chiefly of a study of the Psalms, church singing, writing, arithmetic, and grammar. In the higher schools a new type of literature adapted to Christian needs was developed; in form it was classical but it dealt with religious themes. At no time previously were the schools so closely supervised for the purpose of realizing the objectives of education as set up by the Church.

Outside the Church two minor types of education should be noticed in passing. One was the practical education in craftsmanship afforded by the industrial guilds. Through the institution of a system of apprenticeship they provided a thorough system of vocational training to meet the economic needs of burgher society. The other was a type of education contributed by the Age of Chivalry. Chivalric education introduced the military spirit into religion, set up new moral and ethical standards in conduct and human intercourse, both in time of peace and in time of war. Some of the social and moral values of chivalric education still persist in modern society.

The rise of the universities.—By the later Middle Ages Christian Europe was dotted by monastery and cathedral schools devoted in the main, to the services of the Church, that is to say, dominated by the idea of realizing the Christian way of life as a preparation for the fuller life of the world to come. In the twelfth century the medieval system of education was capped by the rise of the universities. Exact dates are difficult to determine. Monarchs and popes vied with each other in founding universities. Records show nineteen universities in the thirteenth century; twenty-five more were founded in the fourteenth; and thirty more in the fifteenth. At the time of the Renaissance some seventy universities existed throughout Europe.

It would be misleading to project the picture of a modern university into the Middle Ages. Then the requisites of a university were only two—a teacher and students. It was merely necessary to obtain a charter from Church or State, conferring legal rights on teachers and students; the *universitas*—a common name for guild-

was then ready to operate. Universities took on the universal or international character of the medieval world about them; they drew their faculties and students from all parts of the Christian world. The charters conferred upon the universities political and civil jurisdiction over the students and granted special privileges to the university communities, such as exemption from taxation and military service. The government of the university was democratic in form. The practice of granting degrees was early established, these being at first merely licenses to teach.

In their early period universities contributed little in the way of change of fundamental objectives in education. Although they had risen largely in response to that remarkable quickening of intellectual life and an intense desire to learn that characterized the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they were at once captured by the medieval religious ideal, still too strong to be overborne by the first advances of the New Learning. The great teachers of the universities became imbued with a dominating desire to bring the teachings of Christianity, based on divine revelation, into harmony with reason as dictated by the logic of the Greek philosopher Aristotle. Thus university education became intimately associated with and centered about Aristotelian philosophy; it became almost identical with logic. University life was marked by an intense intellectual activity but it became stereotyped under the intellectual formulas set by the scholastics, as the great university teachers were called. The Aristotelian philosophy of education as training and mental discipline was the accepted thing. The ultimate object was to find absolute authority.

FORCES SHAPING MODERN EDUCATION

This last word in medieval education was given decisive form by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), an Italian scholastic and one of the greatest figures of the Middle Ages. In the fourteenth century, the opening period of the Renaissance, currents of thought are discernible which were to gather strength, as the Renaissance wore on, and change the trend in education. With the advance of the modern period, other forces were brought to bear on educational thought and practice. The final result was the stamping of education with the general characteristics that it bears today. It is these influences which we wish to examine briefly.

The secularizing of education.—The rich variety of interests that stirred society during the Renaissance inevitably brought the ideals of medieval education, particularly in the universities, out of adjustment with social needs. A thousand years of training and preparation for the future world began to weary men in Western Europe. States and cities were rising to power and influence through trade and commerce; new worlds were discovered; new inventions were made. The educational system of the medieval world had become static in curriculum and in the technique of teaching. Education as it had existed for so long was ill adapted to a changing world. After a long discipline, men began to turn again to the affairs of the world around them. Otherworldliness gave way to interest in the present world, in man, and in nature. Asceticism yielded to social life and interests. The study of mankind was substituted for religion and divinity. New values were set up in the light of the rediscovery of the cultures of the classical world. These cultures became of interest for themselves. Social intercourse was again marked by elegance of speech and polished manners. The way to personal distinction and preferment led through a mastery of language and knowledge. Travel, the study of poetry and eloquence became badges of cultural distinction. Latin was utilized as the universal medium for the exchange of thoughts and ideas. Later, Greek created great enthusiasm, but did not find the wide vogue which Latin enjoyed.

The secular aim of education is well illustrated by the school of Vittorino da Feltre in Italy. This was only one of a number of private schools in Italy which were important centers for the spread of the educational ideals and practices of the Renaissance. Vittorino da Feltre selected from classical literature materials for moral or character education. The same materials were used for training in language, for intellectual training, and for informational content such as science, geography, and history. Da Feltre's school is one of the first on record to require mathematics and music. The physical well-being of pupils was supervised in diet, clothing, and recreation. Games and sports were fostered. He gave some attention to individual differences and to social training in the school community.

Da Feltre's aims reflect the general effect of Renaissance ideals which was to broaden the scope and purpose of education. It was thought that the greatest menace to man was ignorance, and the

the broad way of enlightenment was to be found in a diligent study of the classics, which revealed the rich and many-sided intellectual life of the ancients.

Only with many misgivings did the universities open their doors to the new learning of the Renaissance. They

held themselves obstinately closed to the new methods long after these had achieved brilliant results outside their walls. When admission was at last grudgingly allowed a few representatives of the new learning, it was accompanied with many petty slights and indignities. Inaugural addresses were required to be submitted for examination before delivery, the use of the library was denied, a share in the government of the university was refused, or, as we should say, the right to attend the meetings of the faculty—or no place was given the new studies in the schedule of lecture hours. The Church, so bound up with the scholastic system, came to its defense. Greek was judged an heretical tongue. No one should lecture on the New Testament, it was declared, without a previous theological examination. It was held to be heresy to say that the Greek or Hebrew text reads thus, or that a knowledge of the original languages is necessary to interpret the Scripture correctly.¹

The final triumphant invasion of the universities by humanism, the new learning came to be called, enriched the educational curriculum, but only for a brief hour did it change the spirit of the faculties. A great enthusiasm to extend human knowledge under a spirit of free inquiry was a distinguishing feature of the Renaissance, but with the close of the sixteenth century humanism had passed into a decline. The university teachers of the new learning became as dogmatic as the scholastics had been before them; if the Greek Aristotle had been worshipped by the former, the Roman Virgil had taken his place among the latter. Nor were the later humanistic teachers any more hospitable to new fields of learning. Modern science had made impressive strides during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but it was only after a struggle that it made a place for itself in the universities. Only for limited periods and under special circumstances have universities been in the forefront of intellectual movements. Historically, as institutions, they have been conservative, backward-looking, and intolerant of "orthodox" or unapproved fields of learning.

¹ George B. Adams, *Civilization During the Middle Ages*, revised edition, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914, pp. 376-377.

The admission of humanism to the universities marked another advance in the secularizing of education, since it signalized the divorcing of the universities from the dominating influence of the Church. It meant that they had turned from the formula set up by Aquinas, who measured educational values in terms of theology to the broader position that all aspects of culture were legitimately a part of their fields of study. The university was coming to be recognized not only as a training ground for the clergy or other servants of the Church, but also as a center reflecting the manifold interests of men living in a modern community. To an increasing degree the universities became thronged by men looking to a career in the professions, in politics, in commerce, and in business generally. With the historical retreat of religion as the primary interest, the secularizing of education was inevitable. It was a process by which the schools were brought into adjustment with the society of the modern world.

The influence of democracy and industrialism.—The recognition of classical studies by the universities modified the content of higher education, but it is not to be concluded that the triumph of humanism excluded theology as an important subject of study. Nor did it mean that the tight hold of religion upon education generally had been broken. Outside of the universities its influence continued to be dominant. That was particularly true in Catholic countries. The retreat of religion from the schools had been slow and hard fought, and the evacuation is by no means complete even now. The fact is but one illustration of the persistence of certain elements of medieval culture in modern society. A second feature in the education of the early modern period was its comparatively limited application. The present ideal of general education has no place in the accepted opinion of the time. While it is not strictly true to say that education was thought of as an accomplishment solely for gentlemen and the aristocracy, yet the tendency was in that direction, particularly in the universities. It was bound to be so since the society in which education functioned was essentially dominated by the aristocracy. The assault on what—for want of a better term—we shall call the aristocratic conception of education belongs to the nineteenth century, which also witnessed a further reduction of religious influence.

The establishment of popular governments in the nineteenth century introduced new ideas of the function of education. Pos

essed of political power, the people of a country were now in a position to capture its educational machinery—to a considerable extent at least—and to mold educational aims and methods to meet the needs of the common man as well as of the privileged few. The democratizing of education then began. As the downward broadening of the process went on, national societies came to comprehend more and more clearly the responsibility of government for providing the facilities necessary to draw the masses into the schools. Once that function of government was accepted, a new ideal, not yet completely realized, emerged—the ideal of free, compulsory education.

Along with democratic government came a renewed attack upon the influence of religion in the schools. In France, where religion was still regarded as an ally of monarchy and an enemy of the Republic, governments were fearful of the control of religion over the ideas of the youth, and made a sustained and successful attack upon Catholic education. In England attempts were made to break the hold of the Anglican Church by the creating of a non-sectarian national school system. The extremists in the movement failed to have their way, but a compromise measure did create non-sectarian schools as an important feature of the English educational system.

Another powerful force in the shaping of educational aims in the modern world was the Industrial Revolution. Contemporary Western civilization is dominated by machinery, and mechanical power is dependent on science. So far as education is concerned, the result has been not to eliminate the humanities, so long dominant in our schools, but to press humanism into a generally subordinate position and to stress the physical and natural sciences. Another influence in the same direction has arisen through the multiplying of technological schools of all kinds where the humanities receive little or no attention.

The influence of nationalism.—Closely allied with effects of democracy and modern industrialism upon educational institutions is the influence of political nationalism. In the late Middle Ages, it will be recalled, education, like certain other features of social activity, took on a more or less universal pattern. Everywhere in Western Europe the aims of the Church were the same, and everywhere it set up the same sort of educational machinery to realize its aims. When the universities arose they took on an international

character both as to students and faculties. There was one medium of instruction throughout Western Europe; that was Latin. With the rise of national monarchies Europe became compartmented into nation states, and all institutions gradually took on a national coloring. Educational institutions were nationalized along with other things. The vernacular came into use as a medium of instruction, and certain characteristic differences arose to set off education in one state from that in another; that is to say, education became more or less national in its character. Thus with the development of national cultures, segregated and guarded from other national cultures by an aggressive political nationalism, education lost much of its cosmopolitan character. It continued to accept the culture of the whole world as its proper field, but each state society introduced as a leading motive the inculcation of the national culture and the national ideals.

European trends in education.—In this brief treatment of the subject we cannot examine the national systems of the European states, but we can consider a few of the trends in contemporary European education. Some of these trends bear a likeness to movements in the United States; others exemplify characteristic contrasts in educational ideals. It is not a matter of argument as to which national system is best. Cultural development as revealed in the history of a given nation explains the educational aims and practices of that nation, even if it does not entirely justify them. Education in Europe has had the advantage of a much longer history than in the United States, and European educational experience has been quite different from ours. It is not surprising therefore that Europe has developed a philosophy and a program of education to an extent unknown in our own country.

If we look for educational trends in Europe similar to our own, perhaps the most significant is the movement for the further democratization of education, as it has developed since the World War. The movement is already old in the United States; in Europe the spread of education from the top down—from the classes to the masses—has not been so rapid or so complete as in America. Now there is a strong demand for it in some of the European countries. In France and Germany, especially, there is a growing tendency to provide a common elementary education for all children below the secondary school. In England, France, and Germany there is a demand for increased opportunities for secondary education, with

the result that secondary education has expanded notably since the war. In the broadening of educational opportunities and in the present tendency of some of the European countries to provide the same kind of education for all in the elementary stages, Europe is showing educational characteristics similar to our own. It is in the secondary stage that Europe exhibits a marked departure from prevailing educational aims and ideals in the United States, a departure springing primarily from differences in historical background.

In Europe, secondary education is designed for a selected class—a aristocracy, not of birth, however, but of intellect. It aims to give a liberal education to prepare the more able for leadership in the more exacting callings and in service to the national society and to the state. It is frankly recognized that all youths are not capable of receiving a liberal education, and lack capacity for able leadership. Consequently, European education provides machinery for selecting the able. These go into the secondary schools as a preparation for the university; others are directed into vocational or trade schools and receive training for commerce or industry. Between vocational training and education in the liberal sense European educational philosophy draws a sharp distinction.

Contemporary German education will serve to illustrate these characteristic features. The German school system consists first of a common school (*Grundschule*) of four years. The pupil completing this training has a choice of entering either an intermediate school for general and pre-vocational training or a secondary school. About thirty per cent of secondary-school students enjoy free tuition. An additional small number enjoy reduced fees. Four or five types of secondary schools, each with its own distinctive curriculum, are open to those who have completed the common elementary school. Thus, German secondary education is differentiated through parallel schools each having its own integrated curriculum, which requires nine years in the older classical schools and six years in some of the other types. The secondary schools prepare for university work. Vocational training is provided by a separate system of schools which do not prepare for higher education. Secondary education in Germany is not designed for the masses. It is for the upper classes with emphasis on ability. The results of the system are tested by rigid examination, designed not to test detailed information but to discover intellectual maturity and ability

to pursue university studies. Secondary education is selective and confers a badge of social distinction. It is conceived as liberal education designed to adjust the individual to the new political order. A major problem is to make a transfer from the pre-war solidarity and loyalty to imperial government to post-war solidarity and loyalty to the new republic. The older aim of general education has given way to the new view of education as instrumental—that is, education the ultimate test of which is ability to handle new situations.

An examination of present-day education in France, Italy, and England would reveal certain important differences resulting from peculiarities of national development and expressive of "national characteristics," but in all three there exist the similarities in educational philosophy indicated above. That is, in all three education is conceived as liberal, having as its chief function the preparation of men to occupy responsible positions in government and administration and in society at large; and in all three, separate provision is made for the vocational training of the great majority who are expected to go into trades or to take other subordinate positions in the industrial and commercial world.

This survey of the influences that have shaped modern European education is sufficient to show that it is a child of past culture. From the ancient civilizations it took its classical studies and its conception of the humanities; from the Middle Ages came the infusion of Christian religious influences that still color educational thought and practice. With the rise of democracy in the nineteenth century, education acquired its broad base, and the development of machine industry not only established a secure place for the natural sciences in educational institutions but gave to them a dominance in some respects analogous to that of theology in the Middle Ages. And, finally, political nationalism has infused the education of each country with certain characteristic features of its national life and history.

CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF EDUCATION THROUGH HISTORY

The development of education in Western civilization reveals two basic functions. First, education is a social agency in which the emphasis is laid upon the idea of the conservation of human culture generally and of the community or national aspects of the

culture in particular, and upon the idea of inculcating the community culture in the individual. The other function of education is to develop the individual as a person to the fullest extent of his powers. The two aims are related; the realization of the one contributes to the realization of the other up to a given point. But they may clash. In fact, one of the most persistent problems of education has been to reconcile the conflict between the larger social aim and the narrower individual aim in education.

The reaction to the problem has varied in different cultures. In primitive society the social aim held an exclusive place, that of inculcating the *mores* of the group. The Greeks exalted the individual and conceived education as the development of personality. The Romans conceived education in terms of the state. In the Middle Ages when the Church rose to supreme authority education was defined in terms of piety, faith, and otherworldliness. Classical learning was denatured or suppressed, and theology was largely made the content of education. After a thousand years of practice of Christian living man's outlook changed, especially so since the expected reward of the millennium did not materialize as had been expected. A combination of influences during the closing centuries of the Middle Ages turned man's attention again to the affairs of this world. Education was redefined in terms of social life, its interests, and needs. Modern society appears to value the well-being of the group more highly than the culture and achievement of the individual.

Directly and by implication the generalization was made that an institution is justified in its social setting. In primitive, classical, medieval, and modern life, it is noted that schools functioned effectively at the time of founding or origin. They continued to be effective agencies of social progress as long as they adjusted content and method to a changing civilization. In each instance of a civilized nation, it was noted that in their later history schools became rigidly institutionalized, that is, they existed for their own ends. Once overcome by inertia, they became static and sterile and were unable to readjust themselves to new social needs. They ceased to be a dynamic factor in the life of the nation. In some instances the schools continued in existence by reason of inertia until they were seized in a later age, readjusted by means of a revitalized curriculum and methods, and made to function again as an effective instrument of social progress. In the contemporary

world, characterized as it is by a multitude of rapid changes, the problem of adjusting education to social needs is, as we shall presently discover, an exceedingly difficult one.

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CHAPTER XXXV

CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN EDUCATION

WHEN it is remembered that the English colonies in America represented English civilization transplanted to new soil, it is not surprising to find that colonial education bore the imprint of English institutions. Where existing English models were adaptable to colonial ideas and aims, they were followed; where no suitable English models were available, the colonists struck out boldly along new educational paths. The earliest colonial universities—Harvard, Yale, William and Mary—were patterned after the old English universities; and when colonists rebelled in some quarters against the dominant position of theology in the colonial universities, they found their models for a more secular type of institution in the secondary schools set up by the dissenters in England. Thus came into existence the famous “academies,” which were to play a notable part in early American education. How American universities, beginning largely as copies of English institutions, developed into their present forms—so completely dissimilar from their English prototypes—forms an interesting chapter in the history of American education. That aspect of the subject we cannot pursue further. For present purposes our interest must be primarily limited to contemporary elementary and secondary education and its problems.

It is in these fields that a distinctly national character has been stamped upon American education, for here there was no suitable English pattern to follow. During the colonial period and the early years of the American republic, England had no national system of education. In fact, she did not establish a national system until 1870—and then in imperfect form. During the years in which America was formulating its national policy and laying the foundations for the American educational system, England was ruled by an aristocratic minority who had no conception of education as a function of the state and who would have opposed the democratic idea of education as a national calamity. Obviously England was not the place to look to for educational ideals and principles for a

people who had staked their fortunes on a belief in the worth of the common man and his right to participate in the work of shaping the course for the great adventure in democracy.

THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION

In its fundamentals, the American system of education can be understood only in the light of its historical background. So viewed, it is an objective outgrowth and an expression of the idea of democracy. During the American Revolution, independence and democracy were the centers around which the colonists rallied and the successful outcome of that Revolution paved the way for an experiment in democracy on a large national scale. The conservation and perpetuation of a democratic government obviously depended on an intelligent citizenry. The means for the realization of this objective was a system of education for the masses. The inception of the idea of universal education, however, runs back to a much earlier time than that of the American Revolution. As early as 1647 the democratic spirit of the Massachusetts Bay colony expressed itself in legislative enactments requiring that each community of fifty families or householders should establish an elementary school, and that each community of one hundred families or householders should provide a school capable of preparing pupils to enter the University (Harvard).

These enactments by the legislature of the Massachusetts Bay colony constitute a landmark in the history of American education. In the first place, they are unprecedented in history; they represent an absolutely new departure in educational theory and practice. Secondly, the goal set by the Massachusetts Bay colony became the goal of the American Union, for once the United States was established upon the democratic principle, universal education came to be regarded as the effective means of promoting morality and intelligence among the mass of the people, without which the great experiment in democracy could not hope to succeed. This conception of the proper solution of a fundamental problem of democracy has resulted in a public school system—free, tax-supported, state-controlled, and non-sectarian. America's faith in the saving power of universal education is traditional in our history.

If works are a measure of faith, the American people have furnished ample evidence of faith in their lavish outlay upon education

and in the vast educational structure they have built. Statistics taken from the United States government reports of the Office of Education present an amazing picture. In the period of about sixty years from 1870 to 1932, the total enrollment in public elementary and secondary schools increased from 6,871,522 to 27,560,000; enrollment in public high schools increased from 80,227 to 4,000,000; the average number of days attendance per year for the pupils enrolled increased from 78.4 days to 140.4 days; the average number of days the schools were in session increased from 132.2 days in 1870 to 172.7 days in 1930. Universities and colleges, public and private, enroll (1932) approximately 1,000,000. Private schools enroll an additional 2,500,000. These figures are augmented by an enrollment of 833,054 students in public evening elementary and secondary schools. Approximately 2,000,000 adults are enrolled in classes and correspondence courses. These pupils and students are instructed by approximately 1,000,000 teachers. In the United States, education is the major business and occupation of almost exactly one out of every four of the total population of the entire country. This marks the high tide of education in Western civilization.

Obviously mass education is being supported in most generous fashion by American democracy. The Office of Education reports (1932) the total value of all school property including endowments is \$9,302,048,000; total annual expenditures for public and private education, \$3,234,638,567; the average annual cost per elementary school pupil \$67.82; for each high school student, \$144.03; and for each college and university student, \$500.00 (estimated). The ideal of democracy has caused to be set up in the United States a school system which enrolls more pupils and students, taught by more teachers, in more expensive buildings more luxuriously equipped, and at greater cost per student, than ever before in the world's history.

How far do the results obtained in American education justify the enormous amount of energy and wealth that have gone to maintain it? In the analyzing of this question, we have no desire to belittle the nobility of aim behind the American effort or to depreciate the durable values that are inherent in some features of our educational system. At the same time it must be remembered that what has been said of the necessity of eternal vigilance if institutions are not to crystallize and lose their power of adaptation to changing

conditions, is as true of educational institutions as of any other. The position taken in this discussion is that along with much that is of unquestioned value and worthy of preservation in American education, there have grown up conditions and practices that are now devitalizing our educational work. It is some of these features that we wish to examine.

Some consequences of mass education.—The realization of the ideal of democracy involves at least three variable factors. The first variable is the concept of democracy. It is popularly supposed that the government of the United States, as framed in the Federal constitution, has not changed except by amendment since its adoption. The error of the supposition is easily demonstrated. The second variable lies in the nature of the individual member of a democratic society. The extension of Jefferson's dictum, "All men are created equal," into phases of human life which Jefferson probably never intended, has introduced confusion into thinking on education. Jefferson was speaking the language of a notable political theory and not the language of biology or psychology. All men are not created equal in capacity to receive an education. The third variable is a changing society. The founders of American democratic government could not foresee the evolution of an agricultural people into a complex industrial nation.

The American conception of democracy has led to the very laudable aim to carry education to the masses. With universal education as an aim we have no quarrel; what we are interested in is this: Has the democratic ideal led us to pursue unwise paths in the educating of the masses? Many educators believe that it has. They believe that our mass methods have given us a product that in many cases is more accurately described as "schooling" than as "education"; the result of those methods has been much schooling in the United States but little genuine education.

The nature of the individual to be educated determines the nature and the limits of the educative process. The individuals to be educated vary widely in native ability and in social and cultural backgrounds. The large masses to be educated have caused the schools—by reason of necessity and by reason of failure to distinguish clearly between the educative process and the industrial process—to adopt the methods of mass production in industry. In general, the schools take a variable group of children, expose them to a uniform body of content, and employ uniform methods in

teaching them. The results are too frequently unsatisfactory to society.

Our early adoption of the policy of compulsory education for the masses created a demand for certain educational resources. Obviously, to realize the best results of a compulsory system of education, it is necessary to have highly trained leadership and socially valid objectives. But trained leadership has been insufficient to administer the rapidly expanding school system. The outcome has been that administrators of American schools have devoted themselves to routine, clerical duties which have no educational value in themselves. The headmaster of an American school is too largely occupied with things that are merely a means and not an end. His time is devoted to budgets, buildings, equipment, supplies, classification and assignment of students, schedule making, discipline, credits, records, and reports. The list is not exhaustive. The masses to be taken care of have driven administrators to give attention to organization of a smooth-working machine. There is an irreconcilable conflict between administrative machinery of the American school system and genuine educational objectives. In resolving such a conflict, educational considerations usually give way to the requirements of administrative machinery.

Mass education with emphasis on mechanical, routine factors, combined with the absence of a sound philosophy of education and a valid program, has resulted in setting up false objectives. Some of these objectives are time-to-be-spent on a subject, ground-to-be-covered, passing marks, or credits. If a student has spent 120 clock hours or if he has read a prescribed number of pages in a book, or if by an average of high and low marks a passing mark is assigned, the student is given credit. By saving credit coupons until he has accumulated fifteen or sixteen, the high-school student is given a certificate or diploma testifying that the holder has achieved a high-school education. The same procedure is not unknown on the next or college level of the American school system.

Mass education and school organization.—Mass education has affected other important phases of American education. Democracy demands that there shall be equality of opportunity for school attendance. The door to the next higher level shall always be open to all. Hence American education is organized on successive levels. Each stage prepares for admission to the stage next higher. This is in contrast to the European practice of organizing schools

on parallel lines, each continuing over a long period. The short-term institution in the United States can offer only a short-term curriculum, which all too frequently lacks articulation with either preceding or succeeding curricula. In the past twenty years two new institutions have been established, namely, a three-year Junior High School and a two-year Junior College.

The reorganization of the educational system of the United States during the last two decades has resulted in the following set-up which is generally accepted in theory and practice:

Pre-school or Nursery	1—2 yrs.		
Kindergarten	1—2 yrs.		
Elementary school	6 yrs.	Compulsory	
Junior High School	3	"	"
Senior " "	3	"	" (in part)
Junior College } Liberal Arts	2	"	
Senior College }	2	"	
or			
Liberal Arts College	4	"	

Compulsory attendance laws require the mass of American children to attend the common elementary school through the sixth grade. Differentiation in curriculum or grouping of children for instructional purposes is often difficult or impossible. Unselected masses require a peculiar type of curriculum. To satisfy the needs of the mass it must be broad and shallow; broad to adjust it to the diverse interests (or lack of interest) of the masses, and shallow to adjust it to level of ability of the less capable. Subject matter is of necessity elementary in character, and is organized and presented to meet the needs of the average group. The heterogeneity of the student body of secondary and higher institutions of learning has made the selection of curricular materials likewise a matter of compromise. The compromise has not produced a high average type of education.

An evaluation of mass education reveals advantages and disadvantages. It has raised the level of schooling to a height never before attained in Western civilization. It has given dignity, confidence, and poise to lower groups, and a degree of drive, optimism, and satisfaction not found elsewhere. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the effect of mass education is leveling; it results in mediocrity. For in mass education superior ability and original and creative genius frequently find inadequate challenge and incen-

to work to capacity. The potentialities capable of being released are incalculable; their release is indispensable to a realization of the greatest social and cultural progress: consequently, if superior individuals are undertrained, there is a resultant tremendous waste of society. Cultural progress is retarded. Adequate provision for the education of these superior individuals is one of the most important problems in American education.

UTILITARIAN VERSUS CULTURAL EDUCATION

Utility as a criterion of education.—Education may be evaluated by the criterion of culture or of utility. The latter is usually interpreted in terms of money value or returns in form of goods. Beginning with secondary education there is an insistent demand on the part of patrons and students to know the use of a subject study. The inquirer means: Will this study or subject help me get a better job at a higher wage or salary than I could get without it? Teachers are hard put to it to give an answer that carries weight and conviction in terms other than money or bread-and-butter value. Economic well-being is a legitimate objective, but it is a means and not an end. Utility is practical, immediate, objective, easily judged; hence, it is not difficult to set up utility as the goal or objective of education.

As evidence of this tendency is cited the advance of enrollment in commercial subjects in high school from sixth place in 1922 to fifth place in 1928. Foreign language exchanged places with commercial subjects in the same period. The extent to which colleges of liberal arts have acceded to the demands of the utilitarian and professional cannot be definitely measured. The frequent mention of pre-legal, pre-medical, pre-engineering, and various combination curricula leads to a strong suspicion that the older liberal education has turned liberal, that is, utilitarian and professional. Utilitarian education prepares for performing the work of the world. It consists of training in techniques and acquiring skills to be used in performance. This education is for doing. Utilitarian education is indispensable to society, but it does not meet society's whole demand.

Culture as a criterion of education.—The ideal of culture in education stands in rather sharp opposition to the ideal of utility. In earlier times culture was conceived as the mastery of a definite body of knowledge. This knowledge was comprised of what past

time had selected as of highest worth, which came to be regarded as consisting of classical literature. One who did not know the classics was not cultured in the original sense of the term. Training in other fields was utilitarian or technical, or professional, hence of lesser value than education in the classics. Contemporary society no longer accepts the old definition. The concept of culture must be redefined and reconciled with present-day life. An eminent scholar reconciles the conflict between the two ideals by defining culture in terms of attitude of mind instead of subject matter. Culture is a personal, subjective quality. The individual who is sympathetic, tolerant, just, and sensitive to higher values is truly cultured, according to this view. An attempt to test this definition by application to definite persons is likely to be unconvincing.

Cultural education cannot be defined in terms of mastery of a definite body of subject matter or in terms of attitudes and sympathies. It must be defined in terms of modern life. The idea is more or less elusive. An attempt at explanation rather than definition will be made. Culture is a matter of insight, of seeing truth clearly. Culture is background. It is seeing relations, causes and effects as opposed to seeing things or facts. Culture is a possession of clear conceptions of the highest values of life. Culture is the spirit of inquiry and the understanding of the problems and values of the modern age. Cultural education produces leadership—moral, social, civic, religious. Such leadership is the result of clear vision and wisdom. Cultural education enables one to comprehend and synthesize; adjusted to modern, urban, industrial society it will produce the moral and spiritual leadership necessary for continuing further progress.

In American education both the cultural and the utilitarian types are recognized. We have secondary schools devoted almost exclusively to cultural aims, and in many of them the standards are high. We also have secondary schools essentially utilitarian in aim and curricula. What then is there to be concerned about? The first matter for concern is alluded to above. It is that commercialism—the desire for material rewards—has so deeply invaded our educational institutions that there is great danger of submerging the spirit and essence of cultural education even while we are doing it outward lip service. The second matter for concern is that, generally speaking, there is no established conviction or appreciation of the need of discriminating between cultural and utilitarian education.

on as an adequate foundation for a satisfactory grade of university work. The result is that many of our universities are invaded by students whose preparation is unsuitable for university education. Here is our reason for the complaint that freshman college work must be done on a level little advanced above secondary-school grade.

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL NEEDS

So far, consideration has centered largely on the human product resulting from the educational process and the bearing which conceptions and types of education have in determining the character of the product. Related to this matter is the problem of adjusting educational institutions to social needs. Educational institutions, like others, are the instruments or agencies of society in conserving its own well-being and promoting its progress. Such institutions are the creation of society. It would be irrational for society to foster and support an institution which would destroy society itself. Schools have the responsibility of conserving society, but the conserving of society may involve aid to society in reconstructing itself. Schools are not justified in evading all controversial issues. Problems of government, of economics, of industry, of morals, of civics, must be solved. Schools must educate the members of society so that they may be intelligent concerning those problems. Nothing less than this will satisfy society. Schools must share the blame for any shortcomings in the performance of their function.

Excellent examples of the adjustment of educational institutions to social needs are found in various countries of Europe. There the schools are in some cases reconstructing society for life under a new form of government. The experiments are apparently meeting with success. The world's greatest experiment in educational adjustment is found in the U. S. S. R. (Russia). A country with 18,500,000 inhabitants, speaking a variety of languages and spread over 8,144,228 square miles of territory, is redirecting and reconstructing the social life of the people through education. Attendance at school increased from 4,000,000 in 1923 to 22,000,000 in 1930. Beginning with 1931, attendance became compulsory. Up to the present it must be admitted that Russian achievement is impressive, however violently one may disagree with the social, economic, and political philosophy underlying the experiment. Another example of educational institutions meeting the needs of

society (as determined by authority) is found in Italy under Gentile reforms.

Education and the state.—The problem of adjusting education to social demands involves the question of the relation of governmental or other outside authority to the schools. If the duty of education to conserve society is interpreted to mean the preservation of the *status quo* with all the vested interests of powerful or privileged groups, that is one thing. But if society is recognized as a dynamic organism, subject to changes of far-reaching character which are constantly producing maladjustments and serious social problems, then the question takes on quite a different meaning. A recent publication sets up the thesis "that education should be considered as a long-term investment by the state that it may perpetuate itself and promote its own interests." The state is interested in having a high type of citizenship. Crime must be decreased; poverty must be reduced and eliminated if possible; disease must be conquered. In the final analysis, education is the most effective means for achieving these things, and the state looks to the schools to give the education.

Another question is the extent to which the state may dictate what shall or shall not be taught in the schools. The state is justified in prohibiting schools from teaching political theories and doctrines which aim at revolution or the overthrow of the government by violence. The state is not justified in prohibiting teaching which aims only at change in government by peaceful means, as by ballot. Neither is the state justified in legislating on matters that affect the beliefs of people only. Reference is to recent legislation in certain states on the teaching of the doctrine of evolution. "The perpetuity of government is in no way affected by the belief of the people on such a matter as biological evolution." The state has a number of obligations to the schools. It must give them adequate financial support. It must protect them from partisan and political interference. It must prevent any one from trying "to grab the schools for the sake of grabbing society."

The relations of educational institutions and government are reciprocal. The state owes the institutions adequate financial support and must provide satisfactory working conditions, such as protection from political interference and noninterference in matters which should be left to the control of the institution. The schools owe the state reasonable and adequate returns on the investment.

the state. Returns are in the forms of citizenship and leadership able of carrying on for the welfare of the state and society. To these ends the schools should be protected in the necessary freedom to accomplish their social purpose.

OBSTACLES TO EDUCATION AS A QUICKENING FORCE IN SOCIETY

Is education as it exists today in the United States fitted to meet the needs of a rapidly changing society? Conservatism is one of the concomitants of age. Fixity and loss of flexibility are characteristics of maturity, whether in plant, or animal, or man. Institutions, customs, habits, and practices tend to become fixed. Human thought tends to become fixed and run in a channel or rut. The human mind ever seeks a place in which to light and be at rest. One of America's leading philosophers has proposed the thesis that thinking only occurs when the mind arrives at a fork in the road and must make a choice. Another philosopher worked out a stimulating lecture entitled "The Trap," based on the biological fact that the living cell sooner or later loses its power of growth and adjustment and becomes incapable of change. It is caught in the trap. The human mind is subject to the same law. Sooner or later man is caught in the trap. In thought and action man becomes conservative, unable and unwilling to change. Institutions are subject to the same laws.

The danger of educational crystallization.—Medieval schools worked out a content for education, clothed it in the garb of classical language, and conserved education practically unchanged for a thousand years. In the United States, secondary education was organized to establish a new type of school at intervals of approximately a century to institute a reform in education at the secondary-school level; the American academy, the public high school, and the organized high school, each was the result of a reaction against the content and method of the type of school it supplanted. And the present-day large high schools in the United States are for the most part stable, conservative institutions. A wide survey made by a prominent educator shows that eighty-four per cent of the teachers and ninety-three per cent of the principals feel that throughout the whole the curricula of their high schools are adjusted to the needs of the community. The same investigation shows that a large majority of teachers and principals report that the academic

curriculum dominates in the high schools. This curriculum survives largely on account of its traditional, social prestige. Conservatism is responsible for the retention in elementary, secondary, and high schools of much curricular content of little or no value in modern society. This conservatism of a group of educators was strikingly demonstrated at a national convention in a symposium on the junior-high-school curriculum. Most of the speakers assumed the rôle of propagandists for their subjects. The arguments were those that had been used for decades in justifying the teaching of those subjects. In only a few instances did the speakers show constructive, progressive thinking in curriculum building. It is to the dominating influence of conservatism in secondary education in the United States that we may attribute the slow progress in reforming the curriculum in the high schools. A careful student of secondary education says, "The scientific reconstruction of the secondary school program of studies in the light of a sound social and educational philosophy has not even been attempted."

Educational changes looking to a real adjustment to present-day demands come all too slowly. It is a reflection on educational institutions that reforms are forced from the outside. Due to inertia of teachers, vested interests, and other causes, schools appear to be incapable of reforming themselves. Transforming school systems and individual institutions into dynamic instruments for the reconstruction of society has frequently been the work of laymen. In some instances the reform has been the work of a great leader who was able to break with tradition and escape from the hampering influence of conservatism. Once reform has been effected by capable leaders, whether individual or group, lay or professional, educational institutions become most important agencies for progress. Widespread movements of reform in the colleges of the United States at the present time give promise of a new day in education. Colleges may become real centers of increased activity for the preparation of leaders capable of grappling intelligently with the problems of a changing world.

Encroachments on academic freedom.—Encroachments upon academic freedom may also become a menace to effective education. Theoretically, teachers in educational institutions enjoy the privilege of academic freedom. Practically, it may be a privilege which instructors enjoy more in the abstract than in the concrete. There is a strong pressure on teachers to conform in thought and teaching

academic freedom is especially a problem in the fields of science, economics, and American history. In the field of science a wave of opposition having its source in the sections of the country where fundamentalism is most strongly entrenched, resulted in laws prohibiting the teaching of the doctrine of biological evolution. The law is obeyed in form but not in spirit. Outwardly teachers in the schools of those states conform and have surrendered one of the most important prerogatives of the teacher, namely, to teach truth as the teacher conceives or believes it. Also in the field of American history the public-school teacher is unquestionably restricted in his academic freedom in writing and speech.

In the fields of economics and sociology there is grave danger of defending vested interests, or capital, or labor organizations, or some other special group. It is not a matter of overt interference with academic freedom. The evil lies in the fact that the penalty for offense to vested interests or special groups may be imposed in various subtle ways. Controversial subjects are carefully avoided, and the teaching becomes a mere presentation of commonplaces and attitudes which are colorless and innocuous. Such teaching is fruitless. The problem is one of supreme importance. Academic freedom must be conserved. It is the only guarantee of a vigorous, dynamic intellectual life. The moral and spiritual leadership mentioned above can be developed only through a free, aggressive activity in the search for and the spread of truth.

Propaganda in the schools.—Propaganda in educational institutions is frequently another obstacle to vital education. Propaganda is a human tendency. There is always an eagerness to impose one's cherished beliefs on one's fellowman. The younger generation is the fertile field for attack. All too frequently the objective of teaching is an indoctrination of youth in the habits of thought held by those in control of the schools. Particular names matter not. It may be state or church, or political party, or special group. If the objective of teaching be youth and his adjustment to the world, it is education. If on the other hand the objective be partial truth or indoctrination of a static world view or plan, the matter is nearly if not wholly in the realm of propaganda. It must be admitted the line is hard to draw.

Educational institutions are exposed to some grave dangers. It must be noted that the schools of the United States are the only institutions which have a perfect and complete organization that

touches directly more homes than any other kind of institution. Propagandists turn to the schools as the most fruitful agency for furthering their special, selfish interests. Groups and special interests exert tremendous pressure on school boards for the privilege of entering the schools to present pet schemes or hobbies. The entrance of propaganda is sometimes attempted through legislation. In too many instances the movement is successful. Elementary schools have suffered greatly in this respect. Legislation has been passed prescribing special days or making time allotments for programs and the teaching of certain things a stated number of minutes per week, or month. The special days and special subjects have encroached on the time of the regular schedule to such an extent as to interfere seriously with the older valuable work of the curriculum. In most instances the material offered by the propagandist is either valueless, or it could be taught equally well or more effectively in connection with the regular curriculum.

Another type of propaganda is the distribution of publicity materials of various sorts in the public schools. The commercial aspect is excellent; the materials are free. The psychology of the situation is subtle and effective. The children absorb the idea or point of view merely through exposure. The plan is effective in achieving the objective of the propagandist. In the high school and college propaganda is sometimes introduced by powerful and influential business interests. Bequests, endowments, and donations frequently carry with them the condition of presenting a prescribed theory of economics, social theory, etc. A particularly vicious type of propaganda is the subsidizing of teachers to do research work and present the findings as the results of pure and independent research without disclosing the connection of the researcher with the interests employing him. The seriousness of the problem of propaganda is indicated by the fact that at a recent meeting of the American Association of University Professors there was adopted a regulation prohibiting any member of the association from accepting from private corporations or interests any honorarium for work done without making public his connections with the corporation or interests.

THE IDEAL PRODUCT OF THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS

It will not be possible to give a perfect description of the ideal product of the educational process. The difficulty arises from the

that the ideal product represents a perfect adjustment of the individual to a changing society. It would be difficult indeed to predict relations which these two factors will bear to each other even a decade or two hence. The ideal product of the educational process will be an individual capable of contributing his share in solving in whole or in part the problems which go to the very roots of social life. The ideal education will produce original, resourceful, creative minds. It will give the world a high type of moral and spiritual leadership, either individual or composite. This new moral and spiritual leadership will probably bring about an accelerated advance of Western civilization.

The dissatisfaction with the results of technology gives support to the opinion that the ideal education of the future will partake more of the nature of liberal, cultural education. It will be the education that produces the creative mind, a mind that is able to comprehend relations, causes, and effects, and to interpret and evaluate them. Professional and technical training will be carried out at a higher level even than at present. Emphasis, however, will probably be on cultural or general education. The depersonalizing effect of modern tendencies will be checked. Contemporary education is controlled all too much by big, impersonal corporations. From impersonal corporations, in the last analysis, emanate the forces which mold business, industry, education, and civic and social life. Because corporations are impersonal, they are likely to lack the qualities we call human. They are likely to be devoid of deep human insight and human sympathy in social relations. Hence they tend to dehumanize what they touch and influence. The education of the future will restore the human element. Science, industry, business, education will be humanized. Human relations will be improved through a better understanding of human life in all its complexity. Education must assume the responsibility for the advance in civilization.

Should the American education of the future take on the characteristics outlined above, it will still conserve the inspiring ideal of universal education, first enunciated by the Massachusetts Bay colony nearly three hundred years ago. But we shall interpret the democratic ideal with a more realistic appreciation of the fact that in a complex civilization like ours, with its rapid changes and its multiplicity of complicated problems, we must fit the service which we require of the individual citizen to his capacity and natural gifts;

and that his capacity and natural gifts must be developed to the uttermost by an educational discipline specially fitted to him and the group to which he belongs. Only by such discriminating fitting of the youth to the kind of educational process which his individual powers demand, can we hope to produce a high order of ability along the numerous lines required by the many-sided civilization in which we live.

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PART VIII

THE DESCENT OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

- XXXVI. The Nature and Development of Religion
XXXVII. Christianity before Modern Times
XXXVIII. Christianity in Modern Society
ROBERT SHAFER

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

WE ARE not consulted about our birth. We do not choose our parents, or their position in life, or their place of residence, or the state of their health, or the kind of society of which they make us members. We have to take these things as we find them; we have to take life as we find it, and try to make the best of it. We cannot alter our height, or the color of our eyes, or the extent of our intelligence; we cannot live without food and shelter; we may die tomorrow, or fifty years from tomorrow, but we cannot know when, nor can we prolong life beyond a brief span, nor is it entirely within our power to prolong it beyond the present moment. We find the world indifferent to our concerns, if not radically unjust. A wise Frenchman has written: "The things we most desire never happen, if they happen, it is neither at the time nor under the circumstances when they would have given most pleasure." We want the world's prizes; those who get them want something else. We cannot command the enduring gratitude of men, or preëminent success, or perfect happiness. These are gifts, bestowed upon a few, for reasons often beyond our understanding.

We are, in short, though capable of doing much for ourselves, never capable of doing enough. For we are "cribbed, cabined, and confined" within a round of existence which we did not plan, which we would not choose, and which we cannot alter. We are prisoners—some of us blind prisoners, unable even to see the bars; we are creatures, not creators, save of trifles; we are, thought Shakespeare, "such stuff as dreams are made on." Man is, thought a Greek poet, less than that—he is "but a dream of a shadow." Yet perhaps no writers have done more than Shakespeare and Pindar to bring home to us the high worth and dignity which human life may have, even under tragic conditions, and the grandeur of man "when the sun shines upon him." "Man is but a reed, weakest in nature," wrote Pascal, "but a reed which thinks. It needs not that the whole universe should arm to crush him. A vapor, a drop of water,

is enough to kill him. But were the Universe to crush him, man would still be more noble than that which has slain him, because he knows that he dies, and that the Universe has the better of him. The Universe knows nothing of this."

The paradoxical union of opposites thus illustrated by Pascal—greatness and littleness somehow joined within man's nature—is the ultimate yet familiar mystery from which religion springs. And religion endures through all vicissitudes, all changes, in human society, because no changes, no developments of culture, no advances in knowledge, no increasing complexities of life, alter this fundamental paradox which constitutes human nature as we know it in history and in experience.

WHAT IS RELIGION?

In an earlier chapter of this work¹ it is said that there are "hundreds of so-called 'primitive' religions, and thousands of variations among the major religions themselves." The fact has been a source of trouble not only to many religious people, but to students. As early as the first half of the seventeenth century, Lord Herbert of Cherbury in effect inaugurated the comparative study of religions when he suggested that there were certain notions or beliefs present as identical elements in all religions. He was confident that he had discovered what these notions were, and drew the logical conclusion that there was one true religion, everywhere the same, which had been overlaid or corrupted at different times and in different places by varying interpretations, usages, and unessential added features. It was soon shown that Lord Herbert was mistaken in thinking he had discovered the universal religion of mankind; but the effort to discover it continued, flourishing especially during the later years of the nineteenth century, and resulting in a number of definitions for which universal validity has been claimed.

The method followed has been, of necessity, that suggested by Lord Herbert's premature generalization. Religions early and late, simple and complex, lower and higher, have been compared with each other, and elements not common to all of them have been discarded, until some belief, or usage, or attitude has been found which forms a part of every known religion. It is a process of squeezing, or of scaling down religions to their lowest common

¹See p. 55.

nominator. The outcome may be illustrated by several examples. The great anthropologist, E. B. Tylor, concluded that religion is "the belief in spiritual beings." Marie-Jean Guyau has defined it as "a universal sociomorphism. The religious sense is the sense of dependence in relation to wills which primitive man places in the universe." M. Salomon Reinach presents religion as "a sum of scruples which impede the free exercise of our faculties." M. Émile Durkheim defines it thus: "The phenomena which we call religious are those which consist in obligatory beliefs connected with definite practices relating to objects given in these beliefs." Professor Robert H. Lowie defines it as "a universal feature of human culture, not because all societies foster a belief in spirits, but because all recognize in some form or other awe-inspiring, extraordinary manifestations of reality."

These, we must remember, are *minimum* definitions. They do not profess to be adequate for any single given religion; yet whether they serve any useful purpose, beyond demonstrating conclusively the extreme difficulty of finding an element common to all religions, is open to question. Moreover, M. Reinach's definition is illustrative of a whole group which might be cited, requiring on the part of the reader the knowledge which those definitions are supposed to give; for this famous definition cannot refer to all scruples, but only to a particular kind—to specifically *religious* scruples. And this of course means that practically M. Reinach contents himself with saying, "Religion is religion." The definition given in the *New English Dictionary* is as follows: "Recognition on the part of man of some higher unseen power as having control of his destiny, and as being entitled to obedience, reverence, and worship; the general mental and moral attitude resulting from this belief, with reference to its effect upon the individual or the community; personal or general acceptance of this feeling as a standard of spiritual and practical life." This, though it is very guarded, is not circular, and it sheds more light on the subject than any of the definitions given above. Nevertheless, it could not be accepted by students of comparative religion, because it can hardly be stretched to cover all the known kinds.

There is a reason for this special difficulty—not encountered to the same extent in the study of the other institutions of society—namely, that we cannot understand either the diversity of religions, or the force behind them, or the place they fill in the social structure, until

we turn to consider their origin and the way in which they can be said to have developed.

RELIGIOUS ORIGINS

Man a creature of infinite wants.—We may best understand the starting-point and fundamental nature of religion by considering certain basic facts about ourselves. As has already been said, we do not make ourselves or the world in which we live. But we are not simply the creatures of heredity and environment. We can think and act. We are sources of *power*, and can to some extent deliberately direct our expenditure of power. We have, moreover, like other animals, certain elemental desires or impulses—the impulse to self-preservation, the impulse to propagate our kind. And as a general rule we are not satisfied merely with self-preservation. We want something better than bare existence, and direct our energies to the improvement of our lives in so far as we can think of appropriate and practicable means or, in other words, channels for the expenditure of available power. We can thus to some extent remake both ourselves and our environment, in accordance with our judgment as to what is “better.” Our elemental impulses, furthermore, are capable of an indefinite expansion by subdivision, refinement, and even transmutation.

We require, for example, food in order to live; but who is content with simply anything that is edible and sustaining? Volumes could be written upon the development of this demand of our nature, as fortunes are spent in satisfying it in accordance with cultivated taste. Again, who is content with just anybody—the nearest male or female—in relations which have their basis in sex? Cats seem to be thus content, as well as certain other mammals and perhaps all animals of relatively very simple structure. But between these animals and ourselves there is a gulf, formed by a process of progressive refinement, and so deep and wide that no human being can cross it, even if in certain moments some of us fancy we wish to. Moreover, to return to self-preservation, the value which may come to be set upon the “self” may be such that, for any one of a considerable number of reasons, we may decide to risk or even to forfeit our lives rather than subject the “self” to indignity. Thousands of men and women have thus died for convictions which they have held to be more precious than their own individual existence, and perhaps

is many more because it seemed intolerably shameful to admit to their fellows that they did not have qualities or convictions thought to be essential in "good" citizens.

Thus has the impulse to propagation been developed and refined, and the impulse to self-preservation been not only developed and refined, but transmuted. It is useless to dogmatize concerning the limits of this process. There are limits, however, beyond which change is not development, but merely change—which, of course, is valued by some kinds of people for its own sake. Many seem to imagine that the simple multiplication of man's needs, and of the means to satisfy them somehow or other, is a new kind of evolutionary progress. To what extent this multiplication may properly be termed a "progress" we need not decide; as regards man himself, however, it seems to be now an accepted fact that his physical and mental characteristics have not *essentially* changed during probably the last 30,000 years. And it is equally well established that whenever a stationary point is reached in the evolution of organisms, that point is also a limit, beyond which no further development is possible. It remains a fact, too, that the fundamental conditions of life, such as those mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, do not change. In particular, whatever men may attempt, whatever they may accomplish, all are swallowed up in death by the system of things, after a brief period of existence. And during life men are never at ease. Impelled continually to aim at something "better," which is often partially but never fully attained, men find life a continuous struggle, or series of struggles, because forces both within and without them oppose change and resist the effort to obtain mastery over them for human purposes.

Religion a means of satisfying human wants.—Consequently whatever knowledge of the system of things men secure, through hard experience, is of inestimable value to them. It is something to be treasured up; it is a rock of safety in a marshy land, an oasis in a desert, a guiding star shining above the wide ocean; it must be reserved at all costs and passed on to the next generation. Such knowledge we call by the general names, science and philosophy. It is the fruit of experience. But experience is not all of one kind. It may be gained by deliberate and planned experimentation; it may be gained casually, by unplanned trial and error; or it may *crystallize*, as it were, in a sudden, inexplicable flash of illumination. This mysterious crystallization is by no means uncommon. It has

occurred in every age of which we know anything, though it takes many differing forms, and varies greatly, from one instance to another, in suddenness, intensity, and what may be called availability—or the ease with which it may be translated into intelligible speech. It is, of course, difficult to describe. Plato has told how Socrates, in the midst of his effort to learn whether or not he was really wiser than other men, was baffled by the poets. Their words might be wisdom, but they themselves seemed to know less than their auditors what they meant, and could not explain whence their wisdom came nor how. They were, as we evasively say, “inspired.” But the thing we most definitely know about “inspiration” is that the more deliberately it is sought, the less likely is it to be found. Again, as we know from many accounts, men have often been in the utmost difficulty when confronted by a genuine problem—and a genuine problem is always an unexpected, surprising problem—and they have been driven to their wits’ end until finally, without apparent progress of any kind having been made towards the solution, they have been overtaken by the sleep of sheer exhaustion;—whereupon awaking, they have seen before them, clear, unmistakable and complete, precisely the answer they had so vainly sought. Psychologists offer explanations of this phenomenon, but only through lame analogies whose pertinence is dubious. It is best to say honestly that it is something beyond the range of our ordinary views.

Crystallization, as we may continue to call it, could be variously and almost endlessly illustrated, but the two examples just presented should suffice to show the kind of thing it is. And from it springs religion. The knowledge which is thus communicated or revealed to man forms a part of his science and philosophy, but this knowledge is often set apart, because it is believed to be peculiarly precious—crucial to human welfare—and because it is believed to come directly from a supernatural source, and to demonstrate the existence of a favorable relationship between man and the supernatural powers, or power, or force, or whatever is supernatural. When this occurs, it seems as important to preserve the relationship as the knowledge communicated, and to both ends appropriate action is required of man, in addition to the course of action required by new knowledge. The consequence is what we can recognize as religion. Definite beliefs, considered to be true beyond doubt, are essential to it, but do not of themselves constitute it. Beliefs origi-

ating in extraordinary experience must flow out into an appropriate way of life—and when they do so we are in the presence of religion.

Diversities in religions.—We have been trying, it must be remembered, to discover the starting-point of religion, and to get some light on its fundamental nature. The account just given is necessarily abstract. We may now notice, however, that it leaves room for all the diversities which have been observed in the religions of the world, past and present. And it should, in addition, help us to understand these diversities. For if religious belief has its basis in man's experience, it evidently must take forms suggested by that experience. We can, in general, understand something only in so far as we can relate it to what we already know. The same statement made to a child of ten, to a youth of fifteen, and to a man of thirty, is likely to be understood in a different way by each—and in a still different way if made to a person just beginning to learn our language. The same statement made to an American farmer, to an Eskimo, to a Peruvian Indian, and to a London banker, is likely to be understood in a different way by each. The mere fact that a message comes, or is believed to come, from a supernatural realm is itself of considerable importance, as will presently be explained. But there is always the question—a very practical and persistent question—how it is to be understood. And it will be understood, it *can* be understood, only in terms of the experience, the ways of life, the conscious needs, the values, of the people who receive it. Hence, from the very nature of the case, there are bound to be as many religions, and as many varying religious usages, as there are different peoples, living under differing conditions, and at different stages of development, in the several portions of the earth. As soon as we begin really to think about the matter, it is impossible to imagine how it could be otherwise. It is a fact having the same significance—no more, no less—as the similar variations to be found in the sphere of education, and in that of “science and philosophy.”

RELIGION AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Has religion lost its vitality?—Looked at externally, in the light of what has just been said, religion sometimes seems to be no more than an instrument—of high efficacy under some conditions—for preserving and transmitting cultures and for holding communities

together. In highly developed and complex societies, moreover, many of the offices performed under simpler conditions of life by religion are separated off and taken over by other institutions—by the secular state, for example, and by educational agencies, and organizations for scientific investigation. In these circumstances it is sometimes felt by “emancipated” people that religion serves no useful purpose, but is merely a species of delusion somehow set on foot and maintained for their own profit by priests—who are alleged to be really charlatans.

Both the view that religion is merely a useful servant of the state and the view that it is a delusion fostered by priests for their profit are very ancient, and are sporadically recurrent. Both may furthermore, at particular times be true of particular religions. It is always possible that an educational institution, or even an educational system, may fall into the hands of quacks and charlatans and may be maintained—no longer for the sake of education, which is a hard discipline—but with a view solely to the profit either of individuals or of the teaching guild as a whole. It is equally possible, also, that an educational institution or system may be perverted by interested people to the service of propaganda. And just so may religions at times suffer either of these misfortunes. But we learn nothing about education—though we may learn something about educational administration—by studying its perversions; we know, or ought to know, that every institution entrusted to man is like man himself, open to perversion, degeneracy, and disease, and in the case of religion we should not imagine—any more than we do in the case of man or of other institutions—that we can learn its true nature and office from studying only part of the evidence and in particular only the part showing that religions may become perverted, degenerate, or outworn. Undoubtedly some have considered this legitimate because religions lay claim to supernatural sanction; but, equally whether this claim be allowed or not, it remains a fact that religious institutions—exactly like all other institutions—are perforce in the hands of men, and are, consequently exposed to every kind of danger.

We need pay no further attention to the charge that religion being really a mischievous delusion fostered by priests for their own profit, is simply a burden to society. This charge was revived in the eighteenth century and was then widely credited. In our own time it has again been revived, in somewhat different form. W

now hear it said that religion is only a tool of capitalism, maintained to keep the "wage-slaves" contented with their lot. But this is a piece of sheer demagogism, credible only to very ignorant and prejudiced people. No qualified student of religion today gives the slightest support to this charge in either of its forms.

The enduring values of religion.—On the contrary, such students recognize that religion can perform, and has performed, services of incalculable value to society; and for this reason it is necessary that we should clearly understand the autonomous character of religion. It is a fact, which has already been admitted, that society, or the state, can on occasion capture religion and use it for what we now call secular purposes; but what we must understand is that this is a perversion of religion which normally ends in killing it for the time being. The well-meaning people who hope thus to transform society end by transforming religion instead; and they so thoroughly discredit it in the course of their endeavors that it can finally perform no useful service of any kind.

Why should this be so? At bottom the reason is exceedingly simple and equally conclusive. Religion, as we have seen, has its starting point in some form of communication to man which is regarded as a species of divine revelation. It takes its rise, then, from an extraordinary experience which is believed to prove that man is in direct contact with superior powers able to affect his life favorably or unfavorably. This is a minimum statement. In the more developed religions it is explicitly held that man is in communication with, and is capable of becoming one with, ultimate Reality, and that the means necessary to salvation, as this union is termed, have been made known to him. Obviously, if this be so, religion is something fundamental, meriting man's primary allegiance. Everything else must be secondary to this. And consequently religion cannot, without perversion and degeneracy, be made to serve the state or society. It serves something infinitely more important; and it commands a devotion which statesmen envy, and vainly attempt to secure, solely because it represents something ultimate and absolute.

Yet, as has been said, religion performs services of incalculable value to society. But such services are secondary and of the nature of by-products. In general, as we have noticed, man's life is an unceasing struggle, terminated only by death, and usually involving many lesser defeats along the way to this inevitable end. And it is

primarily religion which has fostered in men those qualities of character without which it is inconceivable that they should have continued undauntedly to face through the centuries those constant trials, hardships, and defeats imposed on them by the unalterable conditions of existence; and that they should, moreover, have so largely triumphed in those spheres of action within which it has proved possible for them to remake themselves and their environment. It is primarily religion which has given men courage, born of the conviction that higher powers are with them, supporting and aiding them. It is primarily religion which has given men faith that, despite all appearances, life is important, significant and worth all it costs to carry it off well. It is primarily religion which has kept men modest in prosperity; which has curbed their insolence and brutality; which has fostered not only the early but the greatest developments of architecture, the fine arts, and literature; and which has tenaciously conserved past experience, without which man's existence would remain a wretched hand-to-mouth affair.

These are great things. It has a paradoxical appearance, but it is undeniable that religion has been equally constructive and conservative. Perhaps it is only possible to be splendidly constructive upon a basis of conservatism. At any rate, it is to be noted that the constructive activity fostered by religion relates to what may be called the development of man's *humanity*; it does not relate to the development of the exact sciences which deal with the physical world and with man's animal nature. Real or supposed knowledge of this kind religion accepts, preserves—often until long after it has been discredited—and *uses*. But it has not fostered progress in this direction. It is, as not a few students have insisted, thoroughly *practical*, concerned as to how a man applies or uses knowledge, but relatively indifferent to that knowledge itself. And though this is only a half-truth, it is important. For it aids us to see that while religion, when unperverted, does serve fundamental interests of society, it serves these only to the extent that the interests of religion and of society happen to be identical. We have not the slightest notion how society might have developed without religion. There is no instance of such a development known to history or anthropology. It is reasonable to conclude that religion has been essential in the process. Yet religion does what society needs, not for the sake of society, but for its own sake. It has its own ends, its own

purposes, and works for them. It has its own character; it is autonomous. It is only as it were by accident that it performs essential services to society, and those services it cannot perform when society succeeds in making religion its servant or slave.

PRIMITIVE RELIGION

The limitations of our knowledge.—When we turn from a general consideration of the character of religion to its history, we are first confronted with a question to which there is no answer. Nobody knows when the first religion arose, or where, or how. It has been mentioned, however, earlier in this work¹ that Neanderthal man apparently had some definitely religious belief, and it is reasonable to suppose that the earliest human societies were organized only on a basis afforded by religion. But, beyond this, nothing can be said, and we cannot even discuss with much certainty the religions of so-called "primitive" peoples. Evidence afforded by archaeology is, in this connection, of little value, because of the difficulty of interpreting it; and, of course, no "primitive" peoples are now in existence. Groups with relatively simple culture, such as those living in central Australia, may or may not be similar to "primitive" peoples—and there is no way of knowing. It is certain, however, that such tribes or communities have as long a past as our own, that their condition has not been absolutely static throughout an untold number of centuries, and that there is far less difference, in fundamental characteristics, between such groups and the most highly civilized peoples than was formerly supposed. It seems practically certain, moreover, that some savage groups are now preserving and transmitting only the decayed and tattered remnants of a culture and religion at one time more vigorous, positive, and complex.

Nowadays, of course, not because it is really "scientific," but because it is the easiest thing to do, we try to arrange every collection of varying phenomena in an order of succession patterned in accordance with the hypothesis of organic evolution. That hypothesis is now everywhere accepted, as Henry Adams has made clear to our generation, not because it is or can be proved, but because we find it irresistibly convenient. And for the same reason we extend it, and talk of "the evolution of religion." Thus anthropologists

¹See p. 123.

arrange religions in an order of ascending complexity, and call the simplest that they can find "primitive religion"—while those who are candid warn their readers that "primitive," as they use it, is "devoid of chronological import."¹ Readers should also be warned however, that to talk of "the evolution of religion" is to employ only a loose and very imperfect analogy.

Actually, we know of nothing of the sort. Actually, we know only religions, not "religion," in history and in pre-historic times and we do not see them turning into each other or succeeding each other in any regular, evolutionary way. We have already observed how the forms taken by religions are conditioned, or prescribed, by the development of groups at the times when their religions are introduced. Consequently "the evolution of religion" is just as much a fiction as is "the evolution of civilization." And in the case of religion, just as in the case of civilization, we can only observe anything approaching a regular process of change *within* given religions, but not connecting them with each other in any orderly sequence. All, in fact, that can be said on this subject is that generally religions seem, after a relatively short period, to enter into a course of gradual deterioration. There is nothing, however, to prove that this is inevitable, and more than one existing religion may yet demonstrate that at least the rule is open to exceptions.

Man's interpretation of experience in terms of power.—With these warnings in mind, we will now glance briefly at the most elementary forms of religion of which anything is known. In the first place, we have no evidence of any being properly to be regarded as a man who does not have some kind of consciousness of himself as a purposeful agent. Man, then—the earliest we can imagine—finds himself in a world where objects surrounding him are, like him, apparently capable of moving themselves and of acting. He assumes unquestioningly that they are "powers." He himself is a "power." When he does something he means to do it, he is actuated by some purpose. He assumes that it is the same with other "powers." When a black cloud comes up the sky, flashing lightning and sending forth peals of thunder, it *means* to do that; and when it strikes trees near by and other men, it means to do that also. and of course purposely spares him. When, a little later, he is suddenly attacked by an acute pain in his belly, he straightway assumes that some other "power"—this time an invisible one—has

¹Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Religion*.

uck him down. His world is peopled with these powers, because whatever happens to him must be the act of one of them. He begins to differentiate them in accordance with the places where they are active—sky, mountain, and the like—or in accordance with what they do. He comes to think of some as unfriendly, of others as uncertain or indifferent, though capable of being friendly;—and sooner or later some surprising event convinces him that there is a way of getting them to help him. It is a disputed question whether this moment marks the birth of magic or of religion. It is, however, probably a mistake to try to distinguish the two sharply at this, or even at a considerably later, stage of development, and the effort will not be made here.

The word "power" has been used to indicate that at first these notions are spontaneous, unquestioning, and vague. But it is not long before man becomes sufficiently reflective to get the idea that he is made up of soul and body, the former being the animating principle, the real man or self; the latter being the soul's temporary place of abode. The observation of death helps to suggest this idea, and also the observer's own dreams. The conditions of savage life make regular eating often an impossibility, and alternate periods of fasting and of over-eating promote both "visions" during waking hours and vivid dreams. In addition, victims of mental and nervous disorders have seemed to their contemporaries, through many ages, obviously to be possessed by some "power." To see a man die is to see the thing, whatever it was, that animated him depart. The commonest notions were that it left with the dying man's last breath, or, if he had been wounded, that it oozed out with his blood. In any case it is very evident that its departure makes a profound difference. And dreams shed light on the phenomenon. In them the dreamer has many experiences which seem to prove that the soul leaves its body temporarily—amongst these the experience of meeting, talking with, or perhaps fighting with the souls of dead men. It is all very definite and conclusive, and from the accumulated evidence of dreams it can be discovered just what souls are like, how they spend their time, what is needed to keep them contented, and, indeed, everything one might want to know about them.

Animism and totemism.—The inference is natural that all things capable of moving or acting likewise have souls. Animals have them, and so do trees, rivers, clouds, the stars, and the like. Besides, to account for things that happen without visible agency,

there are unembodied spirits. This stage of belief is called *animism*. And since man cannot live without encountering these spirits constantly, it is of the utmost importance to him to know how to treat them. It is very generally believed, for example, that the spirits of the dead require certain attentions from their living descendants and that they become malignant enemies when neglected. Acts of propitiation, sacrifices, and offerings, directed towards powerful spirits, thus begin, and often develop in time into very intricate ceremonies, every detail of which is important and must be exactly carried out, though the original reason may long since have been forgotten.

It is very early believed, however, not only that man can protect himself from hostile spirits, but that he can make some spirits serve his own purposes. Two methods of doing so have been followed at one time or another almost everywhere. One is to induce a spirit to enter into a man who then can control it. Such a man, having peculiarly close relations with spirits, is called a *Shaman*. He can, through his power over them, see into the future, learn what is occurring in distant places, discover what is necessary to influence the spirits favorably, expel harmful spirits, and, generally, meet every emergency. The Shaman is, in other words, not unlike the modern spiritualistic "medium." The other common method of controlling the spirits for human purposes is to conjure them into some object—usually a small one that may easily be carried about—and then to seal it up tightly. Such an object is then a *fetish*, and often a man will have a number of them, each one serving to protect him from some specific ill, or to give him some desirable quality.

Since everything that affects man's life is endowed with a spirit or soul, animals are regarded as beings similar to men except in appearance. Some of them, moreover, are superior to men in certain respects. Hence it is not surprising that men should seek to form alliances with them. The same kind of union is also formed, for the same reason, with some plants, with such objects as the sun or the moon, and sometimes even with a valuable artificial object, such as an ax. This is *totemism*; and the totem is regarded as a powerful friend, and gives its name to the group, and aids greatly in binding the members together closely. At the same time there are some objects, some events, that are held to be dangerous. Hence contact with them, or the performance of certain deeds, is

prohibited, on pain of untold calamity, not only to the offender but all connected with him. Such prohibitions are *taboos*. They are "as various as the conditions of human life."

TRANSITION TO POLYTHEISM

The principal characteristics of "primitive religion," just enumerated, show how primitive man's "science and philosophy" caused him to see a religious significance in practically every aspect of his life and in every portion of his environment which he could observe acting upon him or affecting him in any way. Yet at the same time, the more we should see more plainly could we go further into detail, while primitive man appears to have taken a "future life" for granted, his attention was concentrated, for himself, upon his present life and his own practical problems while living on earth. The world was full of souls or spirits—it is impossible to draw a line between the two—and he himself was a soul like the rest, and they all continued to exist, indefinitely or for "a very long time." But the important aspect of this discovery was its direct bearing upon man's immediate problems here and now. The spirits could help or hurt: the great thing was to get them on one's own side, to get them to do what man wanted, to coerce, cajole, or persuade them to side with man in his endeavors—in hunting, in fighting, in getting women, in getting children, in securing the best and the most of everything.

There was no particular question about what one wanted—that could be allowed to take care of itself. The thing was to get it. And this is the characteristic point of view of what we may call the "natural man." Such, apparently, were the earliest human beings, or that great majority of them about whom alone we can make probable conjectures. But the type has persisted, and indeed flourished. We find it today, in all essentials indistinguishable from the so-called primitive man, not only in existing backward peoples, but in the most highly civilized communities of the Western world. It is, in fact, the "natural man" who has caused recent writers to declare that in the late nineteenth century the doctrine or dogma of "progress" became the real dominant religion of Western civilization. And the viewpoint of the "natural man," as we see, is not inconsistent with a certain kind of religion. The form taken by that religion in the most elementary cultures was conditioned by the

"science and philosophy" of the period. As men reached a more complex and more highly developed state of existence, "animism" turned into *polytheism*; but this was a change of form, not of fundamental character—just as the so-called "religion of progress" of quite recent times is basically identical *in spirit* with animism, though radically different in form.

POLYTHEISM

In polytheism the government of the world is regarded as being lodged in a number of superhuman figures, very similar to men in every respect save length of life and extent of power. Animism tended constantly to make the spirits more like persons, and the relation between the spirits and man more like a personal one. Further reflection, an altered conception of man's dependence on nature—when agriculture came to demand systematic operation on a large scale—and the development of highly organized political systems, gathering many groups together under a single rule, all contributed to carry this tendency to its conclusion—the substitution of the god for the spirit. The change was not absolute or complete, and much that was characteristic of animism continued to be believed. But a new conception of the divine made its appearance, and had a rich and varied development. In general it amounted to this: The "powers" affecting man's life were felt to be, not less real than before, but more distant, more independent of merely local manifestation, grander, more like great personages and kingly rulers. The "powers," in other words, could no longer be thought of merely in terms of what they *did*. Increased knowledge, together with a growing sense of human dignity and worth and a larger conception of the possibilities of life, impelled men to think more of what the "powers" *were*. What kind of being would and could, do the things the "powers" are responsible for? The answer was irresistible: *Persons*, beings like men, though endowed with superhuman strength, agility, loveliness, kindliness, longevity—with, in short, every human quality or characteristic raised to higher power, including anger, eagerness for gifts, and lust.

These were gods. They did not make their appearance in accordance with any plan, or system. They were of gradual growth. There were as many of them, with as many different characteristics as men felt the need for. There were gods of the sky, of the sea

earth, of food-planting, of harvest, of war, of love, of child-bearing, creation, of the other world, of victory; gods of clans or groups, cities; sun-gods, moon-gods, or goddesses, and the like, to an definite number.¹ What they were like can be seen, far better than it can be described, in such poems as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and in Greek sculptured representations of the gods.

In Homer, moreover, one sees the beginnings of a further development. For the Homeric gods themselves form a community, with Zeus at their head, ruler both of gods and of men, yet himself subject to a power beyond him, Fate, and able to command no absolute obedience from his fellow-gods. And from Hesiod one learns that the Greek gods not only formed a community from a very early time, but that they also had a history. This was preserved in *myths*. A myth is simply an answer to a question—a story told to explain how something happened “once upon a time.” Such stories, of course, aided greatly in objectifying and rendering finite the conceptions of the divine which prevailed during this age of belief in the several parts of the world. They also aided in producing order into the various assemblages of gods, as, too, did more elaborate and settled habits of worship.

The transition from animism to polytheism had been, in part, a movement away from an implicit belief in anarchy amongst the “powers” affecting man’s life. Later efforts to conceive of the gods as forming a community with some one great god at their head, such as Zeus amongst Greek peoples, were more conscious attempts in the same direction. Increasing knowledge, together with the formation of large city-states and great empires, made men conscious that the processes of change in their physical environment were on the whole *orderly* processes; and political development at the same time necessitated *orderly* relations between men—not only between members of the same small group, but between hundreds of groups, families, clans, all gathered together in one comprehensive organization. The situation made *justice* a fundamental requisite of life, even though it was practically, as it has remained, an unattainable ideal. The need, however, served at least to promote the change which was taking place in religion—the change from a conception of the gods as the sources of order, with some one god tending to assume general command in the interest of justice.

¹A brief account of nature gods anciently worshiped in the Near East is to be found in Chapter X of this volume, pp. 153 ff.

THE HIGHER RELIGIONS

When polytheism reached the point just described it had gone about as far, apparently, as it could go. Such a religion might remain indefinitely satisfactory to a people—as also might animism. That would depend on the level of culture beyond which, for one reason or another, a given group might never go. There are people today whose religion is animistic; and other peoples who are polytheists. And this is true not only of tribes or groups whom we should unhesitatingly call “backward,” but also of highly civilized peoples. In China, for example, though conditions are at present too chaotic to permit of confident generalization, until 1912, when the Manchu dynasty was overthrown, the religion of the State was polytheistic, and that of the masses of the people a mixture of ancestor-worship with certain animistic elements.¹

The persistence of early religious conceptions.—In other civilized lands than China, however, where many circumstances were quite different, polytheism was proving unable, by the fifth century B. C. or earlier, to adapt itself to increased knowledge and the demands of mature reflection. Nor is this surprising. In general the kinds of religion which have thus far been noticed are alike, as has been said above, in that they are appropriate, at different levels of experience or culture, to the “natural man.” The “natural man” is one who, whether he considers a future life certain or not, thinks in terms of his present life here and now, or of himself as one whose success is to be measured in terms of earthly satisfaction. He is, in the language of Christianity, the “unregenerate man,” or the “once-born man.” He is conscious of needs—the good life is one in which they are satisfied. He thinks of the “powers” manifesting themselves around him as possible aids in the execution of his own purposes. He tries to get them on his side; or, if they seem definitely hostile, he tries to buy them off.

This point of view is one which the “natural man” shares with children, and some have not hesitated to call it childish. It depends at any rate, on what we can recognize as youthful illusions, however

¹Nothing, of course, like a complete history of religions can be attempted in these chapters. It is intended simply to give a sketch of developments necessary to a understanding of the history and place of religion in Western civilization. Hence no outline of religion in China can be presented; nor can any mention be made of the work of Confucius (551-478 B. C.), interesting though that is as the world's best example of the inculcation of worldly wisdom of a high type on a religious basis.

inevitable such illusions may be at a certain stage of experience. It is an illusion, for example, to suppose that our needs can ever be satisfied—for they expand and change constantly in proportion as we do satisfy them. It is an illusion, again, to suppose that we can become masters of our fate. We know much better than did any man 3000 years ago how to enslave or buy off the "powers" of nature; but there are limits beyond which we cannot go in this enterprise, and these limits are far on the lower side of what is necessary to make man the "lord of creation." It is an illusion, furthermore, in view of these circumstances, to suppose that life is an opportunity for enjoyment.

The emergence of new religious conceptions.—Such considerations as these, which men become aware of almost as soon as they cease taking life for granted and begin to reflect questioningly upon its real nature, were doubtless abroad in the ancient world from a very early time. They suggested to some, as they do today, that life was an empty farce, look at it how one might.¹ But to others they suggested a very different conclusion; and a whole group of religions arose whose founders taught that the meaning of life lay in the opportunity it afforded the individual, not to win the gods over to his side, but to bring himself over to the side of God. In important respects these religions varied from each other; but they were remarkable for the extent to which, at bottom, they taught the same lesson: that life is crucially significant, though only an episode in the existence of the soul, that our real business is the making of ourselves, that we can free ourselves from illusion, and that we can attain for all eternity the end towards which our whole being is directed—the peace which passeth understanding.

This development constituted no absolute break with the past. It was rather a new orientation of old elements. It found room for the whole life of man, but gave that life a larger meaning than before, and opened up an inexhaustible vista. It was the fruit of disillusionment, yet was a discovery that life was fuller and more abundant than the "natural man" had ever guessed. It adapted itself, of necessity, to varying antecedents and conditions in the several parts of the world—and this accounts for the varying characteristics to be observed in those religions which can here be briefly described.

¹As regards our time, see *The Modern Temper*, by J. W. Krutch. The book can only be understood as a somewhat unusual example of self-revelation.

Buddhism.—India was invaded from the north by Aryan people at some time earlier—probably a good deal earlier—than 1000 B. C. The Aryans brought with them a nature-religion which developed into a polytheism whose records are extant in a collection of works known as *Vedas*. These served as the basis for a great further development, at the hands of an emerging priestly caste, the *Brahmans*, who elaborated ritual ceremonies, but also were deeply engaged in philosophical thought. It was thus against a background of minutely systematized religious observance and also of profound religious philosophy that an Aryan nobleman, Siddhartha Gotama, was brought up. He was born, according to our methods of calculating time, about 563 B. C. (died about 483 B. C.), and was to become known to all the world as the *Buddha*—the Wise, Enlightened one, the Messiah. His contemporaries had come to believe in the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, and the great problem with which they were concerned was one of deliverance—deliverance from the endless wheel of successive incarnations, which if it was really endless and cyclical, made life an utterly empty mockery.

Gotama, seeking deliverance, left his wife, his son, his home, his place in the social world, and for seven years sought the answer to his question, first under the guidance of teachers learned in the methods of inducing mystical ecstasy, and then through severe ascetic practices, until finally the four great truths leading to salvation “came” to him in a moment of quiet rest. He then, at the age of about thirty-seven, became a teacher, and in substance taught as follows: The self is condemned to an endless chain of successive embodiments, of which the present life is a single link. Suffering is inevitable and universal throughout life, and has its origin in desire. We are ignorant of the way in which desire, purpose, deed, and consequence are linked together, and for this reason keep desiring only what can lead to suffering. Suffering cannot be ended except by extinguishing desire itself—even the desire for life. This may be accomplished by following the “eightfold path”—a course of moral and intellectual self-discipline which leads to a gradual withdrawal of the self from the body through the suppression of sensation, intellection, and consciousness itself. At the further end of the “eightfold path” one may actually experience by anticipation the state of eternal peace—Nirvana. Selfhood, to Buddha, is itself a bondage to illusion. Nirvana is often spoken of as if it

were the negation of existence, and this has given rise to much misunderstanding. It is defined negatively because this is the only way in which we can now speak of it, but the conception itself is positive. Nirvana is a blessed state of release from bondage—is the peace which passeth understanding.

To follow the "eightfold path" one had to do as Buddha had done—renounce the world and devote one's self wholly to the task of self-discipline. Buddha founded a monkish order for the purpose, whose members depended for the necessities of life on alms, bestowed by those who could not or would not themselves follow the way of salvation. All that these lay-Buddhists could hope for was that they might be able to become mendicant brothers in a future incarnation. Buddha himself was simply the teacher of men; and even later, when he came to be regarded as divine, he was supremely venerated rather than worshiped. For it remained the doctrine of Buddhism that deliverance, or salvation, could come only through adherence to the "eightfold path"—that, in other words, man had to work out his own salvation, which could not be bestowed on him through any supernatural grace or intervention. This was too austere a creed to become popular, and as Buddhism spread into Tibet, China, Korea, and Japan, it was considerably modified. It is preserved, however, in a pure form as a living belief, in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam, though there have been no Buddhists in India itself since about the fourteenth century of our era.

Zoroastrianism.—At about the same time that some of the Aryans moved down into India, others moved westward into Persia and Media, taking with them a nature-religion very similar to that of the Vedic Indians, with identical names for various gods, and with at least some identical usages. The names of several of these gods appear in documents found in Asia Minor and dating from early in the fourteenth century B. C. It was not, however, until much later—about the second half of the seventh century B. C.—that the Iranians, as they are called, really established a united kingdom in Media. *Zoroaster* was probably a Mede, and was probably born a good many years before this event. Practically nothing is known about his life, though there is no doubt that he was an historical person, and is not a mere legendary figure. Such evidence as there is suggests that the traditional date of his birth (600 B. C.) is almost certainly too late, and perhaps very much

too late. If he was a Mede, he probably was driven by hostility to his teaching to settle in Bactria, in eastern Iran, where he is said to have made his first converts. What is definitely known about him is that he appeared as a reforming prophet to whom had been revealed the true religion of the true god, in opposition to the false Iranian nature-religion.

This polytheism Zoroaster totally rejected, preaching a true monotheism. There is, he taught, but one god, Ahura Mazda, the Lord of Wisdom. Mazda, however, as his earliest deed, created several beneficent powers—the Good Mind, the Right, Piety, Sovereignty and others—who remained his close associates. Inasmuch as Ahura Mazda was proclaimed the true god in opposition to the old polytheism, the Iranian gods became the devils of the new religion. And Zoroaster saw in the existence of opposites a principle which extended throughout the world and throughout life. There are beneficent plants and poisonous; there are civilized men and barbarians; there are beasts helpful to man and beasts hostile; there are true believers and false believers; there is, in short, a division running throughout all things. Those who followed Zoroaster, moreover, did so of their own volition. Hence he was led to conclude that every man is free to choose whether he will be of those who are for or against righteousness and truth. This earth is a battlefield and life is warfare. Not only men, but also animals and plants and all things that compose the earth are arrayed in two opposing armies, respectively led by Ahura Mazda and by Ahriman—that is by God and by Satan. Zoroaster foretold the ultimate triumph of the Good, which was to result in the earth's becoming a paradise. He believed that this victory and change were close at hand, which gave urgency to his preaching; and he taught that after Mazda's triumph there would be a Day of Judgment accompanied by the resurrection of the dead. Those adjudged not wanting were to live eternally in the earthly paradise, while the evil were to be tormented by fire.

In later generations, when the victory of Mazda seemed to be a far off as ever, it was taught that the souls of the dead underwent a preliminary judgment immediately, and journeyed over a bridge broad for the righteous, but narrow as a sword's edge for the wicked. The latter accordingly tumbled into a fathomless abyss, while the former passed over easily into a region of light close to Ahura Mazda.

Zoroastrianism is preëminently an ethical religion. There is only one way to be saved—by fighting in the cause of righteousness with the militant God of Right. To live the good life is to obey the moral law, to meet evil by fighting it and overcoming it, both as it appears within one's self and as it appears in the surrounding world. One is not to requite evil with good, but to exterminate it. One is not to retreat from the world, but to do battle unceasingly in it while life lasts.

With the rise and spread of Mohammedanism¹—Mohammed was born A. D. 570—both Christians and Zoroastrians in western Asia found their old religions a burden, and in the great majority of cases too heavy a burden to be borne along with the rule of their Moslem conquerors. Hence, particularly from about the ninth century A. D., Zoroastrianism tended to decline. At the present time there are said to be only about 10,000 Zoroastrians in Persia. There are, however, about 90,000 more in India, chiefly in Bombay, where they form a prosperous community of their own.

Judaism.—The religion of the Hebrews was similar to Zoroastrianism in that it was announced by prophets as a true monotheism opposed to the nature-religions of neighboring peoples. In the beginning, however, it did not make its appeal to individuals, as did Zoroastrianism, but to the nation as a whole; and it promised no future life to believers, but only a glorious future for the nation. The Hebrew god, Jehovah, was a jealous and wrathful deity, who threatened his people with national disaster if they did not worship him alone. To worship him truly, however, was not only to be scrupulous in carrying out ceremonial requirements, but also to be just, to be honest, to be compassionate towards the poor and the unfortunate, to avoid sexual irregularity, and the like. Fundamental elements of right behavior towards both Jehovah and one's fellow men are stated briefly in the Ten Commandments (Exodus, ch. 1-17), and although these in their present form include elements as late as about 450 B. C., in the main they date from the eighth century B. C. and embody some commands from an even earlier period.

The warnings of national disaster to follow upon disobedience, which had repeatedly been given by the prophets of Jehovah, were

¹ Limitations of space have prevented the inclusion of any outline of Mohammedanism, which is distinctly less important for the purpose of these chapters than the religions here considered.

duly fulfilled, especially by the Babylonian conquest at the close of the sixth century. Thereafter the doctrine of divine retribution was further individualized, and it was taught that Jehovah insured to every man his just deserts while living on earth. This doctrine was made very rigorous, but it accords so ill with experience that it could not persist without serious modification. The Book of Job is the great monument of revolt against it (written probably about 450-425 B. C.), but its author had serious difficulty when he came to face the consequences; for he could only declare that while Jehovah was certainly a just God, his dealings with his worshippers were beyond the compass of our understandings.

This has everywhere been a crucial problem in the development of religion. There was a distinct tendency for a time amongst the Hebrews to abandon the moral law as a vanity, because the Creator of the world evidently had no regard for it.¹ A way out of the dilemma, however, was found in acceptance of the doctrine of a future life, in which the good were to be rewarded eternally, and the evil punished. This doctrine had not been preached by the older prophets and did not become a part of Hebrew religion until some time after about 400 B. C. It was then suggested to the Jews, on one side, by Zoroastrianism, and on the other by the Greeks. This at least is the most probable conjecture as to its origin amongst them, but it has rightly been pointed out that the doctrine was so evidently necessary to the completion of their ethical beliefs that they must have thought of it as really their own, and essentially Jewish, wherever they discovered it. Accordingly, it was adopted by some believing only in the immortality of the soul, and others believing, with the Zoroastrians, in a final resurrection of the body and a general last judgment of the quick and the dead, and a paradise for those found not wanting. To both classes of believers, the things necessary for salvation were the same: allegiance to the one true and just God, and complete obedience to his laws, both moral and ceremonial.

That the requirement of perfect obedience, if rigidly exacted would condemn all men to perdition was, however, recognized; and it was taught that Jehovah, foreseeing man's weakness and instability, had mercifully agreed to accept repentance as a sufficient remedy for sin, or disobedience. Hence repentance became a primary factor in the Judaic scheme of salvation, and as such it

¹Cf. the Book of Ecclesiastes.

as carefully safeguarded. It had to be a genuine turning away from evil, and its reality was to be judged by results. To return to one's sin after repentance proved that repentance had not been real, and no severity of penance could atone for such failure. On the other hand, no amount or kind of sin was too evil to permit of Jehovah's forgiveness if repentance was complete and genuine.

The Greek Mysteries.—Every polytheistic religion is the product of a slow growth out of many elements which are not capable of being completely harmonized. All polytheisms consequently have loose edges, so to say, which give room for special developments under favoring circumstances. Two such special developments which took place in Greece demand notice here—the worship of Dionysus and the worship of Demeter.¹ Both took the form of *mysteries*. A “mystery” to the Greek was “a ritual-drama, beheld and shared only by the initiated”; and it was this characteristic of these religions which has caused the use of this word to describe them. The actual secrets of initiation were probably of no great importance. What is important to us is the fact that the immortality of the soul—as a religious belief, not as a philosophical doctrine—received its chief support and great development in Greece from the *mythic mysteries* (Dionysus-worship) and the Eleusinian mysteries (Demeter-worship). The origin of both cults is lost in the obscurity of the pre-historic age—the Dionysus cult in particular embodying elements of immemorial antiquity—and both persisted until the triumph of Christianity.

The cult of Dionysus came down into Greece from Thrace, and there is evidence that it was known as early as the sixth century B. C. The tradition was that the doctrine had been divinely revealed to Orpheus. It was in substance as follows: Man is made up of evil and of divine elements. He possesses a divine and immortal soul, of which his body is the prison-house or grave. He is doomed to suffer punishment after death for sins of the body on earth, and then to be reborn once more, and so on *ad infinitum*. Release from this endless succession of sin and punishment is, however, possible. By certain acts man can break the chain and win eternal life with the blessed gods. The essential features in this process, which must be kept secret, are the rebirth of man into a divine existence, and the careful observance thereafter of ritual purity of life. Re-

See Chapter XI of this volume, pp. 179-180, for an outline of the general development of Greek religion in connection with Greek science and philosophy.

birth is accomplished by actual participation in the substance of the god—as, for example, by tearing apart a living animal, believed to be, at least for the time being, the god himself, and drinking up the warm blood or devouring the warm and palpitating flesh. Thus man becomes himself divine, enters on a new life, and is assured of a happy and blessed immortality.

As Orphism was known in Greece it contained Pythagorean elements, and the initiation, or rebirth of man into his true divine nature, became an elaborate symbolic drama. Dionysus was a vegetation-god, and in his own life symbolized that which he was. For he was fabled annually to become seized with madness to rush wildly through forests, and finally to be torn in pieces by enemies, only to be brought back to life again. Hence his followers sought to participate in his divinity by re-enacting this pursuit to death, and resurrection.

The Eleusinian mysteries differed from the Orphic greatly in details, but the character and object and importance of both were identical. And the high significance of the mysteries lies in the fact that they expressed the enduring conviction of the Greeks that religion is a crucial reality for the individual. This the Olympian religion of the state could not do, and its failure left a gap which history shows, man must fill, somehow or other, in the best way he can—a gap which he will fill in a poor way if no good one is open to him. The mysteries made religion a matter of actual experience—not a matter of formal ceremony and conventional observance—and so made vital the doctrine that there is an element of undying divinity in man's nature, and that the purpose of human life lies in the opportunity it gives the soul to win its way to eternal union with Reality itself, or the divine nature. Orphism, in addition, taught that all things come from god, whatever name or names he used to designate him, and find the reason for their existence in the possibility of returning to their source.

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CHAPTER XXXVII

CHRISTIANITY BEFORE MODERN TIMES

THE brief account of Judaism given in the preceding chapter contains no mention of one development whose seeds were early sown, and whose growth was rapid during the years immediately before the Christian era. This was the repeated assurance given by prophets that the long struggle of Israel was to issue in a glorious consummation, which was to be heralded by, or brought about by, a *Messiah*, an "anointed one," who would, it was usually said, be of the tribe of Judah and a descendant of David. Opinion varied as to just what was to happen, and as to the precise office and status of the Messiah, or—to use the Greek form of the word—Christ. All were agreed that he was to be sent by Jehovah and was to effect the deliverance of the Chosen People. To some, however, this only meant that a great conquering ruler was to appear, who was to overthrow the Roman Empire and all other kingdoms and to set up a magnificent Jewish domination of the earth. It was all to be most satisfactory for the Jews, and it was to last forever. But at a time passed, the fact became more and more clear that even such a purely national deliverance as this could scarcely be accomplished without the direct intervention of Jehovah, and the conception of the Messiah began to be transformed accordingly. With the spread of belief in a future life, moreover, and a corresponding tendency to individualize the approaching deliverance, it came to assume a very different form. The Messiah was to appear in glory as a divine or semi-divine representative of Jehovah, announcing the end of the world and the institution of the Kingdom of Heaven, in which the righteous—both the quick and the dead—were to enjoy an eternal and blessed life.

In accordance with this expectation, alleged forerunners of the Messiah occasionally appeared, in the last years of the pre-Christian era and in the earliest years of our era, who were able to attract considerable number of followers when they proclaimed that the Kingdom of Heaven was at hand, and that the time for repentance

short. One of these was a man who washed away, in the river Jordan, the sins of those who repented, and who was hence called *the Baptizer*, or Baptist. To him came a young man of Nazareth, the son of Joseph, a carpenter. Tradition has it that John recognized in Joseph's son, whose name was Jesus, the Messiah whose coming he had prophesied;—and from this we may date the beginning of Christianity.

LIFE AND TEACHING OF JESUS

Sources of our knowledge.—Practically all that we know concerning Jesus comes to us from a collection of narratives and epistles called the New Testament. These documents were written at various times within a hundred years of the death of Jesus, and were long regarded, together with sacred writings of the Hebrews comprised in the Old Testament, as above question or investigation; because it was believed that God had in effect dictated them and had so ensured their complete accuracy. For a couple of centuries, however, it has been increasingly recognized that, whatever their ultimate source, these books were written and transmitted by men like ourselves, under human conditions, and that consequently they must be treated and studied in exactly the same way as any other historical documents, if we are to understand them aright. Such study has been very active, especially during the last hundred years, and has resulted in definite conclusions which nobody can now ignore. We have to be on our guard, however, against many "reconstructions" of the life and teaching of Jesus based, not simply or even primarily on critical study, but on what their authors regard as possible, or probable, or desirable, in view of modern science and philosophy. The most famous of these are *Das Leben Jesu* (1835), by David Strauss, and *La Vie de Jésus* (1863), by Ernest Renan, but there are many others like them. They are all works of imagination controlled by prejudice, even though they embody results of careful historical criticism. Actually, the New Testament contains several records which, in essentials, agree remarkably with each other, and which show how the life of Jesus was understood in the earliest age of the Christian Church. It is possible, but not likely, that all those who wrote the several portions of the New Testament misinterpreted that life. If they did, it is an extraordinary fact that they all misinterpreted

it in the same way. The evidence available would really be regarded as conclusive for any other historical event, and has been impugned or cast aside in this instance for reasons which have nothing to do with the established principles of historical criticism.

In any case, we cannot go behind the extant records, and therefore agree in exhibiting Jesus as one who became persuaded that he was the expected Messiah. As the Messiah, his life and death were the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy, and so close and constant is the correspondence that the former cannot be understood without the latter. Jesus, then, from the beginning, so far as we can know, was understood to have lived, and spoken, and acted in conscious fulfillment of the promises which had been made by God through the prophets to his People.

Jesus as a moral teacher.—Jesus was a teacher, a profound moral teacher, and his words were the fulfillment of the moral Law of the Hebrews. It was not enough for a man to obey in outward action the old commands; one must not even entertain secretly the mere thought of disobedience. Only the pure in heart might hope to see God. It was not how a man seemed to be that mattered, but what he was. And to save his soul, his real self, to win his way through shams to what was true, a man must turn away from evil—that is, from everything that might enslave him to what was only of this earth. The trouble with the things of this earth was that they were corruptible, that they passed away from moment to moment and were no more, that no reliance could be placed on them, so that the man pursuing these shadows was led a vain chase while he became enslaved to them and like them in nature, the creature of shadows and a shadow himself. Where one's heart was, there was one's destiny. It was not that the things of earth were essentially evil—but man's business was to *use* them, not to be used by them. Even the Sabbath was created for man, not man for the Sabbath. Hence man might use the things of this earth, but he must at all costs keep himself unspotted by the world, detach himself from dependence on it, and cleave to the unseen things which are eternal.

So to do was to become pure in heart; but, such was man's nature, partaking of the corruptible earth, that purity itself tended to encourage spiritual pride—the conceit of lordliness. Hence it was necessary also for man never to forget that he was not his own creator, but a creature, and that all he was or might become

red to the author of his being. Not to the wise in their own estimation, but to those who were meek and lowly of heart was the way open to fullness of life—because only the humble could truly know themselves for what men are, and *feel* their debt to God.

And to love God, on whom all depended, was the final thing needed, loving also one's neighbor as one's self. It was not enough to reverence God; it was necessary to love him, to love righteousness and for itself, with one's whole being, with such singleness of heart that one's love overflowed to one's neighbor. It was not that one's neighbor was worthy of love; only God was worthy of it; but God was worthy even of such love as could not but extend itself to his children for the Father's sake.

Jesus more than a moral teacher.—Such, in substance, according to the records, was the teaching of Jesus. There is no hint of sentimentalism, no indulgence, no relenting attitude towards the righteous, no trace of modern humanitarianism, in the love of which he made so much account. A great deal else in his teaching invites comment, but we must go on at once to observe that he was not simply, not even chiefly, a moral teacher. It was essential to his task to make it clear that those who were to be of the Kingdom must obey counsels of unworldly perfection; but he repeatedly said, in effect, that men could not hope to *make themselves worthy* of eternal life, yet that all things might be possible to them if only they would unqualifiedly believe in him as the Christ. He was the Son of God, sent to live the divine life as a man under human conditions. He was, not merely through what he *said*, but substantially in his person and by his life itself and death, the Word of God communicated aforetime through the prophets and now made flesh. He came to redeem men, not by sage advice, or by exhortation to good behavior, or by arousing within them a shallow and vain humanitarianism, but by the direct and living act of the living God. His teaching was primarily a commentary on his nature and on the life of the divine nature under earthly conditions. That life was one of isolation, of apparent weakness, of suffering—and it ended in death by crucifixion, the punishment reserved for criminals. Nevertheless it was a triumphant life too, and precisely because of its heroic cast; for it was a victory of righteousness, steadfast against all odds, and courting death rather than submission to the sinful world. Hence it was that men were, as the supreme test of their good faith, to believe in Jesus as the Christ, because his redemptive

efficacy lay in the man himself, in his life and death, in which men could participate only through entire belief. Acceptance of Christ in singleness of heart meant acceptance with full knowledge of righteousness itself, whatever the consequences; and this in turn meant freedom from sin, and fullness of life.

EARLY SPREAD OF CHRISTIANITY

It is often said, as if it were a matter of some importance, that Jesus had no intention of founding a new religion—a fact which should be obvious from the account just given of his life and teaching. But the acceptance of the claim that he was indeed the Christ—immediately confirmed, as his followers believed, by his Resurrection on the third day after his death—inevitably transformed the Hebrew religion in the very process of fulfilling its promise.

Emergence of Christianity as a new religion.—The claim made by Jesus and for him was never accepted by more than a minority of the Jews, who accordingly persisted, as they do today, in their old religion; while at the same time the gospel of Christ was almost at once carried far beyond Palestine and was readily accepted amongst the Gentiles, or non-Jewish peoples, of the Roman Empire. The books of the New Testament, indeed, from which we derive our knowledge of Jesus, were principally composed for the use of converts amongst the Gentiles. And these converts, of course, as well as the Jews, could only understand the gospel of Christ in terms of the science and philosophy and earlier religions then current. Jesus himself, if he was divine, was also human, and had been constrained not only to speak the language of his time and place, but to think and speak in terms of what could be understood. Necessarily, then, with what degree of exaggeration or distortion nobody can know, when his gospel was carried abroad it was colored by those who received it. Since, for example, it was proclaimed that Jesus was the Son of God, it was unavoidable that it should have been believed and asserted that he had been a wonder-worker; for the power to perform miracles was then everywhere regarded as an attribute of divinity.¹

Inconsistencies in the New Testament, as well as relics of long

¹It is more than likely, however, that this belief had a large basis in fact; inasmuch as it is scarcely open to doubt that Jesus was able to effect cures in a manner we do not yet understand, though apparently similar cures are a matter of authentic experience, in our time as in former ages.

st conditions, seem far less important today than they did to
ics of the nineteenth century; because with closer study and
er knowledge it has now become evident that most, if not all,
these inconsistencies can be explained as consequences of varying
orts to interpret the gospel of Christ to the Gentiles. What is
portant, and increasingly clear, is that the primitive Christian
urch came into existence and rapidly grew because the great
ts of the life and death of Jesus, as soon as they came to be known
d to be understood, everywhere carried conviction. Men really
ieved that Jesus, by what he spoke and did, had finally and
npletely expressed the purpose of the true God. The men, more-
er, who formed this belief were, as was said above, chiefly non-
vish men, to whom the gospel came as a genuinely new religion—
d one further removed from its Judaic origin by the very act of
erpreting it to them—so that, despite a continuity between
laism and Christianity which never was lost sight of, the gospel
y soon was rightly regarded as something distinctive and new,
erving a name of its own.

Reasons for the rapid spread of Christianity.—It was at one
he felt that there was something miraculous in the way in which
e new religion spread out from Jerusalem. It has long been
gnized, however, that the conversion of the ancient world may
fully accounted for by a combination of favoring circumstances
the earliest years of our era. One of these was the existence of
the Roman Empire, in which, as the historian Gibbon says, “the
st civilized provinces of Europe, Asia, and Africa were united
der the dominion of one sovereign, and gradually connected by
the most intimate ties of laws, of manners, and of language. . . .
e public highways, which had been constructed for the use of the
ions, opened an easy passage for the Christian missionaries from
mascus to Corinth, and from Italy to the extremity of Spain or
tain; nor did those spiritual conquerors encounter any of the
stacles which usually retard or prevent the introduction of a
eign religion into a distant country.” Not only, however, had
me unified the civilized world surrounding the Mediterranean;
e had at the same time weakened the many traditional religions
her conquered peoples, and had given them nothing in return
e philosophic skepticism, which might, in an age of peace and
prosperity, content a few fortunate and cultivated men, but which
t the great majority unsustained and hopeless.

Under these conditions, a gospel which gave every life a tremendous meaning had a sure ground of appeal, and Gibbon, in his history of *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, has enumerated five causes which served most effectually to enhance that appeal:

I. The inflexible and, if we may use the expression, the intolerant zeal of the Christians, derived, it is true, from the Jewish religion, but purified from the narrow and unsocial spirit which, instead of inviting, had deterred the Gentiles from embracing the law of Moses. II. The doctrine of a future life, improved by every additional circumstance which could give weight and efficacy to that important truth. III. The miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive church. IV. The pure and austere morals of the Christians. V. The union and discipline of the Christian republic, which gradually formed an independent and increasing state in the heart of the Roman Empire.

These causes for the rapid spread of Christianity through the Roman world were correctly singled out by Gibbon as the most important, but they are, of course, precisely what the great historian called them, "secondary causes." What filled the Christians with an inflexible and intolerant zeal? What promoted their pure and austere morals? What enabled them to attain the union and discipline requisite to their spiritual conquests? The crucial factor was their faith that Jesus was indeed the Christ. And this faith arose not primarily from his moral teaching. His evaluation of life was mature, disillusioned, and profound—herein in itself not well calculated to win immediate, general acceptance—and it was, moreover, not at all original. Hebrew and Christian scholars are today in substantial agreement about this: Every recorded saying of Jesus can be pretty closely matched from Rabbinic literature of his age or earlier. Jesus taught what the great teachers of his race and time were teaching;—yet somehow or other he transformed their precepts, giving them a unique potency. He spoke "as one having authority," we are told, more than that—"never man spake like this man." And therein lies the secret of the matter: Jesus inspired unexampled trust because his nature and his way of life and death bespoke unexampled character. And if men would but put their faith in him, and would entrust themselves wholly to him, he promised, he would see them through.

What we must realize if we are to understand the early spread

Christianity is that men proceeded to do exactly this—and to find experience that Jesus did not fail them, that the promise was apt. If this was delusion, it was delusion of an extraordinary kind. It is, in any event, the one foundation of the Christian Church. And historically it is not open to doubt that men found through Christ a new freedom, an enlarged sense of the possibilities of life, an inexhaustible field for significant achievement, a ground of hope—in a word, a deepened, sobered, spiritualized, enlightened humanity—such as had not previously been known in the ancient world.

From Gibbon's day and before until our own, many explanations have been advanced for the victory of the Christian faith; yet the simplest one remains still the best. Gibbon was right enough as far as he went; but, ultimately, Christianity triumphed because it presented to men, *and enabled them to realize in experience*, a truer, better humanity than had hitherto been conceived or seen.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEOLOGY

Relation of Christianity to paganism.—We have already noticed that the spread of Christianity depended upon the possibility of *interpreting* it to those who were to receive it. It so happened that the new religion could quite easily be understood—though of course not always in exactly the same ways—both by simple and ignorant men and by the best and most highly cultivated minds of the ancient world. It was seen to have points of contact, for example, both with popular mystery-religions, similar to those described at the end of the preceding chapter, and with the philosophy of Plato, and with Stoicism. Within a very short period after the death of Jesus, Christianity was established in four great cities of the Empire—Ephesus, in Antioch, in Alexandria, and in Rome. Undoubtedly it could not remain and flourish in such surroundings without receiving something from them as well as giving something to them. There is a good deal of difficulty in this question, and the tendency for some years has probably been to exaggerate the importance of what Christianity thus absorbed from the pagan world. The essential point to remember is that, while Christianity absorbed much, it nevertheless maintained its substantial identity and distinctiveness and continuity. In other words, it was not eaten up by the mystery-mongers and philosophers of antiquity, but,

on the contrary, it ate them up, in so far as it found them digestible and nutritious, discarding the remainder.

St. Augustine, in his short treatise *On Christian Doctrine*, has fairly stated the general truth of this whole matter. He writes:

If those who are called philosophers, and especially the Platonists, have said aught that is true and in harmony with our faith, we are not only not to shrink from it, but to claim it for our own use from those who have unlawful possession of it. For, as the Egyptians had not only the idols and heavy burdens which the people of Israel hated and fled from, but also vessels and ornaments of gold and silver, and garments which the same people when going out of Egypt appropriated to themselves, designing them for a better use, not doing this on their own authority, but by the command of God, the Egyptians themselves, in their ignorance, providing them with things which they themselves were not making a good use of; in the same way all branches of heathen learning have not only false and superstitious fancies and heavy burdens of unnecessary toil, which every one of us, when going out under the leadership of Christ from the fellowship of the heathen, ought to abhor and avoid; but they contain also liberal instruction which is better adapted to the use of the truth, and some most excellent precepts of morality; and some truths in regard even to the worship of the One God are found amongst them. Now these are, so to speak, their gold and silver, which they did not create themselves, but dug out of the mines of God's providence which are everywhere scattered abroad, and are perversely and unlawfully prostituting to the worship of devils. These, therefore, the Christian, when he separates himself in spirit from the miserable fellowship of these men, ought to take away from them and to devote to their proper use in preaching the gospel. Their garments also—that is, human institutions such as are adapted to the intercourse with men which is indispensable in this life—we must take and turn to a Christian use.

In becoming, then, the religion of the Roman Empire, Christianity made nowhere an absolute break with the traditions, the culture, the science and philosophy, the usages, and the institutions of the pagan peoples. It assimilated them to itself, remaking them in so far as that was possible and desirable. And thus *philosophy* was gradually remade into *theology*.

¹Like the Zoroastrians, the Christians regarded pagan deities as devils, or malignant demons, in masquerade—the disguise enabling them to mislead and plague the votaries.

Fundamentals of Christian belief as set forth by Paul.—The beginnings of the process just mentioned are to be seen in the New Testament itself, in the Gospel of St. John and in the writings of St. Paul. Paul gives us, in effect, the earliest known attempt to place Christianity in a universalized setting, and since much in his account has remained permanently a part of orthodox belief, it may briefly be summarized here: Christ is a divine being, the only begotten Son of God, through whom, as agent, the earth and all that it inhabit, and the heaven above the earth, and the regions below were created. The first man, like the earth, was created good, and the lord of creation, but with freedom to obey or disobey his creator. He disobeyed, thus bringing sin and death into the world, and corrupting not his own nature only, but the whole human race along with him. As a consequence, the propensity to sin became man's second nature, rendering vain all his endeavors and aspirations to truth and goodness, and placing him always in opposition to God and God's will. Because, however, of his concern for man, God's Son laid aside his divine form and became a man and submitted to death on the cross, thus making atonement for the sinfulness of humanity. Christ's death is potentially the death of all men—his resurrection potentially the triumph of all men over sin and death, in eternal life. But only those are saved through Christ who are so united to him by faith that they may be regarded as crucified with him in their old selves, and risen with him, or born again, as purified beings.

Thus the death of Christ in expiation for human sinfulness, and his resurrection, giving men eternal life, are the central factors in Christianity as Paul understood it. To complete our summary, however, it must be added that, following the resurrection, Christ ascended into Heaven, where he occupies a place of enhanced glory because of his voluntary redemption of men, and whence he will come on the day of final judgment to convey those who are saved to their heavenly and eternal home.

Paul did not forget, in drawing out this scheme of God's relations with man, that to Moses had been given the Law, by perfect obedience to which man might redeem himself, without the aid of a Mediator or Savior; nor did he forget that even the Gentiles, through their own rational powers, could learn, and had learned, what it was necessary to do for salvation—"for the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by

the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse."¹ The fact was, however, that both Hebrews and Gentiles, because of the corruptness of human nature since the first man, could not perform what was necessary for salvation, no matter how fully they *knew* what to do; so that both were really in a worse state with their knowledge than they would have been without it—both were only the more clearly "without excuse."

The necessity, therefore, of the Redeemer, if men were to be saved, was complete. But only those could be saved, even so who were united to Christ, as was said above, by faith—and such union henceforth took the place of the old Judaic Law, which expired with the coming of Christ. The question still remained, how could man avail himself of redemption, how could he summon faith? Concerning this, Paul is not clear. Perhaps unconsciously, he entertained more than one answer to the question. He sometimes said that the office of the Law and of rational philosophy had been to awaken men, through conscience, to such a sense of their sinfulness and hopeless condition that, when Christ came, they might be impelled from within to put their trust wholly in him, and so to identify themselves with him and really be made one with him. At other times, however, Paul felt that man could do nothing, because of his corruptness, for himself, and that even the exercise of saving faith was possible only to those upon whom God had bestowed it. In other words, God had from the beginning—for some reason best known to Himself—created some men for eternal life, and others, a larger number, for damnation: "Whom He did predestinate, then He also called; and whom He called, them He also justified; and whom He justified, them He also glorified."²

It remains to mention Paul's teaching concerning the sacraments. A sacrament is "the outward and visible sign of inward and spiritual grace." Paul deals with two—Baptism and the Eucharist, or Lord's Supper—both already firmly established in the earliest years of the Church. In baptism, he says, we "put on Christ." "The immersion in the water and the emergence are not merely typical of our participation in the death and resurrection of Christ but do in some mysterious manner effect that participation; we are baptized 'into Christ,' 'buried with him,' and with him 'raised up from the dead'; we are 'crucified with him,' and 'if we be dead with

¹Romans, i, 20.

²Romans, viii, 30.

Christ we believe that we shall also live with him.' We no longer live to ourselves, but to Christ; rather, Christ lives in us. By the same extension the eucharist becomes, as it were, a renewal and perpetuation of the mystical union accomplished in baptism."¹ And in the eating of the bread, and in the drinking of the wine, the communicant partakes of the body and the blood of Christ—not of substances which symbolically stand for the body and blood, but actually and literally of the body and blood themselves.

The integration of Christianity with world thought.—In following years the effort was continually renewed to define precisely the essential doctrine of the Church, and to build up a rational theology which should give Christian belief a secure foundation in demonstrable truth. The Church was under the necessity not only of meeting attacks from representatives of pagan philosophy, but also of confuting and quelling numerous heretical movements which arose from within its confines. The definition of essential doctrine reached its final stage in A. D. 451, at the Council of Chalcedon, when it was affirmed that Christ united in his one person both a perfect divinity and a complete humanity. In Asia Minor and in Greece there was no considerable development of Christian philosophy after this time. In the West, within the Roman Church, the most influential figure after the age of the Apostles was St. Augustine (354–430), who was converted to Christianity after becoming a student of Neoplatonism, and was in fact converted partly through Neoplatonism, in which he found every article of Christian belief, he said, except Christ himself. He contributed powerfully to make the doctrine of the Neoplatonists the philosophy of the Western Church; and, in addition, he took up and elaborated the doctrine of grace, or of predestination—whose earliest appearance we have noticed in the writings of St. Paul—and secured the formal acceptance of this doctrine in the Roman Church. It did not long maintain itself undiluted, however, and gradually sank from importance.

In the work of Augustine we see an effort being made, on the whole with striking success, to understand Christianity in terms of the best thought of the age. There were from the beginning certain fixed points of Christian belief; but from that time to the close of the Middle Ages there was a constant effort to preserve intellectual unity by interpreting and re-interpreting Christianity, without

¹P. E. More, *The Christ of the New Testament*, Princeton University Press, p. 196.

deserting its essential affirmations, so as to preserve harmony with existing science and philosophy. There was a great heightening of this effort during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and it reached its culmination in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), which is one of the great intellectual achievements of Western civilization, and which remains to this day the accepted philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church. Not long before the time of Aquinas the work of Aristotle, after having been lost to Europe for many centuries, had again become known; and it was this which impelled St. Thomas and several predecessors to reconstruct Christian philosophy in the light of what was to them new and important knowledge.

ORGANIZATION OF THE CHURCH

In the beginning each community in which Christianity was established had its own church, which was independent of all others, though there was frequent communication from one church to another. At the head of each church was an overseer or bishop. From a very early time certain bishops tended, simply from the importance of their geographical position, to assume posts of leadership. All arrangements at first were, however, very informal, loose, and democratic.

Rome first opposes then embraces Christianity.—Christians were held together sufficiently by the fact that their belief set them apart very markedly from the pagan inhabitants of their communities. Converts were, moreover, immediately faced with the possibility of trouble arising from the fact that they could not join in worship of the Roman emperor. Imperial officials found it difficult or impossible to understand this, if they even tried, and the refusal was construed as an act of rebellion—more or less important according to local circumstances. This was, and remained constantly, the focal point of trouble between the Christians and the Empire. A genuinely analogous case in some respects is that of the so-called “conscientious objector” during the World War. Christians were also, however, in some other ways a “peculiar people,” as officials discovered when their attention was directed to them; and because their beliefs and practices were strange, and ill-understood, rumors easily arose, and were sometimes credited, that the converts were addicted to barbarous or unnatural deeds, or that they really con-

stituted a secret political society carrying on a propaganda against the government. Hence for several centuries the Christians were subject to sporadic, local campaigns of persecution, now in one province, now in another. Decius was the first emperor (A. D. 250) to set on foot an organized campaign against Christians extending throughout the Empire. From 260 to 303, Christianity enjoyed practically complete toleration. In the latter year Diocletian inaugurated a new campaign—the last great persecution and by much the most severe of all of them.

The number of Christians who died for their faith rather than offer a sacrifice or burn incense before an "idolatrous" image or the portrait of an emperor cannot be known. It was smaller than was once supposed, but large enough to make a great impression on contemporary society and also to make adhesion to the new faith, very frequently, an act of extreme heroism. What relation this had to the growth of the religion it is difficult to say, though probably it promoted the purity, austerity, close union, and strict discipline of the converts, and so aided in the spread of Christianity. By the beginning of the fourth century it had spread throughout society and throughout the Empire, and had won adherents in the families of emperors. In 311 an edict of toleration was promulgated, and in 313 Christianity was placed in a position of complete equality with other religions. Ten years later a Christian, Constantine, became sole emperor, and thereafter all emperors save Julian reigned (361–363) were Christians. Before the close of the fourth century, heathen worship was officially forbidden, and Christianity thus made the religion of the Empire.

Papal supremacy and Church unity in the West.—The great change in the official position of Christianity was accompanied by corresponding changes in the organization of the Church. Christianity, now the religion of the State, began to assume a dignity of outward form, and also responsibilities, commensurate with its new position. Administrative machinery was necessarily elaborated and tightened. Gradually a few bishops came to occupy positions of leadership which made them natural centers of authority and of administration. From the beginning the church of Rome, the one church of apostolic foundation and at the same time the church of the imperial capital, was the great center of Christianity in the West, and it came very early to be looked on as the center of all Christendom. The primacy of the Bishop of Rome was officially

acknowledged as early as 381. The removal of the Western capital from Rome did not lessen the prestige of the city, and enhanced both the prestige and the responsibilities of the bishop. With the overthrow of the Western Empire (A. D. 476), the Bishop of Rome became practically the heir of the imperial administration, while the Western Church became the custodian of the old civilization and culture. Final separation of the Western Church from the Eastern, after having been many times threatened, came in 1054 when the Pope, as the bishop of Rome had come to be called, formally excommunicated the Patriarch of Constantinople—and was in turn immediately anathematized by the latter. On the part of the Pope this was an act, not of primacy, but of supremacy—and supremacy over Christendom had in fact long before been claimed by the Pope. The coronation of Charlemagne by Pope Leo III in 800 was later regarded as an act denoting the supremacy of papal authority, though it was not so understood by contemporaries, and it was not until the time of Gregory VII (Pope, 1073–1085) that papal supremacy over both Church and State was claimed without qualification. And the actual climax of acknowledged papal supremacy came with the reign of Innocent III (1198–1216).

By this time the Roman Church had become an immensely powerful institution, penetrating and vitally affecting the whole life of the peoples of Western Europe. The extent and importance of this influence, and likewise the virtual freedom of ecclesiastics from secular domination, have been described in an earlier chapter. Here we can only describe briefly the means by which clerical power made itself felt. The long struggle for papal supremacy was really a struggle to preserve, in the one way possible in the existing circumstances, the unity and freedom of the Church. As the Church expanded, authority was more and more centered in one person, the Bishop of Rome, and all other ecclesiastics came more and more to hold their positions as his delegates or representatives. Thus all Europe was portioned off into dioceses, each ruled over by a bishop whose appointment had to be confirmed by Rome; and each diocese was divided into parishes with their own priests acting as spiritual directors of the lay folk. This far-reaching organization was bound together as tightly as might be by dependence at every point upon its one Head. It was not, however, the Church's only

¹Chapter XIII, pp. 222–227.

means of holding its place in the world. It was supplemented by the *monastic orders*.

Monasticism and otherworldliness.—We have already seen that the primitive Christian viewpoint was distinctly *otherworldly*. To attain salvation man was bidden to turn away from the affairs of this life, to renounce wealth, and social position, and even, at need, the closest ties of family, in order to devote himself wholly to things eternal and spiritual. When Christianity became the religion, not of a few heroic souls willing to be separated from their communities as a “peculiar people,” but of those communities themselves in their entirety, otherworldliness took on, of necessity, a different aspect. It was essential to Christianity; it could not be abandoned; but neither could it be required uncompromisingly of everybody. Hence arose gradually the Roman Catholic conception of human society as an organism—as a united whole in which the several members performed differing functions in accordance with their abilities. Just as, within the body of the individual, the heart does one thing, the stomach another, the brain still another, and so on, yet all are equally necessary for life; so within society, it came to be believed, one man may be called to renounce the world, and another to labor in it, yet both for the greater glory of God and each usefully to the other.

Thus a place was found for the most complete otherworldliness, while Utopian efforts to transform society as a whole were wisely left untried. He who renounced the world might well do so just because he knew himself to be a weaker man than his brother who remained in the world. He chose the better way; but it was never thought that all could do so or should. Through renunciation, moreover, he sought not merely his own salvation, but that of others; or it was believed that the saint contributed to the Church’s treasury of merit which could be drawn on to aid in the salvation of the sinful.

Those who withdrew from the world soon found it expedient to associate themselves with one another, and this was the beginning of *monasticism*. The monastic movement had assumed definite form by the third century, and throughout the Middle Ages it continued to grow, attracting thousands of men and women, each of whom took perpetual vows of poverty, celibacy, and obedience. Though some failed to lead the saintly lives to which they were vowed, still, in general, the monks and nuns formed an army of

unique power working single-heartedly for the extension of Christendom and for the renewal, in each generation, of living Christian faith. As one example of the service performed through monastic discipline, it may be mentioned that the Benedictine Order alone gave the Church some twenty-four popes and no less than 460 archbishops and bishops.

Religious functions of the Church.—The secular clergy, as the parish priests were called, and the monastic clergy comprised a great society—a world of their own within the world—giving undivided allegiance to their common head, the Pope, and standing as sole mediators between God and man. For it was taught and believed that only through the offices of the Church could men hope to win salvation and that eternal heavenly life which was pictured as the goal of humanity's earthly probation. The Church, consequently, was the one authoritative guardian of faith and morals; and its exclusive power of direction could be exercised, and often was exercised, in every sphere of life from birth to death. In addition, moreover, the Church was the one channel through which God's grace was communicated to men, especially through the sacraments, which came to be seven in number, and which touched life at every crucial point. They were: Immediately after birth, *Baptism*, opening the Church's gates to man and constituting, symbolically, a second spiritual birth, which at the same time washed away the taint of Adam's sin; *Confirmation*, which completed, in youth, man's entrance into the Church, and came to aid him just when he might most need help against evil temptation; *Marriage*, which blessed the union of man and wife, giving it full religious sanction, and rendering it indissoluble; *Penance*, through which absolution might be obtained for sins committed; the *Eucharist*, which reunited the penitent with God through Christ; *Extreme Unction*, which finally cleansed the soul from sin and fortified it at its last earthly crisis, when facing imminent death; and *Holy Order*, through which bishops ordained priests, thus conferring on them an indelible character. A similar property was attached to Baptism and Confirmation, so that these, and the sacrament of Order, once obtained, could never be received again. Repentance and Communion, however, man stood in constant need of throughout life, so that the sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist were repeated with great frequency.

While these were the recognized channels through which grace was communicated to man, provided he interposed no obstacle,

and were hence made obligatory, the Church instituted many lesser observances and encouraged many forms of devotion which cannot even be mentioned here, but which tended to bring the whole life of man under its sway. At the same time, it was active in exacting their minimal Christian obligations from those who were inclined to be rebellious; and it claimed and received the aid of secular rulers when it became necessary to use force in quelling rebellion or in administering punishment. It has to be remembered in this connection that Christianity had become the religion of the State, that it was in no sense a voluntary society during the Middle Ages, and that disobedience was inevitably regarded much as men in the North regarded Southern secession at the time of the American Civil War. Amongst the Church's resources when ordinary methods of discipline failed, or when extreme cases of disobedience arose, were the *Inquisition*, a court of inquiry which imposed the death penalty on thousands convicted of obstinate heresy; *Excommunication*, which rendered its victim an outlaw and was sometimes, under medieval conditions of life, a penalty worse than immediate death; and the *Crusade*, or war of extermination directed against whole communities known to be heretical.

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

It should be obvious from what has been said about the essential nature of Christianity that, in so far as its precepts should be carried out in action, it would exert a pronounced—even, indeed, a revolutionary—influence upon social life. It should be equally obvious that medieval Christianity did exert a pervasive, unescapable influence throughout society, but not a revolutionary one. Reasons for this have been suggested above, in our brief account of the rise of monasticism. The monasteries represent the only instances known to history of successful communism; yet they were not, of course, instituted as a means of promoting social reform, or as examples of an ideal to be aimed at by those living in the world. Christians who did not feel called to renounce the world were encouraged to detach themselves *inwardly* from it as much as possible, to keep themselves from being enslaved by its distractions, by its burdens, by its snares for enlisting ambition and for raising up pride;—they were encouraged, in brief, to live as men not of the world, though in it. And evidently, to the extent that Christians could so

live, a most important change must have resulted in the spirit of men's dealings with one another, and equally in the character of social life.

No revolution of the kind really occurred during the Middle Ages nevertheless, for the simple reason that the great majority of men could never rise to the level of genuine inward detachment. It is however, not in the least open to doubt that faithfulness to this teaching, on the part of all men, would straightway bring about a social revolution, resulting in universal social welfare. Yet such a revolution would not abolish either poverty or wealth; nor would it if it brought any important changes in the social order, promote equalitarianism. And even the social welfare which it would insure would be strictly a by-product. For the one vital matter from the Christian viewpoint is the character, the real inward state, of the individual; and the inward change promoted by Christianity is conducive to social welfare precisely because the regenerate or twice-born man is personally indifferent to those elements of material well-being which strike the "natural" or once-born man as being the most important factors in life. The "natural man" is always likely to assume, furthermore, that he is in a perfectly satisfactory inward condition, and that what is needed for happiness is greater respect, on the part of all others, for his "rights," as he calls them without really knowing what he is saying. The regenerate man, on the other hand, knows that no human being is in a satisfactory inward condition, and determines that, regardless of others, he personally must keep trying to be honest, to be just, to be faithful in performing his duties, at no matter what cost to himself.

The distinction here drawn is apparently not easy for people nowadays to understand. It is, however, necessary to grasp it, if one is to see Christianity as it was in the beginning and in the Middle Ages, and as it is today where it has not departed from its true character. For historic Christianity is not a gospel of social welfare or of social reform as those terms are practically always used in our time. The notion that happiness is attainable on earth save by anticipation of the immortal, blessed life of the soul, is foreign to Christianity. The notion that man can, through the exercise of his own power and intelligence, so alter the conditions of existence as to make our world an earthly paradise is foreign to Christianity. And the notion, consequently, that such effort is the proper work

of man, through which he develops and realizes his true self and accomplishes the purpose for which he exists, is equally foreign to Christianity.

Devotion to earthly well-being is in fact the antithesis of that which, through the centuries, Christianity has stood for. The conception of "the world" entertained by the earliest Christians was, to be sure, very different from that accepted during the Middle Ages and, in essentials, by modern Roman Catholicism. The practical inference made, however, was the same: The world must go as it will; the true Christian's real concern is not with the improvement of earthly life, but with heavenly things.

This is not to say that the true Christian is or should be indifferent to the improvement of earthly life. But it is necessary to emphasize the subordinate and *sometimes* quite unessential character of earthly well-being from the Christian viewpoint. The whole problem turns upon the end for which man lives and in terms of which all else must be judged. And Christianity, like other religions, is autonomous; it has its own distinct sphere of work and belief; it conceives the prime object of humanity to be the attainment of peace—that peace which passeth understanding—through union with ultimate Reality, which in turn it conceives to be immaterial, divine, and eternally existent in a realm other than this sensible world of our present life; and it judges all things else accordingly as they are useful or not useful for this object. The world of our present life is a mixed world; though divinely created and full of heavenly suggestions for those with eyes to see, it is also transitory, corrupt, and restless—in a state of perpetual change and tension—as we ourselves are. And as long as it remains, it will remain essentially as it is. Peace can come to man, never from immersing himself in earthly concerns, making himself their creature or slave, no matter how excellent his intentions in so doing, but only from breaking through the bars of illusion which imprison him on earth, from putting off the shackles of mortality, and from putting on "incorruption"—which is to say, uniting himself with the timeless realm of immaterial reality.

To contend, moreover, that man is unable to do this when oppressed by poverty, when the victim of injustice, when borne down by disease, when compelled to make war against his fellows, and the like, is to assert what history, in every part of our world, has repeatedly demonstrated to be false. Suffering, on the contrary, is precisely that which most clearly shows, as we say, what a man

is good for. The lessons it teaches, it alone can teach; and without them we are utterly unable to realize and fulfill our humanity. What we know of human steadfastness, courage, dignity, nobility and heroism, we know solely through its instrumentality.

It is, then, because the world is our place of probation and growth—not our resting-place or home—and because social reform, as the term is nowadays used, does not point beyond material well-being and ignoble ease as its goal, that Christianity has been consistently indifferent to clamor for social revolution, while always encouraging individual philanthropy, the performance of kindly and merciful works, issuing from brotherly love—which is not love unless it is personal, and which cannot be expressed save through personal ministrations.

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CHAPTER XXXVIII

CHRISTIANITY IN MODERN SOCIETY

ST. AUGUSTINE wrote, in the treatise *On Christian Doctrine* from which a passage was quoted in the preceding chapter:

To enjoy a thing is to rest with satisfaction in it for its own sake. To use, on the other hand, is to employ whatever means are at one's disposal to obtain what one desires, if it is a proper object of desire; for an unlawful use ought rather to be called an abuse. Suppose, then, we were wanderers in a strange country, and could not live happily away from our fatherland, and that we felt wretched in our wandering and, wishing to put an end to our misery, determined to return home. We find, however, that we must make use of some mode of conveyance, either by land or water, in order to reach that fatherland where our enjoyment is to commence. But the beauty of the country through which we pass and the very pleasure of the motion, charm our hearts, and turning these things which we ought to use into objects of enjoyment, we become unwilling to hasten the end of our journey; and becoming engrossed in factitious delight, our thoughts are diverted from that home whose delights would make us truly happy. Such is a picture of our condition in this life of mortality. We have wandered far from God; and if we wish to return to our Father's home, this world must be used, not enjoyed, that so the invisible things of God may be clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made—that is, that by means of what is material and temporary we may lay hold upon that which is spiritual and eternal.

These words very exactly define the Christian attitude toward life. It is, as we have earlier explained, *otherworldly*. Augustine makes it clear that otherworldliness is not by any means the same thing as asceticism. It may lead to asceticism, as when Jesus bade his followers cut off a hand or pluck out an eye, if necessary, rather than become enslaved by sin. This, however, is an exceptional and desperate remedy for a well-nigh hopeless condition. Yet otherworldliness, while it should not be confused with asceticism, does signify a life of detachment from earthly concerns—a life purged of

self-seeking, of worldly ambition, of wandering desires, a disciplined life, a life of devotion to spiritual ends. And such lives have been lived by some Christians in every generation from the first century of our era to the present day; and the Church in every generation has proved itself a true home for those Christians, and a source of ever-renewed strength.

HUMAN ELEMENTS AS A CORRODING INFLUENCE IN THE MEDIEVAL CHURCH

This fact should be particularly remembered as we proceed. For Christianity, once founded, could only be preserved amongst men by being entrusted to the care of men themselves—imperfect, selfish, sinful, ambitious men. During the first few centuries, to be sure, the consequences of this were not apparent, because selfish and ambitious men were not attracted to ecclesiastical careers when the Christians were few and obscure and when they were often called on to face martyrdom. But when Christianity became the one religion of Europe, the Church became, as we have already said, a great world in itself—a vast and complex organization, with posts at the top of much power and dignity, with growing wealth, and with a place in society to render secure and to heighten when possible. At the same time, this organization had to deal mostly with barbarians, which means that it had to develop strength of a kind that barbarians could feel, that it had to be frequently dictatorial or harshly assertive—as one has to be when dealing with children, that it had to devise awe-inspiring methods of correction or punishment, and that it had to adopt some of the ways of those with whom it dealt. No institution can rise above the level of those who direct it. An institution such as the Roman Catholic Church became during the Middle Ages is necessarily, in its personnel, a cross-section of society, including all kinds of people, good, bad, and indifferent, and affording many opportunities for corrupt practices.

Those opportunities, as time went on, were made the most of. The Church of the later Middle Ages was proud, headstrong, fiercely intolerant, and thoroughly corrupt. Great ecclesiastics occupied positions in society indistinguishable from those of noblemen or kings; and when the revival of classical studies in Italy became unmistakably a secular attempt to enrich earthly life, in all directions

suggested by ancient pagan civilization, the movement found generous patrons and enthusiastic disciples amongst the princes of the Church and on the papal throne. And though the Church had become wealthy—in various parts of Europe it was estimated that not less than one-third of the land had gradually fallen into its hands—still, the Popes remained continually in want of money, and were ready to adopt any likely means of getting it.

THE GROWING OPPOSITION TO THE MEDIEVAL CHURCH

It was primarily the question of money—the root of all evil—which brought about the secession usually referred to as the Protestant Reformation. From the very beginning the Church had had to contend against movements of revolt or dissension. Some of these had assumed the most serious proportions. In general, however, they had, in the end, been either crushed or absorbed. Before the sixteenth century the only great division in Christendom that promised to be permanent was the one between the Eastern churches and Rome, mentioned in the last chapter. Following upon that, especially from the twelfth century on, there had been a long succession of attempts at change or reform which had in one way or another been disposed of. Taking them as a whole, they may fairly be regarded as signs of vitality, and they were certainly, as heretical movements of the earliest centuries had been, instruments of growth. To mention a single example, feelings of deep dissatisfaction with conditions in the Church were responsible, at the close of the twelfth century, for two quite similar movements of reform, one of which, receiving papal approval, resulted in the formation of the Franciscan order—while the other, failing to receive it, perhaps only because it was the earlier, became a troublesome heretical sect known as the Waldensians.

The absorption of the Franciscans shows, however, that, while the Church was ready to make a place for them within its many-sided, complex structure, and to benefit by their piety and zeal, it could not be itself changed in spirit by their example. This great organization had, in fact, acquired a settled character and momentum of its own, too strong to be altered by any one person or group of persons. It had never forgotten the real reason for its

¹First Timothy, vi, 10.

distence, but it had also attained a place of dominance in worldly affairs, and this it was prepared to retain at any cost.

It had, consequently, nothing but opposition for John Wyclif (c. 1324-1384) in England when he expressly challenged the Church's earthly powers and greed for money. Wyclif boldly declared that the Pope, by acquiring worldly power and seeking always to increase it, had become the representative on earth, not of Christ, but of the spirit of Antichrist. For confirmation he appealed directly to the Bible as the one final source of authority for Christians, asserting that in so far as popes and other ecclesiastics had departed from the Bible they had become guilty of heresy. On Biblical grounds he also attacked the doctrine of transubstantiation¹, accepting in its place that of the real presence—the doctrine that the body and blood of Christ are genuinely present in the eucharist, but only in some fashion which resists definition.

There was no possible way in which the Church could absorb the teaching of Wyclif. Though he had no thought of withdrawing from it, he called, as things were, not for reform, but for a revolution. He was accordingly attacked, but was protected from physical harm by certain powerful English families, in grateful return for the aid his teaching gave in their resistance to temporal claims of the Church. During the half-century after his death, however, his English followers, the Lollards, were killed or forced into hiding; and his followers in Bohemia, whither his doctrine had quickly spread, were likewise rooted out. Their leader, John Hus, was burned at the stake in 1415, and many of the rank and file were killed in the Bohemian civil war of 1434.

THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION

Beginning and spread of the Protestant Movement.—During the remainder of the fifteenth century there were no important outbreaks against the papacy. There were, on the contrary, many indications that the power and prestige of Rome were increasing, and that the need for thoroughgoing reform was being recognized, especially in Spain and Italy, by highly-placed churchmen who might reasonably be expected to accomplish it in time.

¹This is the Catholic doctrine that the whole *substance*—though not, of course, the *tributes*, such as appearance, taste, odor—of the eucharistic bread and wine is converted into the body and blood respectively of Christ. "Substance" and "attribute," as used to define transubstantiation, are terms of scholastic philosophy.

In 1510, however, Pope Julius II, in order to raise money for the rebuilding of the Church of St. Peter at Rome, initiated a campaign for the sale of indulgences.¹ This campaign was continued by Leo X, the successor of Julius, with the consequence that in 1517 a Dominican friar named Tetzel undertook to sell indulgences in the region near Wittenberg, in Northern Germany. The actions and reported words of Tetzel aroused the indignant opposition of Martin Luther (1483-1546), a priest and professor of philosophy at the University of Wittenberg, and caused him, on 31 October, 1517, to post on the door of the castle church ninety-five theses against the sale of indulgences.

Luther had no notion what the ultimate consequences of his actions were to be. He was, however, a headstrong man; he found himself at once involved in violent controversy; and he grew bolder with each new pamphlet he wrote against his opponents. He soon discovered, moreover, that he had become the leader of a widespread popular movement, which had needed only a spark to set it off—a movement of revolt, having the active sympathy of princes against the oppressive extortions of the papacy. He was regarded as a new power raised up against clerical abuses, and this indeed he was; but in several of his original theses he had directly questioned the power of the Pope, and as he developed his position he rapidly went as far as Wyclif had gone in the way of making any compromise impossible.

The result was that in 1520 a papal bull was issued, condemning the propositions drawn from Luther's writings, directing that those writings should be burned, and giving their author sixty days within which to recant. Luther answered by openly burning the bull, together with books by his opponents, and by publishing a treatise *Against the Bull of the Antichrist*. He was duly excommunicated.

¹An indulgence is "a remission of the punishment which is still due to sin after sacramental absolution, this remission being valid in the court of conscience and before God, and being made by an application of the treasure of the Church on the part of a lawful superior." (*Catholic Dict.* quoted in N. E. D.) The indulgences offered by Julius II, however, conveyed a plenary remission of all sins under certain conditions and were applicable both to living people and to souls then in purgatory. The "treasure" referred to in the above definition is, so to say, an over-balance of "merit" created by acts of extraordinary piety, which may be drawn on by the Church for the benefit of sinful but repentant persons. The theory of the indulgence, when carefully stated by a theologian, is one thing; the popular conception of the indulgence, in the Middle Ages and later, as practically a licence to sin in safety, purchasable for so much cash, was something else—a scandalous abuse, tacitly or openly fostered by those who had the task of selling the documents in any way they could.

It did not diminish his following, though even as late as 1530 his followers wished not to secede from the Church, but only to bring about its reformation. It was a vain desire, and finally in 1555 the right of the new religion to separate existence was conceded—not, of course, by the Pope, but by the diet of the Holy Roman Empire.

Luther, in contesting the authority of the Pope, had been drawn from one position to another, until he rested in the assertion that final authority was vested in the word of God itself and also, in effect, in the conscience of each believer. This was the position that Protestants in general took—and very soon Protestants were to be found throughout Northern Europe. Lutheranism was established in place of Catholicism in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden by 1537. In 1522 a successful Protestant movement was inaugurated by Ulrich Zwingli at Zürich, in Switzerland, which spread rapidly to the other cantons of German Switzerland, and also to cities in Southern Germany. By 1525 Protestantism had made such headway in France that a campaign of persecution was then undertaken against it; but Protestants continued nevertheless to increase in number there, though not winning a recognized position until much later, and then only temporarily. In 1536 John Calvin (1509–1564), after Luther the greatest of the leaders of the Reformation, and the founder of Presbyterianism, took up his work in Geneva, making that city the center of the reformed churches of France and French Switzerland, and also the fountain-head of Dutch, English, and Scottish Protestantism.

Character and extent of the change.—It might reasonably have been supposed, when the movement had gone thus far with the greatest rapidity, that its further progress would be inevitable, and irresistible, and that the Roman Catholic Church was doomed. In fact, however, Protestantism made but little further progress. It never penetrated Southern Europe or Southern Ireland, and it later tended to recede in France, and in the nineteenth century scarcely held its own in England. Protestantism, it is true, has been carried into all parts of the earth by colonization and missions, but so, equally, has Catholicism—and the Roman Catholic Church remains today the Church of the majority of Christians.

The doctrinal aspect of Protestantism is not a matter of the greatest importance. In general its leaders professed to be returning to primitive Christianity, clearing away the vast accumulation of

errors, abuses, and unjustifiable changes which Rome had gradually introduced. This attempt, however, was chimerical, as are all attempts to restore "the good old times." Actually, the Reformers were much influenced by medieval mysticism, by scholasticism, by the revival of classical studies, and by Roman absolutism, as well as by fresh study of the Bible. Protestant theology was Pauline and Augustinian in character, and Calvin is in this direction chiefly remarkable for the length to which he went in making explicit the consequences of the doctrine of unqualified or absolute predestination. Oliver Wendell Holmes, it may be recalled, did not see how man could understandingly accept this doctrine and remain sane inasmuch as it seems, on its face, to make God a monster and human life meaningless. But, while Protestant theology was forced to take an extreme position on this and on a few other questions around which controversy was made to center, on the whole it remained identical with Roman Catholic theology, alike in its authoritative sources and in its development.

In almost every direction, indeed, the differences between the two camps, of which so much was made, were differences of detail rather than of fundamental principle. Protestantism, for example, took over completely the medieval Catholic conception of society as an organic body under the control of the Deity through both Church and State, and no Protestants in the seventeenth century except the Anabaptists even imagined that Church and State might be separated. Luther and the English gave the primacy to the State, while Calvin, insisting on the complete autonomy of the Church, in effect gave the primacy to it. Equally in both cases, however, the new religion became the religion of the State, and all persons were under the jurisdiction of the one were at the same time and by the same token under the jurisdiction of the other. Thus Calvin and others elsewhere, following him—minutely regulated, for the purposes of religious discipline and instruction, the daily life of every citizen of Geneva, enforcing the rules with the help of the civil government, and tolerating no dissent as well as no disobedience.

The chief difference here between Calvinism and Catholicism is that the Protestant attempt at regulation was successful only for brief periods of exceptional enthusiasm, and then only within relatively small areas. The reason for Protestant failure, in this direction, is that Protestants, in their confidence that they alone were in possession of the absolute truth, fancied the Reformation was to

ear fruit in an instantly transformed human nature. Every protestant was to be a saint, and the things appropriate in a saint were often quite extraordinary. Some saints, a little later, were to be without buttons, because buttons were thought to be unbiblical—and there are still members of this sect today, buttonless, but otherwise not more saintly than many who are buttoned. In general, sanguine expectations made for oppressive regulation, which made for reaction, which afforded a field for fresh reforming efforts. Thus Protestantism has followed an uneven course, periodically bursting forth in revivals more or less spectacular, until the “revival” has come to be regarded as characteristic of it—though it is in fact a symptom of disease.

SOME UNFORESEEN RESULTS OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION

Christianity weakened through division.—There is no desire, lying behind what is said here, either to belittle the need which the reformation attempted to satisfy or to imply that the Protestant revolt did not have far-reaching consequences of the utmost importance. That the Roman Catholic Church, while remaining a many-sided institution, had nevertheless become a corrupt instrument of merciless oppression throughout Europe, has been recognized above. It is useless to imagine what reforms might have been accomplished within it, in time, had the opportunity been given. As a point of fact, it took nothing less than the Reformation to arouse Catholicism to the necessity of a radical change of spirit—though when the Church proved that it had a remarkable and immense fund of vitality, as it obviously has today. For the Reformation was immediately followed by the Counter-Reformation, as it is called, the Catholic Reformation, of which the two most conspicuous outward signs are the work of the Council of Trent (1545–1563) and the formation of the Society of Jesus by Ignatius de Loyola (1491–1556), which received papal approbation in 1540. The Council of Trent not only defined carefully the points of opposition between Catholicism and Protestantism, but also formulated and affirmed a number of doctrines which had long been held without ever being explicitly defined, and instituted reforms of abuses which affected every sphere of the life of the Church. The work of the Council was effective, because there was at the same time a marked increase of religious seriousness throughout the Church.

This, then, was the earliest of the larger consequences of the Reformation. It was one which the Reformers had not foreseen or desired. In both respects it was typical of others that were to follow; and it is a fact which must be faced that the Reformation derives no small part of its great historical importance from its unforeseen and undesired consequences.

Tolerance and religious liberty.—By introducing a permanent division, the Reformation permanently weakened Christianity and rendered it much more vulnerable to the enemies of religion, who were shortly to increase at a rapid rate. The heated theological controversy, in the second place, which attended the Reformation as well as the fact of division itself, led Protestants and Catholics alike to define their positions more exactly and fully and rigidly than had previously been thought necessary by the Church. The Christianity thenceforth presented the spectacle of a number of rival bodies, each claiming to be the sole custodian of saving truth, and each hardened into a spiritual tyranny claiming absolute control over the minds, consciences, and activities of its adherents.

This situation made impossible for religious toleration, though nothing could have been further from the wishes of those who created it. In addition, the very nature of Protestantism made not only impossible for religious toleration but for the growth of rationalistic naturalism in spite of all that the earliest Reformers could do. For Protestantism, in denying the authority of the Catholic Church, did not at all deny that Christianity had been divinely revealed, but simply claimed that the Bible, the written record of revelation, was the sole and final authority for Christians. The Bible was regarded—equally by both Catholics and Protestants—as the infallible word of God. It was without error and it was complete;—that is, it contained the absolute truth concerning everything with which it dealt, and contained all that was necessary to be known for salvation.

However, the matter was not so simple as it may at first have seemed. For if one denied the authority of the Church, which hitherto had vouched for the Bible, how could one be sure that the book was really what it purported to be? The revelation it recorded was one made long ago, to men of a distant place and alien language. How could one know that such a record as the Bible contained was authentic? Yet so much depended on its complete authenticity that some way had to be found of proving it. But, supposing that the way was found, difficulties were by no means over. The Bible

fortunately, was not always clear, and it was not at all evident even to a careful reader of it just what was or was not necessary for salvation. How was this important question to be decided? Hitherto, of course, the Church had been the authoritative interpreter. The unescapable logic of the Protestant position was that henceforth each man must be his own interpreter, and this was understood and accepted without any conception of what the immediate or remoter consequences were to be.

The immediate result was chaos. Nobody wanted that, and nobody had really contemplated every man's setting up his own church, which was the same thing as having no church at all. Hence the Reformers were promptly compelled to draw up articles of faith and statements of doctrine—such as the Westminster Confession of the Presbyterian Church—which prescribed how the Bible must be understood. But to do this, of course, was to give the interpretation thus drawn up an authority superior to that of the Bible, and so to effect to create a new infallible church. It was, in other words, to do exactly that which, when done by the Catholic Church, had caused the Protestants to secede from it.

The expedient was a partial and temporary success, inasmuch as it accomplished what many thought to be necessary, and so were ready to accept. At no time, however, did it prevent Protestants from disagreeing with one another, and it did not long postpone resort to the only argument which, men thought, could serve as a valid justification of Protestantism. This may be illustrated by a few passages from William Chillingworth's *Religion of Protestants Its Safe Way to Salvation*. Chillingworth asks:

If Scripture cannot be the judge of any controversy, how shall that touching the Church and the notes of it be determined? And if it be the judge of this one, why may it not of others? Why not of all? Those only excepted wherein the Scripture itself is the subject of the question, which cannot be determined but by natural reason, the only principle beside Scripture which is common to Christians.

And concerning the interpretation of Scripture Chillingworth says:

Every man is to judge for himself with the judgment of discretion. . . . For if the Scripture (as it is in things necessary) be plain, why should it be more necessary to have a judge to interpret it in plain places, than to have a judge to interpret the meaning of a council's decrees, and

others to interpret their interpretations, and others to interpret their and so on forever? And where they are not plain, there if we, using diligence to find the truth, do yet miss of it and fall into error, there is no danger in it. They that err and they that do not err may both be saved. So that those places which contain things necessary, and wherein error were dangerous, need no infallible interpreter, because they are plain, and those that are obscure need none, because they contain not things necessary, neither is error in them dangerous.

Here Chillingworth not only makes the individual's "natural reason" the final judge as to both the authenticity of Scripture and its meaning, but also points the way to toleration, in his insistence that those questions about Christianity over which there can be no controversy are certainly unessential questions. This leaves room, of course, for any number of differences of interpretation which may be, without harm, allowed to coexist in a community, where all are at least Christians of some kind. And such toleration was established in the colony of Rhode Island about the time that Chillingworth was writing, and in Maryland a couple of years later. It was established in Pennsylvania in 1682, and in England in 1689. It was not at first complete—England, for example, punishing Roman Catholics with severe disabilities until much later—nor has complete religious liberty, the next step, been yet attained in any civilized portions of the earth—nor is it likely to be. In general it may be said that religious toleration, while made inevitable by the many divisions between Protestants, would have come even more slowly than it did, had not political considerations made it seem expedient. And religious liberty, similarly, has won its way not so much on its own merits as because of growing religious indifference.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE

Religious indifference or, under some circumstances, active hostility to Christianity, has come to be an important phenomenon in the modern world owing chiefly to the growth of the exact sciences and to the progress of historical criticism. The last three centuries can be pictured—and are pictured by some historians—as a prolonged but constantly triumphant warfare of "reason" against "superstition." And in this picture "superstition" stands for Christianity. One trouble with the war, which has made it so

gthy an affair, is that religion never seems to know when she is
aten. The "rationalists," as they like to call themselves, are
fectly correct in maintaining that they have a long succession of
isive victories to their credit; and one must agree that if Chris-
nity is, as they tell us, nothing more than a hotbed of "supersti-
n," it is strange indeed that it still survives and still opposes
elf resolutely to these benefactors of mankind. In order to under-
nd the situation for ourselves, however, we must proceed to see
t what "rationalism" has accomplished.

Religion versus rationalism.—The "natural reason" which
illingworth and others in the early seventeenth century liberated
the support of Protestantism was supposed to be a faculty im-
nted in men, by the exercise of which they could come to know
e absolute truth, in so far as that was mirrored in the structure of
e universe. This was a conception of reason which had been
ken over from ancient Greek philosophy by medieval Catholicism,
d which had descended through St. Thomas Aquinas and others
the fathers of the Anglican Church. It had been maintained by
ristian philosophers of Western Europe, under varying conditions
d with apparent success, from St. Augustine until the seventeenth
ntury, that man, simply by the use of "natural reason," could
nt all that was necessary for salvation—and, indeed, as was
nted out in the preceding chapter, this position had been taken
St. Paul in the earliest years of Christianity. It had also been
intained, by St. Thomas and others, that the revealed portion of
ristianity, though not, of course, discoverable by reason, was
eeable to reason, and formed a harmonious and necessary com-
ment to that which reason could discover.

During the period of the Renaissance, however, there had been
some quarters a growing doubt about the reasonableness of
ristianity; because increasing knowledge both of ancient, pre-
ristian civilization and thought, and of the far East and the
mericas, kept suggesting that Christian philosophy had ignored
ch that must be taken into account in any complete and true
ture of the universe and its relation to its real or alleged Creator.
d these suggestions that the conclusions of reason might not
er all be in complete agreement with Christianity had begun to
her force at a time when the conflict between Catholicism and
otestantism had happened, on the one hand, to place extreme
phasis upon the supposed infallibility of the Bible, and, on the

other, to call in question the authority which vouched for the Bible. Moreover, from the time of Copernicus (1473-1543) on to the present day, both the physical and natural sciences and historic investigation have continued to pile up evidence that Christianity in the form in which it was universally conceived in the sixteenth century, is hopelessly at variance with demonstrable truth. The evidence long ago attained massive proportions and entire conclusiveness.

It is sometimes said that the quarrel between those former friends of reason and Christianity, reached its climax and finally irreconcilable stage with Darwin's announcement of his theory of organic evolution in 1859. And in a sense this is true; but it should be realized that, in essentials, the issue was clearly drawn and understood before the close of the seventeenth century. It took, indeed, only one consideration to place the question fairly before men—and a consideration which historical study and geographical exploration had forced upon their attention with unescapable emphasis by the end of the sixteenth century. For it was by that time evident beyond doubt that untold numbers of men in many parts of the world had lived and died without the possibility of becoming even acquainted with the Christian revelation. It was evident, indeed, that only a minority of the men born since the time of Christ had had the opportunity to become Christians. God, then, stood convicted of incredible favoritism and ferocity if it was really true that historical Christianity afforded the one and only means of salvation. Christians had, to be sure, ways of meeting this issue; but as time passed it seemed more and more clear to reasonable men that the difficulty was being evaded rather than conquered—that, in fact, Christians were trying not at all successfully to make the best of a bad situation. Hence it seemed fair to conclude that the claims made for Christianity were exaggerated, if not wholly false.

And men did so conclude. An English nobleman who was in a position to know, wrote, in the early years of the eighteenth century,

The fable of Christianity, as Leo X called it, was now so exploded in England that any man of fashion or condition would have been almost as much ashamed in company to own himself a Christian as formerly he would have been afraid to profess himself none. Even the women who prided themselves at all on their understanding took care to let people know that Christian prejudices were what they despised being

ound by. Many of the best writers of the age had indeed written so forcibly and so openly against this system of religion that it was not surprising they gained so many converts.¹

How far has rationalism overthrown religion?—It is impossible here even to outline the history of this conflict. All that we can now do is to notice just what it is that the progress of knowledge since the Renaissance has overthrown. It has completely overthrown the notion that the Bible is at all different in its composition from any other literary and historical document. It has established beyond question that the Bible, to be understood, must be studied just as we study every other ancient record, and must be judged just as we judge every other ancient record. It has established beyond question that the Bible is the work of men like ourselves, subject to error as we are; and that it necessarily was written in terms of the “science and philosophy” of its day. When the Bible tells us that the world was created in seven days, we are sure that the Bible is wrong—as we are also sure it is wrong when it tells us that Joshua caused the sun to stand still. How much this leaves intact is today a difficult and unsettled question.

It should be clear, however, that the successful attacks of “rationalism” upon the doctrine of Biblical infallibility do nothing to overthrow Christianity. These attacks overthrow only that conception of the historical record, embodied in the Bible, which had come to prevail in the Middle Ages and which was specially developed and “hardened” in the sixteenth century. It is also a fact, however, that the progress of knowledge has rendered completely untenable the notion that Christianity can claim to be the one “true” or necessarily final religion of mankind, and has shown that the Pauline account of the relation between God and his creatures must be regarded as having only symbolic value.

It is supposed by very many at the present time that the progress of knowledge has demonstrated a great deal more than this;—that it has, for example, proved men to be only quite superior animals; that it has disproved the possibility of a future life, and of a Creator, and of the divine nature of Jesus; that it has, consequently, confined the sphere of man’s aspiration rigidly to this earth; and the like. All propositions of this kind, however, are based upon the assumption that our present knowledge, as far as it goes, is absolutely true, and

¹ Lord Hervey’s *Memoirs*.

a firm basis for unlimited inference. And this assumption is one which can only be made and accepted by those who have no capacity for learning the lessons of history. Unfortunately, there are many men in responsible positions nowadays who are glad to act as the guides and teachers of our generation, who may be learned and industrious specialists in some branch of science, but who, nevertheless, have the mentality of "high-powered" salesmen, the kind of self-confidence bred only by ignorance, outside of their small "field," and the unscrupulousness of all fanatics. These are the people who make, and who lead others to make, the assumption in question. They should be regarded by fair-minded persons with the utmost distrust. They are today the worst enemies of the sciences they represent. For actually nothing can be more certain than the falsity of this assumption. Nothing in our world has changed so rapidly during recent years as our so-called science. There is no reason to imagine that it will not change and change again in the future as in the past. There is no reason to fancy that we have attained or can attain absolute knowledge in any important field of inquiry. There is no possibility of reaching objective certainty concerning most of the great questions which we, none the less, have to answer as best we can for our guidance in life. The modern progress of knowledge has, in fact, shown conclusively that we are left to ourselves, no better than the babes in the wood of the old tale. And a more impressive confirmation than this of the profound understanding of life exhibited by the great religious teachers of the ancient world could scarcely be desired.

It can only be said, then, at present, that in the conflict between "rationalism" and Christianity, the former has been properly and decisively victorious over much which it has attacked; but that nevertheless, it has been mistaken in supposing that the object actually attacked was religion. Discredited science and philosophy have not been shown to be identical with Christianity. Historically, Christianity has, certainly, been shown to be imbedded in a mass of outworn science and philosophy and in a mythology based upon this faulty "knowledge"; but this, after all, is just what we should expect. It is really impossible to imagine how it could have been otherwise. And it leaves quite untouched the real question about Christianity. It does not show that the Christian reading of life and Christian faith and hope based thereon, may not still be nearer the truth of things than any alternative answers hitherto given to

er deepest questionings. It does not show that Jesus may not have been in a unique sense the son of God and, indeed, just what was said to be at the Council of Chalcedon. It does show, on the other hand, that Christianity is now in desperate need of reconstruction; and, to speak more generally, it shows that religious truth, if we are to keep it living in our world of change, must always be open to critical examination and must periodically be reformulated and interpreted. The task is difficult and hazardous. It is not surprising that its necessity has been recognized slowly and with reluctance. Reconstruction is, however, bound to come; and it is this, instead of the death of Christianity, which is the real result of the long modern conflict between religion and science.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

Very many would disagree with the statement that a radical reconstruction of Christianity is bound to come, some thinking all religion out of place in the modern world and hoping for its early disappearance; others thinking that no reconstruction of Christianity is necessary or desirable; and still others contending that reconstruction has been actually in progress for many years and is now practically accomplished. Our present situation, in different words, is one of extreme confusion. It is generally recognized that, Christianity is to be discarded, a substitute—not necessarily a new religion—must be found for it; because social existence is not conceivable except in terms of *some* commonly accepted evaluation of life from which standards of conduct may be derived. There are, however, a few nowadays who do not even assent to this elementary proposition. Pleased by our modern confusion, they frankly welcome the state of anarchy towards which they think it points; and some of them, with characteristically sub-human inconsistency, are ready—or talk as if they were ready—to kill all men disagreeing with them. But these are cranks and, in addition, a group of very ignorant barbarians—journalists chiefly—whose capacity for thought is exhausted in a vision of everything “wide-open.”

Civilization has always its “lunatic fringe,” and such people as these belong to it. Their only importance lies in the evidence they furnish that our present situation is a confused one. They are, to be sure, a nuisance when vocal, but they can be counted on to discredit themselves.

Attempts to reconstruct Christianity.—We may go on, then, once to consider the claim that the reconstruction of Christianity in accordance with modern knowledge has been actually in progress for many years and is now practically accomplished. It is quite true, as we have already seen, that serious difficulties over some aspects of Christian belief made themselves widely felt several centuries ago; and it is also true that efforts were promptly made to alter belief in obedience to these objections. It is even possible, up to a certain point, to regard the Protestant Reformation as a movement of this kind, because, following in spite of themselves the general trend of the Renaissance, the Reformers promoted individualism in religion; and also because Calvin gave explicit though guarded encouragement to modern business enterprise. In general, however, it must be said that while various Protestant bodies have persisted from the seventeenth century to the present day, in the effort to adapt themselves to changed conditions of life and thought, the attempt has not been successful. In England, in the eighteenth century, the impression was given that the Church required adhesion to traditional creeds and maintained traditional forms of worship only for the sake of appearances, and that in reality it had come to follow the lead of society and of secular thought, instead of furnishing positive guidance and correction. It continued to receive the support of society because it aided society to go its own way. It did what it could to promote social welfare as social welfare was then conceived. The Church thus became, in effect, the servant of this world, teaching the kind of morality thought to be necessary or useful in facilitating the relations of men with one another. This is not to say that an easy or merely prudential morality was invariably taught; altruism was preached, which presently became consecration to the cause of bringing about "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."

The Modernist view.—On the whole, more "forward-looking" Christian bodies have continued in this path without essential change to the present day. The nineteenth century brought many alterations in thought and ways of life and social conditions, and the twentieth has brought others. These have affected, more or less, nearly all of the Protestant churches. Whereas, for example, the Church of England a century and a half ago supported the cause of social *stability*, some groups within it and within the American Episcopal Church today are composed of zealous social *reformers*.

These religion seems to be summed up in their humanitarian activities, amongst which the most important is the attempt to *change* the structure of society in order to promote "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." This shift from static to so-called dynamic views is striking; but it should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the relationship of the Church to society remains unaltered. Today exactly as in the eighteenth century various Christian bodies are the servants of society, following secular leadership, and aiding the effort to achieve secular aims. It is said, for instance, that this is the very nature of modern Unitarianism, Universalism, and Liberal Congregationalism in the United States. There are, however, considerable differences of emphasis, not only between various groups, but between individuals within the same group or sect, so that it is impossible to make any general statement without qualification. Nevertheless, an unmistakable tendency can be discerned towards a position which may briefly be summarized as follows: "Man as religious," is "simply man behaving in a certain social way." Religions themselves "are in constant process of change in dependence upon the changes in social situation, the advance of practical technique, and the enlarged understanding of the world." There is a constant and distinguishing factor in all religions, none the less: Religion is always a "shared quest for completely satisfying life." What is considered satisfactory varies with different periods and peoples, but invariably consists of "practical or ideal satisfactions of the socially approved needs and aspirations of human life." Nowadays we may find inspiration in the Bible, in so far as it is a record of the honest and earnest efforts of the ancient Hebrews not only to express their "socially approved needs and aspirations," but to satisfy them practically by such means as they could devise. Similarly, "we are coming to the place where Christians will learn about Jesus, not to make him a formal authority, but rather to gain inspiration for the creative task of constructing theological doctrines which shall be as honest and as worthy for our day as were the teachings of Jesus for his day." "The only Christianity which we know is a historical movement in which fallible human beings, meeting definite geographical, political, and cultural conditions, work out the best program possible under the circumstances. As conditions change, the activities, organizations, and doctrines of Christians change." The teachings of Jesus were suited to people very different from ourselves, living in circumstances very different

from ours; our task as loyal Christians is to express the stimulus derived from Jesus "in the attempt to think creatively in terms of modern life." This we must do entirely in the spirit of the fearless modern scientist, without any regard for authority or tradition. Former generations of Christians, because of the conditions under which they lived, regarded "man's life on this earth . . . as a 'probation' to fit him for eternal life in an 'other' world." "During the past two or three generations, however, our attitude toward this present world has significantly changed. To an increasing extent we are coming to feel very much at home here. Particularly within the past fifty years the rapid progress of scientific control and the multiplication of surprising inventions have made our world a supremely interesting place." Hence the modern man's Christianity must be "an attempt . . . to enter into right relations with those forces which will enable him to realize the richest life in the world here and now."¹

We may compare with this conclusion some sentences from what is described as "the authoritative summary of the essential principles" of the latest development amongst the Unitarians, the so-called Humanism:

Humanism believes that the chief end of man is not to glorify God and enjoy him forever, but rather to glorify human life and enjoy it as long as it lasts. . . . If there be a God, man cannot know who or what he is, or how to glorify him. He has no actual knowledge of anything above or beyond himself. . . . Man is not to be treated as a means to a world order, either economic, political, or social. These things are means to the ends of human life, human life is not a means to their end. And in this principle lies Humanism's attitude toward the whole social system. Every institution—the state, the church, the school, the corporation, the labor union; and every social process—marriage, suffrage, immigration, prohibition, banking—stand or fall according to their contribution to human life. . . . Human life is the thing of supreme worth in the world, and must be treated as the end of all human endeavor. . . . Humanism is the effort to understand human experience by the means of human inquiry. . . . Intelligent people today do not take seriously the claims of supernatural revelation. They know that all the knowledge acquired by the race so far has been the result of human

¹The quoted passages in this paragraph are taken from chapters by A. Eustace Haydon and Gerald Birney Smith in *Religious Thought in the Last Quarter-Century*, edited by Gerald Birney Smith, and from *Current Christian Thinking*, by Gerald Birney Smith. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press, publishers.

inquiry, and so Humanism substitutes human inquiry for divine revelation as the means of finding truth and understanding human experience. . . . Humanism depends entirely upon inquiry for its body of knowledge; and while the body of knowledge is very incomplete it is gradually and constantly growing. And of late years it has increased by leaps and bounds. This humanistic method has added more to the sum total of knowledge in the last century than the old method added in a hundred centuries. And the future promises still more rapid strides. The gates to the realm of knowledge have just recently been opened by the scientific method, and we are about to enter. It is only within the last few years that we have gained any real knowledge about ourselves and the world in which we live. And as this knowledge increases and becomes potent in the lives of the many, it will sweep the race along to higher and higher levels. . . . [In spite of his recognition that there are limits, both within and without man, which are apparently insuperable] the Humanist has a vision of what life might be upon this planet if all our intelligence were brought to bear upon its improvement, and he has faith that this vision may be realized through the responsibility and efforts of men themselves. . . . Humanism looks straight into the face of the world and of human life, sees its good and its bad, and expecting no help from without, determines to make the world a fit place in which to live and human life worth living. In some of its aspects Humanism may not be so comforting as the older forms of religion have been; but it will develop men and not mollicoddles. . . . It is time that we saw things as they really are. . . . In spite of an indifferent universe, we ourselves must keep alive all the good the past hath had, and add to it such good as we can create. . . . The world needs many things today, but above all it needs Humanism, which guarantees a fearless outlook and a free intelligence. The virtues corresponding to the points which I have made are knowledge, kindness, courage, and service. . . . With these tools, we can build a beautiful home for mankind on this temporary earth.¹

Evaluation of the Modernist movement.—In commenting upon this modern form of religion, we must say, first of all, that it cannot properly be called a new development, or a reconstruction, of historic Christianity. Whatever its merits, it is something different, and we only promote confusion by failing to recognize this.

¹Printed in *The Twilight of Christianity*, by Harry Elmer Barnes, who states that this authoritative summary" comes from a sermon preached in 1927 by Dr. John H. Dietrich. Professor Barnes's book is dedicated to Dr. Dietrich as the "foremost American exponent of a civilized religion." In quoting, the present writer has altered the position of the first sentence given above. Reprinted by permission of Ray Long and Richard R. Smith, Inc., publishers.

Our two summaries clearly show that Unitarian "Humanism" is identical in character with much that is being preached nowadays as a distinctively modern, but genuine, development of Christianity. The Unitarians, however, frankly proclaim their gospel as one which at most points is the direct antithesis of Christianity;—and they are right. Christians, it is true, are commanded to love their neighbors to be charitable, to relieve the sick; and they are expected in a real sense—in what may be the only sense not illusory—"to realize the richest life in this world here and now." But the spirit, the intention, and the practical outcome of all this are radically different from the spirit, the intention, and the anticipated outcome of humanitarian gospels and efforts. It is not possible here to explain the nature and seriousness of the difference, but this should be very obvious from what has already been said of historic Christianity in the present chapter and in the preceding one. Humanitarianism is in fact a reversion to the religion of the "natural" or "once-born" man, and is something novel, not in its inner nature, but only in its modern trappings. Probably the "natural" man has been in the majority in every age of which we know anything, and we should not be unduly surprised to see him emerging in his true colors at the present time.

It would be very surprising, indeed, had he not done so. For, as we have already seen, the long modern conflict between old religion and new science has, in the eyes of a great many of our contemporaries, thoroughly discredited traditional Christianity. And at the same time the development of applied science has given these contemporaries the illusion that man has at length become the master of his fate, the "lord of creation," the architect of his own destiny. We have more "conveniences" than we well know what to do with. We are told that modern medicine is steadily conquering disease, and may indefinitely postpone, if not conquer, death. Wherever, indeed, the performance of science is imperfect, we are fed with promises;—we are assured that it can only be a matter of years, perhaps of days, until the little defect shall be remedied. We are thus encouraged to imagine that human powers are without limits, and human intelligence adequate to direct them. And a considerable number upon whom fortune has smiled, whose desires seem to be bounded by material satisfactions, and whose forward glance is vague and unseeing, believe all that the flatterers tell them, and visibly bask in the dream of paradise achieved.

One little defect there is, however, which triumphant science has not remedied, but has accentuated. The fruits of our mastery over nature are bestowed in their fullness only upon a minority—and not upon the most scrupulous, but upon the cleverest; not upon the producers, but upon the traders. This at least is what is said, sometimes with manifest truth; and it is the more galling when men consider that the fruits of applied science are what they are living for, and when they are assured that they have an inalienable “right” to them, which can be made good by a change in the form of the State. After the trial, with indifferent success, of various less sweeping measures, it is claimed today that Communism alone will finally enable *everybody* “to realize the richest life in this world here and now.”¹

Evidently, moreover, the “modernism” of our Protestant churches and Unitarian “Humanism” are merely stages on the way to Communism. The approach is unmistakable and, more than that, at present inevitable. Whether for better, for worse, Communism is the form in which the humanitarian gospel takes substance, becomes something more than mere talk, and makes a vital appeal to the “natural” or “once-born” men of our time. It is their anti-religion, with a definite creed, program of action, and way of life. It has its martyrs, saints, and apostles; it has its Bible and inspired prophet; and it receives the unqualified submission of its converts.² It has, too, after a fashion, its apocalyptic vision, iden-

¹It is impossible in this place to discuss the claims made for Communism. Every right-thinking person must sympathize with an effort to promote the welfare, not of a few, necessarily at the expense of others, but equally of *all* human beings. The points which raise questions are the definition of “welfare,” the means proposed to achieve it, and the limitations—if any—within which such an effort is feasible under the conditions of human life. These chapters are written on the assumption that the history of the race cannot be meaningless to us—on the assumption, in other words, that the conditions of life have not changed, and are not changing, in any such way as to refute the conception of human existence embodied in the world’s higher religions. This assumption rests on an amount of evidence—some of which has been adduced in these pages—so impressive that it needs only to be known in order to be recognized as conclusive. But if this be true, it is evident, as is said above, that Communism represents a reversion to a view of life which has, again and again, been discredited by the experience of men.

²It has also the worst vices which accompany unbridled fanaticism. Communists in Russia have already killed, it has been estimated, between two and three million men and women whose only crime was dissent. In the same country, moreover, they are attempting not only complete control of economic life, but of intellectual life as well. This of course includes education, and means that children are taught the creed of Communism as the sum of absolute truth, and are taught history, for example, only as interpreted in accordance with Communistic doctrine. It is clear, in fact, that Communism is guilty of every vice which the modern world has repeatedly and unqualifiedly condemned in the practical workings of Roman Catholicism, both in

tical with that of our American religious "modernists." Yet obviously these "modernists," when compared with their Communist brothers, appear under grave disadvantages. It is perfectly manifest where they belong, and why. But they are somewhere else, seeking an impossible halfway house in a barren desert—from which, however, they can still reach out to the pocketbooks, if not to the hearts, of the well-to-do. Compromise, it is sometimes said, is well nigh the whole art of statesmanship. But it has its limitations. Not only does it often seem to be grounded in timidity, in fear, in the desire to stay in office at any price; but in some situations it is simply impossible—in situations, for example, where honor is clearly at stake. Compromise is in fact only feasible when both parties are in agreement on first principles. And precisely for this reason our religious "modernists" are in an impossible position. One may feel sorry for their difficulties, which are real; and one may sympathize with their intentions, which, granted their premises are "good"; but one must, as some of them insist, face the facts. And the primary fact in this instance is that present-day Communism and historic Christianity are basically incompatible. They are by no means antithetical at every point, but at their centers they are completely opposed, so that each is bound by its essential nature to be destructive of the other.

This is fully recognized by the Communists, and must be recognized by all others who take the trouble to inform themselves before reaching conclusions. It is, of course, the reason for the perpetual ineffectiveness of the "modernists" and their immediate ancestors. In the eighteenth century these gentlemen were unable to do much more than give counsels of mere worldly prudence. They were supported by society because, as we have said, it was thought they were useful in aiding society to go its own way. Today they are supported for much the same reason. Their wealthy friends feel sure that the "modernists" are both harmless and full of good intentions. They are more fervent than their eighteenth-century ancestors, but also more vague. They have the greatest difficulty in stating where they stand, not because they are hypocritically concealing their real position, but because they are seeking a place which is nowhere to be found. They gush with sentiment and

medieval and in more recent times;—with the difference, however, that Communist tyranny is more comprehensive and absolute than any previously set up in the Western world.

attering generalities, but shrink from translating these into the sparse terms of definite action. And we do not hear of their making any converts from amongst Communists. Instead, they prepare the way for Communism, in so far as they accomplish anything determinate—in spite of which they are, not unreasonably, regarded by Communists with scorn.

Fundamentalism a reaction to Modernism.—Yet at the same time the “modernists” are regarded as not much better than traitors by those to whom historic Christianity is still something real. In the eighteenth century the ancestors of our “modernists” provoked the Wesleyan revival and allied movements of return to Bible Christianity.” In the nineteenth century they provoked the Oxford Movement and a widespread return to Catholicism. And in recent years in the United States our “modernists” have provoked the Fundamentalist Movement. In each case these movements have been indicative of a conviction that the “forward-looking” gentlemen had lost sight of that which was distinctive and essential in Christianity—and, by the same token, of something so important and still so vital in the lives of men that it was worth reserving at any cost.

Our intellectual leaders have thought Fundamentalism so ridiculous that they have not tried, apparently, to understand it. Ridiculous it may be—because such an extreme and indefensible attitude is, for example, the militant atheism of today nearly always ends by provoking its opposite extreme—but, for all that, it is important. It may be defined as an attempt to preserve the spirit and truth of historic Christianity in the traditional Protestant fashion—by requiring of its followers an implicit belief in the literal truth of every statement in the Bible. Hence it seems benighted to many educated people because it is an effort to preserve the spirit of the Bible by preserving the letter, in the face of all evidence now available, from science and from historical research, which proves conclusively, as we have already noted, that many statements in the Bible cannot be literally true, and that others cannot be true in any sense. In this respect, Fundamentalism takes a course which may be considered unnecessary as well as unintelligent; nevertheless, it shows, as does the renewed growth of the Roman Catholic Church during the last hundred years, that the spirit of historic Christianity is a living force, which brings to a very large body of men and women in Europe and America a peace so real under the

trial of experience from day to day that it cannot possibly be grounded in mere delusion. It brings to these people, evidently, a great *deliverance*—deliverance from the agonizing illusion that man is the master of life and of the earth, and able to order his existence to suit himself; deliverance from the fevers and brutality of days spent in pursuing earthly ease and enjoyment; deliverance from the sheer emptiness of a gospel, like Communism, which definitely closes the good life to us, while promising that our children's children's children may some day enjoy it—for a brief moment. Certainly it brings much else; but, today as in the beginning, Christianity is a living religion because, over and behind its disillusioned, profound reading of life, there stands the Son of God and Man, saying, Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden . . .

As we have duly noticed above, it is no longer possible for us to accept the absolute and exclusive claims of Christianity. It is not the only true religion; it may not be the final religion of the race. God has manifested himself in divers ways to divers men, and what will be we do not know. But Christianity is the best religion we have now, and it has remained unique in its Founder and in its fruits. It is very evident that it is not dying, and is not going to die. Its enemies will find that they will only strengthen it by their attacks. It stands on the solidest of foundations, on truth which is verified over and over again in history and in daily experience. It is bound to pass through its present time of trial, and triumphantly to receive the restatement and re-interpretation which it imperatively needs. In blindly and stubbornly opposing themselves to the assured knowledge and mature scholarship of our time, the Fundamentalists and the Roman Catholic Church seem to be tragically wrong-headed. Yet we should remember that reconstruction is not easy and cannot be rapid. The record of the bold and confident innovators from the seventeenth century to our day is one to strike caution into the hearts of responsible men. Again and again these gentlemen have anxiously retained the name of Christianity, while throwing away the reality in favor of some "time-spirit" or demand of the moment which turned out presently to be only an empty phantom.

Looking toward the future.—What is wanted, and what is preparing, though we have it not yet save in hints and fragments, is a thorough reconstitution of Christianity, relieving it of its present

burden of outworn and discredited physical knowledge, making clear what in it is symbolic or mythological, making clear also the reasons for the presence of symbol and myth in religion, but preserving inviolable the historic place of its Founder, His whole mission and message to humanity, explaining both mission and message plainly, and likewise the philosophy they imply, and, finally, setting forth in unmistakable terms the meaning and promise of the Christian way of life as contrasted with the other ways of life open to modern man. What we are perpetually getting is some new attempt to adapt Christianity to our own demands or passing needs, often by a process of picking and choosing from the New Testament that which seems to be in harmony with the secular structure of contemporary life. What we should be getting is the attempt to shed light on the real nature and value of our demands and notions by confronting them with the Christian evaluation of life, stated in terms that we of today can fully understand. There is every reason to expect that precisely this is what we shall get, increasingly, in the future; and meanwhile we may believe that no one is so completely deceived as the man who fancies that historic Christianity has had its day.

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PART IX

ETHICAL STANDARDS

- XXXIX. The Nature and Development of Ethics
XL. Ethical Problems in Contemporary Society
VAN METER AMES

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS

FROM the beginning man has lived a group existence, and his behavior in relation to other members of the group has been a factor in the primary problem of human existence and the general welfare. With the advance of his civilization his social relationships have multiplied; the pattern of his behavior has become more complicated; and his concern with questions dealing with the conduct of one individual toward another, of the individual toward the community, and of the community toward other communities has become relatively greater in importance. In brief, man's position in society imposes upon him the responsibility and necessity of acting as a social being. How his acts affect other people is a consideration which he cannot dodge.

What the individual may do and what he may not do is determined in many instances by forces outside himself: by physical conditions in general; and also by government as an agency of social control, through its laws, courts, and police. Everywhere in civilized society the law sets up guides and signposts: this you may do; that you do only at your peril. We usually think of laws as prescribing what is right and prohibiting what is wrong; and, speaking generally, there is a relation of law to morality, but such is not necessarily the case. Many acts legally permissible are morally bad, and many illegal acts may be pronounced morally sound. Besides, there is a wide field of conduct which is not covered by legal enactments at all. One might pursue a strictly legal course throughout life and yet be guilty of great moral wrong. Obviously one requires standards of conduct other than those set up by law. It is just here that ethics invades human behavior as an indispensable component of worthy living.

THE FIELD OF ETHICS

The study of morality is called ethics. It takes up questions of right and wrong, good and bad. These are questions of such great

human interest that much serious study has been dedicated to them, a considerable part of all private musing is devoted to them, and from them is derived the perennial zest of gossip. Wherever human beings are gathered together, ethical problems are discussed. Young and old delight in debating whether or not So-and-so should have done thus and so. They cite cases, make comparisons, and multiply distinctions. A young woman has given up the opportunity of a college education in order to keep house for her old father. In evaluating her conduct her friends call to mind the decision made by other girls in nearly the same situation, and point out wherein the circumstances differ. Should the father have demanded or permitted such a sacrifice on the part of his daughter? Should she have submitted? There is no answer in the abstract. We say, "it depends." Ethical questions always depend upon particular points as well as upon general principles, and they seldom allow unhesitating decisions. That is what makes ethics interesting. A question of fact loses interest as soon as the facts are known. But an ethical problem is likely to become more intriguing as more is learned of the relevant facts. This does not mean that we should not try to make decisions in ethics, but that we should do so cautiously and judiciously. We should remember that there are two sides to every question, and that each side in turn has various aspects which are open to conflicting interpretations. The study of ethics makes it harder and not easier to pass judgment. People should not study ethics who prefer not to be bothered, who wish to believe that there is some easy and infallible method of knowing good from evil.

Ethical problems do not arise except when we are in doubt as to how to act or judge. In any realm of experience, whenever we stand perplexed before two incompatible lines of behavior, one of which we must judge to be the right thing to do and the other the wrong, we are faced with a problem of ethics. Many people have the notion that ethics has to do only with Sunday School lessons and sermons or with some field fenced off from the rest of life. But the subject-matter of ethics comes from home life, from business, from the professions, from any sphere where there are real choices to be made between alternatives. No person deliberately chooses what he thinks is bad, what he does not want. In real ethical problems we are presented with alternatives, both of which look good. There is the rub. If it were a bad thing to get a college education, or if it were

ad to care for an old father, there would be no difficulty in making a choice of action, and there would be no ethical problem.

The contribution of social psychology to ethics.—Ethics is entered in the problematic situation where a choice must be made. Hence ethics is related to psychology, which has to do with the nature of choice. The more we can learn from psychology about how ideas come to us, how our emotions arise, and what the outcome of different psychic states is likely to be, the more we are in a position to evaluate our conduct. The success magazines, with their promises to make us irresistible personalities through applied psychology, though they are absurd, are proof that psychology has helped men toward their ideals of what they would like to be. Psychology cannot work miracles; but it has done wonders, and there is no denying the insight into human nature that it has afforded.

Social psychology has been especially valuable to ethics in throwing light on the social nature of the self. Now it is known that the individual takes over the attitudes and interests of the group about him just as he learns its language. The individual can introduce some novelty into society, but, as John Dewey says, the extent to which he can do this is perhaps no greater than the number of innovations which he can introduce into the common speech. Individual differences are largely to be accounted for by the differences that there are in families and the other groups to which individuals belong. If no two people are alike in a modern society, it is chiefly because no two people throughout their lives have belonged to exactly the same groups. No group, small or large, in which the general interest is not shared by most of its members can survive. The fact of survival is proof that a society is constituted by people who are not wholly self-seeking.

Perhaps nothing has so influenced modern ethics as this teaching of social psychology, that the individual is not a self-inclosed unit, incurably self-centered and incapable of considering other people except for selfish purposes. Before the days of social psychology selfishness was deplored but accepted as inevitable. Altruism was often held up as the ideal, but was regarded as impossible to achieve. Various methods were recommended for forcing or inveigling hopelessly selfish individuals to love their neighbors as themselves, but only supernatural aid could save people from this assumed isolation and self-centeredness.

On the basis of social psychology individuals are as social as they

are selfish. A self includes other people, and may naturally reach out to take in a wider and wider circle. A citizen of a metropolis has interests not only outside his skin, but outside his home, his neighborhood, and his city. He shares many national and international interests. The more contacts and relations he has with the wide world, the more *human* he is. People whom we call bad are people of limited relationships and sympathies, but even they are human in so far as they associate themselves with other people. A gangster belongs to a gang which has its own common good, though we judge it evil because its good is so limited. It does not include enough people; it menaces too many.

According to social psychology the self is essentially social. The virtue is not a magical altruism, an inexplicable interest in people who are clear outside us. Virtue lies in the development of a self with increasing interest in other people and consideration of their welfare. This social interest is natural and innate, but may be indefinitely cultivated.

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY

Standards of behavior among primitive peoples.—The development of social psychology, and its emphasis upon the social nature of the self, has been fostered by increasing familiarity with primitive peoples. In their life the individual is completely subordinate to the group. There are no nonconformists among primitives. They think and feel collectively. The standards of the group are accepted by all members. There is no alternative but ostracism, which means death. Negative customs called taboos, the things that simply are not done, are as important as the things that must be done. In elaborate initiation ceremonies the young are impressed with all that the old men hold sacred. Through story, dance, and drama the great deeds of the past and the ideals of the tribe are kept fresh. In the festivals of seedtime and harvest, upon the focal occasions of birth, marriage, and death, appropriate rites draw the group together and remind men of their solidarity. Thus primitive conduct, though it may shift somewhat in time, nevertheless tends to become more firmly established with each generation.

Much is so irrational in primitive behavior that it cannot be justified except on the ground that it is customary. Yet our own life is rife with unreasonable practices that we accept unquestioningly.

Some of them can be explained as having once been useful. The buttons on the sleeve of a man's coat formerly held lace, and the coat itself once was necessary for warmth indoors. Serving refreshment to afternoon guests, who feel obliged to take it though they spoil their appetites for dinner, harks back to the day when a person probably was hungry by the time he arrived at a friend's house. Anyone can think of many of our ways that may never have been rational. But just as an individual can carry several bad habits as long as they do not predominate over his good ones, and can make many mistakes if they are not fatal, so a society, primitive or civilized, can bear a great weight of foolishness. The fact that a people survives is proof that its way of living is, or has been, fundamentally sound. In the course of time individuals or groups that are rotten at the core must perish.

Though group standards alone do not constitute the highest morality, they are standards. They represent the funded experience of the past and make for security against the unknown and the unrried. Morality even in our own day is largely a matter of blind obedience to custom, and the authority behind it is the same as with savages—that of the group. It rests upon a primitive basis that is always there supporting any moral superstructure that we may achieve. Often we do rise above the ancient foundations; and when we do, it is by building upon them. Without habits and customs unconsciously controlling the greater part of our lives, conscious morality would fall to the ground. The praise and blame of the group behind custom are the most powerful incentives and deterrents, now as ever. Physical force is sometimes used to restrain recalcitrant members of society, but usually the unruly can be kept in line by ridicule.

Ethical standards among the Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans.

—In the Biblical records of the Hebrew people we can see progress from a primitive morality which was unreflective, to a reflective, critical morality. The Hebrew prophets protested against blind adherence to age-old custom, arousing their people to distinguish between the truly fundamental and the superficial in their heritage, to consider more the spirit than the letter of the law. The great prophets despised ceremonies, burnt offerings, and all substitutes for a clean heart and a decent life. The ancient custom of blood revenge was modified by the establishment of trial for murderers, by raising the distinction between intentional and accidental killing,

by requiring testimony of witnesses, and by providing asylum for innocent slayers in the Cities of Refuge. The story of Job shows how the Hebrews gradually got away from the idea that they should be righteous for the sake of external goods, for blessings in basket and in store, and came to learn that virtue is its own reward. Beginning as provincial worshipers of a jealous tribal deity, the Hebrews rose to the conception of a just God who brooked no distinction between Jew and Gentile. Scholars say that the oldest portion of the Old Testament is the bloodthirsty Song of Deborah; it was a long step from this to the teachings of Jesus.

When we turn to the study of Greek ethics we must bear in mind that the sophisticated civilization of the Greeks developed slowly out of a primitive condition back in the mist that history cannot penetrate. In the time of Socrates they had got as far as questioning custom, daring to say that according to nature might is right, and asking whether laws should not be broken by those who are strong and fearless. Socrates himself was bold in challenging tradition, but he did believe that there were some standards, and maintained that they could be discovered by free discussion of ethical problems. In discussion there would emerge some things to which all would agree. These things would be good and true. What had to be discarded as inconsistent and untenable would be false opinions. Socrates thought that the individual by himself, in rebellion against society, was not in a position to decide ethical questions, that such questions could be met fairly only in the spirit of humble inquiry in the give and take of general conversation, out of which knowledge would appear. For Socrates virtue is knowledge. To do wrong is a proof of ignorance, because no man would do wrong and corrupt his own soul if he really knew what he was doing.

Plato also regarded knowledge of the good as essential to being good. Like Socrates he thought that such knowledge could not be entrusted entirely to the individual. First of all it was important in the good life to be born of good parents. The state should see to it that each child had worthy parents, and the state should take charge of his education. Every child should receive as much education as he was capable of. The most able individuals should become rulers and guardians of the state; the rest should be artisans and farmers. In a good state the citizens would live in harmony, each performing the function for which he was suited and trained. Each individual was, for Plato, like a small state, and should try to

achieve in himself a harmony similar to that desirable in the state at large. His gross animal appetite and his fine animal courage should be guided by his intellect, as two horses would be driven by a charioteer.

For Plato the good is harmonious living. But he had other-worldly, ascetic moods in which he advocated escape from the body and the natural interests of this life through meditation upon an unearthly good. This second kind of good was to be attained not by an all-round development of man's capacities, but by a one-sided emphasis upon contemplation.

Aristotle also gave a high place to pure contemplation, but he was chiefly interested in Plato's first kind of good, the good consisting in the harmonious development of all sides of life. "Nothing in excess" was his motto. An extreme of too much or too little is vice. The mean in between is virtue. Courage is the virtue lying midway between foolhardiness and cowardice. Temperance is between indulgence and abstinence, and so on. The virtue of friendship is an exception, because it is a kind of excess. Friendship meant a great deal to the Greeks, and Aristotle said, "A friend is another self." He had no idea that a man could be happy alone. He said that man is a social animal, that he cannot live the kind of life natural to him, in which all his powers may be developed, except in a well-organized society under a good government.

When Greek civilization went to pieces, as a result of wars without end within, the good life came to be conceived as escape from the world. The ideal of the Epicureans was a life of seclusion, a life typified by the retirement of a group of congenial sages to a garden where they could forget the troubles of the time and cultivate the quiet pleasures of the mind. They disdained pleasures of the body because they do not last and because they bring too much pain in their wake. Chief among the obstacles to a pleasant peace of mind the Epicureans placed the fear of death and of life after death. To get rid of this fear they taught the atomism of Democritus, the theory that only atoms are real, moving about in empty space. When a man dies, the atoms composing his physical frame and his consciousness are scattered. Hence there is nothing fearful in death. A person fears death only if he imagines himself standing over his dead body and feeling sorry for himself. But he will feel nothing. Death is like a dreamless sleep. Later this philosophy was very attractive to the world-weary Romans, and it was in the poem *Of*

the Nature of Things by the Roman poet Lucretius that it attained its grandest expression.

Stoicism, another ethical philosophy which the Greeks turned to in the break-up of their society, also flourished in Rome. One of the most famous Roman Stoics was Epictetus, a slave. Another was Marcus Aurelius, the Emperor. According to the Stoics the good life consists largely in getting rid of passions and emotions which upset the harmony that should obtain between man and the divine reason that rules the world. In a calm frame of mind a man will understand his duty and see the task to be done. Pain and misfortune should be matters of indifference to the wise man, inasmuch as nothing can perturb him if he can control his reactions. Outward conditions do not count. All that matters is the inner response to them, and that can be controlled. So Epictetus did not mind being a slave, and Marcus Aurelius said that life could be bearable even in a palace.

Early Christian ethics.—According to ancient thought the world has no beginning in time and will have no end. Nothing new happens, but the same old process comes round and round in endless cycles. Man is nothing but an incident on the face of the earth, of no consequence to whatever powers may be. Nothing he does can matter much. He may do his duty stoically without hope or recognition. Or he may lose himself in contemplation of a divinity that does not care about him.

The Christian view was quite different. Christianity brought fresh breath into ethical thought. The personality of Jesus was very appealing, and he was felt to be near at hand. The Christian God had created the world especially for man, had sent his own son for man's salvation, and when the Day of Judgment should come the whole world would be folded up like a tent and put away forever. Man is of central importance in a universe that was planned for him. Christ has just been here to tell him the good news, and will soon come again to choose those who deserve to be saved. Who would not be humble and hopeful who believed that heaven might be open to him? It is easy to disdain the pleasures and pains of this life in return for eternal joy to come—and the Christians made converts with such speed that three hundred years after the death of Jesus, Christianity became the religion of Rome. When Rome fell the Church did not fall with it, but remained to convert and civilize the barbarian conquerors.

The Stoical attitude was taken up into Christian ethics, along with the contemplative and otherworldly aspects of Platonism and Aristotelianism. Plato's mythology of heaven and hell became very important in Christianity. But the Greek ideal of harmonious development of all the natural interests of man was repugnant to the Church. In the eyes of the Church the natural man was corrupt and sinful. The ideal of the Church, as we have seen, was the monastic life; and it was very popular in the Middle Ages. This ideal involved retirement from mundane interests and was expressed in the triple vow of chastity, poverty, and obedience.

The German tribes which the Church took into her fold had standards of their own which had to be reckoned with. Their warlike and class ideals could not be stamped out; so the Church Christianized them by recognizing knights as defenders of the Faith and sending them on the Crusades. Family loyalty had to be accepted; therefore the Church made marriage one of its sacraments. The pride that could not be quelled was justified on the ground that as a child of God man has a right to be proud; but inasmuch as he is tainted with the sin of Adam he should abase himself. Pride, wealth, and power, as far as possible, were arrogated to the Church as an institution, while humility and contrition were assigned to men as individuals. Men could be saved from their innate wretchedness only by the offices of the Church and divine grace.

The influence of the Renaissance.—In the Renaissance men revolted against the otherworldliness of the Middle Ages. They exulted in their own powers and in the possibilities of this life. They found support for their naturalistic attitude in the literature of antiquity. The new wealth derived from trade in luxuries with the East after the Crusades gave them such security and comfort here below that they did not need to console themselves with thoughts of heaven. Science and art flourished as they never had since the great days of Greece. Men struck out in all directions from the limitations of medieval life. They ventured in their ships around Africa, and across the ocean to America.

A new sense of individualism and independence, spreading from Italy over all Europe, characterized the Renaissance. The authority of one Church was disputed by several sects. The Holy Roman Empire was broken up into nations. Vernacular dialects took their place beside Latin in literature and learning. Universities sprang up everywhere to challenge the prestige of Paris. The whole feudal

system was shaken by the growing power of the towns with their new wealth made in new occupations, and by the rising national monarchies. Men felt like children who have run away from school eager to try everything that had been forbidden and repressed. They tried all the delights of body and mind, and made fun of their old teachers who had taught them to believe things bad which they now found good. The Greek view that it is good to exercise all the capacities in a free way was reborn in the people of the Renaissance. In their exuberance, however, they failed to practice Greek moderation, and did everything in excess.

SOME MODERN ASPECTS OF ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY

In the eighteenth century men had calmed down from the enthusiasm of the Renaissance, and were trying to settle moral problems in the cold light of reason. The emotions should not be consulted. The great German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), argued that moral judgments must be universal, they must hold for everyone, and apply to all possible experience. He insisted upon universality in moral judgments because he was afraid that if exceptions were allowed in certain cases or for certain people, there could be no standards. He was afraid that people would make judgments to suit themselves in discrimination against others, and hence be unfair and immoral. Kant thought that if people followed their inclinations or desires, their actions would all be selfish, because the desires are always self-centered. According to Kant the reason is as universal and fair as the desires are selfish and biased. So he said that in order to be moral a person must ask himself whether an intended act is one that could be universalized, one that he would be willing to have all other people intend. It is immoral for a person to do something merely because he likes to, and not because he ought to. Even a mother should not care for her children because she likes to, but only because she ought to. Kant admitted that it would be very hard for people to live up to this principle, but nevertheless that is what they ought to do, whether they can or not. In an ideal community, where each does as he ought, everyone will consider everyone else before acting; each will treat every other as an end, and never as a means only.

According to Kant, all that can be demanded of people in the way of morality is that they should intend what is right. They should

be judged solely by their intentions, because for these they can be responsible, whereas the consequences of their acts go beyond their control. The best will in the world runs amuck, because of unforeseen circumstances. Good intentions are like jewels that shine by their own light, regardless of their results. Virtue is its own reward, whether it does any good or not.

This extreme position of Kant was opposed in the nineteenth century by John Stuart Mill, who said that people should be judged by what they accomplish rather than by what they intend. For Mill an act is good that promotes the general happiness, or the greatest good of the greatest number. He almost agreed with Kant that the inclinations are selfish, but at the same time he hoped that men might be educated to desire the good of others. He and Kant have the same problem: Assuming that men are selfish, how can they become unselfish? Kant said, by following reason and not the feelings. Mill said, by educating the feelings, so that the main-spring of action will be sympathy with the general welfare.

According to the great thinker of our own day, John Dewey, it would be impossible to make men altruistic if to begin with they were entirely egoistic. For Dewey the self is naturally social, though it can become more social through education. The real question is not how an egoistic person can get away from himself to become altruistic, but how a narrow self can become a wider self. At first blush this distinction is not clear. There is a great difference, however, between expecting men to put off their real natures, and asking them to develop social impulses that they have from the start. If the self includes interest in other selves, it can naturally increase that interest. Then virtue lies in widening sympathy with other people and their needs.

From Dewey's point of view, Kant is right if his ethics be reinterpreted to mean that as far as possible one should consider the total situation likely to be affected, before acting. Mill is right in his belief that results in terms of social welfare should be the chief criterion of conduct. But results cannot be considered apart from motives. People should neither be praised nor blamed for consequences that they could not be expected to foresee. Intentions, on the other hand, cannot be good or bad in themselves, but only as they tend to produce socially desirable or undesirable results.

Dewey flatly disagrees with those who think that human nature is inherently corrupt, that all its impulses are tainted so that only

by unnatural restraint is the good attainable. He also parts company with those who think that the good life necessitates rejection of all the checks and inhibitions of civilization. Dewey believes that it would be disastrous to give license to all impulses. He would say, however, that impulses are neither good nor bad in themselves but only in the light of circumstances and results.

For Dewey the question of good and bad does not arise except in a problematic situation where a choice has to be made between incompatible ends. The good is what is chosen after careful reflection upon social consequences—the bad, what is rejected. This moral choice is not a purely intellectual matter, because we cannot think seriously about consequences that do not touch our sympathies. We must be really interested in a problem before we can think fairly about it. We are intelligent only about things that come home to our business and bosoms. The only true understanding is sympathetic. At the same time, sympathy is not very valuable unless it is understanding. As much harm results from misguided good will as from ill will. We must beware of people who are sure that they are doing right simply because they mean well.

ARE THERE ABSOLUTE MORAL STANDARDS?

A good conscience is a dangerous thing. Its possessors often feel relieved of the responsibility of investigating the consequences of their actions. People who feel that conscience is a divine guide do not realize that it is simply the result of education. Having been taught to maintain a kindly attitude toward others, people may feel thoroughly virtuous as long as they do maintain it. They think complacently that because they intend no harm they can be causing none. Again, people may have learned to consider consequences in a limited way, and continue through life satisfied when they attain certain things and avoid others, yet be ignorant of many factors that ought to be considered. People who shut their eyes to the constantly changing conditions of life, who see in themselves and their conduct only what does them credit, may have "good consciences," but they are not innocent. Anyone can enjoy a good conscience who moves smoothly in the grooves of habit. It often gives the feeling of a bad conscience to break old habits, even when the break is most reasonable. Then the pangs of conscience should be accepted as growing pains and a "good conscience" should be mistrusted.

It is always difficult for the present self to see and feel from the point of view of the wider self to be striven for. We gain courage to push on when we look back upon our little selves of the past and are glad to have left them behind. At times we are tempted to think that if once we could reach a level where we could rest secure in our righteousness, and be done with the effort to cleanse ourselves of hidden faults, morality would be easy. There is insidious attraction in the theory that a clear distinction exists between right and wrong, established forever in an immutable moral law. If there were such a law, morality would indeed be easy. But those who are certain that there is a fixed moral law, as inexorable as the laws of physics once were believed to be, are unable to say what that moral law is, except in such a vague way that no moral guidance results. In practice, believers in an eternal law of morals, if they are not socially intolerable, are forced to feel their way like the rest of us, trying to face each moral problem by sensitively and intelligently doing justice to all the factors involved.

In a sense the virtues do not change. We still revere justice, wisdom, and courage. But to be just, wise, courageous, is not the same thing in ancient Athens, in Tierra del Fuego, and in our society. The need to deal sanely with our own moral problems is ignored almost as much by people who wish to reinstate among us the moral attitudes of the aristocratic Athenians as by those who want us to ape the painted savages. The folkways of primitive peoples are a large element in our society. We owe much to our inheritance from the Hebrews and the Greeks, from the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Familiarity with all this is necessary to the understanding of our own problems. But it is also imperative to recognize that our rapidly developing society needs to be studied for what is new in it as well as for what is old, if we are to find what is right, and to do what is good here and now.

SELECTED REFERENCES FOR FURTHER READING

(Chronologically Arranged)

THE BIBLE. Judges, iv and v (The Song of Deborah) illustrate the primitive morality of blood revenge. Numbers, xxxv; Deuteronomy, xix; Joshua, xx indicate the modification of the custom of blood revenge by the establishment of the Cities of Refuge. The Book of Job shows the development of the idea that virtue is its own reward.

PLATO, *Apology*. Presents Socrates' defense when on trial for his life.
The Republic. Plato's Utopia.

ARISTOTLE, *Nichomachean Ethics*. Not only Aristotle's own ideas on ethics, but a reflection of the prevailing Greek morality.

EPICETUS, *Encheiridion*. Presents the pithy sayings of the Stoic slave.

MARCUS AURELIUS, *Meditations*. The equally pithy sayings of the Stoic emperor.

KANT, *Metaphysic of Morals*. A work as difficult as it is famous.

MILL, JOHN STUART, *Utilitarianism*. Only about sixty pages long and very readable.

DEWEY, JOHN, *Human Nature and Conduct* (Henry Holt and Company 1922). One of Dewey's most important and popular books.

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CHAPTER XL

ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

ETHICAL problems must be examined in their own social setting. They are more difficult in contemporary society than they would be in one that is more under the sway of custom. In a group that is static, or is changing very slowly, customary standards may be satisfactory. But with us the conditions of life have been changing so rapidly that old adjustments and judgments become inadequate before appropriate new ones can be formed. Society is in a state of flux; the emphasis upon individualism, with freer play for its expression in our urbanized life, has lessened respect for the authority of group custom. Society is groping for a scale of moral standards which will more adequately fit the demands of the time. We are often in the dilemma of having to choose between following out-moded criteria of conduct and having no criteria.

THE SEARCH FOR SATISFACTORY CRITERIA

Our patchwork of moral standards.—Science and invention almost overnight have made us members of a world-community. We have awaked to find that morals which were adequate in tribes, in villages, in city-states, even in nations, are no longer applicable. But until we can develop a new morality we shall be confused by a conflict of old moralities. The predatoriness of primitive peoples and their code of blood revenge are carried on openly by gangs in the midst of our cities, and instilled in countless hearts by the propaganda of militarism. The Ten Commandments are memorized and the Hebrew conscience cultivated in Sunday Schools as well as in synagogues. The Greek sense of beauty and harmony is affected by aesthetes and scholars. Medieval otherworldliness characterizes even people who are not priests, or monks, or nuns. Feudal class-consciousness and pride of birth are kept alive by the genteel. The sensualism of the Renaissance, its excitement about science, its love

of art and letters, its nationalistic statesmanship, and its interest in trade and commerce are still with us. Our ethics is a patchwork of these old moralities, with the result that it is very hard for us to have consistent ideas about right and wrong. Sometimes we try to be self-sacrificing like the early Christians. Again we think that there is a goody-goody ideal, that it were better to be downright bad than to be good in such a fashion. In fact, being good is so much associated with being meek and weak, that contrary terms like "wicked" and "mean" are often used to express conduct that we really admire. "Ethics" and "morals" are words so linked with old-fashioned or unfashionable ethics and morals that they suggest to many minds the standards and codes that we cannot take seriously, though we may render them lip service.

Time, place, and intelligence in moral judgments.—What ethics we do respect is largely a matter of the century and the society in which we live. There is no practice odious to us that is not cited in the literature of sociology as right and proper in the culture of one people or another, and such peoples are not confined to unheard-of tribes at the ends of the earth. Even for us we may say that there is nothing right or wrong but time and place make it so. It is wrong to kill, to steal, to lie—except when and where it is right.

This may appear alarming and unsettling to those who feel the need of absolute standards. But an absolute moral law that took no account of particular circumstances, if such a law were possible would be a terrible thing, unless it were so abstract and indefinite as to be meaningless. A law that required us to deafen our ears and harden our hearts to the demands of specific situations would be cruel and fanatical. It would be immoral. We live in particular situations; our lives are made up of them. Ethical standards must be flexible and adaptable to be of any good to us. The only ethics of value is that which teaches consideration of time and place. We could not live with people who followed some absolute, abstract morality, but who failed to do or to refrain from doing according to time and place.

But the time itself may be out of joint and the place infamous. Then the right thing is not tactfully to fit in with the *status quo*, but to attack it. This point leads into a dilemma of ethics. The particular situation and moment must be respected, but also must be considered in the light of a larger setting and a longer duration. A child's momentary needs demand attention, but they should not

be ministered to in such a way as to spoil him for happy relationship with other people later in his life. The whole life of an individual should not be put ahead of the whole life of a community. On the other hand, an individual's life is made up of moments, and it is of individuals that the community is constituted.

The way out of this dilemma is to remember that for thinking and imaginative beings a particular place and time may include relations to all the world—present, past, and future. How much of the world and how many years or centuries should be considered in connection with a specific situation can be answered only by one who is sensitive to the situation and thoughtful about it. How much has to be considered can be estimated only from actual experience of similar situations and by knowledge about them gained in study. It may be objected that this makes ethics too much subject to "ifs" and "ands." But this point of view does not *make* ethics that way; it merely recognizes that ethics *is* that way. Such is the nature of our life. How does a doctor know what to do in a particular case? He knows on the basis of experience and study. But he may be wrong? Of course he may. Yet he is less likely to be wrong than a man who has studied less and has had less experience.

Does this point of view imply that to be ethical it is necessary to be intelligent? There is no alternative in a society complex and changing. Ignorant, insensitive people cannot see what is involved or implied in a situation. They hurt feelings, cause mischief, and commit crimes. So do intelligent people; for intelligence may lead to ill or good. A doctor's knowledge gives him power that can cure or kill. But because doctors may be killers we do not altogether cease to trust them. We know that a man with the intelligence to be a doctor is not likely to be murderous. We know it by experience. By experience we know that this kind of intelligence can be educated and encouraged. We know that if we are intelligent about intelligence, it will be more conducive to good than ignorance can be.

Is science corroding our moral judgments?—Some critics of the machine age argue that intelligence in the form of science is making life cold and mechanical. Under the influence of science, they say, we are coming to conceive the universe as a vast mechanism moved by natural forces and controlled by natural laws. In a universe so conceived, man, it is asserted, feels that he has lost his hold on the controls of life. Moral judgments are thought to be

futile, since man has come to regard himself as a plaything in the hands of natural forces which he can neither control nor direct. Critics point to physical science, which they believe is reducing the world to mathematical, quantitative terms, and thereby doing away with qualities and values. In the popular imagination the physicist or scientist cares only about what can be counted, weighed, and measured; what can be predicted and tested with precision. It is true that in so far as he deals with figures and formulas, the feel and look of the ordinary world do not enter into his calculations. In much of his work the scientist does proceed as if nothing were real except molecules in motion, atoms, electrons, and the like. But we should not be fooled by this fact and allow ourselves to believe that the scientists' abstractions are more real than the every-day world of our experience.

The scientist would be the first to admit that his formulas do not exclude that world. His abstract ideas are merely tools with which to manipulate nature in order to obtain and multiply the concrete things we like. For instance, when the scientist evaluates food in terms of vitamins and calories, his evaluation does not deprive us of tasty morsels we like to eat, but rather enables us to enjoy a greater richness and variety of fare than before. The scientist, instead of reducing reality to a vast mechanism in which men do not count, is thinking in terms of mechanism merely as a means of controlling nature for the greater welfare of man. It is true that the fruits of science are distributed unfairly, and that although science has increased the power of the race, this power is concentrated in the hands of a few who exploit the rest; but all this is beside the point. The results are not the fault of science or the necessary results of scientific knowledge; they constitute problems of social control involving moral considerations of highest importance.

Exploitation of the weak by the strong, through the use of physical science, has been justified by an argument based on biological science. According to the Darwinian theory of evolution all life is a struggle for existence in which the fit survive and the unfit perish. The argument goes that the fit are simply those who manage to survive by fair means or foul. Might is right. War between nations and between classes, laissez-faire, and cutthroat competition have all been whitewashed on the ground that they are natural—part of the divine plan—and inevitable. But Darwin himself said that coöperation and mutual aid are as natural and as important in

olution as struggle. The moral of Darwinism is not to accept brutality of all kinds, but to increase coöperation among men, and strengthen them for the strife against the real enemies of man, such as disease, ignorance, and war.

The plasticity of human beings.—In the search for criteria applicable to contemporary problems, we cannot afford to ignore the teachings of the social sciences. As pointed out in the preceding chapter, psychology and the social sciences have greatly influenced ethical conceptions. The common belief that human nature never changes is the chief obstacle to changing it, but this idea is challenged by the discovery that the human being is plastic, and that his behavior can be molded in innumerable forms. The new knowledge of inhibitions and complexes, and of the effect of different kinds of upbringing upon children, makes it immoral to proceed with education without this knowledge. All that psychology, history, economics, political science, anthropology, sociology, and philosophy are able to tell us about human nature, should increase our clearness as to what is good and what is bad. When the social sciences have developed as far as the physical or even the biological sciences, it will be easier to choose the good and to achieve it. Until we have reached knowledge and control of ourselves comparable to our command of nature, we shall be in the position of irresponsible children playing with high-powered machines and explosives.

ETHICAL ASPECTS OF SOME CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Ethics and sex.—Problems of conduct always become ethical problems when they involve a choice of social consequence. Sex questions are, therefore, preëminently moral matters; for it cannot be denied that the proper treatment of sex is of prime importance to society. The vitality and even the survival of society are here at stake. The significance of sex in the life of the individual is almost equally obvious; for sex, with all its ramifications and powerful as well as subtle influences, can make or mar his happiness and social welfare—indeed the value of carrying on society at all—can, in the end, be reckoned only in terms of the worth of life to the individual. Since society depends directly upon sex for maintenance, and indirectly on sex for value, the social, and in the same breath the ethical, importance of sex is doubly established. In fact, men are already convinced, without argument, of the ethical nature

of sex questions. It is to sex that the words "morality" and "immorality" refer unless otherwise specified.

The whole subject of sex has to be reconsidered today in view of the unprecedented availability and reliability of methods of birth control. As Walter Lippmann has pointed out in his *Preface to Morals*, the advantages of birth control to married people might be admitted more readily if knowledge of contraceptive devices could be confined to the married. The advantages of contraception are plain in the case of families of limited means. When not only bare livelihood but a high standard of living is desired, many thinking people believe that it is imperative to restrict births. It may be more cruel than infanticide to bring children up in the world where they will not be able to enjoy it and who will take the joy out of it for their parents. But the ethical questions as to who are fit to be parents, and how many children they should have, present individual problems which are too complex to develop here.

Usually it is still granted that having a child is a matter of concern to society as well as to the parents; but it is often argued that a childless relationship between man and woman should not be noticed by the law or interfered with at all, because it is a private affair. Any activity tends to become a private affair when its obvious social consequences can be avoided with considerable certainty. Hence there is fresh interest today in "free love" and "companionate marriage." But it is an illusion to think that in anything the individual does, however he regards the act or whatever he calls it, he can altogether escape responsibility to society. He can never get rid of the subtle, imponderable effects of his behavior; and the results of his acts merged with the results of what other people are doing have a combined consequence that sooner or later may become a massive social force. More immediately the individual will become aware of the reaction of his activity upon himself if he fails to see the increase of responsibility that he should take for every increment of freedom. In so far as sex life can be kept a personal matter, people will have to use their own discretion and judgment about it, because whenever people escape outer control they have to control themselves. In order to do this satisfactorily they must be intelligent. The way to be intelligent about sex is to read authoritative books on the subject and to talk with people who have special knowledge about it.

Those who know most about sex agree that when it is made

merely the means of sense-gratification it becomes trivial and banal, and even disgusting, and to that extent immoral, inasmuch as whatever lowers the tone of life for the individual degrades the general level of society. On the other hand, a right use of sex enhances the life of the individual and is so much gained for the universe at large. To persons who are at all refined and sensitive, sexual experience is truly worth while and morally excellent only as an incident in a broader relationship in which the many-sided interests of two lives are shared. This larger relationship, to be entirely satisfactory to persons who are fully developed psychically and emotionally, must be regarded as permanent. For this reason no one who can look forward to a real marriage should be tempted by substitutes.

The increasing divorce rate raises another ethical point. If people cannot get along together, it is unfortunate that they should not realize this fact before marriage. If they fail to discover their incompatibility before marriage, they should at least discover it before they have children. When there are children, society has a right to make divorce difficult unless adequate provision is made for the children. Aside from the question of children, to consider lightly the dissolution of marriage is demoralizing, because the belief that it will last is essential to a genuine marriage. To feel that it may be dissolved at any time is to spoil it from the start. Even in cases where divorce seems wise, the parties to it can hardly avoid a sense of degradation in the defeat of their dearest hopes.

Sexual maladjustment causes incalculable misery. Yet people who seek relief in ways frowned upon by society must count not only on the danger of exposure, but also on the insidious psychological damage suffered by those who express their deepest and noblest feelings clandestinely, cut off from the larger setting and the open associations they should have. Thus, to one who takes the long view of the development of the human race, society is rightly jealous of its customs and traditions, inasmuch as they conserve values that have been important in the past. An individual who thinks that it would be a good thing to break away from an established mode of conduct, must bear the burden of proof. He must be sure that he has something better to offer. Only after serious reflection should he dare to challenge the *status quo*, because life is so complex that a hasty innovation is likely to cause unsuspected mischief that will outweigh the good intended. But there can be no moral

progress unless individuals, convinced that they are right, have the courage to defy convention. Society is indebted to them for every advance.

Ethics and the professions.—Professional men are sometimes defined as groups of persons having peculiar ability and training devoted to the public good for a reasonable remuneration. The definition presents an ideal attained only in individual cases. Such cases are by no means rare; there are many professional men and women whose devotion to the ideal is worthy of strong commendation, but such cases are not typical in our own society. The points stressed in codes of "professional ethics" often indicate the level to be striven for rather than the actual plane of achievement. For instance, the good of his client should be the first consideration of the professional man, and not his fee. Service to the community should come before private profit.

Yet it is often asserted, in the case of the medical profession, for example, that commonly the only persons who are likely to get the quality of service required in serious emergencies are the wealthy who can pay high fees and the poor who patronize free clinics and hospitals that devote their services in part to charity cases. The complaint is also made that the lure of profits and the desire for the advantages of urban life attract most doctors to the cities, and that small rural communities are therefore inadequately supplied with doctors, or not supplied at all. Furthermore, many socially dangerous tendencies are enshrined in professional ethics. The professional man's delicacy about stepping on the toes of another member of the same profession is often injurious to clients. Some doctors are questioning an ethical code which often keeps a patient from the attention and advice he needs, because no other doctor may interfere with the doctor who has the case. Of course doctors should not unscrupulously "cut in" on each other, but neither should they observe their etiquette too scrupulously when patients suffer from it. Considerations like these are provoking a great deal of discussion as to the advisability of socializing medical service, by bringing it more or less completely under public control.

The practice of law also raises many ethical problems. It is inevitable that a profession as intimately bound up with the activities of the business world as the legal profession is, should become tainted with commercialism. Service to the great corporations usually offers the richest material rewards to the lawyer. Such serv-

is obviously necessary and legitimate. It passes into the realm of questionable practices when it is devoted, as it often is, to the circumvention of law and legislation designed to protect the interests of society. In such cases the lawyer becomes the expert devoting his legal knowledge and his ingenuity to keeping his clients "within the law" while they carry on activities which governments condemn as socially undesirable. Even in less pretentious fields the lawyer is beset with temptations. Possessed of a kind of knowledge and technique which are little short of a mystery to most laymen, the lawyer may easily drift into the vice of preying upon the ignorance of his clients for his own profit.

Professionalism is a good thing in so far as it promotes higher standards of training and improves service to society, and a bad thing in so far as it promotes the interest of a few at the expense of the many. Voltaire said that lawyers were the perpetuators of ancient and barbarous practices. It is natural for any vocational group, whether dignified by the title of a profession or not, to be conservative. Teachers dislike changing their vocational attitudes and habits as much as bricklayers, yet it is especially dangerous for teachers to resist modification of their ideas and methods. A complex civilization cannot carry on without adapting education to changing needs, and if teachers do not keep education abreast of the times the men and women they send out into the world can hardly be expected to meet the demands of intelligent citizenship. Every profession must take precautions against the tendency of professionalism to lose intellectual elasticity. Professional men are too prone to regard as sacred their old, established ways, and to think jealously of their work as their own affair, when, in truth, it concerns society at large.

Ethical aspects of economic problems.—Under our individualistic system, as indicated in earlier chapters, men have enjoyed a wide range of liberty in choosing a way of making a living. How a person makes his living is primarily an economic matter, but if the question arises as to whether the manner in which he supports himself is detrimental to the interests of society his activity will be seen in the light of moral or ethical consideration. Governments recognize this fact. Extreme individualism is checked by the courts—by the principle of "eminent domain" (the right of the government to confiscate property for schools, highways, and so forth), and by the police power (as in building commissions, factory legislation,

quarantine, and all matters covered by public health and safety). The government regulates the use of property affecting the public interest, such as railroads. The government tries to prevent monopoly and to preserve fair competition. A striking governmental check to individualism is the income tax, first established in 1913, one of the most revolutionary measures that we have adopted.

The capitalistic system, then, has been extensively curbed in the interest of social welfare, usually through the pressure of an aroused public opinion. Long hours for women and children in factories were not changed until the public conscience was stirred. It is being recognized that there is nothing inherently sacred about any system—that every system must find justification in social welfare. The individualistic system was beneficial to our society earlier in our history. The railroads could not have been built and our country opened up as it was, without that system. But now it is being repeatedly charged that capitalism uses up men, stunts them, and sacrifices their personalities for material profits that they do not receive; that it is wastefully using up natural resources; that it adulterates commodities; that it induces wars, class conflicts, and sabotage. It is only fair to add that up to the present it is not easy to determine how far an alternative social order would go toward introducing a more wholesome scale of values. But since it is asserted and admitted that many of the evils cited above are *inherent* in the individualistic system, society is bound to seek a more just state of existence by a drastic remodeling of that system. It is being asked with growing insistence how much opportunity there is for most individuals in a so-called individualistic system under which two per cent of the population own more of the wealth than all the rest.

The distribution of wealth may take on—in fact, has already taken on—moral implications that make it an ethical problem of the utmost importance. The poor man might not mind doing without money and property if he could live decently and have security without them. But he cannot. If he makes only a living wage, and that may be taken from him any day, he is bound to be restless and resentful. When he is thrown out of work on account of overproduction, and is unable to buy food and other things he needs because they are “overproduced,” the situation is absurd—and dangerous. It is unlikely that a solution will be worked out unless it is thought out. All who are able to think about it are morally

bound to do so. We cannot long stand still on the thin ice of the present situation. We cannot go back to a pre-industrial era. We must go ahead, and the difficulties before us are not insuperable. Science gives man the power to produce whatever he needs. Production is not the problem. The problem is fair distribution of the products of science and labor.

We are shocked at the violent way in which Russia has undertaken to face a situation in some respects similar to our own, though we are filled with admiration at her courage and enterprise. There is much speculation as to whether her plan will succeed, and doubtless we can learn much by watching it. But we do not want revolution. Our society needs what the capitalists themselves are groping for, because it is the only way out—more central planning and social control. The system of each man for himself and the devil take the hindmost has had its day and has reached the point of diminishing utility from the point of view of society as a whole.

If it is objected that these problems are economic rather than ethical, it must be repeated that there are no ethical problems that are not also problems of this or that field of human life. Wherever there is a question of ends, where a choice must be made between alternatives of some social consequence, there is an ethical problem. Many men of affairs are recognizing that business is not merely business, and that their success does not consist simply in going as far as the law allows in crowding out competitors. The words "service," "vision," and "forward-looking" are not always as insincere or meaningless to business men as they are to George F. Babbitt and his friends. There is a growing sense of obligation to society in the minds of many capitalists and employers. Even when they are not enlightened they must not be blamed personally for the impersonal system in which they have succeeded. The underdogs are no more moral for being underneath; if the tables were turned, they would probably behave at the top no better than those who are there now.

Individually the pillars of the old regime are often our choicest people—intelligent, industrious, generous, and idealistic. Many of them see the inevitability and desirability of a new era. Some of them are doing what they can to bring it about. If some of them are conservative, they are not all reactionary; and progress itself needs brakes. The new order must always be indebted to the old, even when breaking away from it. There is the relation between

them of parent and child. Universities and other institutions which encourage new ideas were founded and still are supported by men who represent the passing order. Their faith in education must be justified of its children.

Moral aspects of political problems.—Few would deny that a higher moral tone, a more vivid sense of social obligation, should be injected into our politics. Disclosures of corruption in the political life of our own country are of almost daily occurrence. Political servants to whom public welfare is intrusted—magistrates, policemen and even judges—are frequently the tools of powerful and more or less anti-social interests, or they stand hand-in-glove with gangsters and criminals. Jurors can be bribed, voters bought, and criminals protected for a price. It is easy to exaggerate the picture by the massing of lurid cases of men who have violated a public trust for material ends, whereas the majority of men in public life are doubtless honest and conscientious in the performance of their duties but a minority of rascals can lower the whole tone of public service and do much to undermine the efficiency of government.

The comfortable assumption is often made that the responsibility for such a state of affairs rests wholly with those who hold political office. Governments are considered abstractly as things apart from which are good or bad as officeholders choose to make them. Such an assumption is clearly an evasion by the citizen of his own moral responsibility. A government is merely representative of the people behind it—particularly of the people who have power. As long as powerful groups think in terms of national aggrandizement at the expense of other nations, and of their own private advantage with little or no consideration for the welfare of their fellow-citizens, political behavior and statesmanship will follow traditional grooves. In the midst of a growing contempt for politicians on the part of many citizens, it is not strange that able men with a sense of public duty will shrink from wallowing in the political mire. But it is clear that decent men who fear to soil their hands by engaging in political life are as much to blame for corruption there as are the politicians who have sullied the very name of politics. As Plato said, honest men are punished for refusing to engage in government through being governed by the burly sinners they despise.

The institution of the city-manager plan in some of our cities by conscientious citizens tired of municipal graft shows what can be done when public-spirited people assert themselves. Government

ought to be carried on by persons eminently suited for the task by natural gifts, thorough training, and a zeal for social justice. This ideal can be achieved only by education and by the determination of the educated to act according to their knowledge instead of uncritically falling in with tradition. The outward form of government is frequently secondary in importance to the intelligence and spirit of those who operate it. Some must have power in any system, and the abuse, or right use, of power depends on them. Those in positions of authority, however, cannot ignore public opinion, and public opinion depends upon the general level of intelligence and education.

It hardly needs to be said that honesty, intelligence, and devotion to public welfare are desirable and indispensable qualities in political officeholders if they are to be worthy of public trust. But other qualities are desirable too. In a rapidly changing world officeholders who are right-headed in the wrong direction are likely to be as dangerous as those who are wrong-headed in the right direction. Well-meaning men who have grown mentally rigid, who face backward and devote their powers to maintaining traditional policies that have lost their potency in meeting new emergencies and problems, are of questionable value in places of trust and power; they lack adaptability and the boldness of imagination necessary to meet new situations. Nevertheless, if such men reflect a public opinion supporting tradition and the *status quo*, it is likely that they will retain their seats of power. The answer to such a situation clearly brings us back to the moral responsibility of those citizens who are capable of thinking intelligently about public questions. They must support open-minded, able men for political office, and they must oppose reactionary tendencies. If they shirk this obligation—let well enough alone, accept the trend of the times, and hope for the best—there is no hope.

Intelligent public opinion, then, must be made to function effectively if democracy is not to abdicate as a political force. How to make public opinion effective is a difficult problem that still remains unsolved. There appears to be little hope in the public press so commonly devoted to, and influenced by, powerful interests. In the case of our own country, our forefathers placed great trust in education. Universal education was established in the United States for the express purpose of enabling the people to be intelligent about politics. Political democracy cannot function in any real sense

without democracy of education. However, providing the facilities for education does not insure that people will take advantage of them in the spirit that was intended. But the youth who attend our schools are not entirely to blame. By and large, our educational practices are not of a character to make pupils and students think. It must be admitted that our education needs overhauling in this respect, yet, in the final analysis, the responsibility for thoughtfulness rests with the individual. Too many in college, both among teachers and students, think about education in a purely academic way. Instead of reflecting the world of realities, the thought and activity of the schoolroom are not articulated with thought and activity outside. The educational machinery isolates the student. Even colleges and universities too often fail to impress him with the idea that his academic education should be thought of as the beginning of an educational process that ought to be continued throughout life. Few college graduates remain educationally alive by reading substantial books or even thoughtful periodicals. Yet, unless supposedly educated people keep themselves intelligent about what is going on in the world and aware of the changing needs of society, they are not likely to be sensitive to injustice, old or new, or to be eager for the right. Under such conditions there cannot be high ethical standards in political life or any kind of life. Thus, in a very real sense, to be indifferent to politics is to be immoral.

The problem of war.—As a moral issue the problem of war probably transcends all others in modern society. In the final analysis the World War was the result of men's having more physical power than social control; and as a result of the War there is profound discouragement and disillusionment concerning the future of human life. Naïve faith in providence, simple belief in progress, the easy optimism which says that everything will come out all right, no matter what we do about it, have been blasted by the War. Many people apparently do not care what happens to civilization. They utterly shirk responsibility for it. They occupy themselves with sports and amusements and their private affairs, and let the world go to ruin.

But some realize more than ever since the world conflict that if there is to be improvement in the human lot, those who care will have to do something about it. They recognize that since we are living in a world-community our former provincial attitudes must

ive way to internationalism. It is not only anachronistic but dangerously immoral to ignore the new order in which the good of one nation is involved in the welfare of all. One of the most hopeful things in our time is the growing moral feeling against war and the actors that lead to war. The notion that war is glorious and romantic is disappearing, though it is kept alive by trashy books and periodicals devoted to the exploiting of violence, by films of the same character, by bands, toy soldiers, and flag worship. Militarists themselves feel obliged to say that they hate war, but that since it is "inevitable" we must prepare for it.

Those who really care about peace cannot accept so hopeless a view, particularly when its chief exponents are the militarists whose business is war and the preparation for war. The militarists tell us that war is an inevitable accompaniment of human life, because it is "human nature" for men to fight when they believe that their interests are threatened; and that since we cannot change human nature men will continue to fight. Here again we are confronted by a false psychology. Perhaps we cannot change man's nature, but since it is plastic we can determine in large measure the pattern of human behavior—the form of expression which human nature may take. If our general outlook today is favorable to the continuance of war we must change our attitude. So long as we accept the militaristic point of view, we cannot help flaring up at the call to arms, and there is little hope for permanent peace. Moral indignation against war, treaties, and disarmament conferences will be ineffective unless we disarm our minds and hearts. This real disarmament does not seem out of the question when we realize how plastic man is—how he can educate himself in any direction he chooses, if only he will. It is the moral duty of everyone, in every land, who has the vision of an order in which the horrors of war shall be abolished to do what he can to help direct education toward the realization of this ideal. Habits and customs are indeed hard to change after they have become set; but they are not set in the young, and therein lies our hope.

Dueling was once assumed to be an expression of pugnacious "human nature." For some time dueling has been practically abolished in the Western world simply because it became too much of a nuisance. There was supposed to be an innate propensity to it, at least in gentlemen. Now gentlemen, who would feel foolish or criminal to go about town carrying a sword or a gun, do not see

any inconsistency in toting an armament about the world. To be sure, the abolition of dueling was accomplished by governmental authority, and there is at present no corresponding supernational authority, but such an over-arching authority is within the realm of possibility. For a long time to come there may be unruly nations, as there are obstreperous individuals, and there ought to be protection against them. There is a growing conviction that to disturb the peace by attacking a neighbor nation ought to be regarded as an unlawful act, to be dealt with by international authority and judged by an international court.¹

War as a method of deciding international disputes should look as absurd and obsolete as dueling. One great difference is that duelists risk only their own skins, while warring nations embroil innocent bystanders who cannot help themselves. It is very probable that another great war would directly involve even women and children. Pacifists often wonder whether they should refuse to fight in another war. But once the conflict has broken out perhaps it is futile for an individual to hold out against it. He cannot stop it then, and may only incur the animosity of his friends by hanging back. When the world has gone mad, of what value is sanity? If we are to stop war, we had better start before war begins.

The abolition of dueling compelled bellicose individuals to curb their impulses to destroy one another, but the abolition of war is infinitely more difficult, because it involves radically changing the idea of patriotism that has been inculcated in us for generations as an ideal so high as almost to be a religion. Yet we must modify an ideal of patriotism which means a hateful distrust of other nations. We must get rid of nationalism as the all-pervading, compelling force in determining the relations of one national society to another. In short, we must retreat from the extreme claims of state independence with its selfish and egoistic progeny—imperialism and excessive armaments. Whatever may have been the virtues of political nationalism in the past, it is reasonably clear that in a world now organized as interdependent parts of a great community, political nationalism in its extreme form is an outworn species of provincialism. As such it is the most stubborn obstacle to the working out of indispensable plans of world coöperation. Unless we can get rid of the nationalistic urge to fight other people as we got rid of the individualistic urge to fight duels the abolition of war looks like a hope-

¹Cf. pp. 590 f..

less task. Is the creation of international mindedness among peoples, in the solution of problems affecting seriously the welfare of humanity at large, a possible achievement?

National hatreds, as we know them, are not very old. They are not anywhere near old enough to be considered part of the unalterable frame of the universe. But they are getting older all the time. They can be opposed only by the spirit of youth. Yet enthusiasm is not enough. It would do little good for one nation to lay down its arms while surrounded by armed enemies. Ways and means of peace must be worked out, slowly and painfully, through both national and international channels. In the years since the World War more work for peace has been done than ever before. Already machinery has been established by which many international disagreements, which formerly might easily have led to war, have been arbitrated without recourse to arms.

In case of a dispute there has to be some form of settlement, whether before fighting or after. Fighting cannot take the place of arbitration or judicial settlement, and both sides in a dispute are in a better position to work out a solution when they are not exhausted by war. It may be objected that if you win you can dictate the terms of settlement. Yes, but can you enforce them? The irony of victory in the late War was that the victors were hardly better off than the vanquished. This situation of mutual exhaustion would probably be even more acute following another great war, which presumably would be still more disastrous to all concerned. The fact is that treaties imposed by force by a victor are never just treaties and cannot prove lasting. The only kind of treaty that stands any chance of contributing to peace is one formulated in a spirit of compromise—give and take.

A FINAL WORD

This brief discussion of some of the ethical questions of contemporary society could not solve any of them. The intention was rather to emphasize the pervasive character of ethical problems, to show that there is no aspect of human life in which they do not arise; and that when they become serious they constitute the supreme challenge to human wisdom and will power, because upon ethical decisions depend ultimately the weal and woe of the race. A man's moral responsibility is not limited to his immediate dealings

with other individuals. He cannot be a decent member of society and escape concern in questions of right and wrong that gravely affect the general welfare. Good citizenship must be understood to consist in responsibility for much more than is involved in the narrowly individualistic slogan of "minding one's own business."

In addition to indicating the nature of ethical problems and their seriousness, the present discussion has sought to show how the individual should face them: namely, by being sensitive and intelligent; and by being aware as far as possible of all the factors in a moral situation, including the conditions that led up to it, and the consequences that may flow from it. One must be intelligent to see what is involved, sensitive to feel the human importance of it, and intelligent again to see what may be done. Indifference and ignorance are the evils underlying the injustice and the confusion of values from which we suffer. The hope of a better day lies in developing a more intense love of the good and a more searching knowledge of ways to make that love effective. Only through increasing sympathy and understanding can we build a civilization embodying the vision that has always inspired the wisest and best of men.

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
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TOPICS AND QUESTIONS FOR CLASS DISCUSSION



TOPICS AND QUESTIONS FOR CLASS DISCUSSION

CHAPTER I

MAN AND SOCIETY

1. Explain as fully as you can the significance of the statement that 'man is a social animal.' 2. Why speak of the matter of one's adjustment to his social environment as a "problem"? Why is it a difficult and an important problem to the individual? 3. When may the individual be said to have brought about a satisfactory adjustment to his social environment? Under what conditions might his adjustment be spoken of as not satisfactory? 4. Can you justify a study of man and human society of the past as an aid in the intelligent understanding and interpretation of contemporary man and his society? 5. Explain the statement that society changes faster than institutions. Give a few illustrations of the fact from history or from your observation of contemporary American society. 6. What are social problems? Indicate some of the chief obstacles to our approaching their solution objectively. 7. In what sense does James Harvey Robinson think we may follow a scientific approach in the study of any worthwhile subject?

CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNINGS OF LIFE AND ITS EVOLUTION

1. In what sense is the earth an insignificant part of the cosmos, and in what sense is it the most significant part of all? 2. Indicate the criteria by which the scientist differentiates between living and dead matter (organic and inorganic). 3. What is known of the beginnings of life upon the earth? 4. Indicate the changing character of living things as they developed through the geologic eras and ages. What generalized conclusions can you draw from the known facts? 5. What was the prescientific explanation of the numerous species existing on the earth? 6. How does organic evolution explain these species? 7. Make a list of the different kinds of evidence supporting organic evolution, and explain the significance of each item of evidence. 8. Make a clear distinction between organic evolution as an accepted belief and the various theories of evolution that have been advanced by such men as Lamarck, Darwin, and others. 9. What was Lamarck's idea of the way in which

different species originated? 10. In general terms, what was Darwin's theory? What were the observed facts upon which he based his conclusions? Indicate, step by step, how he interpreted these facts in arriving at the formulation of his theory. 11. To what extent and in what way does the mutations theory of de Vries invalidate Darwin's theory? 12. Explain the significance of August Weismann's experiments and conclusions with reference to Lamarck's ideas. 13. Why does the scientist regard organic evolution as one of the great scientific discoveries of our time? Mention some of the ways in which its implications have been misconstrued. 14. The development of society or of civilization is sometimes spoken of as an "evolution." Point out the falsity of such an analogy. 15. Is evolution a "dead issue"?

CHAPTER III

THE BEGINNINGS OF MAN AND HIS EVOLUTION

1. Present the important points of evidence supporting the evolution of man. Indicate the significance of each of these points as an item of evidence. 2. With reference to the fossil remains of man: (a) explain what is meant by "fossil remains"; (b) name and describe the important discoveries; (c) arrange them in the probable order of their appearance in the evolution of man and indicate the progressive approach to the characteristics of historic man. 3. Do the races of man represent varieties or species of mankind? Explain your conclusion. 4. How do you account for the numerous classifications of men that have been presented? 5. What is meant by biological characteristics as a basis for the determination of race? What characteristics does Kroeber consider as a basis? 6. Criticise the following: "the French race," "the Anglo-Saxon race," "the Jewish race," "the American race." 7. Be prepared to name the races and their subdivisions as presented by Kroeber, and indicate their distinguishing characteristics. Point out roughly the geographical distribution of the races and their subdivisions. 8. With the passing of time why do the so-called races become increasingly less "pure"? What is likely to become of racial differentiation in the distant future? 9. Is the future likely to bring forth a "superman"? Is mankind "progressing"?

CHAPTER IV

MAN AND HIS CULTURE

1. What, in general terms, is the distinction between human culture and human society, and what is the relation of one to the other? 2. De-

fine the term "culture." How do you account for the numerous cultures that man has developed? 3. Why is culture universal in the development of mankind, and why do we speak of it as unique? 4. Despite the variations among cultures, in what sense may we speak of a universal culture pattern? What inferences are to be drawn from the existence of a universal pattern? 5. What are culture biases and what is their relation to the wide variations in human cultures? Give some examples of culture biases that have come to your attention. What culture biases are you conscious of in yourself? Do culture biases ever become obstacles to progress in the ordering of inter-group relationships? Illustrate your conclusions by giving examples. What are some of the factors that tend to preserve this sort of provincialism in a person? 6. Why are cultures never completely static? 7. Enumerate the important factors in culture changes. Picture the circumstances under which you would expect a given culture to change most. 8. What is the nature of culture conflicts that frequently arise as a result of rapid changes in cultures? Illustrate by specific reference to the state of society today. 9. Does the discussion in this chapter throw any light on the reasons for the backwardness or retardation of the native cultures in such places as Africa and Australia?

CHAPTER V

BIOLOGICAL FACTORS IN CULTURE

1. Define "biological factors." 2. Explain why man is the only animal capable of building a culture: the importance of mental characteristics, the importance of physical characteristics, the importance of his plasticity and capacity to learn. In relation to the last point explain the relative importance in culture of what is "innate" and what is "learned." 3. In the light of the facts involved in the preceding topic, be prepared to make a summary statement of the importance of biological factors in culture to the present point of the discussion. 4. Explain the position of the Racial Determinists as to the importance of race as a factor in culture. Indicate the chief objections to their conclusions in the light of present knowledge. If race is not an important factor in culture how would you explain the different degrees of advancement among the various cultures on the globe? 5. Why are accepted *beliefs* concerning racial superiorities or inferiorities of serious importance in society? Illustrate your conclusions by giving facts that have come to your notice touching the situation in the United States. 6. In general terms, state what two opposing opinions exist in the United States concerning the "proper spheres" of men and of women. How would you explain the conflicting opinions? In the light of facts, which side appears to be right?

7. How far do biological factors explain criminal or other tendencies not approved by society in individuals? 8. Explain the relative importance of biological and cultural influences in the maintaining of class distinctions in society. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the belief in "class superiority"? Do we have "classes" in our American democracy? If so, what appears to be the basis of class distinctions?

CHAPTER VI

GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN CULTURE

1. Distinguish between geographic and biological factors, giving examples of each. 2. In what sense is man absolutely dependent on his geographic environment? 3. Explain as fully as you can the statement that "with few exceptions, the influence of physical environment is relative, not absolute." 4. What did geographic environment have to do with the development of the advanced cultures of the Near East and the direction in which they spread over the globe? 5. Indicate some of the ways in which geographic influences may affect: (a) the economic aspects of culture; (b) the political. Give some clear examples not mentioned in the text. 6. Indicate and explain the relationship between physical environment and religious practices in the early cultures. Can you mention any survivals of those remote influences in modern religious beliefs? 7. Give some examples not mentioned in the text of the influence of geographic environment upon the interrelations of peoples. 8. Is there any relation between geographic influences and fashions, conventions, and moods or temperament? In the case of the last two do you think the effect is individual or general in a community? 9. Justify in some detail the statement that "man's climb can be described as a progress from a position of victim to that of master in relation to the world of natural forces about him." How do you account for the triumph of "mind over matter" in this sense during recent times? Cite some cases or situations that indicate how incomplete man's "mastery" still is.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL FACTORS IN CULTURE

1. A pioneer community where timber is close at hand builds log houses, let us say. Would you call the log house, as an item in their culture, a product of geographic, biological, or social factors; or a product

of all three? 2. Explain what is meant by social factors as distinct from the others. 3. What is the author attempting to explain by means of his imaginary picture of a man entering a strange city, after isolation? Enumerate and briefly explain the social factors brought to bear on the newcomer. 4. What is meant by "the social heritage," and what is its general importance in the development of culture? Suppose an American infant of superior parentage were reared in an isolated community in Central Africa. In general, what would be the character of the product after twenty years? Explain your conclusion. 5. Is the existence of an "inferior" culture definite evidence of the biological inferiority of the people who built it? Explain. 6. Analyze patriotism as a product of social factors. 7. Why are many Americans prone to judge European culture in terms of telephones, labor-saving devices in the home, automobiles, physical cleanliness, and the like? 8. Explain the part which social factors play in the field of social control. 9. What would be the general effect on a given culture if social factors remained absolutely unchanged? 10. Give some examples of the modification or extinction of traditional ideas and attitudes in the course of the development of American culture. 11. Can you give examples of the persistence of any American traditions which are perhaps blocking progress in certain directions? 12. What evidence can you give of the increasing importance of social factors in culture? Are economic depressions in any way indicative of the importance of social factors?

CHAPTER VIII

PREHISTORIC CULTURES

1. Indicate the nature of the evidence upon which our knowledge of prehistoric cultures is based. What are some of the limitations imposed upon our knowledge by the nature of the available material? 2. List the divisions and subdivisions of prehistory, and indicate the approximate period covered by each. (See Chart IV.) 3. What are "eoliths" and what is their possible significance? 4. Indicate the evidence of advance along certain lines of cultural development during the Paleolithic period. In your opinion, what cultural changes were most significant as an indication of man's advance during the Paleolithic period? 5. On the basis of cultural advances, justify the division of the Upper Paleolithic into the Aurignacian, Solutrean, and Magdalenian. 6. Indicate roughly where man stood at the close of the Paleolithic period by a comparison between his culture and ours. 7. What is known of the racial types represented by Paleolithic man? 8. What period of time was covered by the Neolithic Age? Point out the specific cultural changes which mark the

advance of Neolithic over Paleolithic man. 9. Who were the Neolithic men and what was the geographic extent of their culture?

CHAPTER IX

THE TRANSITION TO HISTORIC CULTURES

1. Contrast the chronology of the prehistoric with that of the historic period. What does the comparison suggest to your mind? 2. What is meant by a transitional period? Mention the important inventions or other innovations which were factors in the transition from prehistoric to historic times. 3. Why is it impossible to fix a date to mark the transition from Neolithic to historic cultures? 4. What are the specific points of significance which give preëminence to the invention of writing as a factor in the change from the prehistoric to the historic period? Indicate the high points in the development of the use of writing. In what regions did the use develop first? 5. Paint an imaginary picture of what would result if modern society suddenly lost its calendar. 6. Mention some important ways in which the development of the use of bronze and iron aided man in the conquest of nature. 7. What can you say of the geographical spread of the use of metals? 8. Indicate the significance of better methods of transportation in cultural advance. 9. Why give a place to the potter's wheel? 10. Why is the appearance of town and city life in early history a sign of cultural progress? 11. Does our culture owe anything to the prehistoric period? Specify.

CHAPTER X

ANCIENT CULTURES OF THE NEAR EAST

1. What are the geographic and the chronological boundaries involved in this study of the ancient Near East? 2. Justify the statement that the social inheritance of modern civilization has drawn upon the Near East, the Greek, the Roman, and the medieval cultures. 3. Indicate definitely wherein geographic factors help to explain why Neolithic cultures first gave way to more advanced cultures in the Near East. 4. Indicate geographic influences upon migratory and military movements in the history of the Near East. 5. Who were the chief peoples of the period? Can you correlate races with the development of the separate Near-Eastern cultures? Explain. Why would you expect diversity rather than uniformity of culture in this region? 6. Indicate in some detail the influence of geographic factors in the political development of Egypt and Mesopotamia. Point out how social factors entered in. 7. How

Do you explain the interrelation of political, economic, and religious elements in Near-Eastern civilizations? Are there such interrelations in modern civilizations? Did the development of absolute monarchy have any historical significance outside the Near East? 8. Taking a general view of the Near East, how would you describe the political conditions and the political history of the region? 9. Characterize the religious life of the Near East. Did geographic factors have any influence upon religious beliefs and practices? Do you discover any relationship between religion and economic needs? Do you discover any religious and moral conceptions that have survived to the present? 10. Characterize the intellectual life of Egypt. Has modern civilization benefited in any way by its contributions? Explain. 11. What contributions did Babylonian intellectual achievements make to modern culture? 12. Explain in detail the various channels by which Near-Eastern cultures influenced later civilizations. 13. What would you list as the most important contributions of the Near East to modern civilization?

CHAPTER XI

ANCIENT GREEK CULTURE

1. What was the character of the Aegean culture, and what is its relation to Greek civilization? 2. Indicate the geographic extent of Greek culture. 3. Explain the effects of geography on Greek civilization. 4. What were the chief racial stocks of Greek lands? Would you explain the contrasting characteristics in Greek political life and art on the basis of racial mixture, or on the social inheritance of the peoples concerned? 5. How did the Near-Eastern cultures affect the Greek? 6. Discuss the political life of the Greeks: (a) the nature of the city-state; (b) the evolution from aristocratic to democratic control, indicating the forces and social interests contributing to the change. 7. Explain in some detail the reasons for the corruption and decline of political democracy among the Greeks. Does the subject have any interest or significance for modern democracy? 8. What was the reaction of the great philosophers to political conditions, as revealed in their political writings? 9. How do you account for the lack of political unity in the Greek world, and what evils resulted from it? Why did the attempts to effect unity fail? 10. Explain as fully as you can the statement that the Greeks "were preëminently thinkers and artists." 11. Indicate the particulars in which the Greek culture shows a great advance over the culture of the Stone Age man. 12. Summarize the contributions which the Greeks made to the modern world. 13. What, in your opinion, are the most important or striking differences between American and Greek civilization?

CHAPTER XII

ANCIENT ROMAN CULTURE

1. Indicate the character of the beginnings and of the expansion of Rome. What were the limits of the Empire at its height? 2. Explain how geographic features influenced Roman civilization and history. 3. What were the chief racial stocks represented in the Roman population, and how did the term "Roman" come to have a progressively broader application during Roman history? 4. What were the various channels through which the Greek and oriental cultures came to exert an influence upon Roman civilization? 5. Contrast the character of the Romans with that of the Greeks and show how the differences were reflected in the civilizations and history of the two peoples. The English have sometimes been likened to the Romans in some of their characteristics. Do you discover any resemblances? 6. Discuss as fully as you can the statement: The political history of Rome is the history of a "city-state which grew into an Empire of city-states." 7. What features of Roman procedure or policy, in your opinion, account for the success of the Romans as empire builders? Do the British exhibit any of these features in their imperial methods? 8. Indicate the conditions under which the city-state government of Rome became corrupt and incompetent and gave way to absolute monarchy and finally to a despotism. 9. Point out the important steps in the development of Roman law from its beginning as local custom to its crystallization in the Justinian code. Indicate the importance of Roman law and show by what channels it passed to modern civilization. 10. Discuss the development of religious beliefs and practices among the Romans, indicating the effects of the widening circle of contacts with other cultures as the Empire expanded. What were the conditions under which Christianity secured a foothold among the Romans? Why did Rome persecute Christians? Why was the faith finally accepted as the state religion of Rome? 11. Compare the Romans with the Greeks: (a) as builders; (b) in art; (c) in philosophy and science; (d) in literature. 12. Justify the statement that the Roman civilization that came down finally to the modern world was compounded of Roman, Greek, and oriental cultures. What were the chief channels of the descent?

CHAPTER XIII

THE CULTURE OF THE MIDDLE AGES

1. In what sense are the Middle Ages to be regarded as a transition between ancient and modern cultures? 2. Tell what you know of the

"barbarians" who overran the Roman Empire. 3. What was the effect of the invasions on Roman civilization: (a) in Italy; (b) in Spain; (c) in France? 4. What was the influence of Roman culture on the Germans north of the Rhine-Danube frontier and in the British Isles? 5. Justify the statement that the medieval Church was the greatest single civilizing force of the time, indicating the various ways in which it preserved elements of the ancient cultures and otherwise promoted the advance of society. 6. Are modern Christian churches in any way carriers of civilization? 7. What is meant by the Byzantine civilization, and in what ways did it contribute to medieval culture? 8. Indicate the contributions of Arabic civilization to the Middle Ages and later civilization. 9. Point out and explain briefly the characteristics of medieval culture that distinguish it from modern civilization. 10. In what sense did the medieval spirit promote and in what sense retard the intellectual activity of the period? How do the last centuries of the Middle Ages foreshadow the Renaissance? 11. How do you explain the disposition of medieval society to lean upon the Church and accept its teachings and guidance? 12. Indicate the characteristic features of medieval (a) architecture and art, (b) literature, (c) science, (d) education. 13. What examples can you cite of medieval influences in modern culture?

CHAPTER XIV

THE TRANSITION TO MODERN CULTURE

1. What centuries fall within the period of the Renaissance? Why do we characterize it as a transition to modern times? 2. Describe the conditions in Italy which help to explain why the Renaissance began there. 3. Characterize the intellectual spirit of the Renaissance, contrasting it, point by point, with the typical medieval spirit. Does the intellectual spirit of the Renaissance also characterize our own time? 4. How does the Renaissance spirit find expression in the architecture of the period? Point out some examples of a Renaissance style in your own vicinity. 5. How do painting and sculpture reflect the new spirit? Name some of the foremost artists of the period. 6. What changes came over literature as a result of the new spirit? Do Renaissance characteristics, broadly speaking, continue in modern literature? 7. Contrast educational aims and ideals during the Renaissance with those of the Middle Ages. 8. How is the new spirit expressed in science? Why emphasize the importance of the beginnings of modern science? What were some of the notable scientific discoveries? Contrast the methods of procedure in the Renaissance and in the Middle Ages. What great names do you associate with the establishment of the essentials of the

“scientific method”? What was the ultimate effect of the new scientific knowledge upon medieval attitudes? 9. How did the new spirit find expression in “political thought”? Why call Machiavelli the prophet of the modern age in the field of politics? 10. Explain the effect of the Renaissance on medieval religion, indicating the conditions and influences which led to the Protestant Revolt. Indicate the significance of the Protestant Revolt in relation to its immediate and its later effects. 11. Viewed broadly as a movement, did the Renaissance end in the sixteenth century? Be prepared to defend your conclusions.

CHAPTER XV

MODERN CULTURE

1. Name the three periods in the development of modern culture, and explain the bases of the division. 2. Compare modern culture under the Old Order with the civilization of the Middle Ages: (a) in its economic phases; (b) in its political phases; (c) in its religious phases; (d) in its intellectual phases. 3. Looked at in perspective, what impresses you most as characteristic of the Old Order? 4. What was the Age of Revolution as described in this chapter and what is its historical significance? 5. Formulate in writing a statement of about two hundred words indicating the fundamental reasons why society rose in revolt against the Old Order. 6. With relation to the philosophy of revolt in the eighteenth century, explain the meaning and significance: (a) of the progress of science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; (b) of the theory of natural rights; (c) of the theory of the social contract; (d) of the right of revolution. 7. Explain the American Declaration of Independence as a justification for the revolt against England. 8. Why are the 1870's chosen as marking the beginning of the Bourgeois Era? What is meant by the term “bourgeois,” and why is it used to characterize the period after 1870? 9. Characterize the period in the following aspects: (a) social; (b) political; (c) economic; (d) religious. 10. Explain how the Industrial Revolution tended to divide modern society into two groups: (a) the capitalistic class and those associated or allied with it; (b) the proletariat. 11. What is the relation of this division: (a) to the humanitarian movement; (b) to trade unionism; (c) to socialism. 12. Point out the specific points of conflict between socialism and capitalism or individualism. Why is this conflict of major importance in modern civilization? 13. Account for the rising importance of science during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and point out its effect: (a) upon our economic and social life; (b) upon modern thought and religion. 14. Show how the characteristic trends of modern literature from the seventeenth to the

ventieth century reflect the changing moods and interests of civilization as it developed during the period. 15. Describe the ways in which modern Western culture is being carried over the world. What is the cultural significance of the movement?

CHAPTER XVI

THE NATURE OF INSTITUTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION

1. Explain the circumstances under which institutions probably came into existence in early society. 2. Why should you expect institutions to be human, social, permanent, stable, and usually rooted in the past? Take the school as a typical institution and show that it exhibits or contains "the minimum components" set forth in the text. Would a college debating society be an institution? Justify your conclusion by applying the tests suggested. 4. Why do institutions change with the passing of time, and under what conditions may the necessity of rapid change be brought about? If they do not change under such conditions what is the probable result? Does this line of reasoning square with the facts observed in our study of the Age of Revolution, in the preceding chapter? 5. What is meant by the classification of institution on the basis of function? 6. Name the basic institutions of modern society and indicate the chief function of each. Show that institutions overlap their functions. 7. Justify, in some detail, a study of the historical development of institutions as a means toward the understanding of existing institutions. 8. What are social problems, and how is their existence related to institutional life? Point out some contemporary problems that appear to be primarily caused by maladjustments of institutions to society.

CHAPTER XVII

THE BASIC FORMS OF ECONOMIC LIFE

1. What is the major function of economic institutions? Name as many economic institutions as you can, and show how each is related to this major function. 2. Explain what is meant by an "economy" as used in the caption, "Types of Economy." Mention the important types of economy that have been developed during the life of man. 3. What are the disadvantages of the "collectional economy," from our point of view? Why would you associate this type with a "low" culture people? Does such an economy exist among contemporary communities? 4. Wherein does a "nomadic economy" represent a more advanced economic development than a "collectional economy"? By way of

speculation, where would you place each of these two types during the progress of the Stone Age? 5. Explain fully what is meant by the term "producer's capital," and indicate why it marks an economic advance. 6. Indicate the characteristics or attributes which distinguish the settled "village economy." In what cultures already studied did this type of economy exist? How does its development show an advance over the other two types thus far examined? 7. Why would you associate a "town economy" with a more advanced culture than that attending the types of economy already discussed? In which cultures or civilizations already studied did a town economy exist? What changes in the character of society are indicated by the development of a town economy? 8. With the establishment of the national monarchies by the sixteenth century, the earlier local economies were gradually broken down and replaced by "national economies." Why was this economic change an inevitable accompaniment of the political change? What do you understand by a "national economy"? 9. What were the circumstances under which the "national economy" was replaced by a "world economy"? What is a "world economy"? Mention some facts of our present life, not mentioned in the text, which are evidence of our living under a world economy. Can you, on the other hand, cite any facts to indicate that the theory of the self-contained nation, that is, of national economy, is not yet abandoned goal? 10. How does the passage of peoples through these various types of economy indicate an economic integration of peoples?

CHAPTER XVIII

MEDIEVAL ECONOMY

1. What striking contrast do you observe between the general economic situation which prevailed in the Roman world and the existing situation in the modern world—as the situation in each case was affected by political conditions? 2. Present the evidence indicating the relatively greater importance of agriculture in the Middle Ages than in the present age. 3. Compare a medieval village or manor with an agricultural village of the present day, touching the following particulars: (a) the place occupied by each as a means of supporting the community; (b) the physical features of the village, particularly with respect to the laying out of the land, and land tenure; (c) the social status of the occupier or tiller of the land; (d) the methods of cultivation, the aims, the results. 4. What type of economy does the medieval manor represent, and why? 5. What are the advantages of such an economic organization as the manor, and its disadvantages from our point of view? 6. What was the status of industry before the rise of the towns? 7. Compare industry

under the guilds with modern industry, touching the following features: (a) the extent of the market; (b) the methods of manufacture, the organization of the workers, and the amount of output; (c) the nature and purpose of the guild as compared with the nature and purpose of the modern trade-union. 8. What were the disadvantages of the guild system of production from the modern point of view? 9. Why is it logical to conclude that commerce was slight before the rise of towns? And why is it logical to conclude that commerce would increase with the rise of towns? 10. Compare commerce in the later Middle Ages with modern commerce, dealing with the following particulars: (a) the geographical distribution of major areas; (b) the extent of the market; (c) the instruments or methods of control and regulation, and the general nature of commercial policy. 11. How did the commerce of a town on the Rhine differ from that of one like Venice? 12. What evidence supports the conclusion that the commerce with the Orient was highly regarded and much sought after? 13. Why was commerce at a disadvantage under the local control of the towns?

CHAPTER XIX

THE DECAY OF MEDIEVAL ECONOMY

1. Describe in a general way the character of the transition from medieval to modern economy. How do you account for the halting and irregular nature of the change over Europe? What position does the Industrial Revolution occupy in the transition? 2. Under what general conditions do social practices or institutions become outworn? 3. Apply the conclusions you reached in the preceding question to the situation of the manorial system in England in the fourteenth and fifteen centuries. Be prepared to explain how each important factor operated to bring about the change in England. 4. Describe the character of the agricultural arrangements that took the place of the manorial system in certain parts of England. 5. In what sense was the change inevitable? In what sense harmful? 6. Indicate and describe the conditions in England which made the guild system obsolete. Describe the character of the industrial system that took its place. 7. What was the Commercial Revolution of the sixteenth century? What were the chief factors in the change? Point out the significance of the revolution by contrasting, point by point, the character of commerce before and after the change. 8. How did the change affect the position of the bourgeois class? What was the significance of the change? 9. Give a detailed explanation of the doctrine called "mercantilism" and indicate its effect upon the policy of the national monarchies. 10. What changes in finance and business organization accompanied the Commercial Revolution? 11. Looked at in his-

torical perspective why may the Commercial Revolution be regarded as an important landmark in history? 12. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, English economy was still "medieval" in several respects. In a written statement of about two hundred words, indicate changes still necessary to make English economy "modern" in the nineteenth century sense.

CHAPTER XX

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MODERN ECONOMY

1. Indicate the general importance of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in marking the end of "medieval" economy in England and the establishment of "modern" economy. 2. What part did the transformation in English agriculture play in bringing about the change referred to in the preceding question? 3. Define the Industrial Revolution: (a) in terms of mechanical changes; (b) in terms of economic and other social changes. 4. What forces and circumstances combined to produce the Industrial Revolution? 5. Indicate the part played by the Industrial Revolution in the transition to modern economy, touching the following features: (a) the undermining of mercantilism and the establishment of laissez-faire; (b) the passing of handicraft production and the establishment of machine or factory production; (c) the transformation in international commerce (designated as a second commercial revolution), the creation of a world economy, and the revival of imperialism. 6. Modern industry is characterized as capitalistic, large scale, individualistic, and competitive. Indicate the significance of each of these terms as applied to modern industry. 7. How has machine industry enriched the economic life of modern society? 8. Discuss world economy, touching the following points: (a) evidence of the economic interdependence of nations—some illustrations of interdependence not given in the text; (b) ways in which machine industry contributed to bring about a world economy; (c) the contributions of science and mechanical inventions; (d) some of the effects of imperialism that contribute to world economy. 9. What is the chief obstacle at present to the harmonious working of a world economy? 10. What is meant by economic nationalism?

CHAPTER XXI

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

1. What factors have contributed to make the economic development of the United States radically different from that of Europe? 2. List the factors, geographic and social, which account for the rapid economic

advance in the United States. Discuss each factor and explain its contribution. 3. Discuss the development of agriculture before the Civil War: (a) in the Northwest; (b) in the South and Southwest. By reference to geographic and social influences, account for the contrasts between "a" and "b." 4. Discuss the development of industry down to the Civil War: (a) in the North; (b) in the South. Show how geographic and social influences contributed to produce the contrasts between "a" and "b." 5. Explain the bearing of those contrasts upon the forces which led to the Civil War. 6. How did the War itself affect the development of Northern industry, and what bearing did that development have upon the outcome of the War? 7. In what particulars did American agriculture undergo a transformation after the Civil War? Account for those changes. Indicate the nature of the agrarian problems which developed during the period. Why have the farmers' problems become acute during the period since the World War? 8. Point out the salient features in our economic advance since the Civil War as revealed (a) in industrial progress; (b) in expansion of capital; (c) in changes in the character of foreign trade. Explain the significance of these changes with respect to our present position as a "world" Power. 9. In general terms, measure American achievement (a) in the *production* of wealth; (b) in the *distribution* of the wealth produced. 10. Is the situation indicated by a comparison between "a" and "b" in question 9 likely to have any effect upon the attitude of our federal and state governments toward our economic questions and governments' policies in dealing with them? Explain your conclusions.

CHAPTER XXII

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

1. Why have economic and social problems multiplied so rapidly since the Industrial Revolution? 2. It has been said that man's close contact with machinery is making man into a machine. How true is this statement? 3. Why is unemployment to be regarded as one of the most serious problems of the last half century? Explain in some detail the statement that it arises out of the inherent character of capitalistic economy. 4. Just how has trade-unionism effected a greater degree of security to the workers. Why do trade-unions oppose the "open shop," and employers usually favor it? 5. Explain what is meant by "industrial democracy," and why its advocates think that it would improve the position of the workers? How far has the plan been tried? 6. Why speak of the "business cycle" as a phenomenon inseparable from the existing industrial order? Economic depressions have been described as cases of "industrial indigestion." In what sense is the term applicable? 7. In

general terms, how do you account for the fact that despite the great increase of national earnings produced under capitalism, the tendency has been toward the concentration of earnings in the hands of a few? Do you think that this concentration was a factor in bringing on the economic depression of 1929-1933? Explain. What is implied in the term, the "problem of poverty"? How are collectivism and social legislation related to the problem of poverty? 8. Why has the general prosperity of agriculture tended downward during the last decade or so? Does your answer to this question explain why fundamentally the agrarian problem is difficult to solve? 9. Enumerate the causes of the reaction against the individualist system. Explain in some detail the basis for the socialists' belief that capitalistic economy is fundamentally harmful to society. Why do they think socialism would improve the condition of society? In your opinion what suppositions of the socialist are open to doubt? 10. What is meant by "economic planning"? How do you account for its wide discussion during the depression starting in 1929? How does economic planning present a dilemma to the supporters of capitalism? 11. How do you explain the statement that the complexity of our modern economic system has led to greater insecurity in economic life than that which prevailed in preindustrial centuries? 12. Discuss as fully as you can the following statement: "All economic problems come down to the consideration: How much can we produce and how adequately is the production distributed?"

CHAPTER XXIII

MODERN IMPERIALISM

1. Explain the fundamental interests and conditions out of which imperialism arises. Give some examples from history by way of illustration.
2. Indicate the conditions and forces that led to the "old imperialism." How is the doctrine of mercantilism related to the old colonial movement? Indicate the historical importance of the movement.
3. Explain in detail the factors involved in the reaction against mercantilism and imperialism in the eighteenth century. In what sense was the new individualist goal an idealistic conception?
4. Why did the business classes on the Continent turn their backs upon the individualist economic doctrines and return to imperialism after 1870?
5. Why did the bourgeois governments support the business interests in their ambitions?
6. Does American economic history explain why the modern type of imperialism did not become a matter of interest to the United States until the close of the nineteenth century? Enumerate some episodes in our recent history that reflect American imperialist interests.
7. How is political nationalism involved in modern imperialism? In what sense is

imperialism a perversion of nationalism? 8. Indicate some of the typical methods by which imperialist countries have obtained possession of territory and power in backward countries. 9. How has the imperialist obtained native labor to exploit the natural resources of backward countries? 10. Write a list of what you regard as the benefits and the evils of modern imperialism both in relation to the imperialist nations and in relation to the native communities involved. 11. Indicate the extent to which the chief arguments in favor of imperialism stand the test of facts. 12. Point out the relationships of imperialism: (a) to protective tariffs; (b) to political alliances; (c) to armaments and war. 13. Explain how imperialism tends to the development of forces among exploited peoples which promise ultimately to put an end to imperialism in its present form.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: THE STATE

1. Elaborate and justify the statement that the political function "is essentially an adjustment function." 2. Indicate the wide variety of political activities involved in the performing of the "adjustment function." 3. What is the theory of the divine origin of political institutions, and to what historical periods do you assign it? Distinguish it from the theory of "divine right." 4. Explain the "compact theory" of the origin of political institutions, and show where it stands in relation to the theory of divine origins. Indicate the significance of the compact theory in political history. 5. What is the "force theory"? 6. What is the present position of political scientists on the question of origins? 7. Discuss the nature of the state, touching the following features: (a) the relation of the state to other political institutions; (b) the essential attributes which enter into the making of a state; (c) the distinction between "legal" and "political" sovereignty. 8. Explain how the conception of the sovereignty of states tends to create anarchy in international or interstate relations. Name some proposed ways out of this situation. 9. Distinguish between the "state" and the "nation." Name some states that are not nations, and some nations that are not states. 10. What is the "pluralistic theory" of the state, and how have its advocates attempted to justify their conception? 11. How are states sometimes classified on the basis of forms of government? Be prepared to classify states you have already studied and modern states, on this basis. 12. Does history justify the generalization that the trend of political development has been from autocracy, the liberty of one man, to democracy, the liberty of all men? 13. Discuss the character and functions of law, touching the

following: (a) the two great systems of law and the distinction between them; (b) the relation between law and custom. What is the function of law: Does it enhance or curtail liberty?

CHAPTER XXV

THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

1. What is meant by "the conflict between authority and liberty," and just how and why does such a conflict arise between the state and the individual? 2. Was this issue more or less conspicuous in the Middle Ages than in recent modern times? Explain your conclusion. 3. Apply the same question to the period of the Renaissance. 4. Explain how philosophers attempted to establish a permanent defense of individual liberty by the theory of "natural rights." What evidence have you that the theory was taken seriously in the latter part of the eighteenth century? Why does it not hold the same position now? 5. Expound the idea that individual rights are not "natural" or inherent, but "founded in law." In keeping with this conception how have communities sought to establish "guaranteed" individual rights? What are the usual "civil rights" so guaranteed? In practice, does the individual enjoy absolutely guaranteed individual rights—say in the United States? 6. Distinguish between "moral" and "legal" rights. 7. Why can there be no legal right of revolution? 8. In what sense would the individual enjoy the maximum of rights under anarchism? How do the philosophical anarchists attempt to justify an anarchistic society, and the practicability of their ideas? 9. Compare the beliefs of the individualist with those of the anarchist. What was the situation out of which the modern anarchistic and individualistic theories grew? 10. Compare "socialism" with "collectivism." What was the situation out of which these theories grew in late modern times? 11. What are the distinguishing characteristics of "communism"? 12. Explain the statement that most contemporary governments steer a kind of middle course between individualism and socialistic or collectivistic ideas. Judging by present trends, which of these two opposing conceptions is likely to receive greater emphasis in the future? 13. Distinguish between essential and optional functions of the state.

CHAPTER XXVI

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE MIDDLE AGES

1. In what ways did the ancient civilizations, particularly Roman, influence the political life and institutions of medieval times? Are any

of them apparent in the cultures of today? 2. Describe general political conditions in Western Europe after the "fall" of Rome. 3. As you view the whole medieval period, enumerate the types of political organization that successively or concurrently dominated medieval society. 4. What were the distinguishing characteristics of the Byzantine state? In theory, what was the scope of the authority of the Byzantine emperors? 5. Explain how the Carolingian Empire came into existence. Describe the general features of Charlemagne's government and show how it functioned. 6. In what sense was the Holy Roman Empire a continuation of Charlemagne's empire? Was the Holy Roman Empire truly a state? Justify your conclusion. 7. Present specific evidence that the medieval Church was a political as well as a religious institution. Explain how it came to acquire political power. 8. Why did the political claims of the Church later come into conflict with the claims of the national monarchies? How did the Protestant Reformation affect the political powers of the Church? 9. In what sense does the feudal age contrast politically with the preceding period? How does the development of feudalism illustrate how political institutions change to meet new conditions? Describe the essential features of feudalism as a form of government. What was the relation of feudalism to the manorial system? What were the weaknesses of feudalism as a form of government? Were the so-called feudal states states in the strict sense of the term? 10. Contrast the city-state of Florence, in its political aspects, with any large American city. Why call the former a state, and not the latter? What was the trend in the form of government in the city-states? 11. Explain in some detail how cultural nationalism developed in Europe. How does political nationalism differ from cultural nationalism? Why does cultural nationalism tend to produce political nationalism? 12. Enumerate and briefly explain the forces that created the national states during the later Middle Ages. Considering the way in which the national monarchies came into existence, why was absolutism the logical form for governments to take?

CHAPTER XXVII

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN MODERN SOCIETY

1. In general terms explain the difference between government as it existed under the absolute monarchies and popular government. To which part of the modern period does each of these forms belong? 2. Discuss the character of absolute government, touching the following points: (a) the nature of the royal powers, in specific terms; (b) the theory upon which absolutism was based or justified; (c) its advantage from the point of view of the ruler; (d) its disadvantages from the point of view

of the governed. 3. Briefly explain how parliamentary government developed in England, and indicate the importance of the achievement to England and to the world at large. 4. Discuss the theoretical basis of popular government: (a) the doctrine of natural rights; (b) the social-contract theory; (c) recent conceptions. Explain what is meant by the statement that these theories were not so much the causes of the overthrow of the old system as a justification for doing what it was to the interest of the unprivileged classes to do. 5. What part did revolution play in the overthrow of absolutism? 6. With the development of popular government, written constitutions become an essential element. How do you explain this fact. Why have written constitutions become the rule in recent years, and why, with the passage of time, do constitutions tend to become like the British constitution? 7. Why is "direct democracy" going out of use? 8. Show how the organization of popular governments varies as between "presidential" and "cabinet" governments. Indicate and contrast the manner in which the two forms operate in practice. What are the advantages of each? The disadvantages? 9. Indicate the difference of governmental organization between "federal" governments and "unitary" governments. Has one any advantage over the other? 10. How do you account for the reaction against popular government since the World War? What is the character of modern dictatorships, and what do their advocates claim the advantages of dictatorships to be? Is this form of government likely to increase in favor in the near future? 11. The parliamentary type of government developed in England has spread widely over Europe, but in no two countries are the governments just alike. How do you account for the variations?

CHAPTER XXVIII

POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

1. What specific evidence can you present to indicate that the contemporary world is confronted by numerous political problems? Mention some of the important political problems in the United States. 2. How does the question of the functions of government have any bearing upon problems of government? 3. If we could all be transformed into anarchists over night in the United States, what changes should we make in our government, both constructive and destructive in character? In what sense does anarchism present a distant goal or ideal? 4. How far would an orthodox individualist go along with the anarchist? Where would he part company with him? 5. If the people of the United States became socialists, what major changes would they make in government? 6. Assuming an intelligent knowledge of communistic Russia, how do you

account for the widespread dislike of the Russian experiment? 7. Why is impossible for the political scientist to conclude that any one of the prevailing conceptions of government is "best"? 8. Why do people find it necessary to be steadily engaged in "remodeling" their governments? What are the difficulties of remodeling? Can you give any examples of the practice of using "labels" or "slogans" to defeat legislation in our own country? 10. How much validity has the slogan, "Keep government out of business"? Why do American business men frequently raise this issue to defeat certain kinds of legislation? Look up the history of the United States Parcel Post in this connection. 11. What considerations would determine whether or not a government should assume new functions? 12. Indicate the particulars in which popular government is failing to give satisfaction. What factors enter into the problem of making democracy work? 13. Discuss the proposals that have been made to improve the functioning of democratic government. 14. Can you give any speculative answer as to the circumstances under which democratic government in the United States might give way to some form of fascist control? 15. With respect to the organization of governmental machinery: (a) Does a bicameral legislature have any disadvantages? (b) Are there any serious objections to territorial representation?—What are the alternatives and what—if any—advantages are they supposed to possess? (c) What difficulties sometimes arise in American government by reason of our adherence to the theory of "separation of powers"? 16. Discuss as fully as you can the statement that "the government should have powers and rights commensurate with its responsibility and obligations." 17. How do you explain the present-day tendency to place an increasing number of social problems upon government for solution? 18. Can you cite any clear cases of the violations of civil liberties that have occurred in the United States in recent years? How do you account for a rather general indifference to such cases, on the part of the American people? Do you think it is a matter of any serious importance that civil liberties be upheld?

CHAPTER XXIX

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Did the Greeks have any interstate problems? How did they attempt to solve them, and with what success? 2. What was the character of interstate and intercommunity problems during the Roman period? How did Rome finally solve the problem of peace in Europe? 3. What was the character of the attempt to introduce order among peoples during the Middle Ages? How successful was it? 4. Explain why 1648 is chosen as the date of the real beginning of the modern state system and of in-

ternational relations. 5. Give an account of the early development of modern international law—its beginnings, sources, character, and expansion. Why is not international law as effective in maintaining order among nations as civil law is among individuals? 6. How was the field in which international law operated limited in the early period? Mention some of the steps and influences under which its application has been extended. 7. Mention and explain some of the important consequences that have followed the extension of the field of international law. 8. Indicate the various ways in which the force of political nationalism has created international problems. 9. How did the Peace Conference of 1918-19 attempt to solve some of these problems? 10. What evidence can you give indicating that minority groups still constitute an international problem in Europe? 11. How has modern imperialism created additional international problems? 12. What justification can you give for describing the international world as "an international anarchy"? 13. Describe the situations and conceptions which led to the building of powerful national armaments. Are competitive armaments a cause or result of war? 14. Discuss the important steps in the attempt to introduce order into the international anarchy: (a) the "balance-of-power" conception, and its limitations; (b) the "concert-of-Europe" idea; (c) the "concert" idea as applied to public law. 15. Explain how the resort to permanent alliances in Europe after 1870 weakened the effectiveness of the "concert" idea and contributed to the catastrophe of 1914. 16. If you look back over the history of international relations in modern times, what, in your opinion, have been the chief obstacles to the introduction of orderly processes in the dealings of one nation with another? 17. Russia and Prussia, disagreeing over the location of a boundary, find it impossible to agree amicably. What procedure would probably have been taken to settle the dispute in 1820? In 1885? In 1925?

CHAPTER XXX

INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND INSTITUTIONS

1. What is the doctrine of state independence, and how do you account for the great emphasis laid upon it by states? In what sense is this doctrine a major factor in international problems? 2. How did conditions following the Industrial Revolution make the need more pressing for inventing means of settling international disputes? 3. How did the extension of international law and the multiplying of treaties contribute to the meeting of this need? 4. How has the establishment of diplomatic and consular offices contributed to meet the need? 5. What are international conferences, and in what specific ways have they contributed

ward the solution of international problems? 6. In the field of international administrative problems, describe the International Postal Union as an example of what has been accomplished. Name some other administrative problems that have been solved by similar agencies. Name some of the specific features of the Hague conferences that make them stand out in the development of machinery for settling international problems. 8. How did the World War demonstrate the weaknesses of pre-war facilities for settling international disputes? 9. Enumerate the outstanding marks of progress toward international order exhibited in the organization of the League of Nations and its powers. How does the League Secretariat function as an important organ of the League? 10. What is the Permanent Court of International Justice? 11. Describe each of the three processes which may now be resorted to for the settlement of international disputes: (a) judicial settlement; (b) arbitration; (c) conciliation. 12. Under what circumstances may all of these break down in a given international dispute? In such cases how may world opinion become an efficacious force? 13. Explain why labor problems may take on international significance. 14. What was "The International," organized by the socialist and trade union groups, and what sense was it a forerunner of the International Labor Office? 15. Describe the general structure of the International Labor Organization and show how it functions for the solution of international labor problems. 16. Can you justify the conclusion that the League with its related institutions marks a conspicuous achievement in the direction of world order? 17. Do you discover any evidence to support the conclusion that "If the League were destroyed world society would feel the necessity for constructing another League"?

CHAPTER XXXI

THE NATURE OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS

1. Distinguish between marriage and the family as institutions. Explain the term "natural family" as applied to certain animals, and on the basis of your explanation indicate how the human family may be differentiated from that of the animals. 3. Define the family by indicating what it is and what it is not. 4. What were the circumstances out of which the family institution grew? 5. Indicate the different forms of family organization and define each. 6. What have been the functions of the family in the course of history? Which of these would you regard as fundamental? Which of them are performed by the average American family of today? Account for the difference. 7. Name and define the different forms of marriage as an institution. 8. What factors are re-

sponsible for these variations, according to earlier students of the subject? What is the objection to their explanations? 9. What have been the functions of marriage as an institution in the course of its history? Which of these functions does it still perform? Can marriage as an institution be justified today on the basis of the importance of these functions? 10. How do you explain the numerous prohibitions as to who may and who may not marry? Do such prohibitions tend to increase or decrease with the advance of civilization?

CHAPTER XXXII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS

1. Why should the student of contemporary domestic institutions concern himself with the early history of marriage and the family? 2. Indicate the characteristic features which distinguish early Hebrew domestic institutions. How far can you explain their characteristics in terms of then existing social needs? Can you discover any Jewish features in our own domestic institutions? If so, how did they get there? 3. Contrast the character of ancient Greek domestic practices with our own. 4. Explain the influences that liberalized Roman domestic institutions. Indicate the changes that took place. Was their general effect good or bad? 5. How did early Christianity affect Roman domestic institutions? Is the present age sympathetic to the early Christian conception of marriage and the family? 6. Explain the origin of "common-law" marriage. 7. How did chivalry affect medieval domestic life? Do you think that the romantic conception of chivalry still affects moderns? 8. Describe the effects of the Renaissance. 9. How does the influence of the Reformation still show itself in modern practices? 10. Indicate, point by point, some of the influences of English ideas upon colonial domestic practices. 11. Account for the characteristic differences in domestic practices as found in the three American areas: (a) the northern colonies; (b) the southern colonies; (c) the western frontier. 12. Can you justify the statement that the Industrial Revolution has been the most important single force in changing earlier domestic practices? What has been the effect of individualism?

CHAPTER XXXIII

DOMESTIC PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

1. In what ways do modern domestic institutions illustrate the statement that "many social problems result from the lack of institutional adaptation to changing needs"? 2. Indicate and explain the chief

ints of evidence in support of the argument that the family is disintegrating and may disappear. 3. In your opinion, is this conclusion sound? 4. What is the traditional conception of the ideal marriage union? 5. Discuss the evidence supporting the conclusion that the ideal now requires modification. 6. Discuss the evidence opposed to such a conclusion. 7. Is "companionate marriage" an acceptable solution of some important marriage problems? Indicate the evidence for and against. What does the author mean when he says that the companionate is a new name for an old practice? 8. Indicate the possibilities and the limitations of education as an aid in the solution of domestic problems. 9. What contribution might we expect legislation to make toward a solution in the United States? How does our form of government interfere with accomplishment in this direction? 10. Look up some of the legislation passed by the present Russian government. Does this legislation mark an advance in any particulars over our traditional conceptions? Does it involve any socially undesirable consequences?

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION

1. Out of what vital social needs did education grow: (a) among primitive peoples; (b) among peoples of the more advanced cultures? 2. Define the essential functions of education as conceived in modern times, in Western society. 3. Analyze your high-school education and state what appear to have been its chief purposes. 4. Discuss education among the Greeks: (a) Greek theories of the social function of secondary and higher education; (b) the character of the Greek curriculum; (c) relation of Greek views on education to the present. 5. Contrast the Roman life and character with the Greek, and indicate how the differences were reflected in Roman education. What was the Roman conception of the educated man? In your opinion does modern American education approach nearer to the Greek or to the Roman ideal of education? 6. Discuss medieval education: (a) the attitude of the early Christian leaders to the study of classical literature; (b) the conception of liberal education in the Middle Ages; (c) the character of education in the universities in the final period of the Middle Ages. 7. Discuss the influences that have shaped the character of modern education: (a) the Renaissance; (b) democracy; (c) the Industrial Revolution; (d) political nationalism. 8. How do you account for the reluctance of the scholastics to admit humanism to a place in the universities, and, in turn, for the opposition of the humanists to admitting the natural sciences? What advantages and what disadvantages, would you say, are to be found in the conserva-

tism that usually characterizes the attitude of university faculties toward new fields of study? 9. Do you think that there is any truth in the statement of some that natural science dominates our colleges and universities now as religion dominated the universities in the Middle Ages? What differences do you see in the two situations? 10. What argument is presented in support of the American principle of nonsectarian education in our public schools? Why is there opposition to the introduction of nonsectarian teaching of religion? 11. What are some of the characteristic features of contemporary education in Europe? Can you account for those characteristics on the basis of historical background? 12. How do you account for the great changes that have come over education from period to period throughout history?

CHAPTER XXXV

CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN EDUCATION

1. Why would you expect American educational institutions and practices to differ rather widely from those of Europe? 2. Show how the historical setting in America produced the idea of universal education. 3. Distinguish between "mass education" and "education for the masses." 4. How and why has mass education affected: (a) educational standards; (b) administrative machinery; (c) preparation of teachers; (d) organization of educational stages? 5. How would you summarize the gains and losses of American education in a general comparison with European? 6. Does history offer any explanation as to why we have laid more stress on utility than on culture in our education? In your opinion, is our course justifiable? State your reasons. 7. X has had a thorough cultural education; Y has had first-class training as an engineer. The two men constitute a committee to plan the capital city of a new country. How might the difference of training be expected to show in the work of the committee? 8. In the light of the relation of educational institutions to the society that created them, what should be the rôle of government in its conduct toward the schools? 9. If it is true that American education lacks vitality as judged by the needs of society, what are the chief obstacles to the inauguration of needed changes or reforms? How far does your observation and experience lend support to the conclusions of the author in regard to existing obstacles to effective education? 10. Is there a problem of academic freedom in our universities as well as in secondary schools? What instances have come to your notice? 11. In an industrial community which is free from labor troubles, a labor agitator is brought by the university there to give public lectures dealing with labor problems. Complaints are made. Should he

have been invited? Should he be allowed to speak? Should he have special police protection if necessary? Justify your conclusions. 12. On the basis of your experience as pupil and student, what, in your opinion, is the outstanding merit of American education? What important changes, if any, do you think should be brought about? Why?

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

1. We have described man's culture as a kind of by-product of his perpetual seeking after the satisfaction of his wants and desires. What evidence can you give of the limitations of human power in the achievement of these ends? Is religion in any way related to this fact of human limitations? 2. How may we account for the wide variety of religious beliefs of history? 3. Study the definitions of religion given in the text. Do you find any common characteristics running through them all? What characteristics? 4. If man is constantly striving for something better," how are man's science and religion related to achievement in this direction? How does man come by his science and religion? Why do the ways in which religious belief is understood result in many religions? 5. Why may we speak of religion as a means of preserving and transmitting cultures? 6. Explain in some detail what the author means by the statement that "religion cannot, without perversion and degeneracy, be made to serve the state or society." 7. Enumerate the ways in which religion has contributed to civilization. 8. Discuss primitive religions, touching the following: (a) limitation of our knowledge of religions in the prehistoric period; (b) the beginnings of religion as an outgrowth of the nature of man; (c) the character of animism as a religious belief; (d) of totemism; (e) of fetishes and taboos. 9. What is the difference between animism and polytheism as religious conceptions? How did the change probably come about from animism to polytheism in the course of the development of culture? 10. What is mythology? 11. How does polytheism reveal a developing conception of order and justice in human relations? 12. The author speaks of the religions preceding Buddhism in his discussion as religions appropriate to the needs of "natural man," and of Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, etc., as "higher religions," looking beyond the wants of the "natural man" to the satisfaction of the higher yearnings of man to remake himself and find "the peace that passeth understanding." Explain his meaning. 13. What are the characteristics of Buddhism, and how does it reflect desires beyond those of the "natural man"? 14. Apply the same questions to Zoroastrianism, to Judaism, to the Greek Mysteries.

CHAPTER XXXVII

CHRISTIANITY BEFORE MODERN TIMES

1. What was the belief concerning the coming of a Messiah, and how are the beginnings of Christianity related to that belief? 2. If our sources of knowledge of Jesus are to be found only in the New Testament, should the student interpret those writings as revelations or as human documents? What is the objection to such interpretations of these documents as are found in the works of Strauss and Renan? 3. In a statement of about three hundred words summarize the essential points in the teachings of Jesus. In what fundamental ways do these teachings deviate from the beliefs embodied in Animism and Polytheism as explained in the previous chapter? 4. Account for the rapid spread of the new religion. Can you justify the author's conclusion that "the crucial factor in the spread of Christianity) was their [the Christians'] faith that Jesus was indeed the Christ"? 5. What was the attitude of the Christian leaders toward the beliefs of the earlier pagan religions, as reflected in St. Augustine's *On Christian Doctrine*? 6. Differentiate between "religion" and "theology." Be prepared to state the essential points in Christian belief as set forth by St. Paul. Do you find anything in Paul's teaching that might serve as a basis of later opposition to Roman Catholic belief touching the way of salvation? 7. What are the sacraments, and what part do they play in the salvation of the individual, according to medieval Christian belief? 8. During the development of Christian theology, medieval scholarship sought to harmonize Christian belief with world thought. Explain this statement. Where does St. Thomas Aquinas stand in this movement? 9. Discuss the development of the organization of the Church, touching the following features: (a) character of organization in the beginning; (b) attitude of the Roman government toward Christianity; (c) effect of the adoption of Christianity as the State religion of Rome upon the organization of the Church; (d) the importance of the establishment of the papacy. 10. Explain in some detail the author's statement that Christianity has never been, without departing from its true character, a gospel of social welfare or social reform as these phrases are understood today. Is this view commonly held today?

CHAPTER XXXVIII

CHRISTIANITY IN MODERN SOCIETY

1. Explain the Christian attitude toward life, by interpreting the passage from St. Augustine at the opening of the chapter. 2. Why, in the

course of its history, was it impossible to maintain the Christian ideal or attitude toward life? 3. What evidence can you give that individuals and groups of individuals were conscious of the failure of the Church and of Christians to maintain the Christian ideal? What does the author mean when he says that heretical movements during the Middle Ages had been instruments of growth? 4. How were the ideas of John Wyclif dangerous to the position of the medieval Church? Why did the Church burn John Hus at the stake? 5. Explain how the selling of indulgences led to Luther's opposition to the Church and precipitated the Protestant Reformation. 6. The author states that Protestant theology took its ideas from St. Paul and St. Augustine. Refer to what is said of their ideas in the preceding chapter and explain how those ideas could be used against the Roman Catholic position. 7. By way of summary state some of the essentials wherein Catholicism and Protestantism were in agreement and some particulars in which they were opposed to each other. 8. What were some of the unexpected immediate results or by-products of the Protestant Reformation? 9. Explain how the revolt precipitated the issue of religious toleration in a new form. What were some of the influences that led ultimately to the establishment of religious toleration, as far as the law is concerned, in the Western world? Is religious liberty identical with religious toleration? 10. How was "natural reason" used to support Protestantism? 11. Explain how the development of natural science was utilized increasingly to prove the "unreasonableness" of Christian theology. What does the author mean when he says that "rationalism" has not overthrown Christianity? 12. Discuss contemporary movements in religion: (a) the characteristic features of the modernist movement; (b) characteristic features of the fundamentalist movement. 13. Why speak of the need of a reconstitution of religion for the future?

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS

1. What are ethical standards? Under what circumstances do they cease to be a mere matter of individual conscience and become a matter of community concern? Is there any relation between law and ethical standards? 2. Discuss the statement, "Ethical problems do not arise except when we are in doubt as to how to act or judge." 3. How has social psychology altered our attitude toward the self and selfishness? Has this new conception any bearing upon our conception of ethical standards? 4. Describe the character of ethical standards among primitive peoples. How are they related to what are regarded as the vital social needs of the group? How have primitive conceptions carried over into later and mod-

ern society? 5. Wherein do conceptions of morality among the ancient Hebrews mark an advance over the primitive? 6. Indicate the characteristics which distinguish Greek conceptions of morality. 7. In your opinion, what Greek principle would offer a valuable guide to American society? Why? 8. How does later Greek ethical philosophy reflect changes that had come over the fortunes of the Greek world? 9. How did the later Greek philosophy affect Roman conceptions? 10. Why and how did the rise of Christianity have a vitalizing effect upon ethical philosophy? 11. What are the distinguishing characteristics of medieval conceptions of morality? 12. Why and how did the Renaissance produce a reaction to medieval conceptions and standards? 13. How do the ethical principles of John Stuart Mill contrast with those of Kant? Can you discover any relation between Mill's conceptions and the great changes in thought which accompanied the French Revolution and the revolution in industry? 14. What are the characteristics which distinguish the ethical philosophy of John Dewey? 15. Can you justify an attempt to judge behavior on the basis of absolute standards? 16. From the ethical point of view, how do you think Kant would regard suicide? How would Mill? 17. In approximately 200 words indicate your conclusions touching the following problem: Suppose that in a certain country the youth are taught that might is right; that justice is a device to protect the weak from the strong; that property is an institution by which the weak get together in groups to protect themselves from the strong. What might be expected, in time, to occur in that country's relations with its neighbors? What would likely be its internal history?

CHAPTER XL

ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

1. How do you explain the confusion in contemporary society in regard to ethical standards? 2. Indicate the historical sources of our moral standards. Why are these traditional standards inadequate at the present time? Explain what is meant by the statement that moral standards are a matter of place and time. Give some instances illustrative of this fact. 3. How does intelligence become a major factor in deciding between right and wrong? 4. Has the development of modern science demoralized life? Point out the diverse influences of science on ethical standards and formulate a conclusion as to its general effect. 5. In what sense are questions of sex morality a matter of public concern? Under what circumstances, according to some, are they purely personal matters to be settled by the individuals concerned? 6. Explain as fully as you can the author's conclusion that the individual assumes a serious responsibility

when he ignores customary moral standards. 7. What evidence has come to your notice that crystallized "professionalism" sometimes establishes an unethical code harmful to the public? 8. The question is being seriously discussed of taking the matter of health out of the hands of private practitioners and placing it under the state. In your opinion, what would be the advantages and disadvantages of such a change? 9. What specific instances of unethical methods in the business world have come to your notice? Has the doctrine of laissez-faire in business encouraged unethical practices? 10. To what extent has government attempted to eliminate unethical practices in economic activity? 11. How would you explain the moral weaknesses of American political life? What are some of the chief obstacles in the way of "political housecleaning"? 12. Explain the statement that the "World War was the result of man's having more physical power than social control." 13. Why is war a great ethical problem? 14. What has been the effect of the World War on the attitude of peoples toward war? Do you think it affected the attitude of all peoples in the Western world in the same way—the people of Poland, for example, and those in the United States? 15. What is the basis of the common contention that man is incurably a fighting animal and that therefore war is unavoidable?



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
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
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